Writings of Leon Trotsky [1932]
WRITINGS OF
LEON TROTSKY
[1932]
Writings of Leon Trotsky is a collection, in twelve volumes, of pamphlets, articles, letters, and interviews written during Trotsky’s third and final exile (1929-1940). They include many articles translated into English for the first time. They do not include the books and pamphlets from this period that are permanently in print, nor most of the unpublished material in the Trotsky Archives at Harvard University Library.
WRITINGS OF LEON TROTSKY [1932]

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This volume is dedicated to
EVELYN REED and GEORGE NOVACK

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Exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929, Leon Trotsky spent the next four and a half years in Turkey, except for a month in 1932 when he went to Copenhagen to make a speech. The present volume deals with his writings during the fourth year of his stay in Turkey, including the Copenhagen month (November-December), or, to be more precise, all of 1932 except its last half-month.

It was a year of acute ferment and instability. The Soviet Union had not yet recovered from the severe economic dislocations resulting from the bureaucratic collectivization of agriculture, and its workers carried the full brunt of the sacrifices demanded by accelerated industrialization; political dissent was brutally repressed. Trotsky's analysis of these developments—in "The Soviet Economy in Danger" and "The Expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev"—remains superior to that made by anyone else at that time. His own victimization in February, when the Kremlin deprived him of his Soviet citizenship, was answered in a stinging "Open Letter to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR," in which he called on the members of that body to carry out Lenin's last appeal and remove Stalin from the Soviet leadership.

In the major capitalist countries, staggering under the highest level of unemployment in history, political shifts reflected the radicalization of the masses and the polarization of society. In May, parliamentary elections in France led to the replacement of a conservative government by a liberal one; in November, a similar result was obtained when Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president of the United States. In Austria, on the other hand, a right-wing coalition took over in May, and in Germany three different chancellors tried to rule as the Nazis
gained strength at the ballot box and prepared for their take-over of the German government, which came early in 1933. Trotsky's major writings of 1932 on the German crisis are collected in *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany* (Pathfinder Press, 1971), but important aspects of his views are represented here in such essays as "I See War with Germany," written around a year before the Nazi victory.

In the Far East the Japanese militarists, who had invaded Northeast China in September 1931, consolidated their position in Manchuria and established the puppet state of "Manchukuo"; the League of Nations, sponsor of numerous disarmament and peace conferences, did not take long to reveal its total impotence. Trotsky discussed these events and their relation to world politics in his answers to journalists. In addition, he turned his attention to the Chinese Communist Party's latest activities in letters to his Chinese comrades entitled "Peasant War in China and the Proletariat" and "For a Strategy of Action, Not Speculation."

During the first half of the year Trotsky was busy finishing his monumental *History of the Russian Revolution*, but in the midst of that task, as well as after, his interests remained very broad. He wrote also about disarmament, pacifism, and the ultraleftism then being practiced by the Comintern, answers to falsifications about the history of the Marxist movement, on "proletarian literature," the perspectives of American Marxism, the revolutionary future of the oppressed colored races, morality and the family in the Soviet Union, problems of representation at a coming international conference of the Left Opposition, and a radio speech to the United States from Copenhagen (his first speech in English). Included here are interviews by the Associated Press, United Press, the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Daily News*, journalists and students in Denmark, a German journal, and his French translator. Letters printed here went to Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Switzerland, the USA, and the USSR.

Trotsky's major aim in 1932 remained the building of the International Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists). The reader should bear in mind throughout this volume that while Trotsky regarded the policies of the Stalinized Communist International as criminally wrong, his strategy was not to replace the Comintern by the ILO but to "reform" it—to regenerate it along Leninist lines and revive it as a force capable of leading the world revolution. It was not until the middle of 1933, after
Stalinist theory and practice had helped Hitler seize power in Germany, that the Left Opposition renounced its "reform" policy and set out to build the Fourth International (see *Writings 1932-33*).

Almost half of the selections in this volume are translated into English for the first time or have appeared in English previously only in internal bulletins with restricted circulation; two of them, originally published incomplete, are in print here without deletions for the first time, thanks to the Harvard College Library. Several of the articles here were signed by pen names or were unsigned when first published. Leaving aside those that were written during the trip to Denmark and back, all the articles in this volume were written at Prinkipo, except for those before the end of January, which were written at Kadikoy. Translations originally done in the 1930s have been revised to correct obvious errors and achieve uniformity in spelling of names, punctuation, etc. Acknowledgments about the articles and translations, and explanatory material about the persons and events mentioned in them, will be found in the section entitled "Notes and Acknowledgments." "Other Writings of 1932" lists the books, pamphlets, and articles from that period which are not included in this volume because they are in print and available elsewhere.

The comprehensiveness of this volume could not have been achieved without the help of Louis Sinclair's *Leon Trotsky: A Bibliography* (Hoover Institution Press, 1972), which will be essential reading for all serious students of Trotsky's work.

The Editors
April 1972
January 1 — The last year of the first "five-year" plan begins in the Soviet Union and the capitalist world enters probably the worst year of the Great Depression.

January 4 — In a secret letter to the Soviet Political Bureau Trotsky warns that it will be held responsible for acts of repression that Stalin is preparing against the Left Opposition.


January 30-February 4 — The Seventeenth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party is held in Moscow.

February 2 — A world disarmament conference sponsored by the League of Nations opens in Geneva.

February 18 — The Japanese imperialists set up a puppet regime in the Manchurian territory seized from China.

February 20 — Trotsky's Soviet citizenship is revoked by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.

March 1 — Trotsky answers the Central Executive Committee.

March-April — Hindenburg falls just short of a majority in the German presidential election on March 13, even though he is supported by the Social Democrats. In the April 10 runoff election, he is reelected with 53 percent of the vote, while Hitler gets 36 percent and Thaelmann of the Communist Party gets 10 percent.

April 30 — The League of Nations calls on Japan to withdraw from Shanghai in the near future.

May 1 and 8 — Parties of the French left gain around a hundred seats in parliamentary elections; a month later Herriot of the Radical Socialists becomes premier, replacing the right-winger Tardieu.
May 20—Dollfuss is chosen chancellor of Austria by a right-wing coalition led by the Christian Social Party.

May 30-June 1—Bruening, who has been ruling as German chancellor without a parliamentary majority, is removed by Hindenburg and replaced by Papen, who also lacks a majority in the Reichstag.

June 13—Trotsky writes on the role of the colored races and a Stalinist-pacifist congress against war soon to be held in Amsterdam. He also finishes *The History of the Russian Revolution* in June.

June 28—Trotsky writes "Hands Off Rosa Luxemburg!"

July 20—Papen uses a presidential decree to dismiss the Social Democratic government of Prussia and to take over political and police control of that key state.

July 31—in the German Reichstag elections the Nazis get 37 percent of the vote, becoming the largest party in the parliament for the first time.

August 27-29—A congress against war is held in Amsterdam, solidly controlled by the Stalinists. The Left Oppositionists are unable to even get a vote on their proposals.

August 27-September 15—The Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International is held in Moscow.

September 14—Trotsky completes another pamphlet on the German crisis, *The Only Road*.

October 9—Zinoviev and Kamenev are again expelled from the Soviet Communist Party.

November 6—Another Reichstag election is held, in which the Nazis lose two million votes but remain the largest party. Thirteen days later Papen and his cabinet resign.

November 8—Franklin D. Roosevelt is elected to his first term as president of the U.S.

November 14—Trotsky leaves Turkey to give a speech in Copenhagen.

December 2—Hindenburg appoints General Schleicher as chancellor less than two months before he appoints Hitler.

December 11—Trotsky returns to Turkey.
Leon Trotsky and Natalia Sedova on a train in Europe returning from Denmark to Turkey, December 1932.
THE "UPRISING"
OF NOVEMBER 7, 1927

January 2, 1932

In the campaign now being conducted with increased vigor against the Left Opposition, a considerable place is devoted to the question of the uprising of November 7, 1927. In his "historical" article, Stalin places this "uprising" in the foremost position as the main evidence in support of his policy of repression against the Bolshevik-Leninists.

When the best revolutionaries are subjected to the most frightful injuries and acts of violence at the isolation camp in the Upper Urals; when they are forced to resort to hunger strikes to defend their most elementary human rights; when they are shot at without warning; when Rakovsky and hundreds of others crowd the places of deportation; when the veritable flower of the party is smashed, incarcerated, and destroyed; when Stalin had Butov hounded to death and Blumkin shot by Yagoda—all this is explained not by the fact that the Left Opposition did not accept the theory of socialism in one country, that it did not agree to the bloc with Chiang Kai-shek, and that it rejects today capitulation before Hitler! No! The bloody repressions are explained by the fact that the Left Opposition is supposed to have made an attempt at an armed uprising four years ago. All the publications of the various sections of the Comintern have once more reminded their unfortunate, systematically deceived readers of it.

What really happened on November 7, 1927? The Opposition, of course, also participated in the demonstration of the tenth anniversary. Its representatives marched together with their shops, factories, schools, and Soviet offices. Many Opposition groups carried their banners in the general parade.
It was with these banners that they had left the shops and offices. What sort of counterrevolutionary banners were they? Let us recall them once more:

1. "Carry out the testament of Lenin!"
2. "Direct the fire toward the right—against Nepman, kulak [rich peasant], and bureaucrat!"
3. "For genuine workers' democracy!"
4. "Against opportunism, against a split—for the unity of the Leninist party!"
5. "For a Leninist Central Committee!"

Factory workers, government employees, Red Army soldiers, and students walked alongside of the Left Oppositionists who were carrying their banners. There were no clashes. 

Not a single worker in his right mind could interpret these banners as banners directed against the Soviet power and the party. Only after several individual factories had joined the general current of the demonstration did the GPU send out special detachments with instructions from the Stalinist secretariat to assault the demonstrators, who were carrying their banners peacefully. After that, several clashes took place, consisting entirely of attacks by the GPU detachments, who tore their banners away and beat them up. A special group of Red Army commanders broke down the doors of Smilga's quarters and forced their way in—on the balcony were hanging the banners of the Opposition and portraits of Lenin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev. This, then, was the uprising of November 7, 1927.

The slogans—"For workers' democracy!," "Against Nepman, kulak, and bureaucrat!," "For the unity of the party!"—were considered counterrevolutionary, naturally not by the working masses, but by the Stalinist apparatus. Nevertheless, at that time not one of the apparatus people dared as yet to speak of an armed uprising. Such an invention would have seemed altogether too shameless and insolent in the eyes of the participants in the demonstration. When, more than a year after Trotsky had been exiled by Stalin, the GPU accused him of preparing an armed uprising, it was not with regard to the demonstration of November 7 but to something quite new, which the GPU however could not specify. After the exiling of Trotsky, the accusation was not repeated by anybody. Stalin did not dare to introduce it into the press. The very idea went up like smoke and disappeared.

Only when the facts began to fade from memory did the Stalin school of falsification begin to spread the legend of
the attempted uprising of November 7. The fact that this legend has, to a certain degree, become the central point of the campaign is politically significant. It proves that the real actions of the Bolshevik-Leninists do not appear to be "crimes" in the eyes of the masses of workers and party members. Stalin is really complaining that despite the eight-year-long campaign, Trotskyism is still regarded as a Communist tendency inside of the party! For his policy of repression, Stalin needs some point of support that lies outside of the genuine activity of the Left Opposition. This point of support he tries to find in the police myth of the uprising of November 7, 1927. Even if we had no other indication, this fact alone would suffice for us to say: The personal dictatorship of Stalin and his plebiscitary regime are in a bad way, in a very bad way!
A LETTER TO THE POLITBURO

January 4, 1932

ABSOLUTELY SECRET

To the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (B)  
To the Presidium of the Central Control Commission

History has again arrived at one of its great turning points. In Germany the fate of the German proletariat, of the Comintern, and of the USSR is being determined. The policies of the Comintern are steering the German revolution toward destruction just as inevitably as they did the Chinese revolution, although this time it is being done from the opposite direction. Everything it was necessary to say in this regard, I have said elsewhere. There is no point repeating it here. Perhaps two or three months—and that in the very best of cases—remain in which to reverse a ruinous policy, the responsibility for which lies completely with Stalin.

I do not speak of the Central Committee because it has in effect been dismissed. The Soviet papers, including those of the party, speak of "Stalin's leadership," "Stalin's six conditions," "Stalin's forecasts," and "Stalin's general line," ignoring the Central Committee altogether. The party of the dictatorship has been brought to such a state of degradation that the ignorance, organic opportunism, and lack of loyalty of a single individual can leave their mark on great historical events. Having blundered hopelessly in China, England, Germany, in every country of the world, and first of all in the USSR, Stalin, struggling for the salvation of his inflated personal prestige, supports a policy in Germany that automatically will lead to disaster on a scale as yet unknown in history.

In order not to create difficulties for Stalin, the "party" press, reduced to slave status, remains generally silent about Germany. Instead it talks a great deal about "Trotskyism." Entire pages are again filled up with "Trotskyism." The problem is to make people believe that "Trotskyism" is a "counterrevolutionary" tendency, the "vanguard of the world bourgeoisie." Under this sign the Seventeenth Party Conference has been called. It is quite clear that this crude "agitation" is not meant to pursue any ideological goals, but rather to promote very
definite, practical—or more precisely, personal—aims. A concise formulation of these would be stated as follows: the time has come for the Turkulization of policy toward representatives of the Left Opposition.

Through the official Communist press in the West, Stalin has allowed revelations to be made concerning the schemes and designs of a White Guard terrorist organization, hiding these facts all the while from the workers of the USSR. Stalin's aim in having these revelations published abroad is quite clear: to provide himself with an alibi in his joint labors with General Turkul. The names of Gorky and Litvinov were added in all likelihood for purposes of camouflage.

The question of terrorist reprisals against the author of this letter was posed by Stalin long before Turkul: in 1924-25 at an intimate gathering Stalin weighed the pro's and con's. The pro's were obvious and clear. The chief consideration against was that there were too many selfless young Trotskyists who might reply with counterterrorist actions.

There came the time that I was informed about this by Zinoviev and Kamenev, when they had come over to the Opposition; moreover, the circumstances were such and the details provided were such as to dispel any doubts whatsoever about the veracity of the report. Zinoviev and Kamenev, as I hope you have not forgotten, belonged jointly with Stalin to the ruling "triumvirate" which stood above the Central Committee: they were privy to things that were quite inaccessible to rank-and-file members of the Central Committee. If Stalin should now force Zinoviev and Kamenev to renounce their testimony of that time, no one will be taken in.

The question was dropped in 1925; as the present events show, it was merely held over for later consideration.

Stalin has come to the conclusion that it was a mistake to have exiled Trotsky from the Soviet Union. He had hoped, as is known from his statement in the Politburo at that time—which is on record—that Trotsky, deprived of a "secretariat," and without resources, would become a helpless victim of the worldwide bureaucratic slander campaign. This apparatus man miscalculated. Contrary to his expectations it turned out that ideas have a power of their own, even without an apparatus and without resources. The Comintern is a grandiose structure, that has been left a hollow shell both theoretically and politically. The future of revolutionary Marxism, which is to say of Leninism as well, is inseparably bound up from now on with the international cadres of the Left Opposition. No amount
of falsification can change that. The basic works of the Opposition have been, are being, or will be published in every language. Opposition cadres, as yet not very numerous but nonetheless indomitable, are to be found in every country. Stalin understands perfectly well what a grave danger the ideological irreconcilability and persistent growth of the International Left Opposition represent to him personally, to his fake "authority," to his Bonapartist\textsuperscript{25} almightiness.

It is Stalin's calculation that the mistake needs rectification. His plan runs along three channels: first, information obtained by the GPU is made public concerning a terrorist plot against Trotsky being prepared by General Turkul (under maximum favorable conditions, created for him by Stalin); second, an international "ideological" campaign is opened up which will surely culminate in a resolution by the party conference and one by the Comintern—such a resolution being necessary for Stalin as a kind of political mandate for collaboration with Turkul; third, through the services of the GPU Stalin singles out and purges with truly brute ferocity everything that is suspect, unreliable, or questionable, in order to assure himself against counterblows.

I of course have not been let in on the technical details of the undertaking—whether Turkul will try to attribute the work of his hands to Stalin or whether Stalin will hide behind Turkul. This I do not know, but some Yagoda, playing the role of middleman, with the undoubted assistance of the celebrated "Wrangel officer,"\textsuperscript{26} surely knows quite well.

Needless to say, Stalin's schemes and designs cannot affect the politics of the Left Opposition or mine individually, not in any way or from any angle. The political fate of Stalin, corrupter of the party, gravedigger of the Chinese revolution, destroyer of the Comintern, candidate for gravedigger of the German revolution, is foreordained. His political crash will be one of the most terrible in history. It is not a question of Stalin but of saving the Comintern, the proletarian dictatorship, the heritage of the October Revolution, of bringing the party of Lenin back to life. The majority of officeholding bureaucrats on whom Stalin bases himself both in the USSR and in all the Comintern sections will flee at the first roll of thunder. The Left Opposition will remain true to the banner of Marx\textsuperscript{27} and Lenin to the end!

The present document will be preserved in a limited but fully sufficient number of copies by reliable hands in several countries. Thus you have been notified in advance!
Dear Comrade:

I will try to express my views as briefly as possible on the questions raised by you. From the first, I had considered the disintegration of the Brandlerite faction absolutely inevitable. A revolutionary faction which has no ideology, no general conception of the world situation, no elaborated strategical principles, is doomed, as a tendency between communism and the Social Democracy, to a hand-to-mouth existence and cannot withstand the convulsions of the present epoch.

Brandler and Thalheimer, the "leaders" of the international right-wing opposition, called us "sectarians." Now, when we do have a certain number of cadres and slowly begin to grow, these alleged representatives of mass action find themselves in a state of complete disintegration. Half of the leaders want to join Stalin, the other half Seydewitz. When Messrs. Brandler and Thalheimer play the part of yes-men with regard to everything that goes on in the Soviet Union, that does not at all prove that they are blind by nature or that they have been dazzled by the wisdom of the Stalinists, but much rather that they simply don't care what happens in the country of the October Revolution.

Up to February 15, 1928, Brandler and Thalheimer repeatedly said: The Opposition's program of industrialization and collectivization is utopian. On February 16, they immediately approved the new program of Stalin, which was only a caricature of our own. One can readily understand why the Stalinists, under the direct pressure of difficulties and contradictions which they are incapable either of overcoming or even of understanding, are engaged in changing their position sharply and in taking refuge behind lies. But it is really disgusting to hear these two Berlin half-wits constantly repeating yes, without taking any part at all in the matter outside of their fervent desire to be appointed to high posts. In my
eyes, the fact that the Right Opposition tolerates the likes of them in its midst, no, at its head, is very much in character.

We of the Left Opposition are weak. We are growing slowly, but we are patient. The cadres of the Comintern consist either of completely spent, formerly revolutionary elements or of neutral hirelings. The Marxist tradition has been broken. What is parading now under the banner of Leninism is only a hodgepodge of the most heterogeneous elements, held together by plain Stalinist ignorance. The authority of the October Revolution has become an obstacle to revolutionary development. That is the dialectic of history: reason becomes nonsense, the October Revolution, Kaganovich. Under such conditions, how can the Marxist tendency be expected to advance rapidly? In order to grasp the international situation, its turns, its changes, etc., a certain theoretical level is required, or at least a certain amount of political experience. The masses can approve of us only to the extent that our views withstand the test of events and are confirmed by them. For example, our small German organization is taking a serious step forward precisely because it is holding its own in the rush of events, while the Brandlerites are forced into bankruptcy.

Comrade St. believes, according to what you say, that among us there are unreliable and confused people, and even Cantonists who are a discredit, especially in Austria. It's true that in Austria there exist, not four, but—insofar as I have been informed—two groups which count themselves as part of the Left Opposition. For the time being, however, we are allowing both of them to take their course outside the framework of our organization, because right now we place more importance on quality than on numbers. We will become a mass force only when our cadres are sustained by their quality, that is, by their ideas and methods.

When will great successes come? That I cannot tell you. The Left Radicals remained a small minority in the German Social Democracy for years. The Zimmerwald Left consisted of single comrades from various countries, and they were not—as Comrade St. knows very well—among the best: a young Norwegian poet, the confused Hoglund from Sweden, Julian Borchardt, etc. But the doctrine was solid, the orientation firm, the methods correct, that is, appropriate for the epoch. And out of this small group the Third International arose—to be sure, with the October Revolution as catalyst.

Great revolutions always consume whole generations, and that is just what is happening now. In part, but only in part,
it is necessary to begin anew. The most important task is to preserve the continuity of the revolutionary Marxist—in our epoch the Bolshevik—methodology and to transmit it to the younger generation. The confused Cantonists, who "discredit" us, will be thrust aside. One should choose one's path according to fundamental and decisive objective factors and not according to subjective impressions of one or another group of followers of the revolutionary tendency. Engels once wrote to Bernstein somewhat along these lines: "We (that is, of course, Marx and Engels) remained in the minority all our lives and were quite comfortable at that." I do not mean to say by this that we should make this our aim. In my life it also happened that I was with the majority. But all those who constantly cry about winning the "masses" and the "majority" never actually attain it, at least not for revolutionary ends. The masses are not won over by a special mass technique, as Brandler and Thalheimer conceive of it—in this field the trade-union fakers are vastly superior to them. The masses are won over in our epoch, filled with events and crises, only by a clear revolutionary-socialist conception.

The future development of the German situation will be decisive for the international labor movement and, in the first instance, for the Comintern. Should the German proletariat be victorious—this can only happen by the greatest exertion of all the creative forces latent in it—then the dictatorship of the vapid and brutal Stalinist bureaucracy will immediately fall, great ideological struggles will be resolved, the Left Opposition will have a fruitful effect on the revival of the labor movement in Germany and the entire world. Should the German proletariat be defeated by the fascists, then all will be lost for the Comintern and possibly also for the Soviet Union. For the world proletariat, that would be a setback for many years to come. Under such tragic conditions, the Left Opposition will take over the task of continuing to develop the Marxist program, but certainly no longer within the formal framework of the Third International. We have a long-term perspective. Events can accelerate our development, even give it a feverish pace. All the better! We are, however, also prepared to carry on propagandistic and educational work for many years as "sectarians," in order to prepare the yeast for the future.

With best communist regards,
L. Trotsky
INTERNAL POLEMICS
AND THE PARTY PRESS

January 5, 1932

To the National Committee of the Communist League of America

Dear Comrades:

In number 36 of The Militant which has just arrived here I find an article from France on the CGTU congress, signed by Felix. It is quite possible that the article found a place in the paper purely by accident without the editorial board having had the possibility to distinguish the fine points and the insinuations from far off. I fear however—I must say this quite openly—that the article appeared through means of Comrade Shachtman. If I am mistaken, so much the better. If not, then it complicated the matter to the highest degree. The article is directed against the leading group of the French League, not openly and clearly, but through insinuations and pinpricks. This fits in completely with the spirit of the author. Insofar as I was able to observe Comrade Felix, at first with Paz, for whom he acted as a hatchet man against us, then in the League, where he changed positions but not the manner of his struggle, which unfortunately is not the best, it appears to me that he represents a type like Weisbord, above all in the complete sterility of his criticism, its spuriousness, its constant personal emphasis, etc.

Comrade Felix has his own views on the trade-union question in France, which run counter to the official policy of the League. Naturally The Militant, like every paper, has the right to allow the views of the minority to be expressed too. But this must take place quite openly and clearly. Felix should then have said quite openly, in the name of a definite minority, against which tendency in the League he is polemicizing.
I doubt that this was indicated. It would perhaps be better to conduct this polemic in the International Bulletin; but if it were, then, as we said, in a thoroughly clear, open, and unambiguous form. In that way, the polemic might contribute something to the education of our cadres. In this spurious, I might almost say underhanded, form the polemic only serves the ends of international intrigue.

I will be very glad if the whole matter is of a purely accidental nature and has no connection with Comrade Shachtman, for in the contrary case it would only accentuate the great dissatisfaction which Comrade Shachtman evoked against himself among those Opposition elements in France, Germany, also here in Kadikoy, whom I hold to be the best. My concern becomes still more heightened by the fact that Comrade Shachtman has not replied to the letters and warnings on my part and on the part of my closest friends, and that Comrade Glotzer too, who promised me to call Comrade Shachtman to order a little, did not say a single word on this matter. I had the impression that both of them, Shachtman and Glotzer, were under the influence of the small Jewish group in Paris and completely overlooked the perspectives of the Opposition movement in Europe.

In a word, clarification of the situation on your part is absolutely necessary!

With best communist greetings,
L. Trotsky
REPLY TO THE JEWISH GROUP
IN THE
COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF FRANCE

January 15, 1932

Your declaration is an anti-Communist document and shows to what a fatal path the present leaders of your organization have led the group of Jewish workers.

1. You have recalled Comrades Felix and Foucs from the Executive Committee of the League in order to withdraw your "responsibility" for the direction of the League; this constitutes an act of sabotage. The conference elected a definite leadership. You are placing yourselves above the conference, above the League, and you are sabotaging the leading body of the League.

Basically this is an action of splitting the organization. For the leaders of your group, this is a demonstration, a "vote of no confidence," in a word, a parliamentary game. This is not the way proletarian revolutionists act; it is the way of petty-bourgeois anarchists, who scoff at parliamentarism in words but imitate it in deeds.

2. What reason have you given for leaving the Executive Committee? My circular letter. But is the Executive Committee responsible for that? There is absolutely no relation whatsoever between your action and its motive. I can't even for a minute assume that all the members of the Jewish group could have approved of such a disruptive act. I don't know Comrade Foucs and I cannot judge his motives. But Comrade Felix, in this case, has remained true to his past.

3. The situation becomes even more complicated by the fact that you recall Felix and Foucs not in the name of any faction, or any local organization, but in the name of a national group. You thereby transform the League into a federation of national groups. This is the structure the Bund attempted to introduce into the Russian party. As far back as 1903, not only the Bolsheviks but even the Mensheviks considered
such an arrangement incompatible with the fundamentals of revolutionary-proletarian organization. You are introducing Bundism into the ranks of the Left Opposition. The Left Opposition would only be preparing its own destruction if it were to tolerate such a state of affairs for even a day.

4. By creating such a Jewish factional organization, by separating it in this way from the League, by opposing it to the League, Comrades Mill\textsuperscript{51} and Felix are attempting to dictate to the League. At the same time Comrade Felix has misled the Jewish group by greatly exaggerating the differences, by seeking artificial pretexts for differences, by making a caricature of the differences. Because of their sterile and scholastic character, these discussions have not been able to contribute anything to the League in an ideological sense. In a political sense, they paralyzed the League by repelling the French workers. In this manner the Jewish group, instead of being an instrument to attract Jewish workers, has become, thanks to its present leaders, an instrument for the repulsion of French workers.

5. You state that my evaluation of the leaders of the Jewish group (Mill and Felix), that they sabotage the League and lead the Jewish group to its destruction, is based on one-sided and false information given by Comrade Molinier.\textsuperscript{52} This again shows how light-mindedly your leaders make unfounded accusations. To evaluate information, to understand what information should or should not be believed, to show prudence about information furnished in the course of internal conflicts—all these rules and essentials are elementary, the ABC of healthy political thinking. To accuse anyone of forming an opinion on the basis of one-sided and false information actually amounts to a charge of political bankruptcy. We understand things differently, you and I, as to what the Left Opposition is, as to what a revolutionary organization should be, etc. But why mix into this the question of false information by anyone? It is not so long ago that Comrade Mill explained the utter impermissibility of this argument to Naville.\textsuperscript{53} My circular letter condemning the policy of the present leadership of the Jewish group was written before I had any discussion at all with Comrade Molinier.

6. What finally determined my evaluation of the present leadership of the Jewish group? It was your letter to Rosmer.\textsuperscript{54} I consider this document perfectly scandalous; and, through the mistakes of the leadership, it seriously compromises the group.
The struggle against Landau, Naville, and Rosmer\textsuperscript{55} has up to now been the most important and significant event in the internal life of the International Left Opposition, which in this manner purged itself of alien elements. This struggle has led to splits, amputations, and desertions. In the process of your struggle against the new leadership of the League, you suddenly declared your solidarity with Rosmer. That shows that the leaders of your group have understood nothing at all of the preceding struggle, or, what is worse, that they in general are incapable of really taking principled differences seriously. From the point of view of ideological loyalty and revolutionary discipline, the letter to Rosmer was a direct act of treachery. It's understandable that several Jewish workers might be led into error; but the leaders of this affair knew what they were doing. For my part, I withhold any confidence in people who impose such a perfidious act on the Jewish group as an attempt of a bloc with deserters against the International Left Opposition.

7. You accuse me of not having taken a position on your differences with Comrade Treint\textsuperscript{56} and others on the question of the "faction," "party,"\textsuperscript{57} etc. I have arrived at my opinion not through isolated incidents in the constant internal struggle, but on the experience of the last two to three years as a whole. Of what political importance can the views of Comrades Felix and Mill be on the question of a faction, if within the faction to which I belong they, without giving it a second thought, are turning somersaults into the Rosmer-Landau faction? What if Felix and Mill do subscribe even today to the very best definition of a faction? All this in my eyes is only empty talk. By attempting to transform the League into a federation of independent national groups, Mill and Felix are rejecting the meaning of a revolutionary faction. What importance therefore can their exercises around the word "faction" have in my estimation? Our ideological struggle does not have a character all of its own but is an instrument of action and of control by means of action. I keep in mind the activity of Felix and Mill as a whole and the new episode in the discussion cannot change my judgment.

8. Paz, as is well known, subscribed 100 percent to all the formulas which he considered to be Bolshevik-Leninist. When some futile differences arose between himself and Delfosse,\textsuperscript{58} he demanded that I pronounce myself immediately on those differences. And I demanded that the Paz group go over from bombast to serious work and refused to occupy myself with
the differences, which had no actual relationship to genuine work. The Paz group condemned me for this, probably believing that I did not sufficiently understand the depth and importance of the differences that arose within it.

In that discussion Comrade Felix was with Paz against me. As soon as it became clear to Paz that I would not support him, he immediately discovered principled differences between himself and the Russian Opposition; it seems that Rakovsky did not quite reach the revolutionary magnitude of Paz. Felix and Mill are only imitating Paz by demanding of me that I occupy myself with their verbal rubbish instead of judging their activity as a whole.

9. If you are interested in the real source of my information, I will not conceal it from you. My principal informer all this time has been Comrade Mill. I have exchanged dozens upon dozens of letters with him. My conclusion regarding the policy of Mill I have drawn especially on the basis of his own letters. In these letters not a little has been said about Comrade Felix. But in this case I would not for the world have trusted to the impartiality of Comrade Mill. I attempted to judge Comrade Felix by his own actions; his support of Paz against La Verite, his discussion articles in Verite, his role in the attempt of a bloc with Rosmer, his letter to the Greek Opposition—all this sufficed for me. Add to this the minutes of the Executive Committee and the internal bulletins of the League. The present departure of Comrade Felix from the Executive Committee as a sort of parliamentary game only completes the picture.

10. You propose the creation of an international control commission to examine my "accusations." In this regard I can only express my astonishment. On my part it is a question of a political evaluation of the methods and measures by Comrades Mill and Felix. My evaluation may be correct or incorrect, but what can a control commission do about it?

When certain former and present members of the League made use of personal insinuations against their opponents in the course of their political struggles, I proposed that a control commission be created. But nevertheless none of the accusers dared to make a formal accusation. In this way the accusers definitively disqualified themselves, showing that they were directed not by revolutionary zeal but by lack of scruples, typical of the impotent petty bourgeoisie. In such a case, a control commission is entirely in place in order to clear the atmosphere. But in our case it is not a matter of accusations.
of a moral character. Nor can a commission make a judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of a political evaluation; the entire membership of the organization, not a special control commission, must declare itself.

11. Your declaration says that I condemn the activity of the Jewish group as a whole. That’s not true. Insofar as the members of your group under the leadership of the League are conducting propaganda work among the Jewish workers, are spreading the ideas of Bolshevism among them, I certainly can only salute their work and aid them as I have aided them in the past, according to my resources, from the first period of the group’s existence to the time it was drawn onto the unprincipled path of petty-bourgeois politics by Felix and Mill. Precisely now, when the crisis strikes the foreign workers in France above all others, when the Socialist Party betrays them completely and the Communist Party in part (see the vote of the parliamentary fraction), the Left Opposition can and must develop energetic work among the foreign workers, including the Jewish workers. But for that the Jewish group must cease to be a national Jewish faction within the League and become the organ of the League for propaganda in the Jewish language. What must be done for this? The Jewish group must be freed from the leadership of Felix and Mill, who can bring it nothing but harm.

With communist greetings,

L. Trotsky
NO DEAL WITH
GERMAN GOVERNMENT

January 23, 1932

Istanbul, Turkey, Jan. 23 (AP)—Leon Trotsky, exiled by the Soviet Russian government, said today there was no truth in reports that he would be admitted to Germany in exchange for a promise to throw the support of his followers to Chancellor Bruening against Adolf Hitler.

"That report is an invention from top to bottom," he added. "I have not asked the German government for a visa and consequently there has been no reason for that government to suggest any conditions under which I might enter Germany.

"The idea that I would suggest support for the Bruening government is such nonsense that a denial is unnecessary. I consider the German policy a matter for the German people. The Mueller government refused me a visa to Germany three years ago upon the insistence of Joseph Stalin, and there is no reason to hope that the Bruening government would do otherwise."
The writer of this article is being plied on all sides with the question—now gleefully ironical, now genuinely perplexed: Why is the ruling group in the Soviet Union at this time wholly engrossed in historical research? While Japan masters Manchuria and Hitler makes ready to master Germany, Stalin is composing extensive dissertations on the policies of Trotsky in the year 1905 and other questions equally up-to-date. Three years have passed since Stalin and Molotov announced that "Trotkyism" was dead and buried, and now a new campaign—a fifth or sixth campaign—against this same "Trotkyism" has sprung up in the pages of the Soviet press. The unexpectedness of this—for what is the sense of fighting corpses?—and the unusual viciousness of the attack have caused something of a sensation in the European press. Both English and French papers have published disclosures of a mighty conspiracy of "Trotskyists" in the USSR. They are receiving 60,000 rubles monthly from abroad; they have captured the most important positions in the industrial, administrative, and educational fields, etc., etc. Most captivating is the accuracy with which the amount of the foreign subsidy is reported.

With all its absurdity this report rests upon an authority sufficiently precise in its own way—the authority of Stalin himself. Stalin quite recently announced that "Trotkyism" is not a movement within the Communist Party, as the party members in spite of everything still continue to believe, but is "the vanguard of the bourgeois counterrevolution." If this statement be taken seriously, a number of inferences follow. The goal of the counterrevolution is to reestablish capitalism in the Soviet Union, a goal which can be achieved only by overthrowing the Bolshevik power. If the "Trotkyists" are the vanguard of the counterrevolution, that can only mean that they are preparing the destruction of the Soviet regime. From this it is but a step to the conclusion that the interested capitalist circles of Europe must be generously financing their
work. To speak plainly, it is just this interpretation of his words that Stalin is counting on. Just as in 1917 Miliukov and Kerensky\(^\text{64}\) felt obliged to assert that Lenin and Trotsky were agents of German militarism, so now Stalin is trying to get it on record that Trotsky and the Opposition are agents of counterrevolution.

Some months ago a widely circulated Polish newspaper printed over my signature a forged article—not the first of its kind—about the complete breakdown of the five-year plan\(^\text{65}\) and the inevitable fall of the Soviets. Although the crudeness of the forgery was obvious even to an inexperienced eye, Yaroslavsky,\(^\text{66}\) the official historiographer of the Stalin faction, published a facsimile of the article in the Moscow *Pravda*,\(^\text{67}\) giving it out as an authentic document and drawing the corresponding inferences in regard to "Trotskyism." A formal declaration from me that the article was a falsification from beginning to end was refused publication in *Pravda*. The Stalin faction considered it more expedient to support the tale that a powerful group among the Bolsheviks, a group led by the closest associates of Lenin, considers inevitable the downfall of the Soviet power and is working to that end.

The same game has been played before. Government circles must have been surprised four years ago when they read that Rakovsky, who so forcefully and brilliantly defended the interests of the Soviet Union during the Franco-Soviet negotiations, is in reality a most vicious enemy of the Soviet power. They doubtless said to themselves at that time: "Things must be going badly with the Soviet republic, if even Rakovsky has turned up among the counterrevolutionaries." If the French government has hesitated of late years to develop economic relations with the Soviets, or, on the other hand, to break off diplomatic relations, the banishment of Rakovsky has contributed to this hesitation.

The present campaign against the Opposition, arming itself with cruder exaggeration even than the preceding ones, is again placing a weapon in the hands of the most implacable enemies of the Soviet Union in all countries. "Evidently," they are saying, "the situation in the country is getting extremely bad if the inner struggle has again become so bitter." It is this fact that the struggle against "Trotskyism" is being waged with methods deeply injuring the interests of the Soviet Union which impels me to take up a subject which otherwise I would prefer to let alone.
If the "Trotskyists" are in reality "the vanguard of the bourgeois counterrevolution"—so the man in the street must reason—then how explain the fact that the European governments, including even the government of the brand-new Spanish republic, have one after the other refused asylum to Trotsky? Such an inhospitable attitude toward one's own "vanguard" is difficult to explain. The European bourgeoisie has had enough experience to be able by this time to distinguish its friends from its enemies.

The so-called "Trotskyists," the older generation at least, took part in the revolutionary struggle against czarism, in the October Revolution of 1917, in the building of the Soviet republic, in the creation of the Red Army, in the defense of the land of the Soviets against innumerable enemies during three years of civil war, and they played an intimate and frequently a leading part in the economic revival of the country. During these recent years, under the blows of the repression, they have remained completely loyal to those tasks which they set themselves long before 1917. It is needless to say that at a moment of danger to the Soviets the "Trotskyists" would be found in the first line of defense, a position familiar to them in the experience of the past years.

The Stalin faction knows and understands this better than anybody else. If it puts into circulation accusations which are obviously damaging to the Soviet Union, and thus at the same time compromising to itself, the explanation lies in the political situation in which the course of events and its own preceding policies have placed the Stalin faction.

**Stalinism, the Policy of a Conservative Bureaucracy**

The first campaign against "Trotskyism" was opened in 1923, while Lenin was on his deathbed and during a protracted illness of Trotsky. The second and more violent attack developed in 1924, shortly after the death of Lenin. These dates speak for themselves. The members of the old Politburo, the body which actually governed the Soviet republic, were: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Rykov, and Tomsky (or Bukharin). In the present Politburo only Stalin is left of the old staff, although all its members, except Lenin, are living. The selection of leaders of a great historic party is no accidental process. How can it happen that the leaders of the party during the heavy years preceding the revolution, and during the years when the foundations of the Soviets were laid and the building in construction was being defended with the
sword, have suddenly turned out to be "inner enemies," at a
time when the daily Soviet work has become to a certain de-
gree a matter of bureaucratic routine?

These shifts and replacements which stand out at a glance
in the Politburo or the Council of People's Commissars have
also been taking place during the recent period in all levels
of the party building, right down to the village councils. The
present staff of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets,
the personnel of the provincial party secretariats, of the in-
dustrial, military, and diplomatic bodies—all of them with
but few exceptions are men of the new crowd. A majority of
them took no part in the October Revolution. A very consider-
able number were in the camp of its open enemies. To be sure,
a small minority of the new ruling layer did belong to the
Bolshevik Party before October; but these were all revolution-
ary figures of second or third magnitude. Such a combina-
tion is wholly according to the laws of history. A new bureau-
cratic stratum requires an "authoritative" covering. This
covering has been created by those among the Old Bolsheviks
who in the period of storm and assault were pushed to one
side, those who felt a little out of place, who found themselves
in silent semiopposition to the actual leaders of the insurrection,
and became able to enjoy their authority as "Old Bolsheviks"
only in the second stage of the revolution.

It has never yet happened in history that a stratum which
achieved a revolution and guided and defended it in the most
difficult circumstances, suddenly, when the work of its hands
was assured, turned out to be a "counterrevolutionary" stratum,
and that a few years after the revolution a new genuinely
revolutionary stratum arrived to take its place. Indeed, the
opposite fact is to be observed in the history of all great revo-
lutions: when the victory is assured and has brought forth a
new ruling stratum with its own interests and pretensions,
and when this more moderate stratum, reflecting the demand
for "law and order," has pushed aside the revolutionists of the
first draft, it always accuses its predecessors of a lack of revo-
lutionary spirit. The most conservative bureaucracy which
might issue from a revolution could not otherwise defend its
right to power except by declaring its opponents moderate,
halfhearted, and even counterrevolutionary. The methods of
Stalin present nothing new whatever. We must not think, how-
ever, that Stalin is consciously plagiarizing anybody. He does
not know enough history for that. He is simply obeying the
logic of his own situation.
Economic Disagreements

In order to get the sense of Stalin's present political difficulties, it is necessary to recall briefly the essence of those disagreements which lay at the bottom of the dispute between us and the Stalin faction. The Opposition demonstrated that the bureaucracy was underestimating the possibilities of industrialization and collectivization, that the economic work was being carried on empirically in a hand-to-mouth manner, that it was necessary to adopt a broader scale and a faster tempo. The Opposition demanded the abandonment of the one-year for the five-year plan, and asserted that a yearly 20 percent growth of industrial production presented nothing unattainable with a centralized leadership. The Stalin bureaucracy accused the Opposition at that time of superindustrialization and utopianism. Kowtowing to the individual peasant proprietor, preparation to abandon the nationalization of the land, defense of a tortoise tempo in industry, and mockery of the planning principle—such was the platform of the Stalin faction from 1923 to 1928. All the present members of the Politburo without a single exception answered our demand for an increased tempo of industrialization with the stereotyped question: Where shall we get the means? The first draft of the five-year plan, upon which the government institutions got to work in 1927 under pressure from the persecuted "Trotskyists," was constructed on the principle of the descending curve: the growth of production was charted to fall from 9 to 4 percent. This draft was subjected to a withering criticism by the Opposition. The second variant of the five-year plan, the one officially ratified by that Fifteenth Party Congress which condemned the industrial "romanticism" of the Opposition, called for an average growth of 9 percent.

How far Stalin himself fell short of the scale of the present five-year plan before its ratification may be seen in the mere fact that in April 1926, answering Trotsky—who was then president of the Dnieprostroy Commission—he declared at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee: "For us to build the Dnieprostroy [the mighty electrical power plant on the Dnieper] would be just the same as to buy the peasant a phonograph instead of a cow." In the stenographic report of the Central Committee those words are inscribed as the most authentic opinion of Stalin. Subsequent attempts to explain his struggle against industrialization with references to the "prematurity" of the proposals of the Opposition are meaning-
less, since it was not a question of a particular task of the moment but of the general prospects of industry and the five-year program. The trial of the engineer-conspirators, publicly staged a year or so ago, showed that the actual leadership was in the hands of the irreconcilable enemies of the socialist economy. In defending his plans for a "tortoise tempo" Stalin employed methods of repression against the Opposition.

With its usual shortsighted empiricism the Stalin bureaucracy, under the influence of successes, began in 1928 to increase uncritically the tempo of industrialization and collectivization. Here the roles were exchanged. The Left Opposition came out with a warning: with a too swift pace, not tested out by previous experience, disproportions may arise between the cities and the country, and between the different branches of industry, creating dangerous crises. Moreover—and this was the chief argument of the Opposition—a too rapid investment of capital in industry will cut off excessively the share allotted to current consumption, and fail to guarantee the necessary rise of the standard of living of the people. Although cut off from the whole world in his exile in Barnaul, Christian G. Rakovsky sounded the alarm. It is necessary, he said, even at the cost of a lowered tempo, to better the material condition of the laboring masses. Here too the Stalin bureaucracy has been ultimately compelled to listen to the voice of the Opposition. Quite recently a separate Commissariat of Manufacturing Industries was formed out of the staff of the Supreme Council of National Economy. Its task is to take care of the current needs of the population. At the present stage this reform has a purely bureaucratic character, but its goal is clear: to create in the government mechanism certain guarantees that the daily needs of the masses will not be too much sacrificed to the interest of the heavy industries. Here too the Stalin faction, lacking perspective and creative force, is compelled to bless today what it was cursing yesterday.

"Peppery Dishes"

Early in 1928 mass raids against the Opposition were carried out—expulsions, arrests, banishments. During that same year a new five-year plan was put into force, following upon all essential questions the platform of the Left Opposition. This about-face was so sharp that the bureaucracy directly contradicted everything that it had defended during the first four years after Lenin's death. The accusation of superindustrializa-
tion lost all meaning, and active repressions against the Left Opposition still more so.

But here the interest of the new ruling stratum in its own self-preservation stepped to the front. If the Opposition was right in its judgments and proposals, so much the worse for the Opposition. If yesterday's arguments against it are worthless, we must have new ones—and in order to justify repressions we must have extraordinarily bitter ones. It is just in this sphere, however, that Stalin is especially gifted. In 1922, when Stalin was first elected general secretary of the party, Lenin remarked warningly to a small circle: "This cook will give us only peppery dishes." In his deathbed letter to the party, commonly called his "testament," where he insisted on the removal of Stalin from his position as general secretary, Lenin pointed to the crudeness of his methods, his disloyalty and inclination to misuse of power. All these personal traits of Stalin, subsequently developed to a high degree, have been especially well manifested in his struggle against the Opposition.

It was not enough, however, to bring forward fantastic accusations; it was necessary that people should believe them, or at least be afraid to object. In its struggle for self-preservation, the Stalin bureaucracy was, therefore, compelled to begin by suppressing all criticism. Along this line, accordingly, the Opposition opened its most fervent struggle—a struggle for a democratic regime in the party, in the trade unions, in the Soviets. We were defending one of the basic traditions of Bolshevism.

In the very heaviest years of the past—in the period of the underground struggle under czarism, in 1917 when the country passed through two revolutions, during the following three years when twenty armies were fighting on a front seven thousand miles long—the party lived a seething inner life. All questions were freely discussed from the top of the party to the bottom; the freedom of judgment within the party was unqualified. The Stalin apparatus directed its chief efforts to the destruction of this embarrassing party democracy. Tens of thousands of so-called "Trotskyists" were excluded from the party. More than ten thousand were subjected to various forms of criminal repression. Several were shot. Many tens of thousands of fighting revolutionists of the first draft were retained in the party only because they turned away and kept their mouths shut. Thus, in the course of these years, not only the membership of the ruling stratum has completely changed, but also the inner regime of the Bolshevik Party.

Whereas Lenin, to say nothing of his closest comrades-in-
arms, was subjected hundreds of times to the most furious 
blows of inner-party criticism, at the present time any Com-
munist who ventures to doubt the absolute correctness of 
Stalin upon every question whatever, and, moreover, who 
does not express a conviction as to his innate sinlessness, is 
expelled from the party and suffers all the consequences which 
flow from that. The shattering of the Opposition has become 
at the same time a shattering of the party of Lenin.

This shattering has been promoted by deep, although tran-
sitory, causes. The years of the revolutionary earthquake and 
the civil war left the masses in a desperate need of rest. The 
workers, oppressed with need and hunger, wanted a revival 
of economic life at any price. In the presence of considerable 
unemployment the removal of a worker from a factory for 
Oppositional views was a fearful weapon in the hands of the 
Stalin faction. Political interests fell away. The workers were 
ready to give the bureaucracy the broadest powers, if only 
it would restore order, offer an opportunity to revive the fac-
tories, and furnish provisions and raw material from the coun-
try. In this reaction of weariness, quite inevitable after every 
great revolutionary tension, lies the chief cause of the con-
solidation of the bureaucratic regime and the growth of that 
personal power of Stalin, in whom the new bureaucracy has 
found its personification.

Trotskyist Contraband

When living voices had been finally suppressed it turned 
out that in the libraries, in the clubs, in the Soviet bookstores, 
on the shelves of students and workers, old books were stand-
ing which continued to talk the same language they had talked 
in the days when the names of Lenin and Trotsky were in-
separable. It is this barricade of hostile books that the Stalin 
bureaucracy has now come up against.

After nine years of uninterrupted struggle against the Oppo-
sition, the leaders have suddenly discovered that the funda-
mental scientific works and textbooks on questions of 
economics, sociology, history—and above all the history of 
the October Revolution and the Communist International—
are chock-full of "Trotskyist contraband," and that the most 
important chairs of social science in many institutions of 
learning are occupied by "Trotskyists" or "semi-Trotskyists." 
Worst of all, those have been found guilty of Trotskyism who 
up to now had been its chief prosecutors.

In order to show how far this thing has gone it is sufficient
to adduce an example touching the history of Bolshevism. Immediately after the death of Lenin a history of the party hastily written by Zinoviev was put into circulation, its sole purpose being to portray the whole past as a struggle between two principles, the good and the evil, in the persons of Lenin and Trotsky. But since this history accorded to Zinoviev himself a place in the camp of the good and, what is still more horrible, said nothing whatever about the providential role of Stalin, Zinoviev's history was placed on the index as early as 1926, the date of the open conflict between Zinoviev and Stalin.

The man designated to write an authentic history of the party was now Yaroslavsky. In the order of the party hierarchy it fell to Yaroslavsky, a member of the presidium of the Central Control Commission, to captain the whole struggle against the Left Opposition. All the indictments leading to arrests and expulsions, and also a majority of the articles lighting up the repressions against "Trotskyists" in the Soviet press, came from the pen of Yaroslavsky. It was he, indeed, who reprinted in Pravda the forged article from a Polish newspaper. To be sure, the scientific-literary standing of Yaroslavsky was not wholly adequate, but he made up for this with his complete willingness to rewrite all history, including that of ancient Egypt, according to the demands of the bureaucratic stratum led by Stalin. A more reliable historiographer the Stalin bureaucracy could not possibly desire.

The result, however, was a completely unexpected one. In November of last year Stalin found himself compelled to come down on the fourth volume of Yaroslavsky history with a severe article. This too, it seems, was filled with "Trotskyist contraband." If Stanley Baldwin in one of his speeches should accuse Winston Churchill of a sympathy for Bolshevism, this would hardly cause a greater sensation in England than did Stalin's accusing Yaroslavsky of abetting "Trotskyism" in the Soviet Union. That accusatory article of Stalin served as an introduction to this last campaign. Obeying the signal, hundreds and thousands of functionaries, professors, journalists, distinguished in nothing but their zeal, rushed out to rummage through all the Soviet publications. Horrors! "Trotskyism" at every step! There is no escape from "contraband"!

But, after all, how could such a thing happen? Every new stratum as it rises to power shows an inclination to embellish its own past. Since the Stalin bureaucracy cannot, like other ruling classes, find reinforcement among the high places of
Is Stalin Weakening or the Soviets?

religion, it is compelled to create its own historic mythology. It paints in dark colors the past of all those who resisted it, while brushing up its own past with the brightest tints of the spectrum. The biographies of the leading actors of the revolution are made over from year to year in accordance with the changes in the staff of the ruling stratum and the growth of its pretensions. But the historical material puts up some resistance. No matter how great is the zeal of the official historians, they are held in leash by the archives, the periodical press of past years, and by the old articles—among them the articles of Stalin himself. That is the root of the evil!

Under the leadership of Yaroslavsky a number of young historians have been working over the history of the party. They have done all they could. But running into certain unsubmissive facts and documents, they found themselves unable, in spite of their zeal, either to crowd Trotsky out of the October Revolution or provide Stalin with a sufficiently imposing role in it. It was just along this line that Yaroslavsky fell under indictment for circulating "Trotskyist contraband": he did not carry the remaking of history clear through to the end. Woe to him who leaves his job half-done!

In many cases the accusation of harboring contraband has another source. Thousands of the less resolute partisans of the Opposition formally renounced their views during the last years, and were returned to the party and set to work. It soon became evident, however, that the Opposition school had been for them an invaluable school for scientific thinking. Former "Trotskyists" have occupied prominent positions in the sphere of economics, science, literature, and educational activities. They are submissive, as frightened functionaries know how to be, but they also know the facts. In their brain convolutions a number of critical habits have got stuck. The agents of Stalin, spying upon them from all sides, have had no difficulty in discovering in their books and lectures the poison of "Trotskyist contraband."

There is also a third source of this poison, no less dangerous. Serious young investigators, not at all bound up in the past with the Opposition, to a considerable extent nonpolitical but also free from careerist motives, frequently become victims of the scientific material they are working on and their own conscientiousness. Upon a whole series of questions, without ever suspecting it, they fall into the tracks laid down by the Left Opposition. The system of opinions which the Stalin bureaucracy imposes has come into more and more serious con-
conflict, not only with the traditions of the party, but also with any somewhat serious independent investigations in the various spheres of historical and social science, thus giving rise to Opposition moods. As a result it has suddenly been discovered that highly important branches of the social work in the Soviet Union are in the hands of the "vanguard of the bourgeois counterrevolution"

The Strengthening of the Soviet Economy Weakens Stalin

The bitter character of the present campaign against "Trotskyists" has inspired the Russian emigrant press to new prophecies of the coming downfall of the Soviet power. And these voices, in spite of the discouraging experience of the last fourteen years, have found an echo even in the great European and American newspapers. This is not, after all, surprising: not only does the Stalin bureaucracy stubbornly identify itself with the Soviet regime, but its enemies also, in search for comforting illusions, become victims of the same political aberration.

As a matter of fact, there is not the slightest foundation for this talk of the approaching long-awaited "end." The development of the productive forces of the Soviet Union is the most colossal phenomenon of contemporary history. The gigantic advantage of a planned leadership has been demonstrated with a force which nothing can ever refute. The nearsightedness and zigzagging of the Stalin bureaucracy only the more clearly emphasize the power of the methods themselves. Only the maniacs of the restoration can imagine that the toiling masses of Russia want to turn back to the conditions of backward Russian capitalism.

But it is no less an error to imagine that the economic successes in strengthening the new industrial regime have also automatically reinforced the political position of Stalin and his faction. Up to a certain moment it was so. But at present a process of exactly the opposite kind is developing. A people who have achieved a mighty revolution may temporarily, in difficult circumstances, hand over the guidance of their destinies to a bureaucracy. But they are not able to renounce politics for long. It would be blindness not to see that the very strengthening of the economic situation of the country sets the toiling masses in more and more hostile opposition to the omnipotence of a bureaucracy. The workers, not without justification, attribute to themselves the achieved successes, and follow the bureaucracy with more and more critical eyes. For
the masses see from below not only the successes and the possibilities flowing from them, but also the crude mistakes of the leaders and their continuous tendency to shift the responsibility for these mistakes from themselves to their agents. In raising the pride of the workers, the successes have also raised their political demands.

The lessons of the economic zigzags, especially the astounding exposures of the trials of the saboteurs, have taken deep root in the consciousness of the population and greatly undermined even the prestige of Stalin. The inference comes of itself: "It seems as though the Opposition was right!" The ideas of the Opposition, although not showing themselves on the surface, have long been laying down hidden roots. A critical period is now opening. The workers desire not only to obey but to decide. They intend to change many things. It is more than ever demanded of them, however, that they merely ratify decisions adopted without them. The workers are discontented—not with the Soviet regime but with the fact that a bureaucracy is replacing the Soviets. In various workers' councils the "Trotskyists" are lifting their heads, sometimes very courageously. They are being expelled. This has opened a new chapter in the life of the ruling party. Critical voices can no longer be silenced.

Whereas the former party crises reflected directly the difficulties and contradictions of the development of the Soviet republic under bureaucratic leadership, what comes to view in the present period is the contradiction in the position of the Stalin faction and, above all, of Stalin himself.

When these lines see the light the Seventeenth Party Conference will already be ending in Moscow, a conference which is nothing but a meeting of the apparatus, that is, the centralized Stalinist faction. Without a doubt the conference will pass off sufficiently well for the present leadership. But no matter how strong the Stalin faction is, it will not decide. The decision will be made in the last analysis by industrial processes on the one side, and, on the other, by deep political processes taking place in the consciousness of the masses.

The campaign against "Trotskyism" now developing signals the twilight of the omnipotence of the Stalin bureaucracy. But therewith it foretells, not the fall of the Bolshevik power, but on the contrary a new rise of the Soviet regime—not only its industry, but its politics and culture. That movement to which the author belongs is firmly confident of finding its place in the gigantic work to come.
Dear Comrade Shachtman:

Although you have not yet answered my last letter I nevertheless feel duty-bound to write you once more. I notice from the documents received that you propose to give up the post as editor of *The Militant*. I hope that before these lines reach you this matter has already been straightened out. How could it be otherwise? Your resignation would mean a blow not only for the American League but also for the International Opposition. The National Committee by vote has once more expressed its confidence in you. As far as I am concerned I certainly hope that despite the important differences of opinion our collaboration in struggle and friendship in the future will remain unshakable. In every respect it is absolutely necessary that you remain at your post.

L. Trotsky
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS BY THE
NEW YORK TIMES\textsuperscript{73}

February 15, 1932

\textit{Question}: Will you give your appraisal of the five-year plan and the economic perspectives confronting Russia?

\textit{Answer}: The question of industrialization, and particularly of the five-year plan, was one of the chief points of conflict between the Stalin faction and the Left Opposition, to which I belong. Up to February 1928, the Stalin faction considered it necessary to rest its power on the rich peasant and refused to compel the peasant to make sacrifices in the interest of industrialization. The very principle of planning was laughed at by the bureaucracy. "We depend upon rain, not plans," they said. In 1925 I published a book, \textit{Toward Capitalism or Socialism?},\textsuperscript{74} in which I proved that with proper leadership industry could show a 20 percent yearly increase or more. Stalin and Molotov considered these figures fantastic and accused the Left Opposition of "superindustrialization." These cursory comments on the history of the thing are sufficient to demonstrate my attitude to the five-year plan: I consider it a gigantic step forward in the development not only of the Soviet Union but of humanity.

\textit{Q}: Do you believe that the development of the five-year plan has strengthened or weakened the possibility of building socialism in Soviet Russia alone without cooperation along similar lines in the rest of Europe?

\textit{A}: This raises the question about socialism in a single country. The inevitability of socialism flows historically from the fact that the present productive forces of humanity have become incompatible not only with private property in the means of production but also with present national boundaries, especially in Europe. Just as medieval particularism hindered the development of capitalism in its youth, so now
at the peak of its development capitalism is strangling in the limits set by the national states. Socialism cannot confine productive forces in the procrustean bed of national states. The socialist economy will develop on the basis of an international division of labor, the mighty foundations of which have been laid down by capitalism. The Soviet industrial construction is, in my view, a part of a future European, Asiatic, and worldwide socialist structure, and not an independent national whole.

Q: Will Soviet Russia be compelled to come to some sort of a compromise with Western capitalism, assuming that she may not be able to pursue a socialist policy single-handedly? What form would such a compromise assume?

A: The "compromise" between the Soviet and the capitalist systems is not a question of the future but of the present. It is already a fact today, although not a very stable one. How will the interrelations between the isolated Soviet Union and world capitalism develop? Here a concrete prophecy is not easy to make, but in general I should cast the following horoscope: European capitalism is far nearer to a socialist revolution than the Soviet Union is to a national socialist society.

Q: What are the prospects of Soviet Russia's relations with other countries in the political field if such a compromise proves feasible?

A: The Soviet government is interested in maintaining peaceful relations. It has demonstrated its will to peace, and is still demonstrating it by every means at the disposal of a government. It is true that in Paris they consider the Soviet proposal of universal disarmament a proof of the belligerent intentions of Moscow, and on the other hand the refusal of France to take steps toward disarmament they regard as an expression of her peaceful intentions. Following the same logic the French official press considers the Japanese invasion of China an act of civilization, the Chinese resistance a barbarous act. Burglars, according to this logic, are not those who break into other people's houses, but those who defend their own. It is difficult to concur in this.

Q: What is your attitude toward the Stalin regime today and why?

A: To answer this question I distinguish sharply two different conceptions: the Soviet regime as the regime of proletarian dictatorship and the Stalin regime, which is a bureaucratic perversion of the Soviet regime. It is with the
aim of strengthening and developing the Soviet system that I wage a struggle against the Stalin regime.

Q: Do you still regard the present phase of the Bolshevik revolution as "Thermidorean," and has your view as expressed in your autobiography been borne out by events since your departure from Russia?

A: I have never said that the present stage of the revolution was "Thermidorean." The historic conception of Thermidor has a very definite content: it means a completion of the first stage of a victorious counterrevolution. Thermidor in the USSR could mean nothing else than the coming into power, although at first in a semidisguised form, of the bourgeoisie, and consequently a breakdown of the October Revolution. I have never, at any time or anywhere, said that the October Revolution has broken down. This opinion is persistently attributed to me by the Stalinist press for purposes which have nothing whatever to do with the interests of truth. What I have asserted and do assert is that there has grown up on the basis of the October Revolution a powerful bureaucratic stratum in which both active and passive Thermidorean tendencies are very strong. However, their victory is still far off. The opposition to these tendencies consists of a struggle for the independence of the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the Soviets and for their vigilant control over the bureaucracy. This opinion was not formed by me after my exile from the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it was the cause of my exile. A bureaucracy does not tolerate any attacks on its commanding role. The danger inherent in the Thermidorean tendencies of a bureaucracy was perfectly clear to Lenin. He warned against this danger in his last speech at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922. My last conversation with Lenin was devoted to this question. Lenin proposed that I form a bloc with him against that bureaucratism, the focal point of which he considered, and I also, to be the secretarial apparatus of the party led by Stalin. Lenin's second illness prevented the carrying out of this plan.

Q: Is there need of modifying the Communist dictatorship in Russia and how should it be modified?

A: This question is closely bound up with the first two. The economic successes, it is needless to say, have greatly strengthened the Soviet Union. At the same time they have greatly weakened the position of Stalin's official apparatus. In this there is no contradiction. In the first place, it is perfectly clear to all conscious elements of the population of the Soviet Union
that the successes in the sphere of industrialization and collectivization became possible only because the Stalinist bureaucracy came up against the resistance of its protege, the kulak, who refused to surrender his grain to the state, and thus the bureaucracy was compelled to take over and carry out the program of the Left Opposition. Stalin has dealt with our program in much the same way that the free-trader MacDonald has dealt with the protectionist program of Joseph Chamberlain, who also in his time was cruelly beaten at the polls. Today Chamberlain—I mean the father, not the son—is in any case more popular in England than MacDonald. To be sure, Chamberlain died long ago. But the principal leaders of the Russian Opposition are alive. Rakovsky in Barnaul is attentively following all the processes of industry and politics in the Soviet Union.

A second and still more important cause of the weakening of the Soviet bureaucracy lies in the fact that the economic successes have greatly elevated not only the number of Russian workers, but also their cultural level, their confidence in their own powers, and their feeling of independence. All these traits are hard to reconcile with bureaucratic guardianship. Nevertheless, the Stalin apparatus in its struggle for dominance has carried the bureaucratic regime to its utmost extremes. I want especially to emphasize this fact: the economic successes, as frequently happens in history, have not strengthened but, on the contrary, undermined the position of the ruling stratum. I consider important changes in the methods of the Soviet regime absolutely inevitable, and that, too, in the rather near future. These changes will involve a blow at the dictatorship of the Stalinist bureaucracy, and will indubitably clear the road for a flourishing of Soviet democracy on the foundations laid down by the October Revolution.

Q: Do you look forward to your return to Soviet Russia? Under what conditions would that be possible and what would be your program?

A: I think that the above-mentioned changes will make possible and inevitable a return of the Left Opposition to active work in the Soviet Union.

Q: You have been reported as urging the Communists in Germany to support the Brueining government as a means of staving off the victory of Hitlerism. Is that true? Why do you consider the present policy of German communism erroneous?
A: Dispatches to the effect that I have urged the German Communists to support the government of Bruening are, of course, false. The Stalinist press has attributed this plan to me, and the idea has been taken up by journalists who do not understand the situation. I proposed to the German Communists to carry out the policy of a united front. The Communists ought to propose to the Social Democrats and to the trade unions led by them a program of cooperative, practical struggle against the attack of the fascists. The Social Democratic masses quite sincerely desire to wage such a struggle. If the leaders refuse, they will compromise themselves in the eyes of their own supporters. If the leaders agree, the masses, in practical action, will go beyond their leaders and support the Communists. One must learn to make use of disagreements in the camp of opponents and enemies. Only with a policy as flexible as this is it possible to rise step by step to the top. Strategy involves maneuver as well as assault. I have not the slightest doubt that the German Communist Party, in spite of the resistance of the Stalinist bureaucracy, will learn this strategy, through which alone Bolshevism was able to win power in Russia.

Q: What is your view of the present world economic crisis and its implications for the prevailing social order? Do you still look for world revolution as a likely consequence of the crisis or do you believe that capitalism may surmount the crisis and enter upon a period of stabilization? What would be the situation of Soviet Russia in event of stabilization? Has not the world economic crisis placed before Soviet Russia the need of revising her own economic policies?

A: The present economic crisis is an indubitable expression of the fact that world capitalism has outlived itself as a system. The question of the historic date when it will be replaced by another system will be decided, of course, in different ways for different countries, and especially for different parts of the world. Even though the automatic working of the laws of the market may lead to a softening of the crisis in Europe after a year or two, the crisis will return again in a comparatively short time with redoubled force. The productive forces are being strangled in the national cells of Europe. The dilettante plan of M. Briand for a union of Europe has not emerged and never will emerge from the laboratory of the chancelleries and editorial offices. The ruling classes will cure the crisis with a further economic decimation of Europe and a strengthening of protectionism and militarism. Under these
circumstances I see no prospect of a general stabilization of European capitalism.

Q: How do you view the position of the United States in the present world situation?

A: I think, as a result of the present crisis, the predominance of American over European capitalism will grow still more pronounced. In the same way, as a result of every crisis, you see a growth in the predominance of the big enterprise over the small, the trust over the isolated undertaking. However, this inevitable growth of the world hegemony of the United States will entail further deep contradictions both in the economy and in the politics of the great American republic. In asserting the dictatorship of the dollar over the whole world, the ruling class of the United States will introduce the contradictions of the whole world into the very basis of its own dominance. The economy and the politics of the United States will depend more and more directly upon crises, wars, and revolutions in all parts of the world. The position of "observer" cannot long be maintained formally. I think that America will create the most colossal system of land, sea, and air militarism that can be imagined. The conclusive emergence of America from its old provincialism, the struggle for markets, the growth of armaments, an active world policy, the experience of the present crisis—all these things will inevitably introduce deep changes into the inner life of the United States. The emergence of a labor party is inevitable. It may begin to grow with an "American tempo," leading to the liquidation of one of the two old parties, just as the Liberals have disappeared in England. To sum it up, you must say the Soviet Union will be Americanized technically, Europe will either be sovietized or descend to barbarism, the United States will be Europeanized politically.
FROM A LETTER
TO SIMON AND SCHUSTER 80

February 26, 1932

... The young scholars who helped me with the preparation of the books [Collected Works in the Russian] are now, like my other closest coworkers, in prisons and other places of exile in Siberia and Central Asia.

... The second volume [of The History of the Russian Revolution], devoted to the October Revolution, is almost finished.81 It has taken me considerably more time than the first—not only because it considerably exceeds the first volume in size but chiefly because in the sphere of the October Revolution the official Stalin school of history has succeeded in carrying out a colossal work of "stylization" (not to say falsification), and here the verification of facts and documents has demanded special care.

... In 1919 Wilson and Lloyd George82 proposed to call an international conference at Prinkipo with the participation of the Soviets. Lenin insisted that I represent Soviet Russia at that conference. The conference did not take place owing to inner conflicts in the Entente.83 But I arrived in Prinkipo just the same—not for negotiations with European diplomats but for work on the history of the Russian Revolution. I must confess that this work is far more agreeable to me than the other.
INTERVIEW BY THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS

Observations, Political and Personal

February 26, 1932

I have neither the text of the decree of which you speak nor official confirmation that such a decision has been made, but supposing the information is correct, which I believe highly probable, I can give the following explanation:

The list of names in the decree is wholly artificial. It is the famous "amalgam" system. They have combined a list of opponents and enemies of the Soviet regime, expelled from Soviet Russia since 1921, as a specific entourage around my name. Stalin's need for resorting to such methods is due to the fact that his personal situation is thoroughly shaken and compromised.

Indisputable economic successes have been made along the lines advocated by the Opposition, while difficulties have resulted from Stalin's purely bureaucratic method. The working classes of Russia are clearly aware of this. After declaring us dead four years ago, Stalin found himself forced some months ago to launch a desperate international campaign against "Trotskyism" and me personally. The present decree is merely the crown of this campaign, which indicates the strength of our tendency in the Soviets.

We have come again to Prinkipo where, with my family, I spent the first two years of my exile until fire destroyed our dwelling and everything it contained, including my library. Here we are even more isolated from the outside world than at Moda. At present during stormy days in February the post does not arrive for a day or two days at a time. All houses are tightly closed. You can see there are ideal conditions here for abstaining from politics. However, the world press does
not allow me a political holiday. Not long ago news appeared in the papers of several countries that I was planning to leave for Germany to take upon myself the defense of the Bruening government. The Spanish press, basing its opinions partly on the theory of permanent revolution, which I uphold, and partly on police communications, accuses me of organizing recent movements against Civil Guards there.

At the same time at Moscow the Stalin faction decided during its last conference that I was directing "the vanguard of bourgeois counterrevolution." Again it must be remembered that a few months ago there appeared in the world press an announcement of my plot, together with the former emir of Afghanistan, to free India.

Which of these communications is true and exact? I have to disappoint you. They are all false.

If you ask me which of them pleases me most, my choice will fall on the plot with the emir of Afghanistan. In this story there is at least the most creative fantasy. I am only sorry we aren't accorded as a third ally Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. It is true that, without officially taking part in a plot, he does all in his power for the quickest possible liberation of India from England. To have introduced him officially into the conspiracy would have been tantamount to compromising him unnecessarily.

When I was arrested in Madrid during the war the director of police thus answered my questions as to the reasons for the arrest: "Your ideas are too advanced for Spain." Thereupon I was incarcerated in a "model" prison at Madrid, which I confess did not appear especially model to me.

Since that time monarchy has given place in Spain to a republic, which even in its constitution is called a republic of labor. I do not know to what extent the police of Madrid have been renovated, but apparently they have the same conviction that my ideas are too advanced for Spain.

Nevertheless they consider this very brief formula sufficient to motivate a refusal of a visa. Thence arises this version of my long-distance direction of the recent popular movement in Spain.

How should the Stalin faction's new campaign against me be explained? There are two causes, one general, the other personal.

In spite of everything that many newspapers write, the personal position of Stalin and his limited group is tottering pre-
cariously. The economic and cultural successes of the Soviet Union have considerably aroused the self-confidence of the working class and, at the same time, its criticism of the bureaucratic regime which Stalin personifies.

There is nothing anti-Soviet in this movement; on the contrary, it is entirely impregnated with the traditions of October and the Bolshevik Party. But it is directed against the dictatorship of the Stalin faction. This is the explanation for hundreds and hundreds of articles and annotations in Soviet newspapers, which disclose everywhere "Trotskyist contraband."

That is the title which simply leads one to understand the increasing independence of the workers and their animosity against the bureaucracy.

There is a second and more personal cause for the campaign against us. It goes back to the past, but is connected with the present. Unkind tongues say there exist in America not a few estimable men who, despite their modest birth, try, as soon as their "price" begins to express itself in numbers of seven figures, to seek out their ancestors among the English aristocracy or even the Scottish dynasty.

The bureaucratic faction of Stalin cannot take this road, but the members of this faction try to prove their special rights by their roles in the fight against the czar and in the October Revolution. Thus are created apocryphal biographies and thus apocryphal history is written. During my years of exile I have edited a series of historical documents in the Russian language. I have devoted my time on this island principally to historical works. Two of the latter, My Life and the history of the revolution of February, have appeared in America, England, and other countries. The third, the revolution of October, should appear shortly. I am at present working on its last chapter.

All these books are absolutely forbidden to be imported into the Soviet Union. But many Soviet citizens, and some Communists among them, leave for abroad for economic, diplomatic, scientific, and other reasons. They read my books and carry back in their heads to the Soviet Union the so-called "Trotskyist contraband."

The veritable picture of the revolution of 1917 which I have made on the basis of positive and indisputable documents is in complete disaccord with the official legend of the Stalin bureaucracy. Stalin and his creatures have discovered with horror that Trotskyist contraband has pierced its way into historical research, historical journals, and even into school-
books. In November of last year Stalin gave the alarm signal to begin the recent campaign against the Trotskyists.

Not long ago a young historian named Keen was accused of irrational contraband and repented with the following words before the Society of Marxist Historians: "Our fault was that we wanted to be too objective, whereas the history of the revolution should not be objective but conformable to our goal." In other words, it should respond to the exigencies of the Stalin bureaucracy just as genealogical researches should to the exigencies of canning-factory millionaires in Chicago.

The words of the young historian I have named are not ironical—that is, not ironical for himself. He is merely expressing with too much frankness what is at the bottom of the affair: one must not write the history of the Russian Revolution too objectively or one will get Trotskyist contraband. Not one of my fervent friends could give a more favorable report of my historical work.

If living on the island of Prinkipo doesn't facilitate the direction of the movement at Seville, on the other hand one can in this tranquility ponder quietly and thoroughly the logical succession of great historic events and in that light the roles of parties and men. Two-thirds of my time is consecrated to this and the other third—one-fourth, let us say—of all my time is devoted to articles and pamphlets on current political events.

There remains a twelfth, you say? I see that you are strong in arithmetic. This little time permit me to reserve for fishing and hunting.
Trotsky, Natalia Sedova, and the fisherman Charolambos at Prinkipo.
INTERVIEW BY THE
UNITED PRESS
Japan, China, and the USSR
February 29, 1932

The activities of the Japanese troops in China are developing in a spiral whose radius is increasing from month to month. Such a method has political and diplomatic advantages: it gradually draws into war both one's own nation and the enemy's, while the rest of the world is confronted with a series of faits accomplis. This method is evidence that the military clique has to overcome at this preliminary stage not only external but also internal opposition. From the purely military point of view the mode of action of "small doses" carries within itself certain disadvantages. Evidently the Japanese rulers are of the opinion that given the military weakness of China and the insoluble contradictions in the camp of its enemies and rivals, it is possible to allow themselves initially a certain loss of time which is connected with a spiral advance.

But after the first stage—with or without a delay—the second stage must inevitably follow, i.e., the stage of real war. What is its political objective? The leading Paris press, which zealously translates the ideas and slogans of the Japanese general staff into French, has continually given assurance that this is a matter not of war but of police measures. This interpretation goes with "the method of small doses." It will fall apart of itself as soon as the inevitable extension into military actions takes place, and when the attacking forces are in position before the desired targets.

Japan's aim is to colonize China, a grandiose plan. But one can say immediately that this is beyond Japan's powers. Japan has come too late on the scene: at a time when Britain is facing the loss of India, Japan will not succeed in turning China into a new India.
Could not the aim of the Tokyo oligarchy be to strike against the USSR? It would be light-minded to consider such a plan excluded. But this cannot be in the foreground. Only after it has seized Manchuria and consolidated itself there could Japan pose for itself the question of striking to the northwest. But while the Soviet government does not and cannot want war, Japan on its side can hardly decide on direct aggressive measures against the Soviet Union without first ensuring and equipping its Sino-Manchurian position.

There is still one more important consideration in this context. The Japanese oligarchy considers—however basically is another question—it is possible to wage war against China piecemeal, by installments; such a course of action must appear more acceptable even to the Japanese finance minister, whom this matter touches rather closely.

A war against the Soviet Union would require completely different methods. Without powerful allies capable of generously financing the war, Japan will hardly dare step outside the Manchurian border. How much Tokyo today or tomorrow can count on billions in war loans can be established more easily in Paris and New York than in Prinkipo.

Every attempt to ascribe to the Soviet government aggressive intentions in the Far East founders because of internal contradictions. A war would be a cruel blow to the industrial plan with which the whole future of the country is closely bound up. A factory which is incomplete by one percent is not yet a factory. And in the Soviet Union there are hundreds and thousands of factories still in the process of being built. A war would turn them for a long time into dead capital. All this is too obvious to need emphasizing.

Even if it is assumed that a military collision in the Far East is nevertheless inevitable—and many politicians not only in Japan, but elsewhere too, are convinced of this—then even in this event the Soviet government cannot have any reason to force a conflict. Japan is involved in China in an enormous enterprise with unforeseeable consequences. She may and will have individual military and diplomatic successes but they will be transitory whereas the difficulties will be permanent and increasing. In Korea Japan has her Ireland. In China she is trying to create her own India. Only completely dull, feudal-type generals can regard the nationalist movement in China with nonchalance. It is impossible to contain the awakening of a great nation of 450 million people by means of aircraft. Japan is up to her knees if not up to her waist in
the soft soil of Manchuria. And since in Japan herself economic
development has come into irreconcilable contradiction with
the feudal structure of society, an internal crisis must be re-
garded as quite inevitable. For a start the Seiyukai Party
will give place to the Minseito Party which will move to
the left; then a revolutionary party will raise its head. . . .
France lost not a little through financing czarism. She is
mistaken if she thinks that this has insured her against a loss
in financing the mikado. It is clear that in the Far East
the Soviet government can have no grounds for being pre-
cipitate or nervous.

Consequently, a war between the USSR and Japan could
break out only in the event of the conflict being consciously
and deliberately provoked by Japan in agreement with more
powerful allies. At stake in this war would be of course far
more than the Chinese Eastern Railroad or Manchuria as
a whole. Certain French newspapers have been rather hasty
in predicting that "Bolshevism will perish in the Siberian
steppes." The steppes and forests of Siberia are very extensive
and much could perish in them. But can one be sure that it
will be Bolshevism that will perish?

The idea of a war between the Soviet Union and Japan
and the parallel idea of a war between Japan and the USA
at once raises the problem of space; an ocean of dry land
and an ocean of water are the possible arenas for the mili-
tary operations At first sight the strategic problem goes
straight to the problem of space. Hence many rush to draw
unpleasant conclusions for the Soviet Union; the sparseness
of population in the Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union, its in-
dustrial backwardness, the insufficient rail communications—all
these are negative factors on the Soviet Union's side. To
a certain extent that is so, but only to a certain extent. Even
limiting the problem to the military-technical sphere, it is im-
possible not to see that these same spaces will also be allies
for the Soviet Union. If one admits military successes for Japan
going from East to West, then it is easy to foresee that dif-
ficulties would arise proportionate at least to the square of the
distances traversed by the Japanese troops. The successes would
devour themselves, and Japan would be forced to leave be-
hind her back her own Ireland and her own India.

However one cannot pose the problem so narrowly. The
war would be conducted not only by military means. The
Soviet Union would not be alone. China has awakened. She
wants to and is able to struggle for her existence. Whoever ignores this factor risks running into a stone wall.

To convey millions of soldiers across the Siberian mainland and supply them with the necessary war material is no small task. However, due to the present exceptional growth of industrial potential in the Soviet Union, if necessary transport by rail could be considerably increased. Of course, this would take time. But a war over great distances would inevitably be a war over a great period of time. Perhaps it would be necessary to work out a military "five-year plan" or refashion the economic five-year plan in accordance with its requirements. Of course, this would deliver the cruelest blow to the economy and culture of the countries participating in the war. But I reject the hypothesis that there is any other way. Once war is inevitable it must be waged totally and all means and resources mobilized.

The participation of the Soviet Union in the war would open new perspectives for the Chinese nation and engender a great national upsurge in it. Whoever understands the logic of the situation and the psychology of the popular masses cannot have any doubt about this. In China there is no shortage of human reserves. Millions of Chinese have learned how to handle a rifle. What is lacking is not the will to struggle but proper military training, organization, system, and skilled command. Here the Red Army could offer very effective help. The best units of Chiang Kai-shek's army were in their time created, as is known, under the leadership of Soviet instructors. The experience of the Whampoa Military Academy, built on different political foundations (I am not going to touch on this question here), could be extended on a large scale. In addition to the necessary military supplies, the Trans-Siberian Railroad could transport, not an army, but the essential cadres of one. How to improvise troops from awakened and aroused human beings has been learned well by the Bolsheviks and they cannot have forgotten it. I do not doubt that in the course of twelve to eighteen months it would be possible to mobilize, equip, arm, train, and transport to the battlefront the first million troops whose training would not be inferior to that of the Japanese and whose military morale would excel theirs. The second million would not need even six months. I am speaking about China. And in addition there stands the Soviet Union, the Red Army, its great reserves. . . . No, the leading French press—the most reactionary in the whole world—is too much in a hurry to bury the Soviets in the
Siberian steppes; naked hatred is always a bad counselor, particularly when dealing with a historical prognosis.

But if the prospects are so favorable, you will ask, why does the Soviet government avoid a war with all its might? I really have already answered this question: in the Far East the time factor is working against imperialist Japan which has passed its peak and is now coming to its decline. Besides, and no less important, the world does not consist solely of the Far East. The key to the world situation is today not in Mukden but in Berlin. If Hitler came to power that would signify for the Soviet Union an incomparably more immediate danger than the intentions of the military oligarchy in Tokyo.

But we decided from the beginning to limit ourselves to the problem of the Far East. Let us therefore do as we said.
ON BEING DEPRIVED OF SOVIET CITIZENSHIP

Open Letter to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR

March 1, 1932

With inevitable delay I learn from Pravda of your decision of February 20, 1932, depriving me and the members of my family sharing my expulsion, exile, and work, of the rights of Soviet citizenship and forbidding our entry into the USSR. Wherein my "counterrevolutionary" activity lies, the decision does not say. If we discount the polemical rituals against "Trotskyism," the Soviet press cited only two instances of my alleged activity which could have been characterized as counterrevolutionary—had they actually occurred.

Pravda of July 2, 1931, carried with corresponding commentaries a photostatic reproduction of the first page of the Polish newspaper Kurier Codzienny [Daily Courier] containing an article supposedly by me directed against the Soviet Union. It is taken for granted that none of you doubted for a moment that this article was a forgery by a filthy sheet, well known for its falsifications. The same newspaper shortly thereafter forged documents against Galician (Ukrainian) revolutionaries. Even the bourgeois press such as the Manchester Guardian at that time characterized the Kurier Codzienny as a newspaper which had already distinguished itself by the forgery of an article by Trotsky. I demanded a repudiation from Pravda. It did not appear. Pravda intentionally deceived millions of workers, Red soldiers, sailors, and peasants, lending support in its name to the forgery of the Polish fascists. One cannot but recall that the author of these "disclosures" in Pravda was none other than Yaroslavsky, in those days one of the supreme guardians of party morality. If since then he has suffered somewhat, it was at any rate not due to the forgery, but rather to its incompleteness.
On Being Deprived of Soviet Citizenship

The second example of my "counterrevolutionary" activity preceded your decision only by a few weeks. On January 16, 1932, the Central Executive Committee's Izvestia\textsuperscript{93} carried a dispatch from Berlin to the effect that I call for the support of the Bruening government, acting in agreement with the German Social Democracy and in particular with Karl Kautsky and Alfred Adler (?),\textsuperscript{94} and that in return for this a visa for entry into Germany is promised me. All this information, in which, of course, it is clear to you there isn't a single word of truth, is taken from a reactionary, anti-Semitic Berlin sheet which one can hardly look at, let alone quote. Not one newspaper in Germany attributed any significance to these inventive labors of the German Purishkeviches.\textsuperscript{95} Only Izvestia, a newspaper formally under your, the presidium's control, published this acknowledgedly false information, consciously deceiving millions of citizens of the Soviet Union.

Thus you did not consider it possible to adopt your decision until two of the most responsible papers of the Soviet Union—the central publication of the party and the official publication of the government—had deceived the people with the aid of forgeries fabricated by Polish and German fascists. This is a fact which can neither be erased nor obliterated.

But even after such preparations you found it necessary—or it was suggested to you—that you carefully disguise your decision. This extraordinary measure against me, prepared in advance by the latest anti-Trotskyist campaign—I do not remember which one it is numerically out of a long series—you were forced to transform into a decree, directed supposedly against thirty-seven persons, including, outside of the members of my family, over thirty people who were dragged in exclusively for the purpose of a political cover. You included leaders of Menshevism expelled from the Soviet Union with my direct participation over ten years ago. Apparently it seemed to Stalin that this was a masterly move. Actually, the thread stitching it together is all too obvious. Pretending that the nature of Dan's and Abramovich's\textsuperscript{96} activity became clear to you only in 1932, you place the presidium of the CEC in a very uncomfortable position. You yourself can't help realizing this, but in this matter also you are forced to submit to the Stalinist bureaucracy, which operates in an increasingly crude fashion, not troubling about the dignity of the highest bodies of the Soviet power.

It is too distasteful to dwell on the other characteristics of Stalin's manufactured list; in the intentional intermingling of
names for the purposes of additional "effect," it represents a document on the same moral level as the two above-mentioned forgeries which served as preparations for it.

Only a police mentality can link the Left Opposition with Menshevisim. In the field of politics, your centrsim\textsuperscript{97} stands between the Left Opposition and Menshevisim. No trickery will change that. The decision of February 20 represents a consummate amalgam in the Thermidorean style. Centrism, oscillating between Marxism and national reformism, is forced — it cannot do otherwise — to combine and connect its petty-bourgeois enemies from the right with its revolutionary opponents from the left in order to cover up its own void by means of such an amalgam. I wish to remind you that the first piece of advice concerning the expulsion of the Left Oppositionists from the country was given in writing to Stalin by none other than Ustrialov.\textsuperscript{98} Your decision will go down in history with the stigma of Thermidor.

Stalin will tell you that it is not a question of "isolated" facts but that the decision is based on all the counterrevolutionary activity of myself and my family, in general, which needs no proof. If this is so, why was it necessary to resort to false documents and to introduce elements of an unworthy masquerade into the decision itself? He cannot squirm out of this. The very fact that after nine years of uninterrupted attack — remember that the beginning of the struggle against "Trotksyism" coincided with the death of Lenin — you had to resort to the filthy sheets of Polish and German chauvinism and hide under an amalgam in order to pass this exceptional law against me and my family discloses and exposes the impotence of all the campaigns against "Trotksyism" and compromises your latest invention beyond repair.

From the point of view of personal revenge — and this element, as you well know, enters into all of Stalin's fabrications — the decree completely failed to accomplish its aim. This time Stalin thrust himself out too far from behind stage and carelessly revealed his true political and moral stature. If he forced you to issue — not without timid resistance, I know — this unworthy decree of exclusion, it was only because the profound correctness of the Left Opposition has been demonstrated on all questions without exception, national and international, on which we waged a struggle all these years. The seemingly aggressive gesture of Stalin is helpless and even pitiable self-defense.
On Being Deprived of Soviet Citizenship

The Opposition fought against the Stalinist faction for industrialization, for planning, for higher tempos of the economy, and for collectivization instead of dependence upon the kulak. Beginning in 1923, the Opposition demanded the preparation of a five-year plan and indicated its basic elements. All the economic successes of the Soviet Union were prepared theoretically and in part organizationally by the Left Opposition. Your president, Kalinin, who supported Stalin from the right against the Left Opposition, knows more about this than anyone else. As late as April 1926, Stalin, in the struggle against me, with the support of Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, and others, declared that "we need the Dnieprostroy as a peasant needs a phonograph." In this formula is contained a whole philosophy of history. For the struggle against it and for its defeat, Rakovsky is confined at Barnaul, hundreds and thousands of unyielding revolutionaries fill the places of detention and exile, and some Bolshevik-Leninists— are shot.

On the international arena, the situation was not much different. The Opposition fought against the 1923 capitulationist policies of Brandler, who was supported on the right by Stalin; against the Stalinist theory of worker-peasant parties, the confinement of Chinese communism within the iron cage of the Kuomintang, the bloc of the Politburo with the clique of British strikebreakers; against the whole opportunist, ruinous, shameful, thoroughly treacherous policy of Stalin, who for several years held the stirrup for Chiang Kai-shek and exchanged portraits with him on the very eve of the day Chiang Kai-shek carried out the bloodbath in Shanghai. You yourselves are well acquainted with the facts and know that there is no exaggeration at all in my words. It is not for nothing that the history of the Chinese revolution became a prohibited book in the Soviet Union: each page of it burns the fingers of the Stalinist clique.

In what does our "counterrevolutionary" activity lie? Among the hundreds of the current Stalinist theoreticians (hired by the day or by the piece) who crawl like worms in the wounds of the world proletariat, there are not a few volunteers willing to change white into black, or into any color of the rainbow. They will not change historic facts, however, nor weaken the foundations of Marxism. The Left Opposition has the right to be proud of its struggle against the Stalinist faction in the USSR and in Germany, in China, in England, in all parts of the world touched by the hand of the opportunistic apparatus.
Hit over the head by the kulaks, deceived in its calculations by friend Chiang Kai-shek, kicked instead of thanked by the British trade-unionists they had rescued, the Stalinist bureaucracy in 1928 made a whirlwind turn of 180 degrees over our heads, then to plunge into monstrous economic and political adventurism, the accounts for which are still to be settled.

The Left Oppositionists—the only true Bolshevik-Leninists in the ranks of the international proletariat!—again quickly and decisively came out against this bureaucratic adventurism that is armed with the resources of the workers' state. Our warning against the irresponsible conversion of the five-year plan into a four-year plan has been fully confirmed. The artificial acceleration, prepared neither theoretically nor practically, not only made it impossible to solve what had become more of an exercise in sport than an economic problem, but deepened a series of disproportions which are now being incorporated into the framework of the second five-year plan. The Opposition warned against the dangerous game of "complete collectivization" and the notion of "the liquidation of classes" within the period of the first five-year plan. Today "complete collectivization" is halted, and "the liquidation of classes" through two or three stages is projected in the new five-year plan. This too is a bureaucratic utopian idea. As a result of forced collectivization and the violation of basic economic proportions, the extremely unsatisfactory food and general living conditions of the working class remain, unfortunately, a reality.

The working class of Russia has the right to be proud of the truly great technical achievements accomplished within the last few years. These achievements became possible only when the pressure of events forced the bureaucracy to make use of the platform of the Left Opposition, although after a delay and in distorted and twisted form. The political consciousness of the workers has risen to new heights. No historic force can compel them to renounce the foundations laid by the October Revolution and the methods of planned economy verified in actual work. They will crush anyone who tries to drag them back toward bourgeois democracy and capitalism.

But the workers also realize more and more clearly which one of the political groups was the real initiator of planned socialist construction and which one introduced into the economic construction first bureaucratic obstruction, then—the adventurist race in the dark. The workers want to direct the economy themselves and not merely execute plans which
the Stalinist bureaucracy makes behind their backs in collaboration with incompetents from the right or from the left. The anxiety of the workers, their dissatisfaction, their as yet mute protests—all this substantiates the criticism of the Left Opposition.

The strengthening of the economic foundation of the dictatorship and the growth in numbers and self-confidence of the proletariat lead not to the strengthening but to the weakening of the political position of the bureaucracy. Its ranks are beginning to scatter. A small minority holds on even more tightly to Stalin as an anchor of safety. The others look about in search of reassurance. The Bessedovskys, Agabekovs, Dmitrievskys,102 corrupted careerists, clever scoundrels, 100 percent swindlers—how many of them are there in the apparatus?—try to find the nearest fence to jump over into the camp of the class enemy.

The honest elements of the apparatus—fortunately they are a majority—listen to the voices from below, compare the past stages and the discarded slogans of the years 1923-26-28-30-32, all those zigzags of bureaucratic blindness, and realize with horror that the Stalinist "general line" is a myth, an illusion, a hazy reflection of the vacillations of the apparatus itself. Thus begins the chapter of reckoning for the revision of the basis of scientific socialism, for the brazen violation of the party.

The mistakes and crimes of the bureaucracy for these nine years have not gone unpunished. The Stalinist regime is approaching a decisive crisis. The episode with the "semi-Trotskyist" Yaroslavsky would have seemed absolutely impossible a year or a year and a half ago, when I wrote of the first "squeak in the apparatus."103 Today this episode does not astonish anyone; on the contrary, it is accepted as an unmistakable symptom of a deeper process. The Stalinist apparatus has ceased to be the Stalinist apparatus. It has become a system of contradictions and cracks. As the workers become more impatient with the orders of the bureaucracy, the apparatus becomes more distrustful of the leadership of Stalin; the two processes are interconnected. All the more fiercely, therefore, is the pressured Stalinist faction forced to fight for the retention of its leading positions.

You started the struggle against "Trotskyism" under the banner of the "Old Bolshevik Guard." To Trotsky's imaginary ambitions of personal leadership, ambitions which you your-
selves had invented, you opposed the "collective leadership of the Leninist Central Committee." What remains of that collective leadership and what is left of the Leninist Central Committee? The apparatus, independent of the working class and of the party, has set the stage for Stalin's dictatorship which is independent of the apparatus. Now to pledge loyalty to the "Leninist Central Committee" is almost the same as to call openly for insurrection. Only an oath of loyalty to Stalin may be taken—this is the only formula permitted. The public speaker, the propagandist, the journalist, the theoretician, the educator, the sportsman—each must include in his speech, article, or lecture the phrase about the infallibility of the policy of the Central Committee "under Stalin's leadership," which means the infallibility of Stalin who rides on the back of the Central Committee. Every party member and Soviet official, from the president of the Council of People's Commissars to a humble provincial clerk, must take openly, before the whole country, an oath that in case of disagreement between the Central Committee and Stalin, he, the undersigned, will support Stalin against the CC. To this level are the bylaws of the party and the Soviet constitution now reduced in practice.

This sort of thing is going further and further. The official anniversary article on the Red Army (February 23) states that the "Communist Party" with its Leninist Central Committee headed by Comrade Stalin is the leader of all the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The Red Army is called upon to be loyal to the Soviets of the working masses, to the proletariat and its vanguard as long as Stalin will remain "at the head" of the party. This means that on the day when the party will no longer desire his costly leadership, the Red Army will have to support Stalin against the party. There can be no other meaning in the oath to the name of Stalin. This is a new stage in the systematic, planned, persistent preparation of Bonapartism. Reread history!

When you started the struggle in the party in the name of the struggle against "Trotskyism," you formed within the official Politburo a secret Politburo, or "the seven," against me. You had your secret meetings, your secret discipline, your secret code for communication with agents of the conspiracy in the provinces. The baiting of Trotsky and of "Trotskyism" went parallel with the stifling of the party's independence; one and the other were equally necessary for the triumph of the bureaucracy.
Now the same thing, although as a caricature in Bonapartist form, is being performed on a new historic stage. Without doubt Stalin's narrow faction has its own secret staff, its slogans and passwords, its agents and codes; the conspiracy against the apparatus is pushed full speed ahead, while the apparatus is still in conspiracy against the party. The despotism of Stalin, threatened from below, hastens to assume ever more finished form.

The party threatens to intervene in the conflict which has started between Stalin and the apparatus. It must intervene or the class enemy will. To help the party intervene powerfully is the aim of the Left Opposition. Stalin is in mortal fear of this. He wants to strangle the party completely before he settles accounts with the apparatus. That is why the Seventeenth Party Conference was treated to a new campaign against "Trotskyism." That is why the conference was transformed into a rolcall of those loyal to Stalin. And that is why it was necessary to complete the conference by your decision of February 20. The meaning of this policy is that each new blow against the party is inseparable from a blow against "Trotskyism." In this lies the strength of the Opposition. In this lies the doom of Stalin.

You long ago substituted "self-criticism" for inner-party democracy. In the beginning this meant that one may criticize anyone outside of the Central Committee. Later it meant that one may criticize only those whom the CC orders to be criticized. Now it means that one may criticize anyone but Stalin and must persecute any member of the CC who does not swear by the name of Stalin. Above the party, above the apparatus, above criticism—stands Stalin. The law of his infallibility takes on a retroactive character. The history of the party is rebuilt around Stalin's infallibility as around a new axis. Anyone who has not succeeded in reeducating himself inevitably falls under the gun.

It became necessary to transform a revolutionary party, which based itself on a scientific doctrine and a great tradition, into a temple where Kaganovich, in the role of high priest, burns incense to the idol of eternal perfection. All that is lacking to complete the system is that the dogma of immaculate conception be added to the dogma of infallibility.

Can there be anything more malignant, more degenerate, and more shameful than the introduction of supermonarchical authority into the party of the proletariat? Perhaps you don't know where it leads to: reread history. The dogma of lifetime
infallibility is the most unquestionable, the most shameful expression of the fact that Stalin's leadership is in irreconcilable contradiction to the economic, political, and cultural development of Soviet democracy, and, what is no less important, to the historical problems of the world proletarian vanguard.

Just think of it. Only one and a half decades after the October Revolution there stands at the head of the Comintern—Manuilsky. You know this person no less than I do. None of us ever took him seriously. At all critical moments he vacillated, was confused, and retreated; always and ever he sought a master. In 1918 he declared in writing that Trotsky saved Bolshevism from national limitedness. In 1923, once more in writing, he called Lenin and Trotsky the originators of the theory and practice of the Communist International. You will say that he was motivated by personal reasons? I will not dispute it. But in that case he miscalculated. The "triumvirate" gave Manuilsky an ultimatum: either start a campaign against Rakovsky, who was universally respected, or be crushed. You know Manuilsky. He chose the first. And now, frightful to think: Manuilsky is the leader of the Comintern!

The strategy of Marx and Lenin, the historical experience of Bolshevism, the great lessons of 1917—everything is distorted, maimed, slandered. Yesterday's mistakes of the bureaucracy, not disclosed nor refuted, are transformed into an obligatory tradition and on each turn of the road serve as traps and pitfalls. The leadership of the Comintern has become the organized sabotage of the international proletarian revolution. Its crimes are countless. And now before your very eyes is being prepared the most terrible of them all.

The theory of social fascism, in which the ignorance of Stalin is coupled with the irresponsibility of Manuilsky, has become a noose around the neck of the German proletariat. Under the whip of the Stalinist clique the miserable, confused, frightened, terrified Central Committee of the German Communist Party helps with all its might, cannot but help, the leaders of the German Social Democracy to send the German working class into crucifixion by Hitler.

Do you think that with this false scrap of paper of February 20 you will stop the growth of Bolshevik criticism? Prevent us from doing our duty? Frighten our cothinkers?

Already in not less than twenty countries there are cadres of Bolsheviks who rightfully consider themselves to be the
continuators of the Marxist tradition, of the Leninist school, of the commandments of the October Revolution. You will not silence them!

Of course, Stalin has not said his last word. The arsenal of his methods is known: Lenin weighed them and characterized them. But these methods can now serve only for personal revenge. The blows at the old intransigent fighter Rakovsky, the shooting of the "traitor" Blumkin and his replacement by the authentic Stalinist Agabekov, the shooting at Bolsheviks interned in isolation, the small, modest, and concealed aid to class enemies against a revolutionary opponent—for this the Stalinist arsenal will yet suffice. But not for more than this!

You know Stalin as well as I know him. Many of you, in conversations with me or with people close to me, have more than once given your own estimate of Stalin, and given it without illusions. Stalin's strength has always lain in the apparatus, not in himself; or in himself only insofar as he remained the complete incorporation of bureaucratic automatism. Severed from the apparatus, opposed to the apparatus, Stalin represents nothing. The man who was yesterday the symbol of bureaucratic power tomorrow will be in the eyes of all the symbol of bureaucratic bankruptcy. It is time to do away with the Stalinist myth. It is necessary to place your trust in the working class and its genuine, not its counterfeit, party.

Read again the resolutions of the plenums of the Central Committee for the years 1926 and 1927, read again the statements of the Opposition; you have a fuller set of documents than I have. And you will be convinced again that the whole evolution of the party, of the apparatus, of the Stalinist clique, was predicted by us, all the milestones were indicated in advance. The Stalinist system is disintegrating exactly in the manner indicated by the Opposition. Do you want to follow the Stalinist road any further? But there is no road further. Stalin has brought you to an impasse. You cannot proceed without liquidating Stalinism. You must rely on the working class and give the proletarian vanguard the possibility, through free criticism from top to bottom, to review the whole Soviet system and cleanse it ruthlessly from all the accumulated filth. It is time to carry out at last Lenin's final and insistent advice: remove Stalin!

In the work of regenerating the party and Soviet democracy the Left Opposition is ready at all times to take a direct part.
It can be trusted. It represents a selection of revolutionists who are wholeheartedly devoted to the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is a priceless leaven for the crushed, torn party, undermined from the top by careerism and servility.

Great problems are again being placed on the order of the day by history: in the Far East and especially in the center of Europe, in Germany. At this time when great political measures are needed, Stalin schemes with petty police measures. The Opposition will step over the decree of February 20 as a worker on the way to work steps over a dirty puddle.

Bolshevik-Leninists, forward!
A CORRECTION ON RAKOVSKY

March 15, 1932

To the Editors of the International Bulletin

Dear Comrades:

An inaccuracy has crept into your notice on C. G. Rakovsky in number 14 of the Bulletin, which I should like to correct with these lines. You write that Rakovsky's health was broken by thirty years of service to the revolutionary cause. You thereby reduce the length of his service by a whole third: Christian Georgievich has been in the revolutionary ranks for forty-five years!

I first met Rakovsky in 1902, that is, thirty years ago. Before that meeting I had been in the revolutionary ranks about five years, Rakovsky for about fifteen. The first appearance of Rakovsky as a revolutionary belongs to his school days. As a fifteen-year-old high-school student, he made a socialist speech against the priests in the church in his hometown of Kotel, in the heart of Bulgaria. He was expelled from high school for this, and, if I am not mistaken, arrested for the first time. From then on Rakovsky's revolutionary work was uninterrupted, in Bulgaria, Rumania, France, Russia, again in Bulgaria and Rumania, and finally in the Soviet Union—such is the truly international arena of his vigorous revolutionary activity.

Communist greetings,
L. Trotsky
Dear Comrades:

The news that you are proceeding to bring out a weekly greatly delights me. In the conditions of the present dreadful crisis and its unforeseeable political consequences, a very heavy responsibility falls on the Left Opposition. The tragic experience of Germany shows where the leadership of the Comintern has fallen to. Under the burden of uncorrected and uncondemned past errors, that leadership is no longer capable of taking a single correct step. The interest of worldwide liberation is sacrificed at the altar of the compromised prestige of the bureaucratic clique. The Bolshevik-Leninists are called upon to show the proletarian vanguard the correct path. The education and reeducation of Marxist cadres is possible only on the basis of living experience on a national and international scale. The weekly journal will give you the capacity to enlighten the advanced workers in Bulgaria about the most important steps of the proletarian struggle in the whole world. Fortunately in most countries with an advanced workers' movement there is already an organization of the Left Opposition. The closer the links are between them and the more energetically their experience is exchanged, the quicker will the Left Opposition free the world proletarian vanguard from the blind and fatal leadership of the bureaucracy.

The ideological and organizational growth of the Left Opposition is pushing the Stalinist bureaucracy, in its struggle for self-preservation, onto the path not only of increased cruelty of repression, but also of ever baser deception of the workers. It is sufficient to mention the fact that the French organ of the International Red Aid,108 Defense, contains in one of
its latest issues an article explaining in detail how Trotsky allegedly gave advice to vote for Hindenburg at the time of the presidential elections. How much further can they sink after that? Revolutionary Marxism was always proud of the fact that it told the truth to the workers. But the Stalinist bureaucracy can no longer take a step without a lie, and those lies are getting more crude, more stupid, and more monstrous. Only a clique which is condemned by history and which is using up the last crumbs of its political capital can have recourse to such measures.

The appearance of your weekly will meet with the warm sympathy of all the sections and groups of the International Left Opposition. You can firmly rely on the comradely support of the Bolshevik-Leninists of all countries.

Yours,
L. Trotsky
I SEE WAR WITH GERMANY

Published April 1932

World politics has at present two focal points unusually remote from each other: one on the Mukden-Peking line, the other on the Berlin-Munich. Either one of these points of infection is enough to destroy the "normal" course of events on our planet for years, for decades. However, the day-by-day work of the diplomats and official politicians looks as though nothing unusual were happening. It looked the same along in 1912 during the Balkan War which was the overture to 1914.

For some reason—grossly slandering an intelligent bird—people call this an ostrich policy. The ornamental decision adopted by the League of Nations on the Manchurian question is a document of impotence without equal even in the history of European diplomacy: no self-respecting ostrich could possibly sign his name to it. This blindness—in some cases, of course, quite voluntary—to what is brewing in the Far East has at least this mitigating circumstance: that events there will develop at a comparatively slow pace. The East, although awakening to a new life, is still far from the "American," and even the European, tempo.

Germany is a different matter. The blind alley into which Europe, Balkanized at Versailles, has now run finds a concentrated expression in Germany, where it has taken the political form of "National Socialism." In the language of social psychology this political tendency might be described as an epidemic hysteria of despair among the intermediate classes: the ruined small trader, craftsman, and peasant; in part, too, the unemployed proletarian; the officer and noncommissioned officer of the Great War, still wearing the symbols of distinction but without rations; the clerk of the closed-up office; the
bookkeeper of the bankrupt bank; the engineer without occupation; the journalist without salary or prospect; the physician whose clients are still sick but have forgotten how to pay.

Hitler has refused to answer questions about his domestic program on the ground that it is a military secret. He is not obliged, he says, to give away his secret methods of salvation to his political enemies. This is not very patriotic, but it is clever. In reality Hitler has no secrets at all. However we are not here concerned with domestic policies. In the matter of international politics his position seems at first glance a little more definite. In his speeches and articles Hitler declares war on the Versailles Treaty, whose creature he himself is. He specializes in terms of abuse directed against France. But as a matter of fact if he came into power, he would become one of the chief pillars of Versailles and would turn out to be a mainstay of French imperialism.

These assertions may seem paradoxical. Yet they flow inexorably from the logic of the European and international situation when correctly analyzed, that is, when the analysis starts from the basic factors of politics, and not from phrases, gestures, and the other trash of the demagogue.

**Hitler Will Need Allies**

The German fascists declare that they have two enemies: Marxism and Versailles. By "Marxism" they mean two German parties, the Communists and the Social Democrats, and one state, the Soviet Union. By Versailles they mean France and Poland. In order to understand what will be the actual international role of a National Socialist Germany, it is necessary to weigh briefly these elements of the problem.

The relation between fascism and "Marxism" is sufficiently clear from the experience of Italy. Mussolini's program, to the day of the operetta march on Rome, was no less radical and no less mystical than that of Hitler. The reality turned out to be merely a struggle against revolutionary and oppositional forces. Like its Italian prototype, German National Socialism can come to power only after breaking up the workers' organizations. This, however, is no simple task. Civil war lies on the road between the National Socialists and the power they seek. Even if Hitler should get a parliamentary majority by peaceful methods—which may safely be excluded from things possible—he would find it necessary just the same, in order to inaugurate a fascist regime, to break the backbone of the Communist Party, the Social Democracy, and
the trade unions. And this is a very painful and prolonged surgical operation. Hitler himself, of course, understands this. That is why he is not at all disposed to accommodate his political plans to the uncertain destinies of German parliamentarism.

While covering himself with phrases about legality, Hitler is awaiting the opportune moment to strike a short and sharp blow. Will he succeed in this? It is no easy task. But it would be unpardonably light-minded to consider his success impossible. And by whatever roads Hitler might come to power, whether through open doors or by breaking in, the fascistization of Germany would mean in any case a severe domestic conflict. This would inevitably paralyze the forces of the country for a considerable period of time and compel Hitler to seek in surrounding Europe, not revenge, but allies and protectors. From this fundamental consideration our analysis must begin.

In their struggle against fascism the German workers will naturally seek support in the Soviet Union, and they will find it. Can you imagine for a moment that in these circumstances Hitler's government will risk getting into an armed conflict with France or Poland? Between the proletariat of a fascist Germany and the Soviet Union stands Pilsudski.114 Pilsudski's help, or at least his friendly neutrality, will be infinitely more important to Hitler, absorbed in the fascistization of Germany, than the liquidation of the Polish Corridor.115 How insignificant this question will seem to Hitler—and indeed the whole question of the boundaries of Germany—in the midst of his bitter struggle to get the power and to keep it!

For Hitler, Pilsudski would be a bridge toward friendship with France, if indeed there were not other bridges closer by. Even now there are voices heard in the French press—as yet only in its secondary organs—"It is time to steer our course by Hitler!" To be sure the official press, led by Le Temps,116 takes a hostile attitude to the National Socialists. But this is not because the masters of fate in contemporary France take Hitler's martial gestures seriously. No, what frightens them is the path by which Hitler can alone come to power, the path of civil war, a thing whose outcome cannot be predicted by anybody. May not his policy of a state overturn from the right unleash a revolution on the left? That is what the ruling circles in France are worrying about, and quite justifiably too.

But one thing is clear: if Hitler did overcome all obstacles and arrive in power, he would be compelled, in order to get
a free hand within his own country, to begin with an oath of loyalty to Versailles. Nobody on the Quai D'Orsay [French Foreign Office] has any doubt of that. Moreover, it is well understood there that a military dictatorship of Hitler, once it was firmly established in Germany, might become a considerably more reliable element in the French hegemony over Europe than the present German governmental system, whose mathematical formula consists almost entirely of unknown quantities.

**War Would Be Inevitable**

To imagine that the ruling circles in France would be "embarrassed" to act as patrons of a fascist Germany would be quite childishly naive. France is now relying upon Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, three countries ruled by a military dictatorship! Is this accidental? Not in the least. The present French hegemony over Europe is a result of the fact that France still remains the sole inheritor of the victory of the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and herself. (I do not name Russia here since she did not participate in the victory, although she paid for it with the greatest number of human lives.) From the hands of the most powerful combination of world forces which history has known, France has received an inheritance which she will not let go of, but which is too heavy for her narrow shoulders. The territory of France, her population, her productive forces, her national income—all these are obviously inadequate to support her lordly position. The Balkanization of Europe, the stirring up of antagonisms, the struggle against disarmament, the support to military dictatorships—these are the methods necessary to prolong the hegemony of France.

The forcible splitting-up of the German nation enters into the system as a link quite as necessary as the fantastic boundary lines of Poland with its famous Corridor. In the language of Versailles, "Corridor" is the name given to an operation which other people call removing a rib from a living organism. When France, while supporting Japan in Manchuria, swears to God that she seeks peace, this only means that she stands for the inviolability of her own hegemony, that is, her right to dismember Europe and reduce it to chaos. Immoderate conquerors, as history testifies, are always inclined to "pacifism," because they dread the revenge of the conquered.

A fascist regime, which could be realized only at the price of bloody convulsions and a new exhaustion of Germany,
would be for that very reason an invaluable element in French
hegemony. From the side of the National Socialists, France
and her Versailles system have nothing at all to fear.

Would Hitler in power, then, mean peace? No, Hitler in
power would mean a reinforcement of French hegemony. But
exactly for this reason Hitler in power would mean war, not
against Poland, not against France, but against the Soviet
Union.

The Moscow press has spoken more than once in recent
years about an approaching military intervention in the So-
viet Union. The author of these lines has more than once ob-
jected to this kind of snap prognosis, not because he thought
that there was in Europe, or on the rest of the planet, any
lack of the evil will to war against the Soviet Union. No,
there was no lack of that. But for such a risky undertaking
the disagreements and resistances were too great, not only
between the different European states, but still more within
each of them.

There is hardly a politician worth mentioning who now
imagines that the Soviet republic could be settled with by
means of armies improvised along the border or simple land-
ing operations. Even Winston Churchill no longer believes
that, notwithstanding the very wide gamut of his political vocal
exercises. An experiment of this kind was more than well made
during the years 1918-20 when Churchill, according to his
own proud boast, mobilized "fourteen nations" against the
Soviet Union. How happy the British exchequer would be
now to have back those hundreds of millions of pounds spent
on intervention in Russia!

But we mustn't cry over spilt milk. Besides a good lesson
was paid for with that money. If at that time, in the first years
of the Soviet republic when the Red Army was still walking
in its baby shoes—alas, in those years it often had nothing
on its feet at all!—the troops of "fourteen nations" could not
win victory, how much less hope there is now, when the Red
Army is a mighty force, with a victorious tradition, with young
and yet experienced officers, with inexhaustible reserves raised
up by the revolution, and with sufficiently opulent mili-
tary stores!

The united forces of the encircling nations, even if they could
be dragged into the adventure, would be small for the task of
intervention in the Soviet Union. Japan is too far off for an
independent military role against the Soviet Union, and more-
over the mikado's government will have troubles enough
nearby in the coming years. To make intervention possible, a great, highly industrialized, and moreover continental European empire would be needed, one which would desire, and be able, to take upon itself the principal weight of a holy pilgrimage against the Soviets. To be more accurate, a country would be needed which had nothing to lose. A glance at the political map of Europe will convince you that such a mission could be undertaken only by a fascist Germany. More than that, a fascist Germany would have no other road left to go. Having come to power at the price of innumerable victims, having revealed its bankruptcy in all domestic problems, having capitulated to France and consequently to such semivassal states as Poland, the fascist regime would be inexorably compelled to seek some sort of gamble out of its own bankruptcy and out of the contradictions of the international situation. A war against the Soviet Union would grow out of these circumstances with fatal necessity.

To this pessimistic prognosis you might reply by citing the example of Italy, with whom the Soviet Union has established a modus vivendi. But that objection is superficial. Italy is separated from the Soviet Union by a series of intervening countries. Italian fascism rose with the yeast of a purely domestic crisis, the national claims of Italy having been satisfied liberally enough at Versailles. Italian fascism came to power shortly after the Great War, at which time there could be no talk of a new war. And finally fascist Italy remained lonely, and nobody in Europe knew how stable the fascist regime would prove, on the one hand, or the Soviet regime on the other.

In all these respects, the position of Hitler's Germany would be fatally different. An external success would be necessary to it. The Soviet Union would be an intolerable neighbor. We remember how long Pilsudski hesitated before signing the pact of nonaggression with Russia. Hitler side by side with Pilsudski—that alone almost answers our question. On the other hand France cannot help understanding that she is not in a position to keep Germany permanently disarmed. The French policy will be to turn fascist Germany against the East. That will offer an escape valve for the national indignation against the Versailles regime, and—who knows?—maybe we will have the good luck to find along this road new sources for the solution of that most sacred of all world problems, the problem of reparations.
Russia Must Be Prepared

If you take on faith the assertion of the fascist prophets that they will come to power during the first half of 1932—though we are far from believing these people on their mere word—it is possible to lay out in advance a sort of political calendar. A couple of years must be set aside for the fascistization of Germany: for crushing the German working class, creating a fascist militia, and restoring the cadres of the army. Along about 1933-34, then, the conditions for a military intervention in the Soviet Union would be adequately ripe.

This "calendar" of course assumes that the government of the Soviet Union will be meanwhile patiently waiting. My relations with the present Moscow government are not such that I have any right to speak in its name or refer to its intentions, about which I, like every other reader and man of politics, can judge only on the basis of all the information accessible. But I am all the more free to say how in my opinion the Soviet government ought to act in case of a fascist state victory in Germany. Upon receiving the telegraphic communication of this event I would sign an order for the mobilization of the reserves. When you have a mortal enemy before you, and when war flows with necessity from the logic of the objective situation, it would be unpardonable light-mindedness to give that enemy time to establish and fortify himself, conclude the necessary alliances, receive the necessary help, work out a plan of concentric military actions, not only from the West but from the East, and thus grow up to the dimensions of a colossal danger.117

Hitler's shock troops are already singing all over Germany a marching song against the Soviets, composed by a certain Doctor Hans Buchner. It would be imprudent to let the fascists drawl this martial air. If they are destined to sing it, let them sing it staccato.

Whichever of the two might happen to take the formal initiative, a war between a government of Hitler and the Soviet government would be inevitable, and that too at a very early date. The consequences of this war would be incalculable. But whatever illusions they might cherish in Paris, one thing could be confidently asserted: in the flames of a Bolshevik-fascist war, one of the first things to burn up would be the Versailles Treaty.
(From a letter)

The second presidential election in Germany means in the full sense of the word a catastrophe for the German Communist Party. Our criticism will meet with an already favorable audience there. I do not doubt that in the coming months the Left Opposition in Germany will enjoy very great success.

A few days ago I received a packet of the Bulgarian journal, *Klasove Borba* [Class Struggle], with some articles of mine reprinted. As far as I understand, that journal is issued by the left wing of the Social Democracy. Like other organs of the latter, this journal reprints articles directed against the official course of the Comintern while saying nothing of our criticism directed against the Social Democracy. These "left" Social Democrats lead a purely parasitic ideological existence. They do not understand, or pretend not to understand, that we stand much further from them than does the Stalinist bureaucracy, regardless of its phraseology about "social fascism."
ON A POLITICAL NOVEL

April 13, 1932

Dear Comrade M. Neumann:

I gave your novel to two younger friends to read. They found reading it very interesting, and when they were finished both had the same unshakable impression—emotionally for the Oppositionists, politically against the Opposition. That coincides completely with my impression too. You yourself make no attempt to hide this attitude. On the contrary, you express the moral of the book in the title: I Can't Go On. This refers not only to the Opposition, but to the Soviet Union as a whole: I can't stand it any more. You develop this trend by tracing the root of the problem to the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this question is the dividing line between communism and reformism—here dictatorship, there democracy. In this sense too your book has been written completely in favor of the Social Democracy and against communism. I do not doubt for a moment that this was not your goal, but you reached it all the same. You will understand when I say that in no case and by no means can I solidarize myself with this book. It is unfair not so much to me as to the cause I defend for the publisher to want to put my picture on the jacket. But of course I can't prevent that.

Let me add that your book contains factual errors. The Fifth World Congress [1924] was not concerned with a "lost revolution." On the contrary, it still saw the revolutionary situation ahead of it. No one wanted to censor my speech. And I was not against but in favor of the November demonstration of 1927.

My sincere thanks for the friendly feelings you hold for me. You have won me over so much through your letters that I deeply regret the fact that our paths are leading in such irreconcilable directions.

With warmest greetings.

Yours,
L. Trotsky
1. The fundamental cause of the crisis may be defined by a single word: capitalism. The specific character of this crisis is explained by another term: imperialism, that is to say, monopoly capitalism, which is beginning to putrefy within its own insoluble contradictions. The rise and fall of Ivar Kreuger symbolizes all of capitalism today. The official moralists are hurling their thunder against the match king after the event. But he could have replied to them: Why have you given me free rein to dispose of productive forces which, under the direction of a humane society, ought to serve society itself?

Will the capitalist world order survive the present crisis? The reply depends upon what is understood by the term crisis. Conjunctural variations accompany the entire history of capitalism. In past periods the curve of capitalism rose throughout all the conjunctural variations. Today it is declining. This does not exclude conjunctural variations in the future; on the contrary, these are inevitable. But the present acute crisis can only be attenuated in such a way that it will culminate in a higher paroxysm in the next immediate stage. This whole tragic process can end only by the transformation of the whole social system.

2. Have I any hope of success of the disarmament conference? Not the least. But in this I am not an exception. The French project is sufficiently characterized by the fact it has been presented by the Tardieu government. At the same time that France supports the bloody work of Japan in the Far East, Japan gratefully supports the pacifist initiative of France at Geneva. An incomparable lesson for everyone! The project of France provides for the creation, under the mantle
of the League of Nations, of a new entente with the one aim of stabilizing the hegemony of French finance capital with the aid of an "international" army.

But the American project also does not open up any perspective. Wars today are not conducted with the arms which the warring nation possesses on the eve of war, but with those which are manufactured in the course of the war itself. The United States has, from this point of view, given a lesson to the entire world and to Germany in particular. The outcome of the future war will be determined by the technical capacity of the belligerent countries. The more advanced the industrial development of a country, the more interested is the country in a provisional "limitation" of armaments, for in such a case it will really be easier for it to provide its army with the necessities.

At best, the conference will be terminated with hollow phrases. The failure of the Geneva conference will constitute a new impulsion for the course toward armaments and will amplify the war danger.

The Franco-Japanese policy, its bellicose as well as its "pacifist" side, is being oriented more and more openly not only against China but also against the Soviet Union. That Litvinov at the Geneva conference expresses the honest desire of the USSR not to enter the war cannot be doubted by any attentive observer. But I wish the Soviet delegation had devoted a moment to pass over from the technical peace proposals, which even from an educational point of view do not bear any great importance, to a more active policy, that is, to say what is openly before the conference, and in this manner to warn the people of the danger facing them. For if there is any force on our planet capable of "limiting" armaments on land and sea, it is the desire of the masses of the people.

3. The rumors in the press about my return to the USSR in the near future do not rest upon any serious information whatsoever. It is rather more a matter of inventions caused by the highly charged general situation. Needless to say the faction to which I belong will put itself entirely and completely at the disposal of the Soviet government. As a precedent we can point out that in the period of the civil war of 1918-20, Stalin, Voroshilov, and others were in sharp opposition to the methods of conducting the war that I, in full agreement with Lenin, pursued. This did not at all prevent the oppositionists of that time from taking an active part in the struggles.
"THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM"¹²⁴
A Foolish Man on a Serious Subject

May 1932

The German liberal newspaper, Das Berliner Tageblatt, dedicated a special issue in May to economic construction in the USSR. The political article was written by Radek.¹²⁵ To the question in which direction the Soviet Union is developing Radek answers as follows: "In the fourteen years which separate us from the October Revolution, the foundations of socialism have been created in Russia. By gigantic struggles, by unceasing labor, a new society is being born." In such a general form, of course, these words can evoke no objections, particularly since they are published in the columns of a bourgeois paper. But Radek does not confine himself to this. Spurred on by an insatiable need to prove the sincerity of his repentance, he goes on to write: "This is denied not only by outright enemies of the Soviet Union, but it is also impugned by Leon Trotsky; as he puts it, at a time when there is a scarcity of milk in Russia he who talks about the creation of the foundations of socialism compromises socialism. This remark shows only," continues Radek, "that the author has lost those scales which he was formerly capable of applying to evaluate historical events." Radek, who renounced his own program, is accusing others of losing their historical scales! What, however, should these consist of? We quote the answer verbatim: "Milk is a product of cows and not of socialism, and you would actually have to confuse socialism with the image of a country where flow rivers of milk in order not to understand that a country can rise for a time to a higher level of development without any considerable rise in the material condition of the masses."
For the moment let us put aside the clownish tone of the discussion, and let us try to extract its serious kernel. There is, first of all, in Radek's answer the same theoretical subterfuge which Stalin has resorted to more than once when pressed to the wall. The matter concerns the little word "foundations" of socialism. The current leaders of the Soviet Union have officially proclaimed that the country "has entered into socialism." We have called and continue to call this assertion criminal bureaucratic charlatanism. Radek keeps mum on the entry into socialism. Instead he advises us that in the Soviet Union there have been created the foundations of socialism. One can agree or disagree with this, depending upon what one understands by "foundations."

Radek does not leave us without an answer on this point. "If we are convinced," he says, "that the foundations of socialism have already been laid in Russia, it is because our judgment rests, in the first place, on the fact that the possessing classes have disappeared and that the means of production are concentrated in the hands of the proletarian state." In this sense, the foundations indubitably have been laid. But in such a formulation the subject of the dispute disappears altogether. Radek reduces his proof to the fact that Russia has passed through the proletarian revolution. There is no harm in reminding the honored readers of Das Berliner Tageblatt about it. Unfortunately, however, the proletarian revolution and the expropriation of the possessing classes took place as early as 1917-18, while the arrival of socialism was announced in 1930-31. We were advised of it not on the basis of the expropriation of the expropriators (we knew about this even before), but on the basis of 100 percent collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks as a class. Then why does Radek surrender without a blow the first line of battle, "the Stalin line"? Why, while so bravely assuming military activities against Trotsky, does he immediately retreat far, far to the rear, and entrench himself in the line of 1918 that is threatened by nobody?

There is no denying that in the first years after the October overturn all of us said tens and hundreds of times, "We are laying the foundations of socialist construction." And that was correct. But this meant only that the political and legal property prerequisites for socialist transformation were created. And that is all!

If it were in any way possible to speak seriously on serious subjects with Radek, we would make an attempt to explain
to him that it is impossible, in 1932, to answer the question of the direction in which the Soviet Union is developing by referring to the political "foundations" of socialist construction. The insufficiency of this reference by itself was exposed for the first time on a major scale in 1921, when the question of the reciprocal relations with the peasantry was posed point-blank. The creation of the economic link between the city and the village was then proclaimed to be the genuine foundation of socialist construction. This was the basic task of the New Economic Policy. The theoretical formula of the link was very simple: nationalized industry must provide the peasantry with products indispensable to it, in such quantity, of such quality, and at such prices as would entirely eliminate or reduce to a minimum, in the relations between the state and the peasant masses, the factor of extra-economic force, that is, seizure of peasant labor by decree. (This of course does not refer to the kulaks, in relation to whom a special task is posed: to limit their exploiting activities and to prevent their becoming the dominant power in the village.) The establishment of a reciprocal relationship of voluntary "barter" between industry and agriculture, between the city and the village, would impart an immutable firmness to the political link between the proletariat and the peasantry. There would still remain, of course, a long and difficult road to socialism. But on this foundation—on the foundation of a link between the city and the village acceptable to the peasant—economic construction could be advanced with confidence, without rushing ahead or falling behind, by maneuvering on the world market and in accordance with the tempo of the development of revolution in the West and in the East. This was not projected as a road to socialism on a national scale—that could not be useful to anyone. It would suffice if the still-isolated economy of the Soviet Union became one of the preparatory elements of the future international socialist society.

He who talks about "the foundations of socialism" in 1932 has no right to retreat to the line of 1918, without even an attempt to hold to the line of 1921, that is, without giving an answer to the question: Did we succeed in the twelve years that have elapsed since the introduction of the NEP in achieving the link, in the Leninist sense of the word? Did the 100 percent collectivization assure such reciprocal relations between the city and the village as to reduce extra-economic force, if not to zero then at least approaching it? This is the nub of the question. And to this fundamental question one is still
compelled to give a negative answer. The 100 percent collectivization has come about not as the crowning and fruition of an accomplished link but as an administrative cover of its absence. To keep mum on this question, to circumvent it, to beat around the bush with words, is to call the greatest dangers upon the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . But of course it is not from Radek that one should expect an analysis of the problems of the relations between worker and peasant.

From Radek one can expect only fancy journalistic turns. In conclusion let me say that it is impossible to observe without dismay Radek's performance on the pages of a liberal paper on the question of the essence of socialism. Socialism is not the land of rivers of milk. Do not demand milk from socialism. "Milk is a product of cows." If one takes into account that right now a battle is occurring in the Soviet Union precisely around the question of cows, which takes on at times tragic forms, then Radek's antics become intolerable. One can't help recalling the merciless evaluation, reserved as it was, that Lenin made of Radek at the Seventh Party Congress during the controversy over the Brest-Litovsk peace. Referring to Radek's remark—"Lenin yields space to gain time"—Lenin said, "I return to what Comrade Radek said, and take this opportunity to emphasize that he has **accidentally** succeeded in uttering a serious thought." And further on, "this time it has happened that Comrade Radek has delivered himself of a thoroughly serious statement."

Lenin meant to make unequivocally clear that serious statements could come from Radek only by accident and as rare exceptions. Matters on this score have in no way improved with the years. There is less hair outside and more foolishness inside. Stalin proclaimed: "We have entered into socialism." Don't boast prematurely, objected the Opposition, for babies still lack milk. A jester takes the spotlight and, jingling his bells, announces that milk is the product of cows and not of socialism. In Radek's vein, one might answer with the Russian proverb: "Bide a day, bide till you're gray, you can't get milk from a billy goat." Even a billy goat grown bald is capable only of prancing, not more. That is why we prefer to return to serious questions on more serious occasions.
A REPLY TO MAY DAY GREETINGS

May 4, 1932

To Osvobozhdenie

Dear Comrades:

I have received your May Day greetings telegram. Thank you! By chance a telegram from the Soviet Union, from the exiles in Siberia, also reached me.

I receive Osvobozhdenie regularly. I have number 5 in my hands right now. The journal produces a lively impression, and I fully understand that this will be the feeling of all thinking and independent elements of the proletarian vanguard.

The Prussian elections have given a cruel check to the policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The results of the French elections will evidently go in the same direction. A hard blow! But as has not seldom been the case in history, the defeats will stimulate critical thought. It is this that explains the fury of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Yesterday I received a letter from the comrades in Danzig, where Stalinist apparatus functionaries, at the head of an attacking gang, burst into a hall where a public meeting of the Opposition was to open and carried out a pogrom, fully in the spirit of the fascist paramilitary units. The meeting was broken up. But on the very next day the secretary of the local organization of young workers, along with ten others, came over to the ranks of our Danzig organization. A very important and promising symptom!

The more furious the Stalinist bureaucracy becomes, the more tenacity and self-control will be required of the Left Opposition. We shall show and prove to the conscious workers that we are not to be dispersed by threats or overcome by violence. We shall win the confidence of the rank and file of the movement with the clarity and consistency of our class politics.

I do not doubt that the responses to the work and successes of the International Left Opposition will reach even the Russian Bolshevik-Leninists, including those imprisoned and exiled. I take courage from their names, and above all from the name of C. G. Rakovsky, and I pass on to Osvobozhdenie and to all Bulgarian comrades warm fraternal greetings.

Yours,

L. Trotsky

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"BLOCS" AND ABSURDITIES

May 6, 1932

Dear Comrades:

For your information I am sending along the enclosed two letters which were sent to me by the L. group. The first one asks that my references to Die Permanente Revolution be cut out of my German pamphlets. On this condition the L. group would very generously undertake to circulate them. These people—just listen to this—say they cannot unite with the Permanente Revolution group because of its opportunism: "Lenin taught us to be uncompromising," etc., etc. Their proposition was so absurd that of course I left it unanswered.

Some time later, I received a second letter from this group. By this time a "bloc" of organizations belonging to the Left Opposition was being proposed. For the formation of this "bloc" a conference in Berlin was suggested: we should send two representatives to this conference; the L. group would designate two representatives of their own.

Familiar though we are after two years of experience with this worthless group of schemers, we have to marvel at their proposals: first they explain to us that our organization is opportunist, and therefore they cannot work with us; when they receive no answer from us, they propose a "bloc" with this same opportunist organization.

They are obviously not clear on what they mean by a "bloc." A bloc can be formed around some particular concrete action. They, however, have in mind not a temporary bloc but a permanent federation. To base our work on the federation principle—even when it is a question of a serious group—goes against the ABC of democratic centralism. We would first have to sit down with the L. group and come to an understanding with them on every single question, as though they were a
significant force! When there are common grounds for working together, then we have to talk about unification. But the very experience of working with them has proved that there are no such common grounds. In spite of our all too indulgent attitude toward these politically and morally decadent elements, they have grasped the fact—and this in itself must convince them—that our organization is growing while they stand impotent on the sidelines; and so these gentlemen propose a "bloc," a federation of the International Left, on the basis of their line. In other words, they want us to join our organization to an instrument for demoralization and betrayal.

Naturally I have not answered them, and have no intention of doing so. The Left Opposition would not be worth consideration if it had not learned to weigh people and groupings on the strength of the actual work they do, rather than on wholesale formulas. I have no doubt that we wouldn't find a serious revolutionary among the ranks of the International Opposition who would vote to enter into discussions of any kind with bankrupt little schemers. However, since we have new sections which are not too familiar with what has happened, it would probably be worth sending copies of their letters and mine to all sections for their information.

L. Trotsky
I have reread the theses of the Second Conference of the American League concerning the question of the labor party.\textsuperscript{133} I find it excellent in every part, and I subscribe to it with both hands.

I find it necessary to emphasize my full agreement with those theses all the more as my interview to the \textit{New York Times} [printed in] March 1932 gave rise to misunderstanding and misinterpretation, especially on the part of the Lovestone group.\textsuperscript{134}

1. What was my idea on the labor party in that statement? I stated that American politics will be Europeanized in the sense that the inevitable and imminent development of a party of the working class will totally change the political face of the United States. This is a commonplace for a Marxist. The question was not of a labor party in the specific British sense of that word but in the general European sense, without designating what form such a party would take or what phases it would go through. There was not the slightest necessity in that interview to enter into the internal tactical differences within the Communist ranks. The translation of my interview from the Russian text, which employs the words \textit{rabochaya partia}, into the English was defective in that it permitted one to make a concrete and specific interpretation of what should have been a general one.

2. One can declare that even the general term "party of the working class" does not exclude a labor party in the British sense. Be that as it may. However, such an eventuality has nothing to do with a precise tactical question. We can admit hypothetically that the American trade-union bureaucracy will be forced, under certain historical conditions, to imitate the
British trade-union bureaucracy in creating a kind of party based upon the trade unions. But that eventuality, which appears to me to be very problematical, does not constitute an aim for which the Communists must strive and on which one must concentrate the attention of the proletarian vanguard.

3. A long period of confusion in the Comintern led many people to forget a very simple but absolutely irrevocable principle: that a Marxist, a proletarian revolutionist, cannot present himself before the working class with two banners. He cannot say at a workers' meeting: "I have a ticket for a first-class party and another, cheaper ticket for the backward workers." If I am a Communist, I must fight for the Communist party.

4. One can say that under the American conditions a labor party in the British sense would be a progressive step, and by recognizing this and stating so, we ourselves, even though indirectly, help to establish such a party. But that is precisely the reason I will never assume the responsibility to affirm abstractly and dogmatically that the creation of a labor party would be a "progressive step" even in the United States, because I do not know under what circumstances, under what guidance, and for what purposes that party would be created. It seems to me more probable that especially in America, which does not possess any important traditions of independent political action by the working class (like Chartism in England, for example) and where the trade-union bureaucracy is more reactionary and corrupted than it was at the height of the British empire, the creation of a labor party could be provoked only by mighty revolutionary pressure from the working masses and by the growing threat of communism. It is absolutely clear that under these conditions the labor party would signify not a progressive step but a hindrance to the progressive evolution of the working class.

5. In what form the party of the working class will become a genuine mass party in the United States in the immediate future we cannot prophesy, because the socialist and labor parties differ greatly in the various countries, even in Europe. In Belgium, for example, we see an intermediate sort of party arise. Certainly the phases of development of the proletarian party in America will be sui generis. We can only affirm with the greatest assurance: Especially since the United States, in the period from 1921 to 1924, has already had an important rehearsal in the creation of a labor or farmer-labor party, a resurrection of a similar movement cannot be a
simple repetition of that experience, but a far more pregnant
and more crystallized movement, either under the guidance
of a revolutionary Communist party or under the guidance
of reformist\textsuperscript{137} elements against a growing Communist party.
And if even in 1921-24 the Communist Party did not find
great possibilities for independent action inside the organiza-
tion of an inchoate labor party, it would have less possibility
in the new phase of an analogous movement.

6. One can imagine that the trade-union bureaucracy and
its socialist and left-democratic advisers may show themselves
to be more perspicacious and begin the formation of a labor
party before the revolutionary movement becomes too threaten-
ing. In view of the groping empiricism and provincial nar-
rowness of the American labor bureaucracy and the aristocracy
of labor, such perspicacity seems very improbable. The failure
of such an attempt in the past shows us that the bureaucracy,
so tenacious in its immediate aims, is absolutely incapable
of systematic political action on a great scale even in the in-
terests of capitalist society. The bureaucracy must receive a
blow on the skull before taking such a "radical" initiative.
However, if the creation of a labor party would prevent, in
a certain period, great successes of communism, our elemen-
tary duty must be, not to proclaim the progressiveness of
the labor party, but its insufficiency, ambiguity, and limited-
ness, and its historical role as a hindrance to the proletarian
revolution.

7. Must we join that labor party or remain outside? This
is not a question of principle but of circumstances and pos-
sibilities. The question itself has arisen from the experience
of the British Communists with the Labour Party, and that
experience has served far more the Labour Party than the
Communists. It is evident that the possibility of participating
in a labor-party movement and of utilizing it would be greater
in the period of its inception, that is, in the period when the
party is not a party but an amorphous political mass move-
ment. That we must participate in it at that time and with
the greatest energy is without question; not to help form a
labor party which will exclude us and fight against us, but
to push the progressive elements of the movement more and
more to the left by our activity and propaganda. I know this
seems too simple for the great new school which searches
everywhere for some method to jump over its feeble head.

8. To consider a labor party as an integrated series of united
fronts signifies a misunderstanding of the notions both of the
The united front and of the party. The united front is determined by concrete circumstances, for concrete aims. The party is permanent. In a united front we leave our hands free to break with our temporary allies. In a common party with these allies we are bound by discipline and even by the fact of the party itself. The experience of the Kuomintang and of the Anglo-Russian Committee must be well understood. The strategic line dictated by the lack of a spirit of independence of the Communist party and by the desire to enter into the "big" party (Kuomintang, Labour Party) inevitably produced all the consequences of the opportunistic adaptation to the will of the allies and, through them, to that of the enemy. We must educate our cadres to believe in the invincibility of the Communist idea and in the future of the Communist party. The parallel struggle for another party inevitably produces in their minds a duality and turns them onto the road of opportunism.

9. The policy of the united front has not only its great advantages but its limits and its dangers as well. The united front, even in the form of temporary blocs, often impels one to opportunist deviations which are frequently fatal, as, for example, with Brandler in 1923. That danger becomes absolutely predominant in a situation in which the so-called Communist party becomes a part of a labor party created by the grace of the propaganda and action of the Communist party itself.

10. That the labor party can become an arena of successful struggle for us, and that the labor party, created as a barrier to communism, can under certain circumstances strengthen the Communist party, is true, but only under the condition that we consider the labor party not as "our" party but as an arena in which we are acting as an absolutely independent Communist party.

11. All the resolutions about the British Labour Party must be evaluated not as they were written before the experiences of the Comintern and the British Communist Party in that regard, but in the light of that experience. The attempt to apply them mechanically now, in 1932, to American conditions, is characteristic of the mind of the epigones and has nothing to do with Marxism and Leninism.

12. It is not necessary to say that the idea of a farmer-labor party is a treacherous mockery of Marxism.
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL QUESTIONS

May 19, 1932

To the National Committee, Communist League of America
(Excerpts from a letter)

I am very glad you have taken a firm position on the international question. . . .

On the internal dispute in the American League I do not as yet take a position because I have not had an opportunity to study the question with sufficient attentiveness. When I take a position I will try not to let myself be influenced in advance by the false and damaging position of Comrade Shachtman on all the international questions, almost without exception. On the other hand, however, it is not easy to assume that one can be correct on the most important national questions when one is always wrong on the most important international questions.
WHO SHOULD ATTEND THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE?¹⁴⁰

May 22, 1932

To the Administrative Secretariat

Dear Comrades:

Some sections are once again raising the question of the international conference. There is no doubt that the convocation of the conference has suffered extraordinary delay in comparison with our original general intentions. The causes for this are of two types: general causes, arising from the conditions of the world labor movement, and specific causes, arising from the conditions of the development of the International Left Opposition itself.

Despite exceptionally favorable objective conditions, communism is experiencing defeats and is retreating all over the world. This fact of necessity also grips the Left Opposition to a certain extent, since the working masses see it only as a part of communism. This process will inevitably reach a critical turning point in the direction of the Left Opposition. But this point has not yet been reached.

Insofar as the Left Opposition itself is concerned, its ranks have from the very beginning been interspersed with elements that are completely alien to our ideas and methods. No one has caused and no one causes the Opposition more damage than characters of the type of Paz, Gorkin,¹⁴¹ Landau, etc. Unfortunately they have not yet been altogether eliminated from our ranks. Cleansing our ranks of them is itself an indispensable prerequisite for the possibility of convoking an international conference.

We must clearly take into account in advance what can be demanded of the international conference and what it is capable of offering to us. The dead or half-dead groups and individually demoralized elements of the Landau type conceive of the international conference as an arena in which they will be able to preoccupy themselves with personal combinations and intrigues, in general, and to imitate a sort of political activity. It would be suicidal stupidity to offer them such a possibility.
Nevertheless, there are honest followers of the Left Opposition who dream of such an international conference, to which access will be gained without exception by all the groups who believe or declare that they stand on the ground of the Left Opposition's ideas. We must offer determined resistance to this erroneous conception.

Only political infants can believe that the international conference by itself can create anything new in principle or, conversely, that it can undo what has been done. In reality, the conference will only be able to register and to confirm what has been already actually tested and gained by experience. Therein and only therein lies the significance of the conference. To demand more than this means to sow organizational fetishism.

No serious section, no serious revolutionary, will agree to a conference constructed according to the model of Noah's ark, for that would mean to throw the development of the Opposition back by at least two years. The political character of the various organizations and individual persons is recognized and tested not at conferences, but in daily work, in the course of months and years. The conference will not offer anything to those for whom the past of the Landau group, the Austrian Mahnruf group, the Greek Spartakos group, the Parisian Rosmer group, etc., is unknown. And those groups which have broken with the above-mentioned on the basis of lengthy and dearly paid for experience will naturally not agree to a common conference with them.

We need a conference of genuine cothinkers, that is, a conference of such sections whose solidarity on all the basic questions has been tested by the experiences of common struggle. A conference must take as its point of departure the delineation and cleansing of the ranks of the Left Opposition which have already been achieved, and not begin the whole story all over again.

Someone might object: But there are groups which did not participate in the preceding ideological struggles, which did not follow them and have formed no opinion on them—what about them? Quite correct. Such groups do exist. And it is in most cases precisely they who nurture the thought of calling a "universal" conference which is to analyze and bring everything into order. To such groups we can give only one piece of advice: study the old questions of dispute already decided in the Left Opposition, on the basis of the documents, and form your collective opinions on the question. There is no
other way. The international conference will, as a matter of fact, have meaning only when the delegates express not just their personal opinions but represent the opinions of their organizations. However if these questions of dispute are not discussed within the International Left Opposition, what significance can the accidental vote of a delegate at a conference have?

Every organization and group that wants to belong to the International Opposition is not only duty-bound to follow the internal struggle in the other sections, but also to make a choice openly between the most important sections of the International Left Opposition and those groups which have been forced to break with the Bolshevik-Leninists or which have been eliminated from their midst.

The Austrian Opposition (Frey group) left the ranks of the International Opposition about a year and a half ago under the pretext of the incorrect organizational methods of the International Left. In reality, the Frey group would not tolerate critical attitudes towards its own often erroneous methods. After a rather prolonged existence outside of the International Opposition, the Frey group has applied to the Secretariat for readmission. Does this mean that the Austrian Opposition has renounced its erroneous methods? Let's hope that this is so. In any case, we have no right to refuse the attempt of renewed collaboration with the Austrian Opposition, with the earnest intention of achieving complete unity.

In an analogous manner we must proceed with regard to all of the other groups, which, although they declare their solidarity with the Left Opposition, in practice very light-mindedly come into conflict with its principles and methods and basically do not give sufficient weight to their adherence to our international organization. It is a hundred times better to leave such a group to itself for the time being than to permit it to exercise its influence over the decisions of the Left Opposition and to obstruct its development. For a group which rises and develops to the stage of solidarity with our faction we always leave the door open.

In France the struggle was carried on around three questions: (a) one or two parties (the second party very often appeared under the pseudonym of an "independent" faction); (b) the relation between the party and the trade unions; (c) the relationship between the national sections and the international organization. On the basis of these questions and by no means out of personal motives, the split with the Rosmer-Naville
group took place. Naville himself has, to be sure, preferred to remain inside the League, but that does not at all change the character of his group as one alien in principle to the Left Opposition.

In the Belgian section the internal struggle revolved around the questions of the relationship to the party, the Comintern, the Soviet Union on the one hand and the mass organizations on the other. Remaining for a long time without international support, the workers' organization of Charleroi showed remarkable endurance and energy in its struggle against the Overstraeten group, which compromised the cause of the Left Opposition. Will anyone propose to turn back to Overstraeten? Nevertheless the Naville-Rosmer tendency only represents in slightly adulterated form the ideas and methods of Overstraeten.

The Landau group consists of the degenerated refuse of the factional struggle, without any principled ground under its feet. In Austria the Mahnruf group changed in principle its various platforms several times. The Berlin Landau group is in a bloc with the semisyndicalist Rosmer group in Paris although it itself has nothing to do with syndicalism whatsoever. To those within the ranks of the Left Opposition who are not familiar with the history of the Landau-Mahnrf group, the leadership of each national section must at least furnish the most important documents on this question. Every serious worker will understand without any difficulty that we can have nothing in common with such elements as Landau and Co.

According to all information we have on hand, the Greek Spartakos group belongs in the same category as the Landau group. The development of the Opposition in Greece is carried on by the faction of the Archio-Marxists.

The Italian Prometeo group was and still is an alien body inside the Left Opposition. The Prometeo group is bound by its own internal discipline with regard to the International Left and does not permit the propagation within its ranks of our fundamental views. In the period of the struggle of the Left Opposition with the right-center bloc, when the main question of the struggle was that of the independence of the party in the policy of communism (Kuomintang, Anglo-Russian Committee, worker-peasant parties, etc.), there was much that brought the Bordigists close to us; ultralefts very often prove to be on the side of Marxism in the struggle against the reformists. In the period when bureaucratic centrism began its ultraleft zigzag, the Bordigists actually proved to be far closer to the Stalinists than to us. In the bulletin of the New Italian
Opposition, in the organ of the French section *La Lutte des Classes* (the article of Comrade Souze), in the International Bulletin, and finally in the publications of the Bordigists themselves there are enough documents and articles to prove conclusively and completely that the Bordigists have forgotten nothing and learned nothing and that according to their basic views they do not belong to the International Left Opposition. Their participation at the international conference would only mean the reopening of endless debates on the themes of whether we should or should not apply the united-front policy to the Social Democracy and on political questions in general: whether in fascist Italy, not to speak of China and India, we should or should not mobilize the masses with democratic slogans. Debates on these questions would mean a return for the Opposition to its kindergarten stage and would transform the international conference into a caricature that would only compromise us.

On the basis of what has been presented above I take occasion to submit the following proposals to all sections for a vote:

1. The International Left Opposition stands on the ground of the first four congresses of the Comintern. It considers especially and particularly that the policy of the united front is unconditionally correct as it was formulated by the Third and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern and categorically rejects the basically false views of the Prometeo group on this question as well as on the question of the struggle for democratic slogans under definite historical conditions.

2. Only those sections can participate in the international conference which have participated in the life and work of the International Left Opposition not less than one year and whose solidarity with the Opposition has been tested by common work.

3. On all questions that concern the preparation of the international conference, decisions not only by the leadership (central committee), but without exception by all members of the organization are necessary. To this end the most important documents must be translated in time into the national languages and be discussed by all units of every national section. The figures in the votes must be brought to the attention of the International Secretariat in time.

Consequently there can be no question of participation at the conference of competitive or expelled groups side by side with the regular sections.

G. Gourov [L. Trotsky]
Comrade Weisbord:

On its own initiative your organization has delegated you to get an exchange of views on questions which separate you from the American League, which is the section of the International Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists). In the course of several talks you have explained the opinions of your organization on the fundamental questions in dispute. You have proposed that I put down in writing my conclusions from the talks we had. In the following lines I shall try to do this, without pretending to exhaust the questions you have raised.

1. I am inclined to consider the question of the "labor party" the most important. Involved in this is the question of the essential instrument of the proletarian revolution. Any lack of clarity or any ambiguity on this question is pernicious. I have criticized the ideas developed by you in defense of the slogan of the "labor party" in a special document which I have given you. Here I think it necessary to add only a few words.

On the question of the labor party your organization is very close to Lovestone's, which is notoriously opportunistic. The Lovestone group is consistent in its denial of the independent historic role of the Communist party. This group till today approves of the policy of the Comintern in regard to the Kuomintang and the British trade unions, that is, of the capitulation of communism, in principle, in the one case before the bourgeoisie and in the other case before the lieutenants of the bourgeoisie within the working class.

Your group as far as I know condemns the policies of the Stalinists in China and in Great Britain but at the same time accepts the slogan of the labor party. That is, while taking...
or trying to take a Marxist position toward past events in other countries you take an opportunist position toward future events in your own country. I believe that without a radical revision of your position on the central question of the party, an effective rapprochement between your organization and the International Left Opposition cannot be realized.

2. Up to now your group has rejected our definition of the international Stalinist faction as bureaucratic centrism. You begin with the view that one can characterize as "centrist" only those groupings which stand between the official camp of reformism (the Social Democracy) and the official camp of communism. Under this purely formalistic, schematic, undialectical conception of centrism is hidden in fact a lack of clarity of the political position of your own group. You wish to erase the differences between the official party, the right-wing faction (the Lovestone group), and even the American League. This makes it easy for you to maintain an eclectic position and defend your right of a bloc with the Lovestone group.

That the Lovestone group does not represent a purely reformist organization is incontestable, but it is a question of its tendency and political orbit. The Lovestone group represents a variety of right-wing centrism which is evolving from communism to the Social Democracy. The German Socialist Workers Party (SAP), which broke from the Social Democracy, contains a more progressive tendency than the Brandlerites, although according to theoretical formulas the latter are apparently nearer to us. Statically, the Lovestone group, the German Brandlerites, and the SAP represent varieties of right-wing centrism. But dynamically one is different from the other and it is the dynamics that decides.

Certainly on a number of subordinate questions the Lovestone group has taken a more correct position than the official party, but to form a bloc with the Lovestone group would be to augment its general authority and by that to help it perform its reactionary historic mission.

I shall not stop here to go into more details on the question of centrism; I permit myself to refer you to my latest pamphlet (What Next?), which will soon appear in America.

Without clarity on this most essential question, in my opinion a rapprochement between your faction and the International Left Opposition cannot be achieved.

3. To a considerable degree your criticism of the American League starts from wrong premises (the most important are given above). At the same time you give your criticism a
character so immoderate, exaggerated, and embittered that we are forced to view you as an ideological trend not in the camp of the International Opposition but of its adversaries, if not of its open enemies.

On the basis of criteria which are partly false, partly insufficient and arbitrary, you deny, as I have said, the existence of differences in principle between the American League, the Lovestone group, and the official party. By this you declare not only that the leadership of the League is classed as opportunist but also that the International Left Opposition as a whole is absolutely incapable of distinguishing between Marxism and opportunism on a most basic question. Are you astonished then that the Bolshevik-Leninists want to know what holds you to the International Left Opposition?

4. You especially emphasize the necessity of active participation by the Left Opposition in the mass movement and the struggles of the workers in general. Although the Left Opposition in a majority of countries is today a propagandist organization, it propagandizes not in a sectarian form but in a Marxist manner, that is, on the basis of participation in all aspects of the life of the proletariat. I cannot agree that any leader or member of the American League denies this in principle. To a great extent the question reduces itself to the real possibilities, to which also pertain the natural capacity, experience, and initiative of the party.

Let us admit for a minute that the American League lacks this or that possibility for mass work. I agree that your group would be able to complement the work of the American League in that respect. But mass work must be carried out on the basis of definite principles and methods. Until the necessary unanimity on a number of fundamental questions is attained, disputes on "mass work" will inevitably remain fruitless.

5. I have called the position of your group eclectic. By this I certainly don't intend to express a sweeping condemnation which bars the way to a future rapprochement. This is a question that is also decided dynamically. You must openly, clearly, and carefully revise your premises in order to uncover not only obvious political mistakes, but also the historical and principled roots of these mistakes. I have warmly praised the theses of the Second Conference of the American League because in the theses not only was a correct position taken on the essence of the question but also an open and courageous criticism of its own past was made. Only in this way can a revolutionary tendency seriously assure itself against backsliding.
6. Your group has raised the slogan of an international conference with the participation of all the organizations and groups which count themselves in the Left Opposition. This appears to me to be false to the core. This is not the first day in the life of the Left Opposition. In the struggle for its ideas and methods, it has cleansed its ranks of alien elements. The international conference can and must start from the ideological work already accomplished and strengthen and systematize its results. To follow the road proposed by your group would mean to cross out the past and return to the original state of chaos. We cannot even speak of that.

The Left Opposition is not a mathematical sum of vacillating groups but an international faction constructed on the granite foundation of the principles of Marxism. A rapprochement and a fusion with the International Left Opposition cannot be obtained through organizational manipulations or through adventurist combinations a la Landau. I was glad to hear from you that your group has nothing in common with Landau and his methods. Precisely for this reason it is necessary to renounce once and for all the thought of transforming the International Left Opposition into a Noah's ark. It is necessary to choose another road, less precipitate but more serious and certain.

Before all you must keep clearly in mind that the road to the International Left Opposition leads through the American League; a second road does not exist. Unification with the American League is possible only on the basis of the unity of principles and methods, which must be formulated theoretically and verified by experience.

The best thing, in my opinion, would be for you to devote one of the next issues of your publication to a critical revision of your ideological assumptions, especially in regard to the disputed questions. Only the character of this revision (first of all, naturally, its content but in part also its form) can demonstrate to just what degree the practical steps toward unification are really ripe.

The most important excerpts from your articles could be printed in the *International Bulletin* as informational material. Naturally the question will be decided by the American League. But all our sections will want to be informed. Not one of them will demand any concessions in principle from the American League. All of them, however, will cooperate completely in the cause of rapprochement and fusion if the existence of a common basis of principle will be confirmed.
Needless to say I shall be very glad if your trip here and our discussions will contribute to the entry of your group into the camp of the Bolshevik-Leninists.

L. Trotsky

Postscript, May 24, 1932

For the sake of greater clarity I wish to add some remarks:

1. If I speak about the inadmissibility of direct or indirect support of the Lovestone group or the Brandlerites in general, I by no means want to say that these elements could not, under any circumstances, find a place for themselves in the Communist ranks. On the contrary, under a healthy regime of the Comintern, the majority of the Brandlerites would undoubtedly have accomplished some useful work. One of the pernicious consequences of the Stalinist bureaucracy is that it is compelled by each new empirical zigzag, for fear of its own collapse, to push out of the party its allies of yesterday.

Zinoviev and Kamenev represent highly qualified elements. Under Lenin's regime they accomplished very responsible work in spite of their insufficiency, which was well understood by Lenin. The regime of Stalin condemned Zinoviev and Kamenev to political death. The same thing can be said of Bukharin and many others. The ideological and moral degeneration of Radek is witness not only to the fact that Radek is not made of first-class material but also to the fact that the Stalinist regime can rely only on impersonal bureaucrats or morally corrupted individuals.

It is necessary, however, to take facts as they are. The Brandlerites, chased out of the Comintern, and their worst cohorts (the Lovestone group) have condemned themselves to political degeneration. Their ideological resources are nil. They don't have a mass following, and can't have. As an independent group they are capable only of causing confusion and disintegration. The sooner they dissolve the better. Who will be transformed into petty Stalinist officials and who into Social Democrats is a matter of indifference.

2. The remark made before that the SAP contains more progressive elements than the Brandlerites must in no case be submitted to a broad interpretation. One can't even speak of a political bloc between the Left Opposition and the SAP with its current obvious centrist leadership. The progressive tendencies within the SAP can be uncovered only by our implacable criticism of the SAP leadership, and also of the old Brandlerites who are behind them and who play a manifestly reactionary role within the organization.
We cannot put your American left socialists even on the same plane as the centrist leaders of the SAP, who at least have broken with the Social Democracy. By a correct policy on the part of the Communist party, the SAP could become, before its disintegration, a valuable auxiliary instrument for the destruction of the Social Democracy. As for the American left socialists, we do not have the least reason to distinguish them from Hillquit, that is, to see them as anything else than agents of the bourgeoisie within the working class.

3. On the question of the labor party you refer to the decision of the Fourth Congress. The Left Opposition stands entirely on the ground of the decisions of the first four congresses, but distinguishes decisions of principle and program from tactical and episodic decisions. The decision of the Fourth Congress on that question could only be a tactical hypothesis. Later the hypothesis was submitted to an enormous test. The Left Opposition in a certain sense grew from that test. The mistake of your group consists precisely in that you ignore the work of the Left Opposition on this fundamental question.

4. The same thing applies to the question of centrism. You refer to Lenin. But the task does not consist in referring to one or another quotation from Lenin, which relates to other times and conditions, but in using the method of Lenin correctly. Naturally in Lenin you don't find anything about bureaucratic centrism, because the Stalinist faction was formed politically after the death of Lenin. The International Left Opposition grew in the struggle against this faction. On this question, also, you ignore its critical activity.

5. I don't at all mean to imply that in the past your group defended the unworthy methods of the Landau group. You are wrong, however, in thinking that this is an internal question of the Left Opposition. The Left Opposition does not have and cannot have anything in common with the Landau group or with those who support that group.

L. Trotsky
TO A BULGARIAN WORKER
IN THE U. S. \textsuperscript{150}

May 24, 1932

Dear Comrade:

I have received your letter of May 9. As far as I can judge from your letter, you are a Bulgarian. You tell me that you have been in the United States for a long time and that there are many Bulgarian workers in your town. Do you belong to any organization? Do you maintain links with Bulgaria?

In any case, I am sending you some issues of the Bulgarian paper \textit{Osvobozhdenie}. I collaborate with this paper. You probably know the name of the great Bulgarian revolutionary Rakovsky. \textit{Osvobozhdenie} carries on in the spirit of his ideas.

If you are interested in the paper, you should get it sent directly from Sofia.

If you have close comrades who read English, they can get the American paper, \textit{The Militant}, which follows the same policy as \textit{Osvobozhdenie}. You are perfectly correct in saying that this is an exceptionally critical time, especially in the Far East. For precisely this reason not a single conscious worker should stand aside from the great struggle to achieve socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Comradely greetings,
L. Trotsky
To the International Secretariat  
(Copy to the National Committee of the American League)

I have received a copy of the letter dated April 26, 1932, sent by an organization of Negro comrades from Johannesburg. This letter, it seems to me, is of great symptomatic significance. The Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists) can and must become the banner for the most oppressed sections of the world proletariat, and consequently first and foremost for the Negro workers. Upon what do I base this proposition?

The Left Opposition represents at present the most consistent and most revolutionary tendency in the world. Its sharply critical attitude to any and all varieties of bureaucratic arrogance in the labor movement makes it possible for it to pay particular attention to the voice of the most oppressed sections of the working class and the toilers as a whole.

The Left Opposition is the target for the blows not only of the Stalinist apparatus but also of all the bourgeois governments of the world. This fact, which despite all the slanders is entering gradually into the consciousness of the masses, is bound to increasingly attract towards the Left Opposition the warm sympathies of the most oppressed sections of the international working class. From this point of view, the communication addressed to us by the South African comrades seems to me not at all accidental, but profoundly symptomatic.

In their letter, to which twenty-four signatures are appended (with the notation "and others"), the South African comrades expressed particular interest in the questions of the Chinese revolution. This interest, it ought to be acknowledged, is wholly justified. The working masses of the oppressed peoples, who have to carry on the struggle for elementary national rights and for human dignity, are precisely those who incur the greatest risk of suffering the penalties for the muddled teachings of the Stalinist bureaucracy on the subject of the "democratic dictatorship." Under this false banner, the policy a la Kuo-mintang, that is, the vile deception and the unpunished crush-
The program of the permanent revolution, based on the incontestable historic experience of a number of countries, can and must assume primary significance for the liberation movement of the Negro proletariat.

The Johannesburg comrades may not as yet have had the opportunity to acquaint themselves more closely with the views of the Left Opposition on all the most important questions. But this cannot be an obstacle to our getting together with them as closely as possible at this very moment, and helping them in a comradely way to come into the orbit of our program and our tactics.

When ten intellectuals, whether in Paris, Berlin, or New York, who have already been members of various organizations, address themselves to us with a request to be taken into our midst, I would offer the following advice: put them through a series of tests on all the programmatic questions; wet them in the rain, dry them in the sun, and then after a new and careful examination accept maybe one or two.

The case is radically altered when ten workers connected with the masses turn to us. The difference in our attitude to a petty-bourgeois group and to the proletarian group does not require any explanation. But if a proletarian group functions in an area where there are workers of different races and, in spite of this, remains composed solely of workers of a privileged nationality, then I am inclined to view them with suspicion. Are we not dealing perhaps with the labor aristocracy? Isn't the group infected with slaveholding prejudices, active or passive?

It is an entirely different matter when we are approached by a group of Negro workers. Here I am prepared to take it for granted in advance that we shall achieve agreement with them, even if such an agreement is not yet evident, because the Negro workers, by virtue of their whole position, do not and cannot strive to degrade anybody, oppress anybody, or deprive anybody of his rights. They do not seek privileges and cannot rise to the top except on the road of the international revolution.

We can and we must find a way to the consciousness of the Negro workers, the Chinese workers, the Indian workers, and all the oppressed in the human ocean of the colored races to whom belongs the decisive word in the development of mankind.

L. Trotsky
THE COMING
CONGRESS AGAINST WAR

June 13, 1932

Dear Comrades:

I have before me the June 4 issue of the Paris journal Le Monde [The World]. Le Monde is published by Barbusse and serves at the present time as the central organ for the convocation of the "great antiwar congress." On the third page of this journal there is an excerpt from an appeal by Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse. The character and spirit of the appeal are sufficiently clear from the following words: "We call upon all people, all groups, regardless of their political affiliations, and all labor organizations—cultural, social, and trade union—upon all forces and all mass organizations! Let all join us in the International Congress of War against War."

Then follows a passage from a letter addressed by Rolland to Barbusse: "I am wholly of the opinion that the congress should be open to all parties and nonpartisans on a common basis of sincere and determined struggle against war."

on, Rolland expresses his agreement with Barbusse that the first place in this struggle should be occupied by the working class. Still further, we read the first listing of those who have joined the congress. It consists of radical and semiradical French and German writers, pacifists, members of the League of the Rights of Man, and so forth.

This is followed by a maxim from the well-known Emile Vandervelde. "Everywhere war gives birth to . . . explosions of revolutionary dissatisfaction on the one hand and rabid reaction of fanatical nationalism on the other. It is of the utmost necessity that the Internationals closely unite their forces in order to prevent war."
Finally after these words by Vandervelde quoted from the [Belgian] socialist journal *Le Peuple* of May 29, 1932, we read a quotation from the central organ of the French Communist Party, *l'Humanité*, of May 31, 1932: "Reply 'Present!' to the call of Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse for participation in the international congress at Geneva."

In the last issue of *La Vie Ouvrière*, the central organ of the Unitary General Confederation of Labor [CGTU], there is an article in which complete agreement is expressed with the call made by Rolland and Barbusse.

The picture is now perfectly clear. The French Communist Party and the trade-union organization led by it stand behind the initiators of the congress. Behind the Communist Party stands the Comintern.

What is involved is the danger of a new world war. In the struggle against this danger, it is necessary to also utilize fellow travelers who are or who even may only appear to be the most honest and determined among the petty-bourgeois pacifists. In any case, however, this is a question of third-rate importance or less.

The call for a struggle against war, you would think, should be brought by the Comintern and Profintern before the eyes of the international proletariat. The most important problem is to successfully win over the working masses of the Second and the Amsterdam Internationals to our side.

To accomplish this, the policy of the united front can be of great service. The last session of the Executive Committee of the Second International pronounced itself against Japan and "for the defense of the USSR." We know the extent and the value of this defense insofar as the decision of the leaders is concerned. But the very fact that this decision was adopted is an indication of the force of the mass pressure (the crisis and the danger of war). The Comintern was duty-bound in these circumstances to develop the policy of the united front on an international scale, that is, to propose to the Second and the Amsterdam Internationals openly before the world proletariat a definite, carefully considered program of practical measures against the war danger.

But the Comintern is silent. The Profintern is silent. The initiative is surrendered to two pacifist writers, one of whom—Romain Rolland—is undoubtedly a great writer and a prominent person, but a man who is not engaged in politics, and the other—Barbusse—is a pacifist and a mystic, a Communist or one expelled from the Communist Party, but at any
rate an advocate of the complete fusion of the Communist parties with the Social Democracy. "Join us," say Rolland and Barbusse. Answer "Present!" *l'Humanite* joins in the refrain. Is it possible to imagine anything more monstrous, more capitulatory, and more criminal than this crawling of official communism before petty-bourgeois pacifism?

In Germany it is declared impermissible to apply the tactic of a united front to the mass organizations of the workers, with the aim of exposing their reformist leaders. At the same time on an international scale a united front is being applied, with its first steps turned into a booster campaign for the worst in the gallery of reformist traitors. Vandervelde is surely "for peace." He figures that it is more advantageous and convenient to serve in the ministry of his king in time of peace than in time of war. And so the insolent platitudes of this social patriot, whose signature if I am not mistaken appears on the Versailles peace treaty, are made into a program for the huge antiwar congress. And *l'Humanite* gives its support to this treacherous and pernicious masquerade.

In Germany it is a question of preventing a fascist counter-revolutionary pogrom which immediately and directly threatens not only the working class but also its reformist organizations and even its reformist leaders. For the Social Democratic gentlemen, it is a question of salaries, of government privileges, and even of their own hides. One must be in a state of complete bureaucratic idiocy to refuse to utilize correctly and thoroughly in the interests of the proletarian revolution the great, acute contradictions between fascism and the Social Democracy.

On the question of war, however, it is an entirely different matter. War does not at all constitute a direct threat to the reformist organizations, particularly to their leaders. On the contrary, experience has shown that war opens up heady careers for the reformist leaders. Patriotism is precisely the thing which most closely ties the Social Democracy to its national bourgeoisie. If it is possible, even inevitable, that the Social Democracy will be forced in some form or other, within certain bounds, to defend itself against fascism when the latter will seize it by the throat—and it will seize it—the possibility that the Social Democracy of any country would conduct a struggle against its bourgeoisie when war is declared, even if against the Soviet Union, is entirely excluded. The revolutionary campaign against war has as its particular and specific aim the exposure of the deceit and the decay of Social Democratic pacifism.
But what does the Comintern do? It prohibits the utilization of the absolutely real and deep antagonism between the Social Democracy and fascism on a national scale, while it attempts to grab hold of the illusory, hypocritical antagonism between the Social Democracy and its imperialist masters on an international scale.

While in Germany the united front is altogether prohibited, on the international arena the united front is from the very beginning given the decorative cover of a deliberately deceptive and rotten character. Exploiting the idealistic naivete of the entirely sincere Romain Rolland, all the fakers and dirty careerists, retired Social Democratic ministers and candidates for the post of minister, will declare "Present!" For this gentry the congress will serve as a sanatorium where they will improve their somewhat tarnished reputations in order to sell themselves at a higher price. This was the way the participants in the Anti-Imperialist League^159 acted. We are faced with a repetition of a Kuomintang and an Anglo-Russian Committee on a world scale.

There are pedants who doubt that we are correct in defining the international Stalinist faction as centrist. Those who have been poisoned by ill-digested texts are incapable of learning from living facts. Here you have ideal, classic, universal centrism in full bloom: its nose turned to the right, its tail still strongly inclined toward the left. Draw a line uniting its nose with its tail and you will find the orbit of centrism.

History is at a breaking point. The whole world today is at a breaking point. And centrism is at a breaking point. In the USSR the Stalinists continue to babble about the abolition of classes in five years as they simultaneously restore the free market. The ultraleft tail doesn't know yet what the wise opportunist head has decided. In the field of cultural matters, the policy has been given a sharp turn to the right. A silent turn, to be sure, without any commentary, but all the more threatening for that reason. The same process occurs in the policies of the Comintern. While the unlucky Piatnitskys^160 are still chewing the remnants of the ultraleft cud, the Manuilskys have already been ordered to turn their heads to the right, without regard for their backbones. Never before in the nine years of its activities has the epigone school revealed its lack of principle, its poverty of ideology, and its trickery in practice in so naked and shameless a manner as this.

Bolshevik-Leninists! The symptoms of a great historical turning point are accumulating on the world arena. This is bound
to affect the destiny of our faction. We are already charged with tasks of truly great historical significance. The struggle against war means above all a struggle against pacifist masquerades and centrist-bureaucratic fraud. We must launch a merciless campaign to expose the contradictions of the Stalinist apparatus, whose bankruptcy in the impending great events is inevitable.

The defense of the USSR is not a parlor phrase which the not always disinterested friends of the Stalinist bureaucracy repeat. The international defense of the USSR is becoming more and more dependent on the international revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. When the life and death of millions are at stake, the greatest clarity is needed. Nobody today renders better service to the class' enemy than the Stalinist apparatus which, in the struggle for the remains of its prestige, sows confusion and chaos everywhere.

Bolshevik-Leninists! You will be charged with an enormous task. Weeks and months are approaching when all revolutionists will have to show their worth. Carry the ideas of Marxism and Leninism into the ranks of the advanced workers. Help the international proletarian vanguard extricate itself from the straitjacket of the Stalinist bureaucracy, which has lost its head. What is involved is no small matter: it is the fate of the USSR and the world proletarian revolution.

Leon Trotsky
WHY I SIGNED RADEK'S THESES ON GERMANY

June 14, 1932

Dear Comrade Neurath:

... Now to Brandler's letter. He is correct that my signature stands below the theses of Radek and Pyatakov, which do not rightly reflect my views on the events and which, in many parts, are perhaps opposite to them. (Unfortunately I do not have the text.) How did this become possible?

The plenum of the ECCI was convoked towards the end of 1923, when the revolutionary situation in Germany had already been hopelessly missed. I was ill in the country, about 40 kilometers from Moscow. The German delegates (I remember Remmele, Koenen—but there were five or six of them) came to see me in the country in order to learn my opinion on the situation. All of them, like Brandler for that matter, were of the opinion that the revolutionary situation would grow continuously sharper and break out in the immediate future. I considered this position catastrophic for the fate of the party and put this question above all the others. Zinoviev, like the Russian Politburo as a whole, confirmed the course towards the armed uprising in Germany. I could only regard this as disastrous. Radek telephoned me from Moscow at the last hour to ask if I would be prepared to support his theses with my name. The telephone conversation took place half an hour before Radek's appearance at the plenum. I replied to him: "If your theses openly assert that the German situation is in a state of ebb and not of flow and that it is necessary to make a corresponding strategical turn, then I am ready to support your theses without having read them." There was no longer any other practical possibility. Upon Radek's assurance that this opinion was very clearly expressed in the theses, I gave my name over the telephone. At the same
time, however, I insured myself by the fact that I had very precisely formulated my conceptions of the German situation, its phases of development and its perspectives, in a series of articles and reports. My attitude towards the Radek theses may be deemed correct or false. An outsider, who neither knows the circumstances nor had read my writings of the period, can of course be led into confusion by my signature to the theses of Radek (who had to defend himself, too, and thereby also Brandler). But Brandler knows the circumstances very well and when he refers to Radek's theses, it is deliberately misleading on his part.

I must however add that in the Russian Central Committee I personally protected Brandler, because I was always against the policy of scapegoats. But that this goat has the inclination to leap to the right—on that score I had no illusions even then. What completely disqualifies Brandler politically in my eyes is his attitude towards the Chinese revolution and the Anglo-Russian Committee.

While Brandler is formally in the right with regard to the Radek theses, I cannot, however, at all understand what he means when he says that in 1926 I offered him, Brandler, a testimonial from Zinoviev on his, Brandler's, strategical flawlessness. I learn of this story now for the first time. Was it in writing? Was it oral? As I recall, I had neither written nor verbal contact with Brandler in 1926. I scarcely got to see him at all in that period. Radek, to be sure, oscillated between the Left Opposition and Brandler. He had doubts concerning the economic questions and referred constantly to the authority of Brandler as an official of the Supreme Council of National Economy. Brandler asserted that an accelerated industrialization was impossible. During the working out of the platform, Zinoviev demanded that Radek abandon his ambiguous attitude towards Brandlerian opportunism. I supported this proposal with the greatest readiness and we gave Radek a friendly ultimatum. He begged for twenty-four to forty-eight hours to think it over. It occurs to me now that he may have utilized this time to win Brandler for our platform. This is a belated hypothesis of mine, but it is also the only explanation of Brandler's muddled contention. That our bloc with Zinoviev was unprincipled, I cannot concede for a single instant. The principled basis of the bloc was our platform, which I regard to this day as the most important programmatic document of post-Leninist Bolshevism.
How the Brandlerites regarded Trotskyism in 1923 is shown by the enclosed review in *Die Rote Fahne* [The Red Flag]. A German comrade recently sent me the interesting document. *Die Rote Fahne* was at that time in the hands of the Brandlerites (Boettcher and Thalheimer). I assume that Thalheimer wrote the review. Brandler, at the very least, tolerated it. I don't want to dwell upon the inaccuracies in the review. I did not stand at the left wing of the Mensheviks. From 1904 to 1917 I was organizationally outside of both factions and never called myself a Menshevik. But that's neither here nor there at the moment. You know, moreover, what proposal the Brandlerite Central Committee unanimously made to me as late as September 1923. The most fateful matters were involved, and the proposal was motivated accordingly. But that's enough on the matter for the moment.

Leon Trotsky
THE STALIN BUREAUCRACY
IN STRAITS\textsuperscript{168}

June 16, 1932

We are approaching a turn on a major scale in the development of the Comintern and consequently of the Left Opposition as well. Once again big events reveal that false policies, imposed on the proletarian vanguard by force, must be heavily paid for in the end. There is not a single problem, literally not one, which does not expose with devastating clarity the insufficiency of the "general line." When a large concern is in straits, creditors from all sides swarm around and act the more mercilessly the longer the settlement has been delayed.

The war danger in the East is a direct and immediate result of Stalin's ruinous policy in relation to the Chinese revolution. The militarists of Japan threaten the Soviet Union because Stalin helped his ally, Chiang Kai-shek, to strangle the revolution. After that the Stalinists proclaimed the notion that a Soviet China could be built on the basis of peasant guerrilla warfare, without accompanying revolutionary insurrections in the cities. These years of adventurism further weakened the Chinese proletariat. The responsibility for the current weakness of revolutionary China lies on the shoulders of the politicians of the "third period."\textsuperscript{169}

During the last two or three years the Opposition has tirelessly warned that the galloping tempos of industrialization in the USSR brought the threat of a rupture with the village; that the "all-embracing" collectivization, unprepared technically and culturally, held the threat of a crisis in staple goods. Now this warning has become fact. Here, too, the Stalinist bureaucracy is caught in inextricable difficulties. Under the yoke of pressing necessity, it is now performing an economic turn of exceptional historical importance. But it is disorienting and
disarming the working class of the Soviet Union, in part because it does not itself understand what it is doing and in part because it is consciously deceiving the party in order to preserve its prestige.

What additional conditions are required to assure the German working class revolutionary hegemony of the nation and the Communist Party revolutionary hegemony of the working class? But the Stalinist bureaucracy has contrived to doom the Communist Party to fraudulent passivity and degrading helplessness. Since 1914, the policy of the German Social Democracy has worked unceasingly in the interests of fascism. Since 1923, the policy of the German Communist Party has worked unceasingly in the interests of the Social Democracy. Ignoring our warnings and the lessons of tragic experiences, the Stalinist bureaucracy is now driving the German working class straight to the abyss.

The unprecedented economic crisis of capitalism has resulted in a total social collapse; the capitalists are bemoaning their impending demise. But official communism in all countries suffers defeat after defeat. Why? For answer we get: "The general line is correct, but the people who carry it out are worthless." As if these people drop from the sky! As if the nature of the general line itself does not consist precisely in shaping people in its own image! As if the leaders are not responsible for those whom they select! This senseless and dishonest theory of the infallibility of the leadership is dispersing the Communist ranks, by causing aversion in some and destroying the will of others.

We are now confronting a reckoning for the accumulated errors and crimes of the epigones. The centrist bureaucracy, doomed by history, is reaching for tested methods with redoubled efforts. In a vise between its class enemies and the results of its own treachery, it doubles and triples its blows against the Left Opposition.

It would seem that everything has been tried already: vilification, arrest, exile, firing squad. But no. New dishes from the decoctions and dregs of hatred and perfidy are being prepared in the Stalinist kitchen. Recently Pravda reproduced photographic facsimiles of articles by Polish fascists, publishing these falsifications as the sacred truth. More recently Izvestia reprinted with glee the canards of a German fascist sheet about a conspiracy of the Left Opposition with the Social Democracy. This is not the end of it. On instructions from the Stalinist bureau, a certain Buechner is writing a book.
in German in which he attempts to link the Left Opposition with the police. Everything that was written and said in 1917 by the Mensheviks, the Social Revolutionaries, and the Cadets is being surpassed not only in stupidity but also in vileness. In their campaign to demonstrate the inner depravity of Bolshevism, the Mensheviks at least tried to relate it to certain facts: they referred to Malinovsky, who was a police agent on the [Bolshevik] Central Committee and had been elected to the Duma with the help of the police. They said that the police had assigned its secret agents to push for the course which was directed toward a split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. And furthermore, they added, Ludendorff was Lenin's "patron" because he had arranged for Lenin's return to Russia in a sealed train. The Bolsheviks replied with contempt to these scoundrels who attempted to turn the police plots against the most revolutionary party into a polemical weapon against this same party. Today Stalin repeats the tactics of Miliukov, Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Dan, with the sole difference that Stalin, lacking even an iota of facts, manufactures them. The shady character who writes under the name of Buechner relates that Trotsky's autobiography is being published in Warsaw by the political police. And this slander is circulated in all languages: this is the way they educate the Communist youth.

A certain Hungarian fascist "dedicates" his book to Trotsky and expresses his ironical "thanks," in which hatred masquerades as wit. What conclusions can be drawn from this episode? Didn't revolutionists apply that same method, only with greater success, against their class enemies? Didn't Lenin give thanks in print to the English Times for one article or another, which he used in his own way? But there is a scoundrel to be found in the columns of Pravda who speaks about this as a union between Trotsky and the fascists.

In an article I expressed the opinion that Japanese imperialism would hardly dare to openly challenge the Soviet Union before it had entrenched itself in Manchuria. In connection with this, the central paper of the American Communist Party writes that Trotsky acts in the interests of Japan. To explain this away as stupidity would be too superficial: after all, stupidity has its limits. Here we are dealing with a corrupt functionary who will stop at nothing to earn his salary. The intent of my article was to show that a struggle with the Red Army is too hard a nut to crack for Japanese militarism.
The general staff in Tokyo has reason to believe that I am able to evaluate the strength of the Red Army better than the New York barkers who are under orders to snap at my legs. It is obvious, of course, that great world problems are not solved by isolated articles. But if one were to weigh the influence of articles, then my evaluation of the Red Army and the perspectives of a Soviet-Japanese war could serve only those elements in Japan who desire to hinder a war. But is it possible to answer barking and howling with arguments?

These gentlemen depict Rakovsky as an enemy of the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union, they seek a champion in Barbusse, who in turn wants to lean on Vandervelde. With hat in hand, the Stalinist bureaucracy is now begging alms from petty-bourgeois pacifists. And staunch warriors like Sosnovsky, heroes of the civil war like Muralov and Grunstein, like hundreds and thousands of Bolshevik-Leninists, are in exile and confinement, bound hand and foot.

While handing us over to the bourgeois police, the Stalinists shout about our united front with the bourgeois counterrevolution. But before the eyes of the working class the capitalist governments of the world are helping Stalin to surround the Oppositionists with a circle of barbed wire. No matter how much Stalin's agents lie, this single fact completely reveals the true grouping of forces.

They want to connect us with the Japanese military and the Polish police. Kerensky long ago tried to connect the Bolsheviks with the German general staff and czarist police. The hotter the ground under his feet became, the less restraint he used.

Today he has imitators. And what kind are they? These are the people who shot down the Blumkins and sent out the Agabekovs in their place. We brand the name Agabekov on your forehead, a brand which you can never obliterate.

What does Stalin want? He wants to use the war danger for a new, and if possible physical, annihilation of the Bolshevik-Leninists. Letters from the Soviet Union that have reached us recently report that the Left Opposition is now achieving a second enrollment throughout the entire country. In the industrial centers, in plants, factories, and mines, a new generation of Bolshevik-Leninists has appeared. Creative ideas do not die; political facts instruct. The Left Opposition has demonstrated that it is unconquerable.

Stalin on the contrary has compromised himself on all problems. During the Seventeenth Conference he shamefully kept
silent. Not a word about the problems of the Soviet economy! Not a word about the situation in Germany! "The chief," who in the most crucial situations himself admits that it's best to keep quiet, is politically bankrupt. The functionaries in the circles closest to Stalin are ironically whispering—we are written from Moscow—"Hadn't we better ask for instructions from Rakovsky or Trotsky?" Out of this bureaucratic impotence has been born the most recent international campaign against the Left Opposition.

The work done by the Bolshevik-Leninists has not been in vain. The fundamental documents and works of the Left Opposition have been issued in all but the most isolated areas of the world. In tens of countries there are Oppositionist cadres who are convinced to the marrow of their bones of their correctness and historic right to victory. A great and ineradicable achievement!

Unable to answer our criticisms, enmeshed in contradictions, condemned by events, forced to keep quiet on the basic political problems, the Stalinist clique is making a final attempt to isolate us from the official Communist parties by a criminological-political fiction, the ineptitude of which in no way mitigates its vileness.

The Stalinists by their persecutions would like to push us on the road of a second party and a fourth international. They understand that a fatal error of this type on the part of the Opposition would slow up its growth for years, if not nullify all its successes altogether. To counterpose oneself inimically to the Communist parties would be to fulfill the program of the centrist bureaucracy. No, that is not our road! The intrigues of Stalin, his Buechners and his Agabekovs, exposed and unexposed, will not force us to change our course. We stand on the ground of the first four congresses of the Comintern, and the ideas and traditions of Bolshevism. We and only we are applying the lessons of the October Revolution to all the tasks of the world proletariat. The banner of the Third International is ours. We lay full claim to its historical inheritance.

Proletarian politics knows neither the feeling of despair nor the feeling of revenge. It is guided by revolutionary efficacy. Before the working masses of the USSR and of the entire world the Bolshevik-Leninists repeat: Today, as on the day when we first raised our voice of warning against the epigonic bureaucracy, we are ready to the last one to place ourselves at the disposal of the Comintern and the Soviet state for the most
ordinary, the most onerous, and the most dangerous work. We commit ourselves to loyally observe discipline in action. We have only one condition: within the framework of the Comintern we must have the right to defend our ideas, that is, the ideas of Marxism, in conformity with the elementary principles of party democracy.

We know that the Stalinists will not accept our proposal: they are incapable of doing so. In order to agree to it they must not fear us. But it is precisely their fear of the Left Opposition that now motivates important activities of the utterly compromised apparatus.

We seek not friendship with the bureaucracy but collaboration in struggle with the proletarian vanguard. In answer to the provocations and abject plots of the Stalinists, the Bolshevik-Leninists will move closer to the Communist rank and file. Now as before our adherents will not limit themselves to exposing the political mistakes and crimes of the leaders. Hand in hand with the members of the party they will fight for the banner of communism—in strikes, in street demonstrations, in election campaigns, and in more decisive battles when their hour strikes.

Stalin may be able to do away with individual Bolsheviks, but he will never strangle Bolshevism. The victory of Bolshevism is assured by history.
A LETTER TO
THE WORKERS OF ZURICH

June 25, 1932

On the night of June 15 violent encounters took place in Zurich between the workers and the police. I learned of these events from the cables of the bourgeois press agencies, which consequently were very tendentious and hostile to the workers. But even without knowing the details, it is not very difficult to get a general idea of the character of these events. Confrontations between workers, especially workers on strike or unemployed, and the police are abundant in the whole history of capitalism. The present terrible crisis, which reveals all the rottenness of the capitalist system, is making the bourgeoisie extremely tense and is driving them to make use of the police and the army at the slightest alarm. On the other side, the very just indignation of the workers against the bourgeoisie is growing and seeking expression. No matter what the political tendency at the head of the strike and the demonstration in Zurich is, it does not alter the character of the bloody encounter. Capitalism has reduced the workers to starvation, to misery, to despair. Capitalism is throwing them into the streets. Capitalism is beating them down with armed force. If the bullets of the capitalists do not get the workers beforehand, the lackeys of the capitalist press malign them and the capitalist judges put the "leaders" in jail.

This was the simple and obvious explanation I gave, far from the scene, of the events of June 15 and 16. Today, on June 25, I have received from friends a leaflet issued by the "Socialist Party of Zurich" entitled "Settling Accounts with the Communists." In its statement the Social Democracy, which runs the city of Zurich, attempts to absolve itself of all responsibility for the repression used against the strikers and demonstrators. According to the leaflet, the responsibility for
the conflict rests not on capitalism but on communism. In defense of their actions against the Zurich workers the Social Democracy writes: "Lenin and Trotsky, in similar situations, were severe against all the ultraleft syndicalists of the anarchist tendency. They pitilessly crushed in blood all the putschists."

This leaflet has prompted me to address a letter to the workers of Zurich, with the aim of exposing this slander. Lenin and I have more than once been the object of slander. You undoubtedly know that we were even accused of being in the service of the German general staff. Nevertheless I have never known a more dishonest and contemptible slander than that thrown at us by the leaflet of the Zurich Social Democracy.

Lenin's whole life was dedicated to the overthrow of bourgeois society, of its state, its privileges, its laws, its justice, its prisons, its police, its army. How can anyone employ the name of Lenin to justify bourgeois attacks against the workers? I also protest against the use of my name because during the thirty-five years of my conscious life I have served and continue to serve, insofar as I am able, the cause of the emancipation of the working class.

But, the Messrs. Social Democratic journalists will reply, didn't the Soviet power use repressive measures against the anarchists of the Left Social Revolutionaries who attempted to organize an insurrection? To be sure! But the difference lies precisely in this—an insignificant difference isn't it, comrades— that for us it was a question of defending a proletarian state, not a bourgeois state. Before this the Bolsheviks had organized the October insurrection by means of which the proletariat overthrew the bourgeoisie, took possession of its banks and factories, confiscated the land of the rural gentry and turned it over to the peasants, chased out the parasites from their palaces and housed the workers' children in them, deprived the exploiters of their voting rights, concentrated the power and the weapons in the hands of the workers and thus guarded the first proletarian state against its enemies. This precisely is what the regime of the proletarian dictatorship consists of. Yes, we created the Red Army for its defense and effectively defended it with guns in hand. The Social Democracy of the entire world condemned us and hurled curses on our heads. The German Social Democracy supported the Hohenzollerns,177 who tried to strangle the Soviet republic. But the Bolsheviks did not let themselves be strangled; with iron fist they defended the workers' state. The domestic enemies
of the proletarian dictatorship were the bourgeoisie stripped of its rights, the bourgeois officers and cadets, gentlemen of the type of Conradi who assassinated my friend Vorovsky. The Russian Social Democrats (the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries) directly and indirectly supported their struggle against the workers' state. In all instances in which they took up arms against it, we treated them without mercy.

But the Zurich Social Democracy is deceiving you when it refers to Lenin and Trotsky to justify its bloody measures against workers rebelling against the capitalist state. Force was used, to be sure, in both cases. Whenever classes are engaged in an implacable struggle, force always must be resorted to finally. This will be the case as long as classes continue to exist. But the whole question is determined by which class exercises force.

At one of the sessions of the Brest-Litovsk conference, on January 14, 1918, General Hoffmann, the one really in charge of the German general staff on the eastern front, protested against the force employed by the Soviet government. I take the occasion to quote verbatim from the minutes the following extract from my reply:

"General Hoffmann has remarked that our government based its position on power and made use of force against all those whose opinions differed from its own, stigmatizing them as counterrevolutionaries. The general is absolutely correct when he says that our government based itself on force. Throughout all of history, no other kind of government has been known. As long as society is composed of classes engaged in struggle, the state will inevitably be an arm of compulsion and will make use of a compulsory apparatus. . . . What in our actions astonishes and outrages the governments of other countries is the fact that we arrest not the workers who go out on strike but the capitalists who lock out the workers, that we do not shoot down the peasants who demand land but arrest the landlords and the officers who try to shoot the peasants."

The leaders of the Zurich Social Democracy are no different than General Hoffmann when they speak of violence without defining the class which employs this violence. And for good reason: the Social Democracy cannot pose this question openly and honestly because its leaders themselves serve the capitalist regime. On petty local questions, on secondary municipal ones, the Social Democracy attempts to bargain with capitalism on behalf of the workers in order to maintain its
authority among them. But when it is a question of the fundamental interests of the capitalist order and private property, the very foundations of the exploitation of man by man, then the Social Democracy, in Switzerland, in Germany, in Austria, in France, and in the entire world, invariably takes the side of the exploiters. It has once more demonstrated this in unmistakable fashion by the June events in Zurich.

Since the gentlemen of the Social Democratic leadership have taken the liberty of referring to Lenin and me in their attempt to exonerate themselves, I will say in conclusion: Although I cannot judge the events in Zurich except through the accounts in the bourgeois journals, to which I give hardly more than ten percent credence, I nevertheless can safely say, since the workers' movement is involved, that all my sympathies are unreservedly on the side of those who participated in the strike, who protested against the brutality of the police, and who have fallen victim to the new attacks. No matter what the tactical views of the Zurich Communists are, I will always be found on the same side of the barricades with them. Even if they have committed one error or another—I do not know of any—these are the errors of our class, these are the errors of the proletarian revolution which is raising its head against the capitalist yoke. In spite of all the "democratic" peacock feathers with which the Social Democracy covers itself, it has acted and is acting in the Zurich events as the direct agent of the class enemy. The Social Democracy is concealing its treachery with slanders against the proletarian revolution. It is undermining the authority of the workers' state to the great advantage of the authority of the bourgeois state by equating the violence of revolution with the violence of reaction.

I hope that every Zurich worker, the Social Democratic workers included, will thoroughly think over the events and the role which the Social Democratic leaders have played in them in order to draw the necessary political conclusions. Only then will we be able to say that the June victims have not been sacrificed in vain.

Leon Trotsky
Stalin's article, "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism," reached me after much delay. After receiving it, for a long time I could not force myself to read it, for such literature sticks in one's throat like sawdust or mashed bristles. But still, having finally read it, I came to the conclusion that one cannot ignore this performance, if only because there is included in it a vile and barefaced calumny about Rosa Luxemburg. This great revolutionist is enrolled by Stalin into the camp of centrisn! He proves—not proves, of course, but asserts—that Bolshevism from the day of its inception held to the line of a split with the Kautsky center, while Rosa Luxemburg during that time sustained Kautsky from the left. I quote his own words: "... long before the war, approximately since 1903-04, when the Bolshevik group in Russia took shape and when the Lefts in the German Social Democracy first raised their voice, Lenin pursued a line toward a rupture, toward a split with the opportunists both here, in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, and over there, in the Second International, particularly in the German Social Democratic Party." That this, however, could not be achieved was due entirely to the fact that "the Left Social Democrats in the Second International, and above all in the German Social Democratic Party, were a weak and powerless group... and afraid even to pronounce the word 'rupture,' 'split.'"

To put forward such an assertion, one must be absolutely ignorant of the history of one's own party, and first of all, of Lenin's ideological course. There is not a single word of truth in Stalin's point of departure. In 1903-04, Lenin was, indeed, an irreconcilable foe of opportunism in the German Social Democracy. But he considered as opportunism only
the *revisionist* tendency which was led theoretically by Bernstein.

Kautsky at the time was to be found fighting against Bernstein. *Lenin considered Kautsky as his teacher* and stressed this everywhere he could. In Lenin's work of that period and for a number of years following, one does not find even a trace of criticism in principle directed against the Bebel-Kautsky tendency.\footnote{182} Instead one finds a series of declarations to the effect that Bolshevism is not some sort of an independent tendency but is only a translation into the language of Russian conditions of the tendency of Bebel-Kautsky. Here is what Lenin wrote in his famous pamphlet, *Two Tactics*, in the middle of 1905: "When and where did I ever call the revolutionism of Bebel and Kautsky 'opportunism'? . . . When and where have there been brought to light differences between me, on the one hand, and Bebel and Kautsky on the other? . . . The complete unanimity of international revolutionary Social Democracy on all major questions of program and tactics is a most incontrovertible fact" [*Collected Works*, volume 9, July 1905].\footnote{183} Lenin's words are so clear, precise, and categorical as to entirely exhaust the question.

A year and a half later, on December 7, 1906, Lenin wrote in the article "The Crisis of Menshevism": ". . . from the beginning we declared (see *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*): We are not creating a special 'Bolshevik' tendency; always and everywhere we merely uphold the point of view of *revolutionary* Social Democracy. And right up to the social revolution there will inevitably always be an opportunist wing and a revolutionary wing of Social Democracy" [ibid., volume 11, December 7, 1906].

Speaking of Menshevism as the opportunistic wing of the Social Democracy, Lenin compared the Mensheviks not with Kautskyism but with revisionism. Moreover he looked upon Bolshevism as the Russian form of Kautskyism, which in his eyes was in that period identical with Marxism. The passage we have just quoted shows, incidentally, that Lenin did not at all stand absolutely for a split with the opportunists; he not only admitted but also considered "inevitable" the existence of the revisionists in the Social Democracy right up to the social revolution.

Two weeks later, on December 20, 1906, Lenin greeted enthusiastically Kautsky's answer to Plekhanov's\footnote{184} questionnaire on the character of the Russian revolution: "He has fully confirmed our contention that we are defending the position of revolutionary Social Democracy against opportunism, and

Within these limits, I trust, the question is absolutely clear. According to Stalin, Lenin, even from 1903, had demanded a break in Germany with the opportunists, not only of the right wing (Bernstein) but also of the left (Kautsky). Whereas in December 1906, Lenin as we see was proudly pointing out to Plekhanov and the Mensheviks that the tendency of Kautsky in Germany and the tendency of Bolshevism in Russia were—identical. Such is part one of Stalin's excursion into the ideological history of Bolshevism. Our investigator's scrupulousness and his knowledge rest on the same plane!

Directly after his assertion regarding 1903-04, Stalin makes a leap to 1916 and refers to Lenin's sharp criticism of the war pamphlet by Junius, i.e., Rosa Luxemburg. To be sure, in that period Lenin had already declared war to the finish against Kautskyism, having drawn from his criticism all the necessary organizational conclusions. It is not to be denied that Rosa Luxemburg did not pose the question of the struggle against centrism with the requisite completeness—in this Lenin's position was entirely superior. But between October 1916, when Lenin wrote about Junius's pamphlet, and 1903, when Bolshevism had its inception, there is a lapse of thirteen years; in the course of the major part of this period Rosa Luxemburg was to be found in opposition to the Kautsky and Bebel Central Committee, and her fight against the formal, pedantic, and rotten-at-the-core "radicalism" of Kautsky took on an ever increasingly sharp character.

Lenin did not participate in this fight and did not support Rosa Luxemburg up to 1914. Passionately absorbed in Russian affairs, he preserved extreme caution in international matters. In Lenin's eyes Bebel and Kautsky stood immeasurably higher as revolutionists than in the eyes of Rosa Luxemburg, who observed them at closer range, in action, and who was much more directly subjected to the atmosphere of German politics.

The capitulation of German Social Democracy on August 4 was entirely unexpected by Lenin. It is well known that the issue of the Vorwaerts with the patriotic declaration of the Social Democratic faction was taken by Lenin to be a forgery by the German general staff. Only after he was absolutely convinced of the awful truth did he subject to revision his evaluation of the basic tendencies of the German Social
Democracy, and while so doing he performed that task in the Leninist manner, i.e., he finished it off once for all.

On October 27, 1914, Lenin wrote to A. Shlyapnikov:186 "I hate and despise Kautsky now more than anyone, with his vile, dirty, self-satisfied hypocrisy. . . . Rosa Luxemburg was right when she wrote, *long ago*, that Kautsky has the 'subservience of a theoretician'—servility, in plainer language, servility to the majority of the party, to opportunism" (*Leninist Anthology*, volume 2, p. 200, my emphasis) [ibid., volume 35, October 27, 1914].

Were there no other documents—and there are hundreds—these few lines alone could unmistakably clarify the history of the question. Lenin deemed it necessary at the end of 1914 to inform one of his colleagues closest to him at the time that "now," at the present moment, today, in contradistinction to the past, he "hates and despises" Kautsky. The sharpness of the phrase is an unmistakable indication of the extent to which Kautsky betrayed Lenin's hopes and expectations. No less vivid is the second phrase, "Rosa Luxemburg was right when she wrote, *long ago*, that Kautsky has the 'subservience of a theoretician.' . . ." Lenin hastens here to recognize that "veracity" which he did not see formerly, or which, at least, he did not recognize fully on Rosa Luxemburg's side.

Such are the chief chronological guideposts of the questions, which are at the same time important guideposts of Lenin's political biography. The fact is indubitable that his ideological orbit is represented by a continually rising curve. But this only means that Lenin was not born Lenin full-fledged, as he is pictured by the slobbering daubers of the "divine," but that he made himself Lenin. Lenin ever extended his horizons, he learned from others and daily drew himself to a higher plane than was his own yesterday. In this perseverance, in this stubborn resolution of a continual spiritual growth over his own self did his heroic spirit find its expression. If Lenin in 1903 had understood and formulated everything that was required for the coming times, then the remainder of his life would have consisted only of reiterations. In reality this was not at all the case. Stalin simply stamps the Stalinist imprint on Lenin and coins him into the petty small change of numbered adages.

In Rosa Luxemburg's struggle against Kautsky, especially in 1910-14, an important place was occupied by the questions of war, militarism, and pacifism. Kautsky defended the reformist program: limitations of armaments, international
court, etc. Rosa Luxemburg fought decisively against this pro-
gram as illusory. On this question Lenin was in some doubt,
but at a certain period he stood closer to Kautsky than to
Rosa Luxemburg. From conversations at the time with Lenin
I recall that the following argument of Kautsky made a great
impression upon him: just as in domestic questions, reforms
are products of the revolutionary class struggle, so in inter-
national relationships it is possible to fight for and to gain
certain guarantees ("reforms") by means of the international
class struggle. Lenin considered it entirely possible to support
this position of Kautsky, provided that he, after the polemic
with Rosa Luxemburg, turned upon the right-wingers (Noske
and Co.). I do not undertake now to say from memory
to what extent this circle of ideas found its expression in Lenin’s
articles; the question would require a particularly careful anal-
ysis. Neither can I take upon myself to assert from memory
how soon Lenin’s doubts on this question were settled. In
any case they found their expression not only in conversations
but also in correspondence. One of these letters is in the pos-
session of Karl Radek.

I deem it necessary to supply on this question evidence as a
witness in order to attempt in this manner to save an excep-
tionally valuable document for the theoretical biography of
Lenin. In the autumn of 1926, at the time of our collective
work over the platform of the Left Opposition, Radek showed
Kamenev, Zinoviev, and me—probably also other comrades
as well—a letter of Lenin to him (1911?) which consisted of
a defense of Kautsky’s position against the criticism of the
German Lefts. In accordance with the regulation passed by the
Central Committee, Radek, like all others, should have de-
ivered this letter to the Lenin Institute. But fearful lest it be
hidden, if not destroyed, in the Stalinist factory of fabrications,
Radek decided to preserve the letter till some more opportune
time. One cannot deny that there was some foundation to Ra-
dek’s attitude. At present, however, Radek himself has—though
not very responsible—still quite an active part in the work of
producing political forgeries. Suffice it to recall that Radek,
who in distinction to Stalin is acquainted with the history of
Marxism, and who, at any rate, knows this letter of Lenin,
found it possible to make a public statement of his solidarity
with the insolent evaluation placed by Stalin on Rosa Luxem-
burg. The circumstance that Radek acted thereupon under Yaro-
slavsky’s rod does not mitigate his guilt, for only despicable
slaves can renounce the principles of Marxism in the name of the principles of the rod.

However the matter we are concerned with relates not to the personal characterization of Radek but to the fate of Lenin's letter. What happened to it? Is Radek hiding it even now from the Lenin Institute? Hardly. Most probably, he entrusted it, where it should be entrusted, as a tangible proof of an intangible devotion. And what lay in store for the letter thereafter? Is it preserved in Stalin's personal archives alongside with the documents that compromise his closest colleagues? Or is it destroyed as many other most precious documents of the party's past have been destroyed?

In any case there cannot be even the shadow of a political reason for the concealment of a letter written two decades ago on a question that holds now only a historical interest. But it is precisely the historical value of the letter that is exceptionally great. It shows Lenin as he really was, and not as he is being re-created in their own semblance and image by the bureaucratic dunderheads, who pretend to infallibility. We ask, where is Lenin's letter to Radek? Lenin's letter must be where it belongs! Put it on the table of the party and of the Comintern!

If one were to take the disagreements between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg in their entirety, then historical correctness is unconditionally on Lenin's side. But this does not exclude the fact that on certain questions and during definite periods Rosa Luxemburg was correct as against Lenin. In any case, the disagreements, despite their importance and at times their extreme sharpness, developed on the bases of revolutionary proletarian policies common to them both.

When Lenin, going back into the past, wrote in October 1919 ("Greetings to Italian, French, and German Communists") that ". . . at the moment of taking power and establishing the Soviet republic, Bolshevism was united; it drew to itself all that was best in the tendencies of socialist thought akin to it . . ." [ibid., volume 30, October 10, 1919], I repeat, when Lenin wrote this he unquestionably had in mind also the tendency of Rosa Luxemburg, whose closest adherents, e.g., Markhlewsy, Dzerzhinsky, and others were working in the ranks of the Bolsheviks.

Lenin understood Rosa Luxemburg's mistakes more profoundly than Stalin; but it was not accidental that Lenin once quoted the old couplet in relation to Luxemburg: Although the eagles do swoop down and beneath the chickens fly, chickens
Rosa Luxemburg.  

V. I. Lenin in 1915.
with outspread wings never will soar amid clouds in the sky. Precisely the case! Precisely the point! For this very reason Stalin should proceed with caution before employing his vicious mediocrity when the matter touches figures of such stature as Rosa Luxemburg.

In his article "A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship" (October 1920), Lenin, touching upon questions of the Soviet state and the dictatorship of the proletariat already posed by the 1905 revolution, wrote: "While such outstanding representatives of the revolutionary proletariat and of unfalsified Marxism as Rosa Luxemburg immediately realized the significance of this practical experience and made a critical analysis of it at meetings and in the press," on the contrary, ". . . people of the type of the future 'Kautsky-ites' . . . proved absolutely incapable of grasping the significance of this experience . . ." [ibid., volume 31, October 20, 1920]. In a few lines, Lenin fully pays the tribute of recognition to the historical significance of Rosa Luxemburg's struggle against Kautsky—a struggle which Lenin himself had been far from immediately evaluating at its true worth. If to Stalin, the ally of Chiang Kai-shek, and the comrade-in-arms of Purcell, the theoretician of "the worker-peasant party," of "the democratic dictatorship," of "nonantagonizing the bourgeoisie," etc.—if to him Rosa Luxemburg is the representative of centrisim, to Lenin she is the representative of "unfalsified Marxism." What this designation meant coming as it does from Lenin's pen is clear to anyone who is even slightly acquainted with Lenin.

I take the occasion to point out here that in the notes to Lenin's works there is among others the following said about Rosa Luxemburg: "During the florescence of Bernsteinian revisionism and later of ministerialism (Millerand), Luxemburg carried on against this tendency a decisive fight, taking her position in the left wing of the German party. . . . In 1907 she participated as a delegate of the SD of Poland and Lithuania in the London congress of the RSDLP, supporting the Bolshevik faction on all basic questions of the Russian revolution. From 1907, Luxemburg gave herself over entirely to work in Germany, taking a left-radical position and carrying on a fight against the center and the right wing. . . . Her participation in the January 1919 insurrection has made her name the banner of the proletarian revolution."

Of course the author of these notes will in all probability tomorrow confess his sins and announce that in Lenin's epoch
he wrote in a benighted condition, and that he reached complete enlightenment only in the epoch of Stalin. At the present moment announcements of this sort—combinations of sycophancy, idiocy, and buffoonery—are made daily in the Moscow press. But they do not change the nature of things: What's once set down in black and white, no ax will hack nor all your might. Yes, Rosa Luxemburg has become the banner of the proletarian revolution!

How and wherefore, however, did Stalin suddenly busy himself—at so belated a time—with the revision of the old Bolshevik evaluation of Rosa Luxemburg? As was the case with all his preceding theoretical abortions so with this latest one, and the most scandalous, the origin lies in the logic of his struggle against the theory of permanent revolution. In this "historical" article, Stalin once again allotsthe chief place to this theory. There is not a single new word in what he says. I have long ago answered all his arguments in my book The Permanent Revolution. From the historical viewpoint the question will be sufficiently clarified, I trust, in the second volume of The History of the Russian Revolution (the October Revolution), now on the press. In the present case the question of the permanent revolution concerns us only insofar as Stalin links it up with Rosa Luxemburg's name. We shall presently see how the hapless theoretician has contrived to set up a murderous trap for himself.

After recapitulating the controversy between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks on the question of the motive forces of the Russian revolution and after masterfully compressing a series of mistakes into a few lines, which I am compelled to leave without an examination, Stalin writes: "What was the attitude of the German Left Social Democrats, of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, to this controversy? They invented a utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution... Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was seized upon by Trotsky (in part by Martov) and turned into a weapon of struggle against Leninism." Such is the unexpected history of the origin of the theory of the permanent revolution, in accordance with the latest historical researches of Stalin. But, alas, the investigator forgot to consult his own previous learned works. In 1925 this same Stalin had already expressed himself on this question in his polemic against Radek. Here is what he wrote then: "It is not true that the theory of the permanent revolution... was put forward in 1905 by Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. As a
matter of fact this theory was put forward by Parvus and Trotsky." This assertion may be consulted on page 185, *Problems of Leninism*, Russian edition, 1926. Let us hope that it obtains in all foreign editions.

So, in 1925, Stalin pronounced Rosa Luxemburg not guilty in the commission of such a cardinal sin as participating in the creation of the theory of the permanent revolution. "As a matter of fact, this theory was put forward by Parvus and Trotsky." In 1931, we are informed by the identical Stalin that it was precisely "Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg... who invented a utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution." As for Trotsky he was innocent of creating the theory, it was only "seized upon" by him, and at the same time by... Martov! Once again Stalin is caught with the goods. Perhaps he writes on questions of which he can make neither head nor tail. Or is he consciously shuffling marked cards in playing with the basic questions of Marxism? It is incorrect to pose this question as an alternative. As a matter of fact, both the one and the other are true. The Stalinist falsifications are conscious insofar as they are dictated at each given moment by entirely concrete personal interests. At the same time they are semiconscious, insofar as his congenital ignorance places no impediments whatsoever to his theoretical propensities.

But facts remain facts. In his war against "the Trotskyist contraband," Stalin has fallen foul of a new personal enemy, Rosa Luxemburg! He did not pause for a moment before lying about her and vilifying her; and moreover, before proceeding to put into circulation his giant doses of vulgarity and disloyalty, he did not even take the trouble of verifying what he himself had said on the same subject six years before.

The new variant of the history of the ideas of the permanent revolution was indicated first of all by an urge to provide a dish more spicy than all those preceding. It is needless to explain that Martov was dragged in by the hair for the sake of the greater piquancy of theoretical and historical cookery. Martov's attitude to the theory and practice of the permanent revolution was one of unalterable antagonism, and in the old days he stressed more than once that Trotsky's views on revolution were rejected equally by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. But it is not worthwhile to pause over this.

What is truly fatal is that there is not a single major question of the international proletarian revolution on which Stalin
has failed to express two directly contradictory opinions. We all know that in April 1924, he conclusively demonstrated in Problems of Leninism the impossibility of building socialism in one country. In autumn, in a new edition of the book, he substituted in its place a proof—i.e., a bald proclamation—that the proletariat "can and must" build socialism in one country. The entire remainder of the text was left unchanged. On the question of the worker-peasant party, of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the leadership of the October Revolution, on the national question, etc., etc., Stalin contrived to put forward, for a period of a few years, sometimes of a few months, opinions that were mutually exclusive. It would be incorrect to place the blame in everything on a poor memory. The matter reaches deeper here. Stalin completely lacks any method of scientific thinking, he has no criteria of principles. He approaches every question as if that question were born only today and stood apart from all other questions. Stalin contributes his judgments entirely depending upon whatever personal interest of his is uppermost and most urgent today. The contradictions that convict him are the direct vengeance for his vulgar empiricism. Rosa Luxemburg does not appear to him in the perspective of the German, Polish, and international workers' movement of the last half-century. No, she is to him each time a new, and, besides, an isolated figure, regarding whom he is compelled in every new situation to ask himself anew, "Who goes there, friend or foe?" Unerring instinct has this time whispered to the theoretician of socialism in one country that the shade of Rosa Luxemburg is irreconcilably inimical to him. But this does not hinder the great shade from remaining the banner of the international proletarian revolution.

Rosa Luxemburg criticized very severely and fundamentally incorrectly the policies of the Bolsheviks in 1918 from her prison cell. But even in this, her most erroneous work, her eagle's wings are to be seen. Here is her general evaluation of the October insurrection: "Everything that a party could offer of courage, revolutionary farsightedness, and consistency in a historic hour, Lenin, Trotsky, and the other comrades have given in good measure. All the revolutionary honor and capacity which the Social Democracy of the West lacked were represented by the Bolsheviks. Their October uprising was not only the actual salvation of the Russian Revolution; it was also the salvation of the honor of international socialism." Can this be the voice of centrism?
In the succeeding pages, Luxemburg subjects to severe criticism the policies of the Bolsheviks in the agrarian sphere, their slogan of national self-determination, and their rejection of formal democracy. In this criticism we might add, directed equally against Lenin and Trotsky, she makes no distinction whatever between their views; and Rosa Luxemburg knew how to read, understand, and seize upon shadings. It did not even fall into her head, for instance, to accuse me of the fact that by being in solidarity with Lenin on the agrarian question, I had changed my views on the peasantry. And moreover she knew these views very well since I had developed them in detail in 1909 in her Polish journal. Rosa Luxemburg ends her criticism with the demand, "in the policy of the Bolsheviks the essential must be distinguished from the unessential, the fundamental from the accidental." The fundamental she considers to be the force of the action of the masses, the will to socialism. "In this," she writes, "Lenin and Trotsky and their friends were the first, those who went ahead as an example to the proletariat of the world; they are still the only ones up to now who can cry with Hutten, 193 'I have dared!'"

Yes, Stalin has sufficient cause to hate Rosa Luxemburg. But all the more imperious therefore becomes our duty to shield Rosa's memory from Stalin's calumny that has been caught by the hired functionaries of both hemispheres, and to pass on this truly beautiful, heroic, and tragic image to the young generations of the proletariat in all its grandeur and inspirational force.
AN APPEAL FOR THE BIULLETN

July 1932

The present number of the Biulleten has been delayed for reasons other than the wishes of the editor. The next number will appear no later than a month from now, and will be devoted to economic and political problems of the USSR.

We hope to issue the Biulleten regularly in the future. Events demand it. One can say without the slightest exaggeration that it was really only in 1917 that the Bolsheviks were confronted with tasks of such historic dimension as today's. But the difference is that in 1917 at the head of the party was a leadership which met all the demands the great tasks imposed on it. Now there is not even a trace of one. Such a conglomeration of criminal errors which the Stalinist bureaucracy is now committing all over the globe could not be wished on the proletarian revolution even by its worst enemy. The world crisis of the whole capitalist social system is supplemented by a deep crisis in official communism. This fact is history's verdict on the epigonic leadership of the Comintern. Stalinism is irrevocably condemned. There is no appeal against that verdict.

The development of new world Bolshevik cadres goes on more slowly than the decline of the old ones. No wonder; using up accumulated capital is immeasurably easier than building it up again. However, new cadres of Bolshevik-Leninists are growing up throughout the whole world. No force will now stop its growth.

Our Biulleten occupies a definite place in developing new revolutionary cadres. This is proved by the experience of three years. The Biulleten is indispensable. It will come out. The editorial board requests and awaits the help and cooperation of friends, cothinkers, and sympathizers.

Whoever wants to can find a way to us without difficulty. Through the official editor named at the head of the Biulleten it is possible to be in touch with someone who is in direct contact with the editorial board and enjoys its absolute confidence. Correspondence can be sent unsigned. On money orders indicate foreign-sender. All these technical problems are easily solved. All that is needed is the revolutionary will!
ON DEMYAN BEDNY

(Obituary Reflections)

July 1932

Demyan Bedny is in disgrace. The immediate reasons given are somewhat vague. They say he antagonized all the young literary people as well as the old; they say he made himself impossible because of some personal trick or other; they also say he tried to set a mine for Gorky and was himself blown to pieces by it. Probably there is a little of each involved. The three different explanations don't contradict one another but derive in equal measure from the nature of the circumstances and the man.

The man, it must be said right off, does not inspire any sympathy, but neither are the attendant circumstances attractive. Nevertheless, in the persecution that is at present being conducted against a gifted writer, we consider it our duty to come to the defense of Demyan Bedny. Certainly not because of the persecution itself: that kind of sentimentalism is foreign to us. What is decisive in our eyes are the questions: Who is doing the persecuting and why? Although our views might appear at first sight paradoxical we are not afraid to formulate them with all possible clarity: the malevolent criticism of Demyan Bedny is part of the bureaucracy's general work of liquidating the political, ideological, and artistic traditions of the October uprising.

Demyan Bedny had long been honored as a proletarian poet. One of the Averbach people even declared he demyanized Soviet literature. This must be taken to mean that he gave it a completely proletarian character. "Bolshevik poet," "dialectician," "Leninist in poetry"—how unseemly that looks!—in his own field, Demyan Bedny incarnated the whole October Revolution together with its proletarian current. Only the mis-
erable, shortsighted schematism of the terror-stricken epigonic period can explain the startling fact that Demyan Bedny is to be found enrolled among the poets of the proletariat. No, he was a fellow traveler, the first of the many literary fellow travelers of the October uprising. He spoke not for the metal workers but for the insurgent peasant and the urban petty bourgeois who had taken the bit between his teeth. We don't say this in order to attack Demyan Bedny. Petty-bourgeois poetry formed a part of the grandiose background of October. Without the red cock of the peasant, without the mutiny of the soldiers, the workers would never have gained the victory. Maxim Gorky represented in literature the mishmash of "culture" which was frightened by the unrestrained poetry whereas, on the contrary, Demyan swam in it like a fish in water or like a dolphin of solid build.

Demyan is not a poet, not an artist, but a versifier, an agitator who rhymed but in very powerful fashion. The basic forms of his verse were fables and couplets, both extremely archaic forms, deliberately peasant and to that extent, not proletarian. Appearing on the revolutionary arena right in the very depths of the masses of the people, primarily of the peasantry, his old forms of popular literary works could not but rise to the surface of the shallow stream. This made Demyan one of the first. . . .

The October uprising stirred to life a whole peasant-singing literature which, struggling to come to birth with the revolution, at the same time ostentatiously displayed archaisms. This dressed-up, decorative (Klyuev!) literature was obviously painted by the kulaks. Yes, and how could it be otherwise? Only the prosperous peasantry had leisure, play of fancy, and clinking money for the ornamentation of the wing of the house. The kulak put his imprint on popular literature in bygone days.

Peasant-singing literature was conservative since the powerful peasant was conservative though already drawn into the vortex of October. Of all the peasant-singers, Demyan Bedny was closest to the proletariat, boldest in welcoming the revolution already showing clearly its proletarian features, which essentially sickened him inside. But for all that he remained only a fellow traveler. The times favored him—the years of the civil war, the struggles of the peasants against the monarchy, the nobility, the priests, yes, and the bankers too. In those years Demyan was not a poet, in any case not a proletarian poet, but a revolutionary rhymer of historical stature. Perhaps
Demyan Bedny did not move literature forward by as much as an inch; but with the help of literature he helped move the revolution forward. And this covered him with merit. Stories that Lenin rated Demyan Bedny's artistic talents extraordinarily highly are the purest legend. Lenin valued the first-class agitator in rhyme, the remarkable master of popular speech. But this did not prevent Lenin saying openly of Demyan: "He's a vulgarian, alas, what a vulgarian, and possibly not without pornography." And vulgarity and pornography colored Demyan with a kulakish medley of color.

Basically, Demyan was finished when the civil war was. Peasant-singing verse fell by the wayside. To the forefront came problems of industrialization, tempos, world revolution—areas not teeming with fables or couplets. In the first period Demyan tried, and not without some success, to enliven most of the organized reaction against the Left Opposition. The essence of the reaction consisted in the nonproletarian fellow travelers of October—the educated kulaks, the Nepmen, the left intellectuals, the specialist turncoats, the petty bureaucrats—rising against the proletarian leadership and solemnly gathering together to send "permanent" revolution, that is, the international proletarian revolution, to the devil. To this mood Demyan gave highly natural, clear, gut expression. There was no need for a political microphone to make out in the art of Demyan Bedny of the years 1924-27 the truly Russian melody of Thermidor. His pieces on marriage and divorce stuck in the memory as disgusting images of everyday insensitive reaction. His nationalist onomatopoeia smelled of the Black Hundreds, belching straight from *Kievlyanin*. But this too-revealing reaction evidently embarrassed and scandalized the Stalinist bureaucracy, although in the most acute period of struggle against the Left Opposition it had not been altogether ashamed of fully consciously using these Black Hundred sentiments which at first it had tried to keep aloof from. This fellow traveler of October turned out to be a fellow traveler of pre-Thermidor officialdom. After that, Demyan finally became outdated.

Through inertia, he continued to be one of the influential figures. Insinuating and sly people from RAPP did not waste time in praising him to the skies. Demyan himself did not waste time. He counted himself an aristocrat of the revolution and although he did not spare his back before those in power, he was not unwilling on occasion to put his feet on the table. Having contemplated the impressive soles and heels
of the honored writer, the Averbachs declared in chorus: It is necessary, oh, how it is necessary to demyanize proletarian literature.

"Why?" rose the voice of a bureaucrat of refined taste.

"Why, Demyan is the clearest soundfilm we have while Gorky's away at Capri playing host to Bernard Shaw."

"Demyan isn't suitable for a clean public. Besides, he has obvious deviations: in the latest piece, three columns long, twelve lines from the end, on the question of the collectives' hens. He also doesn't highlight Stalin as a theoretician. He, Demyan, belongs to the past!"

It is not difficult to imagine how agitated the poet became when, familiar with the ways of the bureaucracy, he felt that he was being pushed out. On this occasion he was capable of going so far as to be rude: "Is this why we fought?" It's known that Gorky was on the other side of the barricades but when the fighting was over he sat on top of the barricades, shed a few tears, and proposed a general peace, with no annexations and no indemnity. But Demyan was there, on the night of October 25, and on other days and nights, tireless with songs in the camp of the Red soldiers.

True, all too true: but it altered nothing. Ambitious, stubborn Demyan both in his near-October personality and his somewhat Black Hundred substance was needed no more. It is true he was ready to dance attendance, so to speak, on a grand scale; to fish up some circulars and little zigzags to cover up yesterday's tracks; sweetly to trill at Kaganovich's eloquence—but he was no longer able to do this: for such things there are the Bezymenskys,200 seniors and juniors. And the Averbachs suddenly obtained full "apologies for his wit"; not only was it not necessary to demyanize literature, it was necessary to undemyanize Demyan himself, to the last stitch. So the wheel turned and crushed a not very sympathetic but nevertheless an outstanding figure. There was Demyan Bedny—then there was no Demyan Bedny. And if we dwell here on his sad fate it is because the liquidation of Demyan Bedny is part, although indirectly, of the bureaucratic liquidation of the feelings and moods of October.
DECLARATION TO THE ANTIWAR CONGRESS AT AMSTERDAM

July 25, 1932

The danger of a new world war is becoming more apparent every day. The causes of this danger have been exposed in irrefutable fashion by Marxism.

The productive forces of humanity have long since outgrown the limits of private property and the boundaries of the nation-state. The salvation of humanity lies in a socialist economy based on an international division of labor. Under the influence of a conservative leadership, the proletariat failed to carry out its revolutionary task. The world war of 1914-18 was its retribution. The democratic champions of "peaceful development," the opponents of revolutionary methods, bear direct responsibility for the tens of millions killed and wounded in the imperialist slaughter.

The imperialist world has learned nothing and forgotten nothing in the fifteen years that have elapsed since then. Its internal contradictions have grown more acute. The current crisis reveals a frightful picture of the social disintegration of capitalist civilization, with clear signs of advancing gangrene. The salvation of humanity is possible only through the surgical action of proletarian revolution.

The ruling classes are floundering in this hopeless situation. Their financial difficulties and their fear of the people force them to seek a solution in arms-limitation agreements. On the other hand, by raising tariff walls still higher and increasing the restrictions on imports, the rulers are further constricting the world market, deepening the crisis, sharpening national antagonisms, and preparing new wars. The reformist parties, today as yesterday opposed to a revolutionary solution along the road of socialism, are once more taking on themselves the full weight of the responsibility for the misery of the crisis and the impending horror of a new war.
The contradiction between the productive forces and the boundaries of the nation-state has taken on its sharpest and most unbearable form in the old home territory of capitalism—Europe. With its labyrinth of borders and tariff walls, its swollen armies and monstrous national debts, the Europe of Versailles is a constant source of military dangers and war provocations. And it cannot now be united by the bourgeoisie—the class that has bled it dry and Balkanized it. For that, other means and other forces are required.

Only in czarist Russia was power wrested from the hands of the bourgeoisie. Thanks to its revolutionary leadership, the young Russian proletariat was able, for the first time in world history, to show concretely what inexhaustible possibilities are contained in a system of proletarian dictatorship and planned economy. The gigantic economic and cultural achievements of a backward country, which had been transformed into a country of the workers and peasants, point out the road to a solution for all of humanity.

We are now awaiting from the Soviet government the complementing of its second five-year plan by an extensive plan for economic collaboration with the advanced capitalist countries, which will open up a gigantic perspective of human possibilities to the masses, suffering under the burden of the crisis and unemployment. Whatever the immediate practical results of such a plan, its power of attracting millions and millions of workers to socialism will be immense.

The social system in the Soviet Union today is, to be sure, still a long way from socialism. But its inestimable importance lies in the fact that it has started on the road to socialism. It will the more surely and quickly proceed to socialism the sooner the proletariat of the advanced countries seizes power from the hands of its bourgeoisie and creates the definitive premises of a new society, one that can be achieved only on an international basis.

The danger of a world war is a danger to the very existence of the first workers' state. No matter what the cause of the war may be, no matter where it may erupt, in its final stage it will inevitably turn against the USSR. The European and world bourgeoisie will not leave the scene without attempting a transfusion of blood from the arteries of the young workers' state into those of imperialism in its death agony.

In the last year alone, the flames of war threatened the frontiers of the Soviet Union both from the Far East and from the West. At the same time that it is strangling the in-
dependence of China, Japan is constructing fortresses in Manchuria from which to strike at the Soviets. The antagonism between Japan and the United States cannot deter the militarists in Tokyo, for in a war against the Soviet Union in the future they will consider themselves to be in the vanguard of world imperialism. On the other hand, the coup d'etat carried out by Hindenburg on Hitler's orders not only clears the road for a fascist regime in Germany but also opens up the perspective of a life-and-death struggle between a fascist Germany and the Soviet Union. Enormous events are approaching in Europe and the entire world.

Under these conditions the struggle against war is a struggle to save the lives of tens of millions of workers and peasants of the new generation which has grown up since the great slaughter, to preserve all the conquests of labor and thought, to save the first workers' state and the future of humanity.

All the greater is the task, therefore, and all the more necessary is clarity on the method of its solution. To condemn war is easy; to overcome it is difficult. The struggle against war is a struggle against the classes which rule society and which hold in their hands both its productive forces and its destructive weapons. It is not possible to prevent war by moral indignation, by meetings, by resolutions, by newspaper articles, and by congresses. As long as the bourgeoisie has at its command the banks, the factories, the land, the press, and the state apparatus, it will always be able to drive the people to war when its interests demand it. But the propertied classes never cede power without a struggle. Look at Germany. When the fundamental interests of the propertied classes are threatened, democracy gives way to violence. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie is possible only with guns in hand: imperialist war can be stopped only by civil war.

We Bolshevik-Leninists absolutely reject and denounce the deceptive differentiation between a "defensive" and an "offensive" war. In a war between the capitalist states such a differentiation represents only a diplomatic cover to deceive the people. Capitalist brigands always conduct a "defensive" war, even when Japan is marching against Shanghai and France against Syria or Morocco. The revolutionary proletariat distinguishes only between wars of oppression and wars of liberation. The character of a war is defined, not by diplomatic falsifications, but by the class which conducts the war and the objective aims it pursues in that war. The wars of the imperialist states, apart from the pretexts and political rhetoric, are of an op-
pressive character, reactionary and inimical to the people. Only the wars of the proletariat and of the oppressed nations can be characterized as wars of liberation. After its victory the armed insurrection of the proletariat against its oppressors is inevitably transformed into a revolutionary war of the proletarian state for the consolidation and extension of its victory. The policy of socialism does not and cannot have a purely "defensive" character. It is the task of socialism to conquer the world.

It is from this that we derive our position with regard to all forms of pacifism: purely imperialist pacifism (Kellogg-Briand-Herriot, etc.), and petty-bourgeois pacifism (Rolland-Barbusse, and their partisans all over the world). The essence of pacifism is a condemnation, whether hypocritical or sincere, of the use of force in general. By weakening the willpower of the oppressed, it serves the cause of the oppressors. Idealistic pacifism confronts war with moral indignation the way the lamb confronts the butcher's knife with plaintive bleatings. But the task consists of confronting the knife of the bourgeoisie with the knife of the proletariat.

The most influential pacifist force is the Social Democracy. In a period of peace it's not stingy with cheap tirades against war. But it remains tied to "national defense." This is decisive. Every war, however it may begin, menaces each of the warring nations. The imperialists know in advance that the pacifism of the Social Democracy at the first roar of cannon will be transformed into the most servile patriotism and become the most important reserve for militarism. That is why a most intransigent struggle against pacifism, unmasking its treacherous character, is the very first step on the road toward a revolutionary struggle against war.

The League of Nations is the citadel of imperialist pacifism. It represents a transitory historical combination of capitalist states in which the stronger command and buy out the weaker, then crawl on their bellies before America or try to resist; in which all equally are enemies of the Soviet Union, but are prepared to cover up each and every crime of the most powerful and rapacious among them. Only the politically blind, only those who are altogether helpless or who deliberately corrupt the conscience of the people, can consider the League of Nations, directly or indirectly, today or tomorrow, an instrument of peace.

The pretense of "disarmament" has and can have nothing in common with the prevention of war. The program of "dis-
"armament" only signifies an attempt—to up to now only on paper—to reduce in peacetime the expense of this or that kind of armaments. It is above all a question of military technique and the imperialist coffers. The arsenals, the munition factories, the laboratories, and finally, what is most important, capitalist industry as a whole preserve all their force in all the "disarmament programs." But states do not fight because they are armed. On the contrary, they forge arms when they have to fight.

In case of war, all the peace limitations will fall aside like so much chaff. As far back as 1914-18, states no longer fought with the armaments which they had provided for themselves in peacetime, but with those they manufactured during the war. It is not the arsenals but the productive capacity of the country which is decisive. For the United States a limitation of armaments in Europe in time of peace is very much to its advantage because it allows it to demonstrate its industrial domination all the more decisively in time of war. The German bourgeoisie inclines toward a reduction of armaments in order to equalize the handicap in case of a new bloody conflict. General "disarmament" has the same meaning for Germany as naval parity with France has for Italy. The worth these plans will have depends on the combination of the imperialist forces, the state of their budgets, the international financial settlements, etc. The question of disarmament is one of the levers on the arena of imperialism in which the new wars are being prepared. It is pure charlatanism to attempt to distinguish between defensive and offensive machine guns, tanks, airplanes. American policy is dictated in this also by the particular interests of American militarism, the most terrible of all. War is not a game which is conducted according to conventional rules. War demands and creates all the weapons which can most successfully annihilate the enemy. Petty-bourgeois pacifism, which sees in a 10 percent, or 33 percent, or 50 percent disarmament proposal the "first step" towards prevention of war, is more dangerous than all the explosives and asphyxiating gases. Melinite and yperite can do their work only because the masses of people are poisoned in peacetime by the fumes of pacifism.

Without the slightest confidence in the capitalist programs for disarmament or arms limitation, the revolutionary proletariat asks one single question: *In whose hands are the weapons?* Any weapon in the hands of the imperialists is a weapon directed against the working class, against the weak nations, against socialism, against humanity. Weapons in the
hands of the proletariat and of the oppressed nations are the only means of ridding our planet of oppression and war.

The struggle for the self-determination of nations, for all people, for all those who are oppressed and who strive for independence, is one of the most important aspects of the struggle against war. Whoever directly or indirectly supports the system of colonization and protectorates, the domination of British capital in India, the domination of Japan in Korea or in Manchuria, of France in Indochina or in Africa, whoever does not fight against colonial enslavement, whoever does not support the uprisings of the oppressed nations and their independence, whoever defends or idealizes Gandhism, that is, the policy of passive resistance on questions which can be solved only by force of arms, is, despite good intentions or bad, a lackey, an apologist, an agent of the imperialists, of the slaveholders, of the militarists, and helps them to prepare new wars in pursuit of their old aims or new.

The principal force against war is the proletariat. It is only through its example and under its leadership that the peasants and other popular layers of the nation can rise up against war. Within the proletariat, two parties are struggling for influence: the Communist Party and the Social Democracy. The intermediate groups (the SAP in Germany, the PUP in France, the ILP in England, etc.) cannot expect to play an independent historical role. On the question of war, which is the other side of the question of the proletarian revolution, the irreconcilable opposition between communism and social patriotism will reach its most acute expression.

Whoever attempts to put all the programs, all the parties, all the flags into one package in the name of pacifism, that is, of a superficial struggle against war in words, performs the greatest service for imperialism. On the question of war, no less than on all other questions, the Communist Party must seek to free the masses of working people from the disintegrating and demoralizing influence of reformism.

*Le Monde*, the journal of Barbusse, Gorky, and the other organizers of the antiwar congress, is conducting a sustained agitation for the fusion of the Communist and Second Internationals. For a struggle against war, Barbusse addresses himself in the same voice to Lenin and to Vandervelde. This serves only to falsify Lenin and rehabilitate Vandervelde. We reject the policy of Barbusse and his followers and we condemn it as the most dangerous political poison. We believe that the Communist International and the Red International of Labor
Unions committed a serious error by leaving the initiative for the call of the conference to the unprincipled and impotent pacifists.

We consider the fact that the USSR did not enter the League of Nations altogether correct, in tactics and in principle. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the Soviet Union has lent its authority to the Kellogg Pact, which is a complete fraud whose purpose is to "justify" only such wars as correspond to American interests.

We also consider incorrect the tendency of Soviet diplomacy to embellish the policy of American imperialism and particularly its initiative on the question of disarmament. We fully recognize the importance for the USSR of normal economic and diplomatic relations with the USA. But this aim cannot be achieved by verbal capitulations to the maneuvers of American imperialism, the strongest and most rapacious of all. We await from Soviet diplomacy a clear and public statement on the danger of war and the struggle against it. It is necessary to loudly sound an alert to the people. The less Soviet diplomacy adapts itself to the maneuvers of the imperialists on this burning question, the more courageously it raises its own voice, the more ardently will the laboring masses of the whole world respond, the more closely will they align themselves with the USSR, and the more surely will they defend it against the rising danger.

At the same time we consider it our task to declare here openly: Now, in the face of the terrible danger that is drawing close, it is necessary at last to repair the crimes of the Stalinist bureaucracy against the revolution and communism; it is necessary to free the thousands of Bolshevik-Leninists, the organizers of the October Revolution, the creators of the Red Army, the participants in the civil war, the inflexible revolutionary fighters, from the prisons and exile. For the dictatorship of the proletariat and the world revolution, against imperialist war, they want to fight and they will fight with an energy incomparably greater than that of the parlor pacifists and the innumerable Stalinist bureaucrats.

The policy of the united front in the struggle against war demands special attention and revolutionary perseverance. The Communist Party can and must propose openly, without dubious intermediaries, that all the working-class organizations coordinate their efforts in the struggle against war. For our part the Bolshevik-Leninists propose the following points as a basis on which agreement for a struggle is possible, at the
same time maintaining a complete guarantee of the independence of the organizations and their banners.

1. Renunciation of all hopes in the League of Nations and other pacifist illusions.

2. Denunciation of the capitalist "disarmament" programs, which serve to dupe the people.

3. Refusal of all votes to the capitalist governments for military budgets and conscription—not a man, not a cent.

4. Exposure of the fraud of "national defense," because the capitalist nation defends itself by oppressing and dividing the weaker nations.

5. A campaign for economic collaboration with the USSR on the basis of a broadly formulated program, with the mass organizations of the working class drawn into its elaboration and execution.

6. Continual and systematic exposure of the imperialist intrigues against the first and only workers' state.

7. Agitation against war in the war factories, among the soldiers and sailors. Preparation of revolutionary points of support in the war industries, in the army and navy.

8. The training of the Red Army not only in the spirit of a courageous defense of the socialist fatherland but also in the spirit of constant readiness to come to the aid of the proletarian revolution and of the uprisings of the oppressed people in other countries.

9. Systematic education of the laboring masses of the entire world in the spirit of the greatest devotion to the first proletarian state. Despite the unquestionable mistakes in the policy of the present ruling faction, the USSR remains the genuine fatherland of the international proletariat. Its defense is the unflinching duty of every honest worker.

10. Indefatigable explanation to the workers of the whole world that a socialist society can be established only on an international scale, and that the real support of the USSR lies in the extension of the proletarian world revolution.
PILSUDSKISM, FASCISM, AND THE CHARACTER OF OUR EPOCH

August 4, 1932

Introduction

In May 1926 Pilsudski carried out his coup in Poland. The nature of this rescue operation seemed so enigmatic to the leadership of the Communist Party that, in the person of Warski and others, it called the proletariat out into the streets to support the marshal's uprising. Today this fact seems quite incredible. But it went to the very root of Comintern policy at that time. The struggle for the peasantry had been converted by the epigones into the policy of dissolving the proletariat into the petty bourgeoisie. In China the Communist Party entered the Kuomintang and humbly submitted to its discipline. For all the countries of the East, Stalin put up the slogan "the worker-peasant party." In the Soviet Union the struggle against the "superindustrializers" (the Left Opposition) was being waged in the name of preserving good relations with the kulak. In the leading circles of the Russian party, there was rather open discussion on the question whether the time had not come to return from the proletarian dictatorship to the formula of 1905: "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Condemned by the whole course of development and discarded once for all by Lenin in 1917, this formula was converted by the epigones into the highest criterion. From the angle of the "democratic dictatorship," Kostrzewa reevaluated the legacy of Rosa Luxemburg. Warski, after a certain period of vacillation, began to step to the tune of Manuilsky's commands with redoubled diligence. It was in such circumstances that Pilsudski's coup broke out. The Central Committee of the
Polish party had a deadly fear of showing any "underestimation of the peasantry." They had learned the lessons of the struggle against "Trotskyism" well, Lord knows! The Marxists of the Central Committee summoned the workers to support the almost "democratic dictatorship" of the reactionary martinet.

Pilsudski's practice very quickly brought corrections into the theory of the epigones. As early as the beginning of July the Comintern had to concern itself, in Moscow, with a review of the "mistake" of the Polish party. Warski gave the report in the special commission, under the point on information and "self-criticism": he had already been promised complete exoneration—on condition that he voluntarily assume the full responsibility for what had been done, thus shielding the Moscow chiefs! Warski did what he could. However, while confessing his "error" and promising to correct himself, he proved completely incapable of bringing out the matters of principle at the root of his misfortunes. The debate as a whole had an extremely chaotic, confused, and to a certain degree, dishonest character. The whole purpose after all was to wash the coat without getting the cloth wet.

Within the limits of the ten minutes allowed me, I tried to give an evaluation of the Pilsudski coup in connection with the historical function of fascism, and thereby reveal the roots of the "error" of the Polish party leadership. The proceedings of the commission were not published. This did not, of course, prevent a polemic being developed in all languages against my unpublished speech. The reverberations of this polemic have not died down to this day. Having found the stenogram of my speech in the archives, I came to the conclusion that its publication—especially in the light of the current events in Germany—might prove to be of some political interest even today. Political tendencies should be tested at various stages of historical development—only in that way can their real content and the degree of their internal consistency be properly evaluated.

Naturally, in the case of a speech given six years ago in a special commission, within a ten-minute time limit, you cannot expect of it more than it contains. If these lines reach the Polish comrades, for whom they are indeed intended, they, as more fully informed readers, will be able themselves to fill out whatever I have stated incompletely and to correct whatever is not accurate.
Pilsudski's coup is appraised in my speech as a "preventive" (precautionary) one. This characterization may be supported in a certain sense even today. Precisely because the revolutionary situation in Poland did not reach the same maturity as those in Italy in 1920 and, later, in Germany in 1923 and 1931-32, fascist reaction in Poland did not attain such depth and intensity. This explains why Pilsudski, over a period of six years, has still not carried his work to completion.

In connection with the "preventive" character of the coup, the speech expressed the hope that Pilsudski's reign would not be as protracted as that of Mussolini's. Unfortunately, both have been more protracted than any of us hoped in 1926. The cause of this lies not only in the objective circumstances but also in the policies of the Comintern. The basic defects in those policies, as the reader will see, are indicated in the speech—to be sure, in a very cautious manner: it must be recalled that I had to speak, as a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, under discipline.

One cannot deny that the initial role of the PPS*209 in regard to Pilsudskism rendered rather spectacular support to the theory of "social fascism." Later years, however, brought the necessary corrections here, too, bringing out the contradiction between the democratic and the fascist agencies of the bourgeoisie. Whoever regards this contradiction as absolute will inevitably turn onto the path of opportunism. Whoever ignores this contradiction will be doomed to ultraleft capriciousness and revolutionary impotence. Whoever still requires proof of this, need only cast his gaze toward Germany.

**On the Polish Question (July 1926)**

I wish to take up just two questions of general significance which have been raised repeatedly in the discussion, both at yesterday's session and today's.

The first question is, What is Pilsudskism and how is it connected with fascism?

The second question is, What are the roots of the mistake made by the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party? By "roots" I have in mind not matters relating to individuals or groups, but objective ones, built into the conditions of the epoch; but I do not thereby minimize the responsibility of individuals in any way.

The first question: Pilsudskism and fascism.

These two currents undoubtedly have features in common:
their shock troops are recruited, above all, among the petty bourgeoisie; both Pilsudski and Mussolini operated by extra-parliamentary, nakedly violent means, by the methods of civil war; both of them aimed not at overthrowing bourgeois society, but at saving it. Having raised the petty-bourgeois masses to their feet, they both clashed openly with the big bourgeoisie after coming to power. Here a historical generalization involuntarily comes to mind: one is forced to recall Marx's definition of Jacobinism as a plebeian means of dealing with the feudal enemies of the bourgeoisie. That was in the epoch of the rise of the bourgeoisie. It must be said that now, in the epoch of the decline of bourgeois society, the bourgeoisie once again has need of a "plebeian" means of solving its problems—which are no longer progressive but, rather, thoroughly reactionary. In this sense, then, fascism contains a reactionary caricature of Jacobinism.

When it was on the rise, the bourgeoisie could not establish a basis for its growth and predominance within the confines of the feudal-bureaucratic state. There was need for the Jacobin way of dealing with the old society in order to ensure the flowering of the new bourgeois society. The bourgeoisie in decline is incapable of maintaining itself in power with the methods and means of its own creation—the parliamentary state. It needs fascism as a weapon of self-defense, at least at the most critical moments. The bourgeoisie does not like the "plebeian" means of solving its problems. It had an extremely hostile attitude toward Jacobinism, which cleared a path in blood for the development of bourgeois society. The fascists are immeasurably closer to the bourgeoisie in decline than the Jacobins were to the bourgeoisie on the rise. But the established bourgeoisie does not like the fascist means of solving its problems either, for the shocks and disturbances, although in the interests of bourgeois society, involve dangers for it as well. This is the source of the antagonism between fascism and the traditional parties of the bourgeoisie.

It is beyond dispute that Pilsudskism, in its roots, in its impulses, and in the slogans it raises, is a petty-bourgeois movement. That Pilsudski knew beforehand what path he would follow may well be doubted. It is not as though he were particularly brainy. His actions bear the stamp of mediocrity. (Walecki: You're mistaken!) But my aim is not to characterize Pilsudski in any way; I don't know, perhaps he did see somewhat farther ahead than others. At any rate, even if he
did not know what he wanted to do, he certainly—to all appearances—knew rather well what he wanted to avoid, which was, above all, a revolutionary movement of the working masses. Whatever he did not understand, others thought through for him, perhaps even the English ambassador. At any rate, Pilsudski quickly found common ground with big capital, despite the fact that in its roots, impulses, and slogans the movement he headed was petty bourgeois, a "plebeian" means of solving the pressing problems of capitalist society in process of decline and destruction. Here there is a direct parallel with Italian fascism.

It was said here (by Warski) that parliamentary democracy is the arena upon which the petty bourgeoisie performs most brilliantly. Not always, however, and not under all conditions. It may also lose its brilliance, fade, and show its weakness more and more. And since the big bourgeoisie itself is at a dead end, the parliamentary arena becomes a mirror of the situation of impasse and decline of bourgeois society as a whole. The petty bourgeoisie, which attributed such importance to parliamentarism, itself begins to feel it as a burden and to seek a way out upon extraparliamentary paths. In its basic impulse Pilsudskism is an attempt at an extraparliamentary solution of the problems of the petty bourgeoisie. But in this very fact lies the inevitability of capitulation to the big bourgeoisie. For if in parliament the petty bourgeoisie shows its impotence before landlord, capitalist, and banker in one instance after another, on a "retail" basis, then, in the attempt at an extraparliamentary solution of its problems, at the moment when it snatches up power, its social impotence is revealed wholesale and altogether. At first one gets the impression that the petty bourgeoisie with sword in hand is turning upon the bourgeois regime, but its revolt ends with it handing over to the big bourgeoisie, through its own chiefs, the power it had seized by traveling the road of bloodshed. That is precisely what happened in Poland. And that the Central Committee did not understand.

The big bourgeoisie dislikes this method, much as a man with a swollen jaw dislikes having his teeth pulled. The respectable circles of bourgeois society viewed with hatred the services of the dentist Pilsudski, but in the end they gave in to the inevitable, to be sure, with threats of resistance and much haggling and wrangling over the price. And lo, the petty bourgeoisie's idol of yesterday has been transformed into the gendarme of capital! The cinematic tempo of the course of events is surprising, the appallingly rapid transition from outwardly "revo-
lutionary" slogans and techniques to a counterrevolutionary policy of protecting the property holders from the onslaught of the workers and peasants. But the evolution of Pilsudskism is wholly according to law. As for the tempo, that is the result of a civil war that has skipped stages and thus reduced the time requirements.

Is Pilsudskism "left fascism" or is it "nonleft"? I do not think this distinction has anything to offer. The "leftism" in fascism flows from the necessity to arouse and nourish the illusions of the enraged petty proprietor. In various countries, under various conditions, this is done in different ways, with the use of different doses of "leftism." But in essence Pilsudskism, like fascism in general, performs a counterrevolutionary role. This is an antiparliamentary and, above all, antiproletarian counterrevolution, with whose help the declining bourgeoisie attempts—and not without success, at least for a time—to protect and preserve its fundamental positions.

I have called fascism a caricature of Jacobinism. Fascism is related to Jacobinism in the same way that modern capitalism, which is destroying the productive forces and lowering the cultural level of society, relates to youthful capitalism, which increased the power of mankind in all spheres. Of course, the comparison of fascism and Jacobinism, like any broad historical analogy in general, is legitimate only within certain limits and from a certain point of view. The attempt to stretch this analogy beyond its justified limits would carry the danger of false conclusions. But within limits it does explain something. The summits of bourgeois society were not able to clear society of feudalism. For this it was necessary to mobilize the interests, passions, and illusions of the petty bourgeoisie. The latter carried out this work in struggle against the summits of bourgeois society, although in the last analysis it served none other than them. Likewise, the fascists mobilize petty-bourgeois public opinion and their own armed units in struggle or partial struggle with the ruling circles and the official state apparatus. The more threatening the immediate revolutionary danger is to bourgeois society, or the sharper the disillusionment of the petty bourgeoisie, temporarily hoping for revolution, the easier it is for fascism to carry out its mobilization.

In Poland the conditions for this mobilization were unique and complex; they were created by the economic and political impasse, the dim prospects for revolution, and the "Muscovite" danger connected with this. One of the Polish comrades here—
I think it was Leszczynski\textsuperscript{212} — expressed himself to the effect that the real fascists were hiding not in the camp of Pilsudski but in the camp of the National Democrats, i.e., the big capitalist party, which has at its disposal chauvinist bands that have carried out pogroms more than once. Is this the case? The auxiliary bands of the National Democrats would suffice, so to speak, only for everyday affairs. But to arouse the broad masses of the nation to strike a blow against parliamentarism, democracy, and above all the proletariat—and to weld the state power into a military fist—for that the party of the capitalists and landlords would not suffice. In order to mobilize the petty bourgeoisie of the city and countryside, as well as the backward section of the workers, it is necessary to have in one's hands such political resources as the traditions of petty-bourgeois socialism and the revolutionary national-liberation struggle. The National Democrats had not even a trace of this. That is why the mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie of Poland could only have been accomplished by Marshal Pilsudski—with the PPS in tow for a certain period. But having won power, the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of wielding it independently. It is forced either to let go of it under the pressure of the proletariat or, if the latter does not have the strength to seize it, to hand power over to the big bourgeoisie, no longer in the previous dispersed but in the new concentrated form.

The deeper had been the illusions of petty-bourgeois socialism and patriotism in Poland and the more impetuously they had been mobilized in conditions of economic and parliamentary impasse, the more brazenly, cynically, and "suddenly" would the victorious chief of this movement fall down on his knees before the big bourgeoisie with the request that they "crown" him. This is the key to the cinematic tempo of the Polish events.

The big and lasting success of Mussolini turned out to be possible only because the revolution of September 1920, having shaken loose all the buttresses and braces of bourgeois society, was not carried through to the end. On the basis of the ebb of the revolution, the disappointment of the petty bourgeoisie, and the exhaustion of the workers, Mussolini drew up, and put into practice, his plan.

In Poland matters did not get that far. The impasse of the regime was at hand, but a direct revolutionary situation, in the sense of the readiness of the masses to go into combat, did not yet exist. A revolutionary situation was only on the way. Pilsudski's coup, like all of his "fascism," appears then
as a preventive, i.e., precautionary, counterrevolution. That is why it seems to me that Pilsudski's regime has less chance of a lengthy existence than does Italian fascism. Mussolini took advantage of a revolution already broken from within, with the inevitable decline in activity among the proletariat thereafter. Pilsudski, on the other hand, intercepted an oncoming revolution, raised himself to a certain degree with its fresh yeast, and cynically deceived the masses following him. This provides ground for hope that Pilsudskism will be an episode on the wave of revolutionary upsurge, not decline.

The second question that I would like to take up has to do with the objective roots of the error committed by the leaders of the Polish party. Undoubtedly the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie, with its hopes and illusions, was very strong in the days of the May coup. This explains why the party at that stage was unable to win the masses and guide the whole movement onto a truly revolutionary path. But this in no way excuses the leadership of the party, which meekly submitted to the petty-bourgeois chaos, floating upon it without rudder or sails. As for the basic causes of the mistake, they are rooted in the character of our epoch, which we call revolutionary but which we have not gotten to know by a long shot in all its sharp twists and turns — and without this knowledge it is impossible to master each particular concrete situation. Our period differs from the prewar period the way a crisis-filled, explosive period differs from one that is organic, developing in comparative regularity. In the prewar period, we had in Europe the growth of the productive forces, a sharpening class differentiation, the growth of imperialism at one pole and the growth of the Social Democracy at the other. The conquest of power by the proletariat was pictured as the inevitable but distant crowning of this process. More precisely, for the opportunists and centrists of the Social Democracy the social revolution was a phrase without content; for the left wing of the European Social Democracy it was a distant goal for which it was necessary to prepare gradually and systematically. The war cut short this epoch, thoroughly revealing its contradictions; and with the war began a new epoch. One can no longer speak of the regular growth of the productive forces, the steady growth in numbers of the industrial proletariat, and so on. In the economy there is either stagnation or decline. Unemployment has become chronic. If we take the fluctuations in the economic cycle of the European countries, or the changes in the political situa-
tion, and put them on paper in the form of a graph, we get not a regularly rising curve with periodic fluctuations but a feverish curve with frantic zigzags up and down. The economic cycle changes abruptly within the framework of an essentially constant fixed capital. The political cycle changes abruptly in the grip of the economic impasse. The petty-bourgeois masses, involving wide circles of workers as well, charge now to the right, now to the left.

Here we can no longer speak of the organic process of development unceasingly strengthening the proletariat as a productive class and, thereby, its revolutionary party. The interrelations between party and class are subject, under current conditions, to much sharper fluctuations than before. The tactics of the party, while preserving their principled basis, are endowed—and should be endowed!—with a far more maneuverable and creative character, foreign to any routinism whatsoever. In these tactics sharp and daring turns are inevitable, depending above all on whether we are entering a zone of revolutionary upsurge or, on the contrary, a rapid downturn. The whole of our epoch consists of such distinctly marked-off sections of the curve, some rising, some falling. These steep, sometimes sudden, changes must be caught in time. The difference between the role of the Central Committee of a Social Democratic party in prewar conditions and that of the Central Committee of a Communist party in current conditions is to a certain degree like the difference between a general staff, which organizes and trains military forces, and a field headquarters, which is called upon to lead those forces under battle conditions (although there may indeed be long pauses between battles).

The struggle for the masses remains, of course, the basic task, but the conditions of this struggle are different now. Any turn in the domestic or international situation may, at the very next step, transform the struggle for the masses into a direct struggle for power. Today you cannot measure strategy by decades. In the course of a year, or two, or three, the whole situation in a country changes radically. This we have seen especially clearly in the case of Germany. After the attempt to summon up a revolution in the absence of the necessary preconditions (March 1921), we observe in the German party a strong rightward deviation (Brandlerism), and this deviation is subsequently wrecked on the sharp leftward shift in the whole situation (1923). In place of the opportunist deviation comes an ultraleft one, whose ascendancy
coincides, however, with the ebb of the revolution; out of this contradiction between conditions and policies grow mistakes that weaken the revolutionary movement still further. The result is a kind of division of labor between rightist and ultra-leftist groupings according to which each one, at a sharp upward or downward turn of the political curve, suffers defeat and gives way to the rival grouping. At the same time, the method now in practice—of changing the leadership with every shift in the situation—gives the leading cadre no chance to acquire a broader experience that would include both rise and fall, both ebb and flow. And without this generalizing, synthesized understanding of the character of our epoch of rapid shifts and abrupt turns, a truly Bolshevik leadership cannot be educated. That is why, in spite of the profoundly revolutionary character of the epoch, the party and its leadership have not succeeded in rising to the heights of the demands that the situation has placed before them.

Pilsudski's regime in Poland will be a regime of fascist struggle for stabilization, which means an extreme sharpening of the class struggle. Stabilization is not a condition granted to society from without, but a problem for bourgeois politics. This problem is no sooner partly settled than it erupts again. The fascist struggle for stabilization will arouse the resistance of the proletariat. On the soil of mass disillusionment in Pilsudski's coup a favorable situation for our party will be created, on the condition, of course, that the leadership is not one-sidedly adapted to a temporary rise or temporary decline in the political curve, but embraces the basic line of development as a whole. To the fascist struggle for stabilization must be counterposed, above all, the internal stabilization of the Communist Party. Then victory will be assured!
INTENSIFY THE OFFENSIVE! 213

August 6, 1932

The physical attack of the Stalinists on the Bolshevik-Leninists at the Salle Bullier in Paris arouses not only profound indignation but also a feeling of burning shame for the present leadership of the Comintern. This is not the work of rank-and-file Communists, of workers— they would never lower themselves to such abominations!— but of a centralized bureaucracy which is carrying out the orders of the higher echelons. Their aim: to create such an embittered atmosphere within the Communist ranks that all arguments of reason lose their force. Only in this way can the Stalinist bureaucracy still save itself from the criticism of the Left Opposition. What terrible degeneration!

The history of the Russian revolutionary movement is particularly rich in bitter factional struggles. For thirty-five years I have observed very closely and participated in this struggle. I can't recall a single instance in which differences of opinion, not only among the Marxists but between the Marxists, the Narodniks, 214 and the anarchists, were settled by the organized rule of the fist. Petrograd in 1917 seethed with continual meetings. First as an insignificant minority, then as a strong party, finally as the overwhelming majority, the Bolsheviks conducted an annihilating campaign against the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. I can't recall a single meeting where physical fights replaced political struggle. Although for the last two years I have been making a thorough study of the history of the February and October revolutions, I have not been able to find a single indication of such an occurrence in the press of that time. What the proletarian masses wanted to do was to listen and to understand. What the Bolsheviks
Intensify the Offensive!

wanted to do was to convince them. Only in this way can a party be educated and the revolutionary class be drawn to it. In 1923 at the height of the dispute in the Caucasus between the Stalinists and the Leninists, Ordzhonikidze struck one of his opponents in the face. Lenin, seriously ill and confined to the Kremlin, was literally shaken by the report of Ordzhonikidze's conduct. In Lenin's eyes, the fact that Ordzhonikidze stood at the head of the party apparatus in the Caucasus only magnified his guilt. Lenin sent his secretaries Glasser and Fotieva to me a number of times urging the expulsion of Ordzhonikidze. He saw in Ordzhonikidze's hooliganism indications and symptoms of a whole school and an entire system: the school and system of Stalin. That same day Lenin wrote his last letter to Stalin declaring that he was severing all "comradely relations" with him. Since then a whole series of historical factors has led to the triumph of this school of "rudeness" and "disloyalty," not only in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but also in the Comintern. The abomination at Bullier is its unquestionable and unadulterated expression.

Nine-tenths of the people in the apparatus regard the Stalinist system with growing alarm, if not with complete disgust. But they cannot tear themselves out of its clutches. Each of the decisive links in the chain has its Semards and its Yaroslavskys, as well as its Bessedovskys and Agabekovs. From slander and falsification these gentlemen have now proceeded to organized physical attack. The command begins with Stalin and is then transmitted to all sections of the Comintern. Will this help them? No, it will not. Their need to employ continually stronger methods proves the ineffectiveness of their previous attacks against the Bolshevik-Leninists.

Tremendous events are taking place in Germany. The leaders of the Comintern maintain silence; they act as if their mouths were filled with water. Don't the German events demand an immediate convocation of a world congress of the Comintern? Of course they do. But answers will have to be given at a congress, and the Stalinists have nothing to say. Their mistakes, their zigzags, their crimes have completely overwhelmed them. To remain silent, to go into hiding, to passively await the outcome is the sum and substance of the policy of the Stalinist faction.

But the Bolshevik-Leninists will not be silent and they will not allow others to remain silent. Despite their small numbers, our French comrades are showing magnificent perseverance
in raising the burning questions of the proletarian world revolution before the workers. By assaulting them like hooligans, the Stalinists merely pay tribute to their revolutionary energy.

No sooner did the Bolshevik-Leninists in Moscow give warning against Chiang Kai-shek than the Stalinist bureaucracy baited, persecuted, and smashed them. No sooner do the Bolshevik-Leninists in Paris sound the alarm against fascism than the Stalinist clique prepares to smash them. These facts will not go unpunished. From big facts the party learns and the class learns.

We do not hold the rank-and-file Communists responsible for the crimes of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The Bolshevik-Leninists will not change their course towards the French Communist Party or the Comintern. The attempt everywhere to build walls of hate between us and the millions of Communists will not succeed. It is clear that right is on our side and the workers are listening more attentively to our words.

The more the Stalinists lose their heads, the more the Leninists will persevere in their activity. The bureaucracy is twisting and turning under our criticism, under the sweep of our arguments. All the more apparent, therefore, is our correctness and our effectiveness. Let us intensify our offensive twofold, threefold, tenfold!
THREE LETTERS
TO LAZAR KLING

February 9-August 7, 1932

February 9, 1932

Dear Comrade Kling:

Thank you for the books you sent, one of which I am returning to you because I already have a copy.

It is very difficult for me to judge from here whether the League is devoting enough attention to work among "adulterated American" workers, including the Jews. Everything depends on the forces and the means available and on their sound allocation. From the sidelines and from far away it is difficult to form an opinion on this.

The importance of foreign workers in the American revolution will be enormous—in a sense decisive. Certainly the Opposition must, no matter what, make its way into the Jewish workers' surroundings.

You ask what my attitude is toward the Jewish language. It is the same as toward any other language. If I did indeed use the term "jargon" in my autobiography, it is because in the years of my youth in Odessa the Jewish language was not called "Yiddish," as it is now, but "jargon." Jews themselves used this expression, at least in Odessa, and absolutely nothing scornful was meant by it. The word "Yiddish" has come into general use—this applies even in France, for example—only in the last fifteen or twenty years.

You say that I am called an "assimilator." I have no idea what this word can mean. I am, of course, an opponent of Zionism and all other forms of self-isolation of the Jewish workers. I call upon the Jewish workers in France to familiarize themselves as much as possible with the conditions of French life and of the French working class, since without this it will be difficult for them to participate in the workers' movement.
of that country where they are being exploited. Because the Jewish proletariat has been scattered among different countries, the Jewish worker must strive to know, besides the Jewish language, the languages of other countries as a weapon in the class struggle. Is that "assimilation"?

My attitude toward proletarian culture is set forth in my book *Literature and Revolution*. It is wrong, or not totally correct, to contrast proletarian culture to bourgeois culture. The bourgeois regime and, consequently, bourgeois culture developed over many centuries. The proletarian regime is only a short-term regime, transitional to socialism. During this transitional regime (the dictatorship of the proletariat), the proletariat cannot create any finished class culture. It can only prepare elements of socialist culture. The task, then, of the proletariat is to create, not a proletarian culture, but a socialist culture on the basis of a classless society.

Such, in brief, is my opinion on the question of proletarian culture. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg, and others held a similar view on this question.

Once again, thank you for the book. With affectionate comradely greetings.

Yours,

L. Trotsky

May 23, 1932

Dear Comrade Kling:

I have proven to be negligent this time with respect to you. I apologize. I have had a great deal of urgent work to do in recent weeks, and I was forced to greatly neglect correspondence.

Nevertheless I was able to send *Unzer Kampf* a short greeting. I hope that it was received.

I have forwarded to Palestine to the Poale Zion group one copy of all the issues of the newspaper that have reached me. One of the members of their central committee, who signs his name as Nathan, has begun corresponding with me. He is a serious comrade, gravitating strongly toward the Left Opposition. There is sympathy for the Left Opposition among them. It is possible that a good correspondent for *Unzer Kampf* could be found in their midst.

You ask whether it would be proper to present to the trade unions and other mass organizations resolutions protesting
against the persecution of the Left Opposition. In my opinion this depends on the concrete situation. In a reactionary union, of course, it is impossible to put such resolutions to a vote. But if a given organization is sympathetic toward the USSR, it is fully possible to try to secure the passage of a resolution which pledges full support to the USSR and at the same time expresses the demand: End the repression of the Left Opposition.

I must give a similar answer to your second question, about the struggle against the demoralized and unscrupulous figures of the Communist Party. To build a campaign on this basis, of course, is inadmissible since it would create the atmosphere of a terrible squabble and facilitate the application of pogrom-like methods by the Stalinist bureaucracy. But in those cases where the soil has been sufficiently prepared politically it is possible to deal an extra blow by exposing what kind of people are for the defense of the "general line." But in blows of this kind, of a personal nature, the greatest preciseness, substantiation, and honesty is demanded. To be guided by rumors and unverified information is inadmissible under any circumstances.

Thank you for the booklet.

With my greetings,

L. Trotsky

August 7, 1932

Dear Comrade Kling:

I was very pleased to hear about the growing influence of the newspaper Unzer Kamf. We hope that in the near future the newspaper can be converted into a weekly.

You send word of the plan to publish a number of the Left Opposition's works, in particular my own, in the Jewish language in pamphlet and book form. I, of course, can only welcome this.

Comarade Nathan is not a member of the Left Opposition; he is only a sympathizer and is trying to clarify a number of questions through correspondence. I find these letters very interesting because they give me an idea of the Palestine situation. As regards Comrade Stein, he is quite definitely an active member of the Left Opposition.

As far as I can judge from Comrade Nathan's letters the Left Opposition could win considerable influence in the left Poale Zion. It would be good if the American comrades would make the necessary effort toward this end.
You are interested in my opinion concerning the organization in New York of an international bureau of Jewish workers. It seems to me that it may be premature to start this. At the present stage, it is enough to energetically distribute *Unzer Kampf* to all countries where there are Jewish workers, to establish contacts, to carry on correspondence, etc. All this work will naturally become very much expanded and will take on a more systematic character when the newspaper becomes a weekly. Only on the basis of experience will we then be able to judge how expedient it would be to create a special bureau.

On the question about the events in Palestine, I am right now only gathering material. In particular, I am awaiting the arrival of an American, a Marxist, from Palestine. Comrade Nathan is also sending me valuable material. This will give me the opportunity to express a more concrete opinion on the 1929 movement and to make out to what degree and in what proportions the Arab national liberation (anti-imperialist) movement was connected with reactionary Mohammedans and anti-Semitic pogromists. I think that all these elements were present.

I am hoping to write a book about America but not right away. I have been gathering material for it for quite some time.

With comradely greetings,

L. Trotsky
Business cycles in the postwar period have ceased to constitute the normal mechanism of capitalist development insofar as capitalism, as a whole, is in a period of decay. But this does not mean that economic fluctuations belong to the past. Immediately after the war, it's true, they lost their cyclic and, as for recovery at least, their universal character. Both these characteristics, however, are being revived today, at least up to a certain point.

The current crisis has a worldwide character. This means that the world economy, whose functioning was interrupted by the war years, has made its way in spite of all tariff walls and in a painful form has proved its powerful reality. There is every reason to believe that the approaching reversal of the trend in the direction of a business revival—not everywhere and not with equal strength—will also assume a worldwide character. In other words, the cyclical movement of capitalism is restored in the present crisis.

Naturally we cannot expect full-blown cycles in the future. In the decades preceding the war, crises had the character of short and not too profound interruptions, while each new upswing left the peak of the previous one far below. But now we must expect the opposite: profound, long, and painful crises, while the upward movements are weak and short-lived. If the old cycles were the mechanism of a broad upward movement, the new ones can only be the mechanism of capitalist decay.

But the influence of cyclical changes on the life of masses of people remains enormous. In a certain sense it is now more far-reaching than ever before.

The present stage of capitalism more than fulfills the prerequisites for the proletarian revolution. What lags behind
is the consciousness of the proletariat, its organization, its leadership. Because of the general instability of social equilibrium, the conjunctural fluctuations lead to tremendous shifts of political power, to revolutionary and counterrevolutionary disturbances.

The bourgeois world, and with it the Social Democracy, awaits the new upturn in commerce and industry as its salvation. The theoreticians of the Comintern are afraid of such a perspective and deny the possibility of an upward turn in the business-cycle curve. To us Marxists it is perfectly clear that a revival of business activity will not open a broad avenue out of the crisis, but will lead to a new, still sharper, and more painful crisis. On the other hand, the inevitability of an approaching change in the business cycle is perfectly evident to us. We must equip ourselves theoretically for the next "post-crisis period" and take a correct point of departure.

The years of crisis have thrown and are throwing the international proletariat back for a whole historical period. Discontent, the wish to escape poverty, hate for the exploiters and their system, all these emotions which are now suppressed and driven inward by frightful unemployment and governmental repression, will force their way out with redoubled energy at the first real signs of an industrial revival.

Because of the general situation of capital today, even in the event of a substantial revival, the employers will not be in a position to make the kinds of concessions to the workers which would keep the struggle within the confines of the trade unions. We can predict with certainty that the industrial revival will not allow even for a return to those conditions of labor which prevailed before the crisis. The economic conflicts will not only take on a wide scope but also inevitably expand into political movements of a revolutionary character.

The Comintern must strip off the last remnants of the theory of the "third period," must begin to investigate concretely the economic and social terrain of the struggle, and must stop issuing dictatorial commands to the proletarian vanguard but through the latter guide the real development of the class struggle.

In very first place is work in the trade unions. Lozovský's "third period" as well as Manuilsky's third period must be discarded, and an end put to the policy of self-isolation. The question of restoring the unity of the German trade-union movement through the integration of all RGO members into the mass of the "free trade unions" must be posed with the greatest
sharpness. Every party member who can must be obligated to join a trade union.

The development of the economic struggle will place enormous tasks before the reformist bureaucracy. The exploitation of their difficulties can best be accomplished by a flexible and energetic united-front policy.

That the Left Opposition, despite its small numbers, can occupy an honorable place in the mass struggle is shown by the experience of the Belgian comrades. In any case, it is the task of the Left Opposition to unfold the questions clearly before the party, to outline the general perspectives, to formulate slogans of struggle. Now, less than ever, can the Left Opposition permit itself to remain a closed propaganda circle, standing aside from the real development of the class struggle.

Every Bolshevik-Leninist must be a member of one or another mass organization, above all of a trade union. Only in this way will our organization keep its hand on the pulse of the proletariat and fulfill its role as the vanguard of the vanguard.

Postscript

The American comrade, Field, who is familiar with the problems of the world economy, has prepared at my request the first draft of an evaluation of the immediate cyclical tendencies of the world market. The conclusions of Comrade Field are very carefully stated. Everyone who takes account of the complexity of the factors which determine changes in the business cycle will understand and approve the caution of the prognosis. The task is not to make guesses but to put the question correctly, follow the development of the facts, and draw the conclusions in time.

I request the International Secretariat to forward these lines together with the statement of Comrade Field to all the sections as discussion material. It is perfectly clear that our international conference will have to express itself on this most important question.

Comrade Field had a conflict with the American League which led to his removal from our American section. My collaboration with Comrade Field is of a completely personal character and has no connection with the inner life of the American League.
A CONVERSATION WITH TROTSKY

August 25, 1932

Trotsky: You come from Germany? What party are you in?

Bergmann: I'm in the SAP.

T.: That's bad!

B. : I came here with the Walcher-Froelich group. 223

T.: That's worse! A party should be evaluated from two standpoints: national and international! Internationally the SAP links up with all the doubtful elements in the whole world. In Germany it makes the wrong decisions on every important question. Take the presidential elections. It was correct to put up Thaelmann. A joint candidacy of Loebe is impossible. 224 I cannot ask workers to vote for Loebe, i.e., for the Social Democratic program. Certainly I have many differences with Thaelmann, but he does represent a program, a Communist program. But the Social Democracy is a capitalist party.

B. : And if Hitler had been elected like Hindenburg in 1925, i.e., with a margin smaller than Thaelmann's total vote? You have to take that into account, and then the Communists would have been responsible before the whole working class for the direct results of Hitler's election.

T.: You can't please everybody. It's enough for me if I can take on the responsibility for my own party. The Seydewitz stuff about putting the interest of the class before the interest of the party is nonsense. That comes from wanting to be a big party all at once, and not having the patience to build up slowly and systematically. A revolutionary must have patience. Impatience is the mother of opportunism.

B.: Do you think that a party which is led by such leadership can carry through the proletarian revolution in a country like Germany, with such a strong bourgeoisie?

T.: In some situations, yes! Circumstances may prove stronger than human incapacity. The German Communist Party contains

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many revolutionary elements, including ones who more or less know what the October Revolution was and what the dictatorship of the proletariat is. Of course not every Communist bureaucrat will turn out to be a hero, not every reformist bigwig will be a topnotcher. . . . But in the fight with the fascists in the working-class districts it will be the Communists who will be in the front line. The situation in Germany leaves many possibilities open. It may be that the Communist Party will take over the leadership.

B.: What do you think, Comrade Trotsky, about the slogan "self-determination" up to separation? Is there not a danger that in the event of a revolution the bourgeoisie of a province will hide behind this slogan and carry on propaganda for independence or union with a neighboring reactionary country?

T.: The danger exists, but it becomes greater with every ambiguity on the question. We say to the masses of that province: If you want to leave, go ahead, we won't restrain you by force; but what will you do with the big estates? and what about the factories? That's all that interests us—when by our generosity in respect to nationality we put the social question into the foreground, then we will drive a wedge between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; otherwise we would weld them together. Look, the Russian Bolsheviks said: "Right of self-determination including separation." And Russia has become a block despite its forty languages and nations. The Austrian Social Democrats, like a true copy of their bourgeoisie, tried to solve the question by a compromise, and Austria-Hungary has fallen apart. That is history's biggest lesson in this field.

B.: Another question: Is it conceivable for a socialist state to wage war along with a capitalist state against another capitalist state? For example, Russia with America against Japan? What would the attitude of the American Communist Party have to be then?

T.: The concrete case of a war of Russia plus America against Japan is extremely improbable. The American bourgeoisie is the legitimist one among the bourgeoisie, I would say. The above case is conceivable, however, though not for a long time. Since in consequence of a defeat of the third power revolutionary movements will break out in it, an alliance of the two states which had just been fighting each other against the revolutionary proletariat would immediately be formed.

B.: And the tactics of the CP of the country concerned up to that point?
T.: Extreme mistrust of the government; for example, no approval of the budget, but no strikes in the munitions industry, etc. This attitude to continue, of course, only as long as the CP is not strong enough to undertake serious actions to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

B.: If I can put it this way: mistrust and propaganda against the government, gathering of forces for a decisive blow, but no direct sabotage of the war.

T.: Yes, something like that! But I emphasize that this cannot possibly be a prolonged state of affairs. It would come to an end after a short time because of the rupture of the alliance between the socialist and the capitalist state.

B.: What do you think about the possibility of a Japanese-American war, Comrade Trotsky?

T.: It has moved some years off. America cannot wage war against Japan without a base on the East Asian mainland—and arming the Chinese people with the perspective of creating a colonial war as in India would be an experiment with unforeseeable consequences for America and the world. China is a nation, India was a collection of provinces. Now it is becoming a nation, and therefore English rule in India is coming to an end. The arming of the Chinese people by the USSR for a fight against foreign rule, that opens a big revolutionary perspective in the Far East.

B.: How do you evaluate China's internal development?

T.: That depends on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to link up the peasant struggles with the fight of the urban proletariat. The main failing of the Chinese CP consists in its excessive weakness. You will find more details on this in our latest literature.

B.: Now the last question. To what do you attribute the faults of the Comintern, bureaucratization, etc., to internal Russian or to extra-Russian causes?

T.: In the first place to internal Russian ones.

B.: Does that mean that the cure must also come from Russia?

T.: That is not necessary! It can also come from outside.

B.: That means—for some time at least—the destruction of the Comintern in the present sense.

T.: Not necessarily. You must not forget that a new fourth international is only possible after a great historic event. The Third International arose from the Great War and the October Revolution. The worker thinks slowly, he must mull everything over in his mind, I would say. He knows that the party has enlightened him and trained him as a conscious
worker, and therefore he does not change as easily as the intellectual. He learns not from discussions but from historical events. Such an event would be the victory of fascism in Germany. But the victory of fascism in Germany does not only mean in all probability the collapse of the Comintern, but also includes the defeat of the Soviet Union. Only if that takes place—it need not necessarily take place, it can still be prevented, and every effort must of course be made to prevent it—only then will we have the right to talk about a new party, about a fourth international.

[At his request, the conversation was sent to Trotsky before publication. He sent it back with the following accompanying note:]

October 24, 1932

Dear Comrade:

There has been some delay in my reply, since my time was very taken up with other things.

Your note gives our conversation broadly correctly. I should just like to add a few things. Insofar as your manuscript concerns my evaluation of the SAP, the impression may arise that I condemn the SAP so sharply mainly because of its international connections with hopeless splinter organizations. That impression would be false, since it would be one-sided. The connection with the ILP, etc., is only the international extension of the internal "line." The SAP has decided fully in favor of the Ledebour policy.

You ask whether the centristic bureaucratization of the Comintern is to be attributed to internal Russian or to extra-Russian causes. Immediately to the Russian ones, as the answer recorded by you states. But one should not forget here that internal Russian development was shaped by the isolation of the Soviet Union, i.e., by extra-Russian causes.

Such additions require many answers. However, I believe that your reader (if you publish the "interview") will be clever enough to draw out from it for himself what is necessary.

Friendly greetings,

L. Trotsky
GREETINGS TO THE
POLISH LEFT OPPOSITION

August 31, 1932

In the ranks of the International Left Opposition in recent years the question has been raised more than once: What accounts for the fact that the Bolshevik-Leninist faction has not yet encountered any significant response from the ranks of the Polish Communist Party? Polish communism has long-standing, serious theoretical traditions, going back to Rosa Luxemburg. Only four organizations formed before the world war—quite a while before it, in fact—entered the Communist International as complete units: Russian Bolshevism, the Polish Social Democracy, the Bulgarian Tesniaki, and the Dutch Left. (We do not include the Latvian Social Democracy, which had developed in direct connection with the Russian, whereas the Polish Social Democracy had its own special origin and independent position.) All other sections of the Comintern first took shape as nuclei either during the war or even after it.

But between the Polish Marxists on the one hand and the Bulgarians and Dutch on the other, there existed an enormous difference. The Tesniaki and the Dutch Left were propaganda organizations. They preached rather radical formulas, but they never went beyond the framework of preaching. The Polish Social Democracy, like Bolshevism, participated for one and a half to two decades before the war in direct revolutionary struggle against czarism and capital. While the party of the Tesniaki was creating at its top two types: the narrow and lifeless dogmatist of the Kabakchiev type and the accomplished bureaucrat of the Kolarov-Dimitrov type, the old Polish Social Democracy developed the type of the genuine revolutionary. The left wing of the PPS, it is true, brought with it a series of thoroughly formed and incorrigible Mensheviks (Walecki, Lapinski, to a large extent Kostrzewa, and others) into the ranks of the united Communist Party. However the best of the left-wing workers, having gone through the school of struggle against czarism, quickly evolved in the direction of Bolshevism.
Greetings to the Polish Left Opposition

Here too a turning point came with the year 1923: year of inglorious defeat for the revolution in Germany, and of inglorious victory for the centrist Moscow bureaucracy, which had found support in the Thermidorean wave. To measure how far the Polish epigones have fallen from Luxemburgism, it is enough to recall that Warski, once a close student of Rosa's, in 1924-27 supported the policy of the Stalinists in China and in England, in 1926 welcomed Pilsudski's coup in Poland, and now, by way of Barbusse, fraternizes with the French Freemasons under the banner of pacifism.

It is all the more alarming then that the pernicious and unworthy course of the epigones has not produced a decisive rejection from the Polish Communist ranks, in the form of new Bolshevik-Leninists. The explanation for this fact has its roots to a large extent in the extremely difficult conditions in which the Polish Communist Party has been placed, fighting under illegal conditions and at the same time under the direct observation of the Stalinist general staff. Thus Polish Bolshevik-Leninists must operate in an atmosphere of double illegality: one flows from Pilsudski, the other . . . from Stalin. In underground conditions expulsion from the party, which is accompanied by vicious hounding and slander, represents a double and even a triple blow for any revolutionary devoted to the cause of communism. Such are the conditions that explain to a certain degree the slowness with which the Polish Left Opposition was formed and the extreme caution of its first steps.

Now these first steps have been taken. In the Polish party a hopeful nucleus has been formed of Opposition workers with combat experience and serious records in the party. They are actively engaged in translating (into Polish and Yiddish) and distributing the literature of the International Left Opposition. They have managed to pass several pamphlets through the needle's eye of the Polish censorship. The first number of the Opposition paper Proletariat, put out in Brussels, contains extensive factual material. Number 2, we hear, is being prepared for the printer. Opposition publications in Russian, German, French, and other foreign languages are also circulating among party members in Poland. We have no doubt that once the ideas of the Left Opposition penetrate the qualified revolutionary milieu of Polish communism, they will meet with a broad and active response.

Warm greetings to our cothinkers in Poland!

L. T.
FOURTEEN QUESTIONS
ON SOVIET LIFE AND MORALITY

September 17, 1932

The question of recognizing the Soviet Union is now being widely discussed in the United States. Diplomatic recognition, naturally, does not mean that each side approves the politics of the other. The nonrecognition of the Soviet republic up to now has chiefly been based on reasons of a moral nature. The questions put to me by the editor of Liberty cover these grounds.

1. Does the Soviet state turn men into robots?

Why? I ask. The ideologists of the patriarchal system, like Tolstoy or Ruskin, object that machine civilization turns the free peasant and craftsman into joyless automatons. In the last decades this charge has mostly been leveled against the industrial system of America (Taylorism, Fordism).

Shall we now, perhaps, hear from Chicago and Detroit the outcry against the soul-destroying machine? Why not return to stone hatchets and mud dwellings, why not go back to sheepskin coverings? No; we refuse to do that. In the field of mechanization the Soviet republic is so far only a disciple of the United States—and has no intention of stopping halfway.

But perhaps the question is aimed not at mechanical operation but at the distinctive features of the social order. Are not men becoming robots in the Soviet state because the machines are state property and not privately owned? It is enough to ask the question clearly to show that it has no foundation.

There remains, finally, the question of the political regime, the hard dictatorship, the highest tension of all forces, the low standard of living of the population. There would be no sense in denying these facts. But they are the expression not
so much of the new regime as of the fearful inheritance of backwardness.

The dictatorship will have to become softer and milder as the economic welfare of the country is raised. The present method of commanding human beings will give way to one of disposing over things. The road leads not to the robot but to man of a higher order.

2. Is the Soviet state completely dominated by a small group in the Kremlin who exercise oligarchical powers under the guise of a dictatorship of the proletariat?

No, that is not so. The same class can rule with the help of different political systems and methods according to circumstances. So the bourgeoisie on its historical road carried through its rule under absolute monarchy, Bonapartism, parliamentary republic, and fascist dictatorship. All these forms of rule retain a capitalist character insofar as the most important riches of the nation, the administration of the means of production, of the schools, and of the press, remain united in the hands of the bourgeoisie, and insofar as the laws first of all protect bourgeois property.

The Soviet regime means the rule of the proletariat, irrespective of how broad the stratum in whose hands the power is immediately concentrated.

3. Have the Soviets robbed childhood of joy and turned education into a system of Bolshevist propaganda?

The education of children has always and everywhere been connected with propaganda. The propaganda begins by instilling the advantages of a handkerchief over the fingers, and rises to the advantages of the Republican platform over the Democratic, or vice versa. Education in the spirit of religion is propaganda; you will surely not refuse to admit that St. Paul was one of the greatest of propagandists.

The worldly education supplied by the French republic is soaked with propaganda to the marrow. Its main idea is that all virtue is inherent in the French nation or, more accurately, in the ruling class of the French nation.

No one can possibly deny that the education of Soviet children, too, is propaganda. The only difference is that in bourgeois countries it is a question of injecting into the child respect for old institutions and ideas which are taken for granted. In the USSR it is a question of new ideas, and therefore the propaganda leaps to the eye. "Propaganda," in the evil sense of the word, is the name that people usually give to the defense and spread of such ideas as do not please them.
In times of conservatism and stability, the daily propaganda is not noticeable. In times of revolution, propaganda necessarily takes on a belligerent and aggressive character. When I returned to Moscow from Canada with my family early in May 1917, my two boys studied at a "gymnasium" [roughly, high school] which was attended by the children of many politicians, including some ministers of the Provisional Government. In the whole gymnasium there were only two Bolsheviks—my sons—and a third sympathizer. In spite of the official rule, "the school must be free of politics," my son, barely twelve years old, was unmercifully beaten up as a Bolshevik. After I was elected president of the Petrograd Soviet, my son was never called anything but "president" and received a double beating. That was propaganda against Bolshevism.

Those parents and teachers who are devoted to the old society cry out against "propaganda." If a state is to build a new society, can it do otherwise than begin with the school?

"Does the Soviet propaganda rob childhood of joy?" For what reason and in what manner? Soviet children play, sing, dance, and cry like all other children. The unusual care of the Soviet regime for the child is admitted even by malevolent observers. Compared with the old regime, infant mortality has declined by half.

It is true, Soviet children are told nothing about original sin and paradise. In this sense one may say that the children are being robbed of the joys of life after death. Being no expert in these matters, I dare not judge the extent of the loss. Still, the pains of this life take a certain precedence over the joys of the life to come. If children absorb the necessary quantity of calories, the abundance of their living forces will find reasons enough for joy.

Two years ago my five-year-old grandson came to me from Moscow. Although he knew nothing whatever about God, I could find no particularly sinful inclinations in him, except for the time when with the help of some newspapers, he succeeded in hermetically sealing up the washbasin drainpipe. In order to have him mingle with other children on Prinkipo, we had to send him to a kindergarten conducted by Catholic nuns. The worthy sisters have nothing but praise for the morals of my now nearly seven-year-old atheist.

Thanks to this same grandchild, I have been able in the past year to make fairly close acquaintance with Russian children's books, those of the Soviets as well as of the emigres. There is propaganda in both. Yet the Soviet books are in-
Fourteen Questions on Soviet Life and Morality

comparably fresher, more active, more full of life. The little man reads and listens to these books with the greatest pleasure. No, Soviet propaganda does not rob childhood of joy.

4. Is Bolshevism deliberately destroying the family?
5. Is Bolshevism subversive of all moral standards in sex?
6. Is it true that bigamy and polygamy are not punishable under the Soviet system?

If one understands by "family" a compulsory union based on the marriage contract, the blessing of the church, property rights, and the single passport, then Bolshevism has destroyed this policed family from the roots up.

If one understands by "family" the unbounded domination of parents over children, and absence of legal rights for the wife, then Bolshevism has, unfortunately, not yet completely destroyed this carryover of society's old barbarism.

If one understands by "family" ideal monogamy—not in the legal but in the actual sense—then the Bolsheviks could not destroy what never was nor is on earth, barring fortunate exceptions.

There is absolutely no foundation for the statement that the Soviet law on marriage has been an incentive to polygamy and polyandry. Statistics of marriage relations—actual ones—are not available, and cannot be. But even without columns of figures one can be sure that the Moscow index numbers of adulteries and shipwrecked marriages are not much different from the corresponding data for New York, London, or Paris, and—who knows?—are perhaps even lower.

Against prostitution there has been a strenuous and fairly successful struggle. This proves that the Soviets have no intention of tolerating that unbridled promiscuity which finds its most destructive and poisonous expression in prostitution.

A long and permanent marriage, based on mutual love and cooperation—that is the ideal standard. The influences of the school, of literature, and of public opinion in the Soviets tend toward this. Freed from the chains of police and clergy, later also from those of economic necessity, the tie between man and woman will find its own way, determined by physiology, psychology, and care for the welfare of the human race. The Soviet regime is still far from the solution of this, among other problems, but it has created serious prerequisites for a solution. In any case, the problem of marriage has ceased to be a matter of uncritical tradition and the blind force of circumstance; it has been posed as a task of collective reason.

Every year five and a half million children are born in the
Soviet Union. The excess of births over deaths amounts to more than three million. Czarist Russia knew no such growth in population. This fact alone makes it impossible to speak of moral disintegration or of a lowering of the vital forces of the population of Russia.

7. Is it true that incest is not regarded as a criminal offense?

I must admit that I have never taken an interest in this question from the standpoint of criminal prosecution; so that I could not answer without obtaining information as to what the Soviet law says about incest, if it says anything at all. Still, I think the whole question belongs rather to the domain of pathology on the one hand, and education on the other, rather than that of criminology. Incest lessens the desirable qualities and the ability to survive of the human race. For that very reason it is regarded by the great majority of healthy human beings as a violation of normal standards.

The aim of socialism is to bring reason not only into economic relations but also as much as possible into the biological functions of man. Already today the Soviet schools are making many efforts to enlighten the children as to the real needs of the human body and the human spirit. I have no reason to believe that the pathological cases of incest are more numerous in Russia than in other countries. At the same time, I am inclined to hold that precisely in this field juridical intervention can do more harm than good. I question, for example, that humanity would have been the gainer if British justice had sent Byron to jail.

8. Is it true that a divorce may be had for the asking?

Of course it is true. It would have been more in place to ask another question: "Is it true that there are still countries where divorce cannot be obtained for the asking by either party to a marriage?"

9. Is it true that the Soviets have no respect for chastity in men and women?

I think that in this field it is not respect but hypocrisy that has declined.

Is there any doubt, for example, that Ivar Kreuger, the match king, described as a dour ascetic in his lifetime and as an irreconcilable enemy of the Soviets, more than once denounced the immorality of the Russian boys and girls in the Young Communist League who did not seek the blessing of the church on their embraces? Had it not been for the financial wreck, Kreuger would have gone to his grave not only as a just man on the stock exchange but also as a pillar
of morality. But now the press reports that the number of women kept by Kreuger in various continents was several times the number of the chimneys of his match factories.

French, English, and American novels describe double and triple families not as an exception but as the rule. A very well informed young German observer, Klaus Mehnert, who recently had a book published on the Soviet youth, writes, "It is true the young Russians are no paragons of virtue . . . but morally they are certainly no lower than Germans of the same age." I believe that this is true.

In New York, in February 1917, I observed one evening in a subway car about two dozen students and their girl friends. Although there were a number of people in the car who were not in their party, the conduct of these most vivacious couples was such that one could say at once: even if these young people believe in monogamy in principle, in practice they come to it by devious paths.

The abolition of the American dry law would by no means signify that the new administration was striving to encourage drunkenness. In the same way, the Soviet government's abolition of a number of laws which were supposed to protect the domestic hearth, chastity, etc., has nothing to do with any effort to destroy the permanence of the family or encourage promiscuity. It is simply a question of attaining, by raising the material and cultural level, something that cannot be attained by formal prohibition or lifeless preaching.

10. Is the ultimate object of Bolshevism to reproduce the beehive or the ant stage in human life?

11. In what respect does the ideal of Bolshevism differ from the state of civilization that would prevail on earth if insects secured control?

Both questions are unfair to the insects as well as to man. Neither ants nor bees have to answer for such monstrosities as fill human history. On the other hand, no matter how bad human beings may be, they have possibilities which no insect can reach. It would not be difficult to prove that the task of the Soviets is precisely this—to destroy the ant characteristics of human society.

The fact is, bees as well as ants have classes: some work or fight, others specialize in reproduction. Can one see in such a specialization of social functions the ideal of Bolshevism? These are rather the characteristics of our present-day civilization carried to the limit. Certain species of ants make slaves of brother ants of different color.
The Soviet system does not resemble this at all. The ants have not yet even produced their John Brown or Abraham Lincoln.

Benjamin Franklin described man as "the tool-making animal." This notable characterization is at the bottom of the Marxist interpretation of history. The artificial tool has released man from the animal kingdom and has given impetus to the work of the human intellect; it has caused the changes from slavery to feudalism, capitalism, and the Soviet system.

The meaning of the question is clearly that a universal all-embracing control must kill individuality. The evil of the Soviet system would then consist in its excessive control, would it not? Yet a series of other questions, as we have seen, accuses the Soviets of refusal to bring under state control the most intimate fields of personal life—love, family, sex relations. The contradiction is perfectly evident.

The Soviets by no means make it their task to put under control the intellectual and the moral powers of man. On the contrary, through control of economic life they want to free every human personality from the control of the market and its blind forces.

Ford organized automobile production on the conveyor system and thereby obtained an enormous output. The task of socialism, when one gets down to the principle of productive technique, is to organize the entire national and international economy on the conveyor system, on the basis of a plan and of an accurate proportionment of its parts. The conveyor principle, transferred from single factories to all factories and farms, must result in such an output performance that, compared with it, Ford's achievement will look like a miserable handi-craft shop alongside of Detroit. Once man has conquered nature, he will no longer have to earn his daily bread by the sweat of his brow. That is the prerequisite for the liberation of personality.

As soon as three or four hours, let us say, of daily labor suffice to satisfy liberally all material wants, every man and woman will have twenty hours left over, free of all "control." Questions of education, of perfecting the bodily and spiritual structure of man, will occupy the center of general attention. The philosophical and scientific schools, the opposing tendencies in literature, architecture, and art in general, will for the first time be of vital concern not merely to a top layer but to the whole mass of the population. Freed from the pressure of blind economic forces, the struggle of groups, tendencies, and schools
will take on a profoundly ideal and unselfish character. In this atmosphere human personality will not dry up, but on the contrary for the first time will come to full bloom.

12. Is it true that Sovietism teaches children not to respect their parents?

No; in such a general form this assertion is a mere caricature. Still, it is true that rapid progress in the realms of technique, ideas, or manners generally diminishes the authority of the older generation, including that of parents. When professors lecture on the Darwinian theory, the authority of those parents who believe that Eve was made from Adam's rib can only decline.

In the Soviet Union all conflicts are incomparably sharper and more painful. The mores of the Young Communists must inevitably collide with the authority of the parents who would still like to use their own good judgment in marrying off their sons and daughters. The Red Army man who has learned how to handle tractors and combines cannot acknowledge the technical authority of his father who works with a wooden plow.

To maintain his dignity, the father can no longer merely point with his hand to the icon and reinforce this gesture with a slap on the face. The parents resort to spiritual weapons. The children who base themselves on the official authority of the school show themselves, however, to be the better armed. The injured *amour propre* of the parents often turns against the state. This usually happens in those families which are hostile to the new regime in its fundamental tasks. The majority of proletarian parents reconcile themselves to the loss of part of their parental authority more readily as the state takes over the greater part of their parental cares. Still, there are conflicts of the generations even in these circles. Among the peasants they take on special sharpness. Is this good or bad? I think it is good. Otherwise there would be no going forward.

Permit me to point to my own experience. At seventeen I had to break away from home. My father had attempted to determine the course of my life. He told me, "Even in three hundred years the things you are aiming for will not come to pass." And, at that, it was only a question of the overthrowing of the monarchy. Later my father understood the limits of his influence and my relations with my family were restored. After the October Revolution he saw his mistake. "Your truth was stronger," he said. Such examples were counted
by the thousand; later on, by hundreds of thousands and millions. They characterize the critical upheaval of a period when "the bond of ages" goes to pieces.

13. Is it true that Bolshevism penalizes religion and outlawss religious worship?

This deliberately deceptive assertion has been refuted a thousand times by completely indisputable facts, proofs, and testimony of witnesses. Why does it always come up anew? Because the church considers itself persecuted when it is not supported by the budget and the police force and when its opponents are not subject to the reprisals of persecution.

In many states the scientific criticism of religious faiths is considered a crime; in others it is merely tolerated. The Soviet state acts otherwise. Far from considering religious worship a crime, it tolerates the existence of various religions, but at the same time openly supports materialist propaganda against religious belief. It is precisely this situation which the church interprets as religious persecution.

14. Is it true that the Bolshevist state, while hostile to religion, nevertheless capitalizes on the prejudices of the ignorant masses? For instance, the Russians do not consider any saint truly acceptable to heaven unless his body defies decomposition. Is that the reason why the Bolshevists artificially preserve the mummy of Lenin?

No; this is a wholly incorrect interpretation, dictated by prejudice and hostility. I can make this statement all the more freely because from the very beginning I have been a determined opponent of the embalming, mausoleum, and the rest, as was also Lenin's widow, N. K. Krupskaya.231 There is no doubt whatever that if Lenin on his sickbed had thought for a moment that they would treat his corpse like that of a pharaoh, he would have appealed in advance, with indignation, to the party. I brought this objection forward as my main argument. The body of Lenin must not be used against the spirit of Lenin.

I also pointed to the fact that the "incorruptibility" of the embalmed corpse of Lenin might nourish religious superstitions. Krasin,232 who defended and apparently initiated the idea of the embalming, objected: "On the contrary, what was a matter of miracle with the priests will become a matter of technology in our hands. Millions of people will have an idea of how the man looked who brought such great changes into the life of our country. With the help of science, we will satisfy
this justifiable interest of the masses and at the same time explain to them the mystery of incorruptibility."

Undeniably the erection of the mausoleum had a political aim: to strengthen the authority of the disciples eternally through the authority of the teacher. Still, there is no ground to see in this a capitalization of religious superstition. The mausoleum visitors are told that the credit for the preservation of the body from decomposition is due to chemistry.

Our answers absolutely do not attempt to gloss over the present situation in the Soviet Union, to underestimate the economic and cultural achievements, nor still less to represent socialism as a stage which has already been reached. The Soviet regime is and will remain for a long time a transitional regime, full of contradiction and extreme difficulties. Still, we must take the facts in the light of their development. The Soviet Union took over the inheritance of the Romanov empire. For fifteen years it has lived surrounded by a hostile world.

The situation of a besieged fortress has given the dictatorship particularly crude forms. The policies of Japan are least of all calculated to develop in Russia a feeling of security; but also the fact that the United States, which carried on war against the Soviets on Soviet territory, has not taken up diplomatic relations with Moscow to this very day has had an enormous and, naturally, negative influence on the internal regime of the country.
Dear Comrades:

After a long delay, we received your letter of June 15. Needless to say we were overjoyed by the revival and the renascence of the Chinese Left Opposition, despite the most ferocious police persecutions it had endured.

Our irreconcilable attitude toward the vulgar democratic Stalinist position on the peasant movement has, of course, nothing in common with a careless or passive attitude toward the peasant movement itself. The manifesto of the International Left Opposition\textsuperscript{235} that was issued two years ago and that evaluated the peasant movement in the southern provinces of China declared: "The Chinese revolution, betrayed, defeated, exhausted, shows that it is still alive. Let us hope that the time when it will again lift its proletarian head is not far off."

Further on it says: "The vast flood of peasant revolts can unquestionably provide the impulse for the revival of political struggle in the industrial centers. We firmly count on it."

Your letter testifies that under the influence of the crisis and the Japanese intervention, against the background of the peasant war, the struggle of the city workers is burgeoning once again. In the manifesto we wrote about this possibility with necessary caution: "Nobody can foretell now whether the hearths of the peasant revolt can keep a fire burning through the whole long period of time which the proletarian vanguard will need to gather its own strength, bring the working class into the fight, and coordinate its struggle for power with the general offensive of the peasants against their most immediate enemies."
At the present time it is evident that there are substantial grounds for expressing the hope that, through a correct policy, it will be possible to unite the workers' movement, and the urban movement in general, with the peasant war; and this would constitute the beginning of the third Chinese revolution. But in the meantime this still remains only a hope, not a certainty. The most important work lies ahead.

In this letter I want to pose only one question which seems to me, at least from afar, to be the most important and acute. Once again I must remind you that the information at my disposal is altogether insufficient, accidental, and disjointed. I would indeed welcome any amplification and correction.

The peasant movement has created its own armies, has seized great territories, and has installed its own institutions. In the event of further successes—and all of us, of course, passionately desire such successes—the movement will become linked up with the urban and industrial centers and, through that very fact, it will come face to face with the working class. What will be the nature of this encounter? Is it certain that its character will be peaceful and friendly?

At first glance the question might appear to be superfluous. The peasant movement is headed by Communists or sympathizers. Isn't it self-evident that in the event of their coming together the workers and the peasants must unanimously unite under the Communist banner?

Unfortunately the question is not at all so simple. Let me refer to the experience of Russia. During the years of the civil war the peasantry in various parts of the country created its own guerrilla detachments, which sometimes grew into full-fledged armies. Some of these detachments considered themselves Bolshevik, and were often led by workers. Others remained nonparty and most often were led by former non-commissioned officers from among the peasantry. There was also an "anarchist" army under the command of Makhno. So long as the guerrilla armies operated in the rear of the White Guards, they served the cause of the revolution. Some of them were distinguished by exceptional heroism and fortitude. But within the cities these armies often came into conflict with the workers and with the local party organizations. Conflicts also arose during encounters of the partisans with the regular Red Army, and in some instances they took an extremely painful and sharp character.

The grim experience of the civil war demonstrated to us the necessity of disarming peasant detachments immediately
after the Red Army occupied provinces which had been cleared of the White Guards. In these cases the best, the most class-conscious and disciplined elements were absorbed into the ranks of the Red Army. But a considerable portion of the partisans strived to maintain an independent existence and often came into direct armed conflict with the Soviet power. Such was the case with the anarchist army of Makhno, entirely kulak in spirit. But that was not the sole instance; many peasant detachments, which fought splendidly enough against the restoration of the landlords, became transformed after victory into instruments of counterrevolution.

Regardless of their origin in each isolated instance—whether caused by conscious provocation of the White Guards, or by tactlessness of the Communists, or by an unfavorable combination of circumstances—the conflicts between armed peasants and workers were rooted in one and the same social soil; the difference between the class position and training of the workers and of the peasants. The worker approaches questions from the socialist standpoint; the peasant's viewpoint is petty bourgeois. The worker strives to socialize the property that is taken away from the exploiters; the peasant seeks to divide it up. The worker desires to put palaces and parks to common use; the peasant, insofar as he cannot divide them, inclines to burning the palaces and cutting down the parks. The worker strives to solve problems on a national scale and in accordance with a plan; the peasant, on the other hand, approaches all problems on a local scale and takes a hostile attitude to centralized planning, etc.

It is understood that a peasant also is capable of raising himself to the socialist viewpoint. Under a proletarian regime more and more masses of peasants become reeducated in the socialist spirit. But this requires time, years, even decades. It should be borne in mind that in the initial stages of revolution, contradictions between proletarian socialism and peasant individualism often take on an extremely acute character.

But after all aren't there Communists at the head of the Chinese Red armies? Doesn't this by itself exclude the possibility of conflicts between the peasant detachments and the workers' organizations? No, that does not exclude it. The fact that individual Communists are in the leadership of the present armies does not at all transform the social character of these armies, even if their Communist leaders bear a definite proletarian stamp. And how do matters stand in China?
Among the Communist leaders of Red detachments there indubitably are many declasse d intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who have not gone through the school of proletarian struggle. For two or three years they live the lives of partisan commanders and commissars; they wage battles, seize territories, etc. They absorb the spirit of their environment. Meanwhile the majority of the rank-and-file Communists in the Red detachments unquestionably consists of peasants, who assume the name Communist in all honesty and sincerity but who in actuality remain revolutionary paupers or revolutionary petty proprietors. In politics he who judges by denominations and labels and not by social facts is lost. All the more so when the politics concerned is carried out arms in hand.

The true Communist party is the organization of the proletarian vanguard. But we must not forget that the working class of China has been kept in an oppressed and amorphous condition during the last four years, and only recently has it evinced signs of revival. It is one thing when a Communist party, firmly resting on the flower of the urban proletariat, strives through the workers to lead a peasant war. It is an altogether different thing when a few thousand or even tens of thousands of revolutionists, who are truly Communists or only take the name, assume the leadership of a peasant war without having serious support from the proletariat. This is precisely the situation in China. This acts to augment to an extreme the danger of conflicts between the workers and the armed peasants. In any event, one may rest assured there will be no dearth of bourgeois provocateurs.

In Russia, in the period of civil war, the proletariat was already in power in the greater part of the country, the leadership of the struggle was in the hands of a strong and tempered party, the entire commanding apparatus of the centralized Red Army was in the hands of the workers. Notwithstanding all this, the peasant detachments, incomparably weaker than the Red Army, often came into conflict with it after it victoriously moved into peasant guerrilla sectors.

In China the situation is radically different, and moreover completely to the disadvantage of the workers. In the most important regions of China the power is in the hands of bourgeois militarists; in other regions, in the hands of leaders of armed peasants. Nowhere is there any proletarian power as yet. The trade unions are weak. The influence of the party among the workers is insignificant. The peasant detachments, flushed with victories they have achieved, stand under the wing
of the Comintern. They call themselves "the Red Army," i.e., they identify themselves with the armed forces of the Soviets. What results consequently is that the revolutionary peasantry of China, in the person of its ruling stratum, seems to have appropriated to itself beforehand the political and moral capital which should by the nature of things belong to the Chinese workers. Isn't it possible that things may turn out so that all this capital will be directed at a certain moment against the workers?

Naturally the peasant poor, and in China they constitute the overwhelming majority, to the extent they think politically, and these comprise a small minority, sincerely and passionately desire alliance and friendship with the workers. But the peasantry, even when armed, is incapable of conducting an independent policy.

Occupying in daily life an intermediate, indeterminate, and vacillating position, the peasantry at decisive moments can follow either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The peasantry does not find the road to the proletariat easily but only after a series of mistakes and defeats. The bridge between the peasantry and the bourgeoisie is provided by the urban petty bourgeoisie, chiefly by the intellectuals, who commonly come forward under the banner of socialism and even communism.

The commanding stratum of the Chinese "Red Army" has no doubt succeeded in inculcating itself with the habit of issuing commands. The absence of a strong revolutionary party and of mass organizations of the proletariat renders control over the commanding stratum virtually impossible. The commanders and commissars appear in the guise of absolute masters of the situation and upon occupying cities will be rather apt to look down from above upon the workers. The demands of the workers might often appear to them either inopportune or ill-advised.

Nor should one forget such "trifles" as the fact that within cities the staffs and offices of the victorious armies are established not in the proletarian huts but in the finest city buildings, in the houses and apartments of the bourgeoisie; and all this facilitates the inclination of the upper stratum of the peasant armies to feel itself part of the "cultured" and "educated" classes, in no way part of the proletariat.

Thus in China the causes and grounds for conflicts between the army, which is peasant in composition and petty bourgeois in leadership, and the workers not only are not eliminated but, on the contrary, all the circumstances are such as to
greatly increase the possibility and even the inevitability of such conflicts; and in addition the chances of the proletariat are far less favorable to begin with than was the case in Russia.

From the theoretical and political side the danger is increased many times because the Stalinist bureaucracy covers up the contradictory situation by its slogan of "democratic dictatorship" of workers and peasants. Is it possible to conceive of a snare more attractive in appearance and more perfidious in essence? The epigones do their thinking not by means of social concepts, but by means of stereotyped phrases; formalism is the basic trait of bureaucracy.

The Russian Narodniks used to accuse the Russian Marxists of "ignoring" the peasantry, of not carrying on work in the villages, etc. To this the Marxists replied: "We will arouse and organize the advanced workers and through the workers we shall arouse the peasants." Such in general is the only conceivable road for the proletarian party.

The Chinese Stalinists have acted otherwise. During the revolution of 1925-27 they subordinated directly and immediately the interests of the workers and the peasants to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. In the years of the counter-revolution they passed over from the proletariat to the peasantry, i.e., they undertook that role which was fulfilled in our country by the SRs when they were still a revolutionary party. Had the Chinese Communist Party concentrated its efforts for the last few years in the cities, in industry, on the railroads; had it sustained the trade unions, the educational clubs and circles; had it, without breaking off from the workers, taught them to understand what was occurring in the villages—the share of the proletariat in the general correlation of forces would have been incomparably more favorable today.

The party actually tore itself away from its class. Thereby in the last analysis it can cause injury to the peasantry as well. For should the proletariat continue to remain on the sidelines, without organization, without leadership, then the peasant war even if fully victorious will inevitably arrive in a blind alley.

In old China every victorious peasant revolution was concluded by the creation of a new dynasty, and subsequently also by a new group of large proprietors; the movement was caught in a vicious circle. Under present conditions the peasant war by itself, without the direct leadership of the proletarian vanguard, can only pass on the power to a new bourgeois
clique, some "left" Kuomintang or other, a "third party," etc., etc., which in practice will differ very little from the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. And this would signify in turn a new massacre of the workers with the weapons of "democratic dictatorship."

What then are the conclusions that follow from all this? The first conclusion is that one must boldly and openly face the facts as they are. The peasant movement is a mighty revolutionary factor insofar as it is directed against the large land-owners, militarists, feudalists, and usurers. But in the peasant movement itself are very powerful proprietary and reactionary tendencies, and at a certain stage it can become hostile to the workers and sustain that hostility already equipped with arms. He who forgets about the dual nature of the peasantry is not a Marxist. The advanced workers must be taught to distinguish from among "communist" labels and banners the actual social processes.

The activities of the "Red armies" must be attentively followed, and the workers must be given a detailed explanation of the course, significance, and perspectives of the peasant war; and the immediate demands and the tasks of the proletariat must be tied up with the slogans for the liberation of the peasantry.

On the bases of our own observations, reports, and other documents we must painstakingly study the life processes of the peasant armies and the regime established in the regions occupied by them; we must discover in living facts the contradictory class tendencies and clearly point out to the workers the tendencies we support and those we oppose.

We must follow the interrelations between the Red armies and the local workers with special care, without overlooking even the minor misunderstandings between them. Within the framework of isolated cities and regions, conflicts, even if acute, might appear to be insignificant local episodes. But with the development of events, class conflicts may take on a national scope and lead the revolution to a catastrophe, i.e., to a new massacre of the workers by the peasants, hoodwinked by the bourgeoisie. The history of revolutions is full of such examples.

The more clearly the advanced workers understand the living dialectic of the class interrelations of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the bourgeoisie, the more confidently will they seek unity with the peasant strata closest to them, and the more successfully will they counteract the counterrevolutionary provocateurs within the peasant armies themselves as well as within the cities.
The trade-union and the party units must be built up; the advanced workers must be educated, the proletarian vanguard must be brought together and drawn into the battle.

We must turn to all the members of the official Communist Party with words of explanation and challenge. It is quite probable that the rank-and-file Communists who have been led astray by the Stalinist faction will not understand us at once. The bureaucrats will set up a howl about our "underestimation" of the peasantry, perhaps even about our "hostility" to the peasantry. (Chernov always accused Lenin of being hostile to the peasantry.) Naturally such howling will not confuse the Bolshevik-Leninists. When prior to April 1927 we warned against the inevitable coup d'etat of Chiang Kai-shek, the Stalinists accused us of hostility to the Chinese national revolution. Events have demonstrated who was right. Events will provide a confirmation this time as well.

The Left Opposition may turn out to be too weak to direct events in the interests of the proletariat at the present stage. But we are sufficiently strong right now to point out to the workers the correct road and, in the development of the class struggle, to demonstrate to the workers our correctness and political insight. Only in this way can a revolutionary party gain the confidence of the workers, only in this way will it grow, become strong, and take its place at the head of the popular masses.

Postscript, September 26, 1932

In order to express my ideas as clearly as possible, let me sketch the following variant which is theoretically quite possible.

Let us assume that the Chinese Left Opposition carries on in the near future widespread and successful work among the industrial proletariat and attains the preponderant influence over it. The official party, in the meantime, continues to concentrate all its forces on the "Red armies" and in the peasant regions. The moment arrives when the peasant troops occupy the industrial centers and are brought face to face with the workers. In such a situation, in what manner will the Chinese Stalinists act?

It is not difficult to foresee that they will counterpose the peasant army to the "counterrevolutionary Trotskyists" in a hostile manner. In other words, they will incite the armed peasants against the advanced workers. This is what the Russian SRs and the Mensheviks did in 1917; having lost the workers, they fought might and main for support among
the soldiers, inciting the barracks against the factory, the armed peasant against the worker Bolshevik. Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Dan, if they did not label the Bolsheviks outright as counterrevolutionists, called them either "unconscious aides" or "involuntary agents" of counterrevolution. The Stalinists are less choice in their application of political terminology. But the tendency is the same: malicious incitement of the peasant, and generally petty-bourgeois, elements against the vanguard of the working class.

Bureaucratic centrism, as centrism, cannot have an independent class support. But in its struggle against the Bolshevik-Leninists it is compelled to seek support from the right, i.e., from the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, counterposing them to the proletariat. The struggle between the two Communist factions, the Stalinists and the Bolshevik-Leninists, thus bears in itself an inner tendency toward transformation into a class struggle. The revolutionary development of events in China may draw this tendency to its conclusion, i.e., to a civil war between the peasant army led by the Stalinists and the proletarian vanguard led by the Leninists.

Were such a tragic conflict to arise, due entirely to the Chinese Stalinists, it would signify that the Left Opposition and the Stalinists ceased to be Communist factions and had become hostile political parties, each having a different class base.

However is such a perspective inevitable? No, I don't think so at all. Within the Stalinist faction (the official Chinese Communist Party) there are not only peasant, i.e., petty-bourgeois tendencies but also proletarian tendencies. It is extremely important for the Left Opposition to seek to establish connections with the proletarian wing of the Stalinists by presenting to them the Marxist evaluation of "Red armies" and the interrelations between the proletariat and the peasantry in general.

While maintaining its political independence, the proletarian vanguard must be ready always to assure united action with revolutionary democracy. While we refuse to identify the armed peasant detachment with the Red army as the armed power of the proletariat and have no inclination to shut our eyes to the fact that the Communist banner hides the petty-bourgeois content of the peasant movement, we, on the other hand, take an absolutely clear view of the tremendous revolutionary-democratic significance of the peasant war. We teach the workers to appreciate its significance and we are ready to do all in our power in order to achieve the necessary military alliance with the peasant organizations.
Consequently our task consists not only in preventing the political-military command over the proletariat by the petty-bourgeois democracy that leans upon the armed peasant, but in preparing and ensuring the proletarian leadership of the peasant movement, its "Red armies" in particular.

The more clearly the Chinese Bolshevik-Leninists comprehend the political events and the tasks that spring from them, the more successfully will they extend their base within the proletariat. The more persistently they carry out the policy of the united front in relation to the official party and the peasant movement led by it, the more surely will they succeed not only in shielding the revolution from a terribly dangerous conflict between the proletariat and the peasantry and in ensuring the necessary united action between the two revolutionary classes, but also in transforming their united front into the historical step toward the dictatorship of the proletariat.
To Osvobozhdenie

Dear Comrades:

I continue to receive Osvobozhdenie regularly, and attentively follow the work of your publication.

The Czechoslovak government dragged out the question of my visa for several months. First they offered me conditions: to live in a definite place and for not more than eight weeks, only to get medical treatment, not to meet anyone, not to receive journalists, etc., etc. I accepted all these conditions. After all this the visa was refused; in my opinion, for not a single well-founded reason. All this contradicts the words of the Russian poet: "Do here the question is not about a visa.

Our Chinese comrades have recovered following the cruel police repressions. I am sending you a letter to them and the answer.

On reading it you will see how far our Belgian section is advancing. We are also having considerable success in Germany. Inside the SAP a considerable faction of ours is being created, which is on the eve of splitting and coming over to us.

The economic situation in the USSR is extremely strained. It is impossible to follow without extreme unease the contradictions between the fiery trumpeting of the official Stalinist press and the advancing crisis of the Soviet economy. You will find material on this in the Biulleten which has just appeared, and in the next issue there will be a special long article on this question.

A warm handshake,
Your L. Trotsky
Tomsky on the Endurance of Indian Elephants

On January 20, 1926, in the days of the greatest sharpening of the struggle between the right-centrist bloc and the Zinovievist opposition, Tomsky said at the Putilov factory:

"The party understands Vladimir Ilyich's teaching, understands that the main danger lies in a split. Vladimir Ilyich saw this danger too; it was his last thought, when he called the workers of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to see to it, irrespective of persons, that differences of opinion and splits not be permitted. If anyone erred, he was to be condemned. There was no need to crucify him, to chop him off, as they wanted to do with Trotsky. Do perhaps a quarter of what was done to Trotsky. But what was done to Trotsky not even an Indian elephant could bear!"

Tomsky, who was at that time carrying out Stalin's commands, was trying to insure himself by setting a limit beyond which one cannot go in persecution: as a standard the endurance of the Indian elephant was indicated. Tomsky's criterion was too primitive. In revolutionary politics endurance is determined above all by the significance and correctness of the ideas represented by a given person or a given group. Historical experience shows that real revolutionaries, supported by a scientific doctrine, are capable in struggle with enemies and with hostile tendencies of leaving far behind all endurance records set up by the thickest-skinned Indian elephants.

Stalin in the Epoch of the "Triumvirate"

At the time of the Twelfth Party Congress [1923], when the "triumvirate" (Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev) appeared openly on the arena for the first time as a nucleus of the "Leninist old guard" in the struggle against Trotsky, Stalin defended the indissolubility of the Leninist core in the following heartfelt words:
"I cannot, comrades, ignore the attack of Comrade Osinsky against... Comrade Zinoviev. He praised Comrade Stalin, praised Comrade Kamenev, and struck out at Comrade Zinoviev, thinking that at first it is enough to eliminate one, and that then will come the others' turn. He has taken the course of destroying the nucleus which has been formed inside the Central Committee during years of work, in order to destroy everything later, step by step... If Comrade Osinsky seriously intends to undertake such attacks against one or another member of our Central Committee, I must warn him that he will bump into a stone wall on which, I fear, he will smash his head."

The subsequent course of events has shown that the "stone wall" of the Leninist old guard proved to consist of semi-Social Democrats, semi-Mensheviks, bourgeois liberals, and the like.

**Molotov as a Trotskyist Contrabandist**

"This must be said straight out: the party did not have the clarity and decisiveness which the revolutionary moment demanded. It did not have them because it did not have a sufficiently definite orientation toward socialist revolution. Agitation and the revolutionary work of the party as a whole did not have a firm foundation, for thought had not yet reached bold conclusions about the necessity of direct struggle for socialism and socialist revolution."

Thus Molotov describes the policy of the party until the arrival of Lenin in Russia in April 1917, in the German edition of *Rabochaya Literatura* [Workers' Literature] number 1-2, p. 36. In the same article Molotov says:

"From the time of Lenin's arrival in Russia in April 1917 our party felt firm soil under its feet... Up to this moment the party merely felt its way weakly and without confidence"²⁴¹ (p. 35).

We have given the quotations in translation back from the German, since we do not have the Russian edition of the article on hand. We shall be very grateful if any of our friends can get us Molotov's Trotskyist contraband in the original.

**"Tales of Differences Between Lenin and Trotsky"**

In the notes to the sixteenth volume of Lenin's *Collected Works*, published during the author's lifetime, we read:

"Tales of differences between Lenin and Trotsky during the civil war were widespread among the bourgeoisie and petty
bourgeoisie, and sometimes reached the countryside, strongly inflated by kulak elements" (Collected Works, volume 16, p. 505).

The bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and kulak elements then found themselves successors and continuators in the form of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

**Lenin on Slanders Against Trotsky**

On March 1, 1920, Lenin said at the All-Russian Congress of Working Cossacks:

"British writers have written that the armies all over the world are disintegrating, and that if there is any country in the world whose army is gaining strength, that country is Soviet Russia. They tried to slander Comrade Trotsky and said that this was so because the Russian army is being kept under iron discipline, which is enforced by ruthless measures . . ." (Collected Works, volume 17, p. 32) [Collected Works, volume 30, "Speech Delivered at the First All-Russian Congress of Working Cossacks," March 1, 1920].

The British writers of Churchill's school did not, as is known, remain without successors and imitators.

**"Democratic Dictatorship" and "Dictatorship of the Democracy"**

The well-known Left Menshevik Sukhanov242 writes about his political position at the end of May 1917:

"... I personally fully supported those who were demanding the complete removal of the bourgeoisie from power; and I began to use the term 'dictatorship of the democracy' a lot."

On March 23, 1919, Lenin wrote on the same topic:

"Attempts are sometimes made to lend these words what is considered to be greater force by speaking of the 'dictatorship of democracy.' That is sheer nonsense. We know perfectly well from history that the dictatorship of the democratic bourgeoisie meant nothing but the suppression of the insurgent workers" (Collected Works, volume 16, p. 141) [ibid., volume 29, "Report on Work in the Countryside," March 23, 1919].

All this did not prevent the "democratic dictatorship" from getting into the program of the Comintern, as a state above classes.

**Lenin on Party Democracy, Discipline, and Unity**

The Bolshevik-Leninists stand for democracy in all proletarian organizations. But it is fully apparent that the amount
of democracy and its methods will differ not only as a result of the general objective conditions, but also, above all, in view of the nature of the proletarian organizations themselves. The democracy of a trade union must have an immeasurably wider base than party democracy, which is limited in advance by definite program, tactics, and political tradition. In turn, party democracy is necessarily broader than the democracy of a faction.

On July 3, 1909, Lenin wrote:

"In our party Bolshevism is represented by the Bolshevik section. But a section is not a party. A party can contain a whole gamut of opinions and shades of opinion, the extremes of which may be sharply contradictory. In the German party, side by side with the pronouncedly revolutionary wing of Kautsky,* we see the ultrarevisionist wing of Bernstein. That is not the case within a section. A section in a party is a group of like-minded persons formed for the purpose primarily of influencing the party in a definite direction, for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principles in the party in the purest possible form" (Collected Works, volume 11, part 1, p. 282) [ibid., volume 15, "Report on the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of Proletary," July 3, 1909].

This important thought, which we find in Lenin more than once, must be very seriously thought through and carefully assimilated by the Left Opposition.

How Lenin conceived of the normal relations between the Central Committee and the local party organizations is well shown by Lenin's letter of June 6, 1917, to the Petrograd committee:

"If you, comrades, have weighty and serious reasons for not trusting the Central Committee, then say so openly. It is the duty of every member of our democratically organized party to do so, and then it would be the duty of our party's Central Committee to give special consideration to this distrust of yours, report it to the party congress and enter into special negotiations with a view to overcoming this deplorable lack of confidence in the Central Committee on the part of the local organization" (first legal PC, minutes, p. 129) [ibid., volume

*Note, by the way: in his article on history ("historic" for ignorance), Stalin asserted that from 1903 Lenin was demanding a split with the Kautskians. In fact, in July 1909 he writes of the "clearly revolutionary wing of Kautsky." Rosa Luxemburg was already at that time engaged in sharp struggle with Kautsky.
On January 23, 1921, Lenin wrote:

"There being deep and basic disagreements on principle—we may well be asked—do they not serve as a vindication for the sharpest and most factional pronouncements? Is it possible to vindicate such a thing as a split, provided there is need to drive home some entirely new idea?

"I believe it is, provided of course the disagreements are truly very deep and there is no other way to rectify a wrong trend in the policy of the party or of the working class" (Collected Works, volume 18, part i, p. 47) [ibid., volume 32, "Once Again on the Trade Unions," January 25, 1921].

The theory and practice of Lenin have, as we see, nothing in common with the disciplinary cretinism which has been implanted in the Communist Party and the Comintern by the Stalinist apparatus.

Christian G. Rakovsky

In the notes to Lenin's Collected Works, in volume 17, which came out in the author's lifetime, the following brief character sketch of Rakovsky is given:

"Rakovsky, Ch.—active in the Rumanian SD movement, participant at Zimmerwald and Kienthal, member of the 'Zimmerwald Left.' Imprisoned during the war by the Rumanian government for internationalist propaganda. R. was freed in 1917 by the revolutionary Russian troops and since then has worked in Russia, occupying the post of president of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Member of the CC of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the CC RCP. One of the founders and prominent figures of the Third International" (Collected Works, volume 17, p. 448).

Lenin on Sverdlov and Stalin

In his funeral speech on Sverdlov, avoiding exaggerated praise even in respect to the dead, Lenin said, on March 18, 1919:

"... the fact that the leading groups of the party could so firmly, quickly, and unanimously decide the most difficult problems is due entirely to the prominent place among them occupied by such an exceptionally talented organizer as Yakov Sverdlov," who combined a knowledge of the personal composition of the party, a flair for practice, and incontestable
authority. "The work he performed as an organizer... will be performed in the future only if we appoint whole groups of men... and if these men, following in his footsteps, come near to doing what this one man did alone [ibid., volume 29, "Speech in Memory of Y. M. Sverdlov at a Special Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee," March 18, 1919].

Lenin saw in Sverdlov an organizer, as also in Stalin. It is therefore instructive to compare this description of Sverdlov with later descriptions of Stalin.

From Lenin's opinion of Sverdlov—and this opinion was repeated more than once by him—it is fully apparent that the work of leading party organizer was in the previous period in the hands of Sverdlov, not of Stalin. As far as the future was concerned, Lenin considered Sverdlov could not be replaced by an individual, but only by a collective, in the form of the organizational bureau. True to his evaluation of people and circumstances, Lenin in March 1922 spoke out decisively against the appointment of Stalin as general secretary ("that cook will make only peppery dishes"), and in January 1923, in his so-called "testament," he recommended that Stalin be removed from the post of general secretary.

Once Again on Dnieprostroy and the Phonograph

We have already quoted in the Biulleten the penitential declaration of the former Oppositionist S. Gorsky, who retroactively accused Trotsky of equating Dnieprostroy with... a phonograph. We then explained the error of the strayed penitent: he had ascribed to Trotsky the words of Stalin. In number 19 of the Biulleten we had to cite that interesting political episode from memory. Not long ago we found accurate documentation in our files. Here verbatim is what Stalin said at the plenum of the Central Committee in April 1926:

"There is talk... of our constructing Dnieprostroy through our own means. But the sums here are large, several hundred million. How can we avoid falling into the position of the peasant who had saved up some money, but instead of repairing his plough and renewing his equipment, bought a phonograph and went bankrupt? (laughter)... How can we not take into account the congress resolution that our industrial plans must correspond to our resources? But Comrade Trotsky clearly does not take this congress decision into account" (stenographic report of the plenum, p. 110).

Since Dnieprostroy is now, and with full justification, an
object of socialist construction, we consider it completely appropriate to put this episode right in accordance with the documents.

**Lenin on the Alliance Between Worker and Peasant**

In his well-known work on "The Tax in Kind," finished on April 21, 1921, Lenin wrote:

"The correct policy of the proletariat exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country is to obtain grain in exchange for the manufactured goods the peasant needs. That is the only kind of food policy that corresponds to the tasks of the proletariat, and can strengthen the foundations of socialism and lead to its complete victory" (*Collected Works*, volume 18, part i, p. 214) [ibid., volume 32, "The Tax in Kind," April 21, 1921].

Until such time as this problem is solved it is not only impossible to assert that we have entered socialism, but it must be admitted that we have not yet set up the very "foundations of socialism."

**On the Freedom of Individual Commodity Circulation**

At the Tenth Congress, which sanctioned the first steps of the New Economic Policy (NEP), Lenin said at the March 15, 1921, session:

"I must say a few words about the individual exchange of commodities. When we speak of free exchange, we mean individual exchange of commodities, which in turn means encouraging the kulaks. What are we to do? We must not close our eyes to the fact that the switch from the appropriation of surpluses to the tax will mean more kulaks under the new system. They will appear where they could not appear before. This must not be combated by prohibitive measures but by association under state auspices and by government measures from above" (*Collected Works*, volume 18, part i, pp. 144-5) [ibid., volume 32, "Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System," March 15, 1921].

We think that this quote, like many others, should be posted up in the premises of the Council of People's Commissars.
To the Editors of The Symposium

Sirs:

In the July issue of your magazine in an article on the first volume of my History of the Russian Revolution, in a footnote on page 379, I read:

"The truth of statements of fact, of dates, quotations, etc., is another matter, but for the most part of these I have no means of verification. Trotsky is of course in exile, a too active member of the Opposition. I am told that he has deliberately misdated several important quotations and omitted relevant material to support himself against Stalin. And there is no doubt that in this volume, whether or not justifiably, he shows Stalin and Kamenev a good distance from Lenin, and far more conciliatory with the Compromisers than they are likely to admit."

Your article as a whole is written with extraordinarily sympathetic consideration. This makes it the less possible to ignore your footnote. I am far from pretending to an ideal impartiality in relation to political friends and enemies—still farther from demanding that anybody should take my evaluations on faith. But in your footnote something more is asserted, or at least conceded, than the inevitable partiality of a political fighter. Your informers have told you that the author of the history "deliberately misdated several important quotations and omitted relevant material to support himself against Stalin." I venture to assert that your informers have gone too far. I will not insist that the character of my History—to which a majority of the critics have not denied either responsibility or meticulous carefulness—should make that kind of suspicion impossible.
General conclusions of a psychological character are not similarly convincing to all. But I make the following proposal: Can you not, Mr. Editor, invite your informers to name clearly and exactly what "important quotations" I erroneously dated and what I consciously omitted? For my part I promise to supply all the necessary explanations. If this is not done—and I make bold to assert in advance that it will not and cannot be done—you will be in a position to convince yourself, and also your readers, that you have been consciously misled by prejudiced informers.

Yours sincerely,
Leon Trotsky
What are at present the chief elements of the political situation in China?

The two most important revolutionary problems, the national problem and the agrarian problem, have again become aggravated. The pace of the peasant war, slow and crawling but generally victorious, is evidence that the Kuomintang dictatorship has proved incapable of satisfying the countryside or of intimidating it further. The Japanese intervention in Shanghai and their effective annexation of Manchuria have placed in relief the military bankruptcy of the Kuomintang dictatorship. The crisis of power, which at bottom has not stopped for a single moment during these last years, had to grow fatally worse. The struggle between the militarist cliques is destroying what remains of the unity of the country.

If the peasant war has radicalized the intellectuals who have connections with the countryside, the Japanese intervention, on the other hand, has politically stimulated the petty bourgeoisie of the cities. This again has only aggravated the crisis of power. There is not a single section of the bourgeoisie called "nationalist" which does not tend to arrive at the conclusion that the Kuomintang regime devours much and gives little. To demand an end to the period of "education" by the Kuomintang is to demand that the military dictatorship give way to parliamentarism.

The Left Opposition press has sometimes labeled the regime of Chiang Kai-shek as fascist. This definition was derived from the fact that in China, as in Italy, the military-police power is concentrated in the hands of a single bourgeois party to the exclusion of all other parties and, notably, of the workers' organizations. But after the experience of the last years, an
experience complicated by the confusion the Stalinists brought to the question of fascism, it would not be correct to identify the dictatorship of the Kuomintang with fascism. Hitler, like Mussolini before him, supports himself above all on the counter-revolutionary petty bourgeoisie: this is the essence of fascism. The Kuomintang does not have this point of support. In Germany the peasants march behind Hitler and by this fact indirectly support von Papen; in China the peasants carry on a raging struggle against Chiang Kai-shek.

The regime of the Kuomintang contains more of Bonapartist traits than of fascist; not possessing a social base, not even the smallest, the Kuomintang stands between the pressure of the imperialists and compradors on the one hand and of the revolutionary movement on the other. But Bonapartism can make a pretense of stability only when the land hunger of the peasants is satisfied. This is not true in the case of China. Hence the impotence of the military dictatorship which can only maintain itself thanks to the dispersion of its enemies. But under their growing attack even this begins to fall apart.

In the revolution of 1925-27, it was the proletariat which morally and physically suffered the most. That is why the workers are now in the rear of the other classes, not only of the petty bourgeoisie, starting with the students, but also in a certain sense of the peasants. It is precisely this which proves that the third Chinese revolution cannot win, cannot even develop, as long as the working class has not again entered into the struggle.

The slogans of revolutionary democracy correspond best to the prerevolutionary political situation in China today.

It is elementary for a Marxist that the peasants, whatever their banner, fight for the aims of agrarian petty-bourgeois democracy. The slogan of the independence of China, raised anew to a white heat by the Japanese intervention, is a slogan of national democracy. The impotence of the military dictatorship and the division of the country among the militarist cliques put on the agenda the slogan of political democracy.

The students cry: "Down with the Kuomintang government!" Groups of the workers' vanguard support this slogan. The "national" bourgeoisie demands a constitutional regime. The peasants revolt against the dearth of land, the yoke of the militarists, government officials, usurious loans. Under these circumstances, the party of the proletariat must support as the central political slogan the call for a constituent assembly.
Does this mean—it will be asked—that we demand the government convoke the constituent assembly or that we attempt to organize it ourselves? This way of posing the question, at least at this stage, is too formalistic. For a number of years the Russian Revolution coordinated two slogans: "Down with Absolutism" and "Long Live the Constituent Assembly." To the question who would convoke the constituent assembly we answered: the future will tell, that is, the relation of forces, as they establish themselves in the process of the revolution itself. This approach to the question is equally correct for China. If the Kuomintang government at the moment of its collapse tries to convoke some kind of a representative assembly, what shall our attitude be towards it, that is, how shall we best utilize it in the interests of the revolution, by boycotting the elections or participating in them? Will the revolutionary masses succeed in forming an independent governmental body which takes on itself the convocation of a constituent assembly? Will the proletariat succeed, in the course of the struggle for democratic demands, in creating soviets? Will the existence of soviets make the convocation of a constituent assembly superfluous? These questions cannot be answered in advance. But our task consists not in making predictions on a calendar but in mobilizing the workers around the slogans that flow from the political situation. Our strategy is a strategy of revolutionary action, not abstract speculation.

Today, by the force of events, revolutionary agitation is directed above all against the Kuomintang government. We explain to the masses that the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek is the main obstacle which stands in the way of the constituent assembly and that we can rid China of the militarist cliques only by means of an armed insurrection. Agitation, spoken and written, strikes, meetings, demonstrations, boycotts, whatever concrete goals they aim at, must have as a corollary the slogans: "Down with the Kuomintang!" "Long Live the Constituent Assembly!"

In order to achieve real national liberation it is necessary to overthrow the Kuomintang. But this does not mean we postpone the struggle until such time as the Kuomintang is overthrown. The more the struggle against foreign oppression spreads, the more difficulties the Kuomintang will have. The more we mobilize the masses against the Kuomintang, the more the struggle against imperialism will develop.

At the critical moment of Japanese intervention the workers and the students called for arms. From whom? From the
For a Strategy of Action

Kuomintang. It would be a sectarian absurdity to abandon this demand on the plea that we want to overthrow the Kuomintang. We want to overthrow it, but we haven't yet reached that point. The more energetically we demand the arming of the workers, the sooner we shall reach it.

The official Communist Party, despite its ultra-leftism, favors "the resumption of Russian-Chinese diplomatic relations." This is a slogan which is directed against the Kuomintang. To advance it does not at all mean that one has "confidence" in the Kuomintang. On the contrary, the effect of this slogan is to make the government's situation more difficult before the masses. Certain Kuomintang leaders already have had to take up the slogan for the reestablishment of relations with the USSR. We know that with these gentlemen there is a big gap between words and deeds, but here, as in all other questions, mass pressure will decide.

If under the whip of the revolution the Kuomintang government begins to make petty concessions on the agrarian question, tries to call a semblance of a constituent assembly, is forced to give arms to the workers or to reestablish relations with the USSR, it goes without saying that we will at once take advantage of these concessions. We will firmly cling to them at the same time that we correctly show their insufficiency and in this way use these concessions by the Kuomintang as a weapon to overthrow it. Such in general is the reciprocal relation of reforms and revolution in Marxist politics.

But doesn't the scope the peasant war is reaching mean that there is no longer time or place for the slogans and problems of parliamentary democracy in China? Let us go back to this question.

If today the revolutionary Chinese peasants call their fighting organizations "soviet," we have no reason to give up that name. We must simply not get intoxicated with words. To believe that soviet power in essentially rural regions can be an important stable revolutionary power is proof of great frivolity. It is impossible to be ignorant of the experience offered by the only country where soviet power has been effectively established. Although in Petrograd, Moscow, and other industrial centers and regions of Russia soviet power has been firm and constant since November 1917, in all the immense peripheral areas (Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Urals, Siberia, Central Asia, Archangel, Murmansk) this power has appeared and disappeared several times, not only because of foreign intervention but also thanks
to internal revolts. The Chinese soviet power has an essentially rural, peripheral character, and to this day entirely lacks a point of support in the industrial proletariat. The less stable and sure this power is, the less it can be described as soviet power.

Ko-Lin’s article, which appeared in the German paper Der Rote Aufbau [Red Reconstruction], claims that in the Red armies the workers represent 36 percent, the peasants 57 percent, and the intellectuals 7 percent. I confess that these figures arouse serious doubts. If the figures apply to all the insurrectionary armed forces, which according to the author number 350 thousand, the army includes about 125 thousand workers. If the 36 percent applies only to the Red armies, of 150 thousand soldiers there are more than 50 thousand workers. Is this really so? Did they previously belong to the unions, to the party? Did they take part in the revolutionary struggle? But even that does not settle the question. Because of the absence of strong, independent proletarian organizations in the industrial centers, the revolutionary workers, inexperienced or too little experienced, become totally lost in the peasant, petty-bourgeois environment.

Wang Ming’s article, which appeared at the beginning of the year in the Comintern press, singularly exaggerates, as far as I can judge, the scope of the movement in the cities, the degree of independence of the workers in the movement, and the importance of the influence of the Communist Party. The trouble with the present official press is that it mercilessly distorts facts for its factional interests. Thus it is not hard to realize, even by Wang Ming’s article, that the leading place in the movement which began in the autumn of last year belonged to the students and to the school youth in general. The university strikes had an appreciable importance, greater than the factory strikes.

To arouse the workers, to organize them, to give them the possibility of relating to the national and agrarian movements in order to take the leadership of both: such is the task that falls to us. The immediate demands of the proletariat as such (length of the workday, wages, right to organize, etc.) must form the basis of our agitation. But that alone is not enough. Only these three slogans can raise the proletariat to the role of the head of the nation: the independence of China, land to the poor peasants, the constituent assembly.

The Stalinists imagine that the minute the insurgent peasants call their organizations soviets, the stage of revolution-
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ary parliamentarism is already over. This is a serious mistake. The rebel peasants can serve as a point of support to soviets only if the proletariat shows in practice its ability to lead. Without the leadership of the proletariat, the peasant movement can only serve to advance one bourgeois clique against another, finally to break up into provincial factions. The constituent assembly, thanks to its importance as a centralizing force, would mark a serious stage in the development of the agrarian revolution. The existence of rural "soviets" and "Red armies" would help the peasants to elect revolutionary representatives. At the present stage this is the only way to link up the peasant movement politically with the national and proletarian movements.

The official Chinese Communist Party declares that its current "principal slogan" is that of the national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism (see Wang Ming's article in the Communist International, number 1, 1932). This is a one-sided and even adventurist way to pose the question. It is true that the struggle against imperialism, which is the essential task of the Chinese proletariat, cannot be carried through to the end except by insurrection and revolutionary war. But it does not follow in the least that the struggle against Japanese imperialism constitutes the central slogan at the present moment. The question must be solved in an international context.

At the beginning of the year, they thought in Comintern circles that Japan had launched its military action against China in order to immediately push things to a war against the Soviet Union. I wrote then that the Tokyo government would have to be completely out of its mind to run the risk of a war with the Soviet Union before it had at least to some extent consolidated the military base which Manchuria represents for it. In reply to this evaluation of the situation, the American Stalinists, the most vulgar and stupid of all, declared that I was working in the interests of the Japanese general staff. Yet what have the events of these last months shown? The fear of the consequences of a military adventure in Japan's leading circles was so great that the military clique had to liquidate a certain number of Japanese statesmen in order to arouse the mikado's government to complete the annexation of Manchuria. There is no doubt that even today a war against the Soviet Union remains a very real perspective, but in politics time is very important.

If the Soviet government considered war with Japan right
now inevitable, it would have neither the right nor the possibility of carrying out a peace policy, that is, an ostrich policy. In fact, in the course of the year, the Soviet government has concluded an agreement with Japan to furnish Soviet naphtha to the Japanese war fleet. If war is inevitable right now, furnishing naphtha to Japan is equivalent to committing treason towards the proletarian revolution. We won't discuss here the question of knowing to what extent this or that declaration or step of the Soviet government is correct. One thing is clear: contrary to the American Stalinists, whose zeal is beyond measure, the Moscow Stalinists have been oriented towards peace with Japan, not war.

Pravda of September 24 writes: "With vast impatience the world bourgeoisie was expecting a Japanese-Soviet war. But the fact that the USSR has rigorously abstained from intervening in the Sino-Japanese conflict and the firm peace policy she is following has forestalled war...." An admission that if the attitude of the American and other windbags had any political meaning at all, it was this: to push the Soviet power on the same road the world bourgeoisie was pushing it. We don't mean that they were consciously serving the Japanese general staff. Suffice it to say they are incapable of consciously serving the proletarian revolution.

The Chinese proletariat inscribes on its banner not only the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but also the conclusion of a close offensive and defensive alliance with it. This indicates that the policy of the Chinese proletariat must be in conformity with the whole of the international situation and above all with the policy of the Soviet Union. If Japan were to thrust war upon the Soviet Union today, drawing China into that war would be a life-and-death question for the Chinese proletariat and its party. The war would open up boundless horizons for the Chinese revolution. But to the extent that the international situation and internal conditions oblige the Soviet Union to make serious concessions in the Far East in order to avoid war, or to defer it as long as possible, to the extent that Japan does not feel itself strong enough to begin hostilities, the war against Japanese imperialism cannot constitute, at least at the present time, the central fighting slogan of the Chinese Communist Party.249

Wang Ming quotes the following slogans of the Left Opposition in China: "Reconstitution of the mass movement," "Convocation of the constituent assembly," and "Resumption of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union." Simply
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because these slogans seem to be poorly motivated in an article appearing in the legal organ of the Opposition, Wang Ming calls the Left Opposition in China a "counterrevolutionary Trotskyist-Ch'en Tu-hsiu group."\textsuperscript{250}

Even if we were to admit that the revolutionary slogans were poorly motivated, this does not make the slogans or the organization which formulated them counterrevolutionary. But Wang Ming and his like have to speak about the counterrevolutionary spirit of the "Trotskyists" if they want to keep their jobs and their pay.

While they express themselves so sharply against the Bolshevnik-Leninists, who have been proved right in the course of events in China from 1924 to 1932, the Stalinists are extremely indulgent towards themselves, towards their uninterrupted chain of errors.

When Japan attacked Shanghai, the Kuomintang proposed "the united front of the workers, peasants, soldiers, merchants, and students to combat imperialism." But this is the famous "bloc of four classes" of Stalin-Martinov!\textsuperscript{251} Since the second revolution [1925-27], foreign oppression has not weakened, but on the contrary has grown. The antagonism between the needs of the country's development on the one side and the regime and imperialism on the other has also sharpened. The rationale of the old Stalinist arguments in favor of the bloc of four classes has acquired double strength. But now the Stalinists have interpreted the Kuomintang's proposal as a new attempt to deceive the masses. Very well! But they have forgotten to explain why the Comintern leadership helped the Chinese bourgeoisie's fatal deception, and why the philosophy which consisted in being at the beck and call of the Kuomintang found expression in the program of the Comintern.

It is clear that we can and must support the slogan of democratic self-government: of the election of representatives by the people, etc. The democratic program represents a great step forward in relation to the regime of military dictatorship. We must tie in the isolated, partial democratic slogans with the principal slogans and connect them to the problems of the revolutionary organization and arming of the workers.

The question of "patriotism" and "nationalism," like some other questions contained in your letter, is of a terminological rather than fundamental character. The Bolsheviks, in favor of the national liberation of oppressed people by revolutionary means, support the movement of the masses of the people for national liberation by any means, not only against the foreign
imperialists, but also against the bourgeois exploiters of the Kuomintang type inside the national movement.

Must we introduce the term "patriotism," which has been thoroughly discredited and corrupted? I doubt it. Isn't this a tendency to adapt to petty-bourgeois ideology and terminology? If such a tendency were really to appear in our ranks, we would have to fight it mercilessly.

Many questions of a tactical and strategic character will appear insoluble if approached formalistically. But they will fall into place if we pose them dialectically, that is, in the context of the living struggle of classes and parties. The revolutionary dialectic is best assimilated in action. I have no doubt that our Chinese friends and comrades in ideas, the Bolshevik-Leninists, not only passionately discuss the complex problems of the Chinese revolution, but also no less passionately participate in the developing struggle. We are for a strategy of action, not speculation.

L. Trotsky
This work of Lenin which we submit to Polish readers was written in April 1920. At that time the international communist movement had not passed out of its childhood; its ills were indeed those of infancy.

Lenin, while condemning formal "leftism"—the radicalism of gesture and empty talk—defended no less passionately the real revolutionary intransigence of class policy. In so doing, he had not insured himself—alas, far from it—against misuse by the opportunists of various breeds, who, since the publication of this work twelve years ago, have quoted it hundreds and thousands of times with the aim of defending unprincipled conciliation.

At this time, in the conditions of world crisis, left wings in many countries are detaching themselves from the Social Democracy. These groups, on falling into the ditch that separates communism from reformism, usually declare that their main historic task is the creation of a "united front" or—still more expansively—"the unity of the workers' movement." In fact, nothing but such features as these conciliatory slogans make up the whole physiognomy of the Socialist Workers Party of Germany, which is led by Seydewitz, K. Rosenfeld,253 old Ledebour, and others. Very little distinguished from the Socialist Workers Party of Germany, as far as I can judge from here, is the small Polish political group formed around Dr. Joseph Kruk.254 Theoreticians of these groups, the best of them, appeal to Lenin's Left-Wing Communism. Only they simply forget to explain why they have always viewed Lenin as an incorrigible splitter.

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The essence of the Leninist united-front policy consists in giving the proletariat the opportunity — while maintaining a fighting, intransigent organization and program — of achieving, in closed ranks, even a small practical step forward; on the basis of such practical steps by the masses, Lenin strove not to conceal or soften the political contradictions between Marxism and reformism, but, quite the contrary, to lay them bare, to explain them to the masses, and thus to reinforce the revolutionary wing.

The problems of the united front constitute the substance of the problems of tactics. We know that tactics are subordinate to strategy. The lines of our strategy define the historic interests of the proletariat in the light of Marxism. We do not wish, by this, to minimize the significance of tactical problems. Strategy without its corresponding tactic is doomed to remain a lifeless abstraction of the study. But it is no less useless to exalt specific tactics, whatever their importance at a given moment, into a panacea, a universal remedy, an article of faith. The first rule in the employment of the united-front policy is a complete and irreconcilable break with unprincipled conciliation.

Lenin's book seemed to deal the deathblow to sham radicalism. The Third and Fourth Congresses of the Communist International, in their resolutions, almost unanimously endorsed the conclusions of the book. But during the subsequent period, the beginning of which coincided with the illness and death of Lenin, we observe that which astonishes at first sight: ultraleft tendencies again come to the fore, acquire strength, lead to a series of defeats, disappear, only to reappear in a more acute and malignant form.

Formal, point-blank protests against an agreement of any kind with reformism, against any united front with the Social Democracy, against the unity of the trade-union movement, and superficial arguments for the creation of our own "pure" trade unions, as Lenin termed them — all these ultraleft considerations are neither more serious nor more intelligent than the ones expounded these days, not by the feeble pipings of infants, but by the bass bellowings of bureaucrats. What is the reason for this amazing relapse?

We know that political tendencies do not exist "in the air": deviations and mistakes, if persistent and prolonged, must be rooted in a class basis. To speak of ultraleftism without defining its social roots is to replace Marxist analysis by "bright ideas." The right wing, the opportunist critics of Stalinism, for example the Branderites, going further, actually reduce all
the mistakes of the Comintern to a simple, ideological mis-
understanding. On a supersocial, superhistorical, almost mysti-
cal basis, ultraleftism is transformed into some form of malevo-
ent spirit such as devours the most pious Christians.

The problem must be approached quite differently. Events
conclusively demonstrate that these mistakes, which before were
only the expression of individual personalities or of groups,
and due solely to their practical infancy, are now exalted into
a system and have become the deliberate method of control
by an existing political current: bureaucratic centrism. It is
not really a question of the inconsistencies of ultraleft think-
ing, since the political clique that today controls the Comin-
tern alternates its ultraleft mistakes with opportunist practice.
And sometimes the Stalinist faction, instead of alternating be-
tween radicalism and opportunism, uses both simultaneously
in different matters, in direct relation to the needs of its faction-
al struggle.

Thus, at this moment, we see on the one hand a refusal on
principle to carry through any policy of agreements, whatever
they may be, with the German Social Democracy and on the
other hand we witness the antiwar congress, called together
through agreements with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois paci-
fists, French Radicals, Freemasons, or with pretentious in-
dividuals of the Barbusse type who consider it their particular
mission to "unite the Second and Third Internationals."

Those simple and, as always, exhaustive arguments that
Lenin advanced in favor of "agreements," of "compromises,"
of inevitable concessions, all unsurpassably serve to demon-
strate the limits which these methods must not transgress with-
out most certainly transforming them into their opposite.

The tactic of a united front is not a universal panacea. It
is subjected to a higher test: does it effect the unification of the
proletarian vanguard on the basis of an intransigent Marxist
policy? The art of leadership consists in defining, in each case,
on the basis of a concrete class relationship, with whom, to
what end, and to what limits the united front is acceptable, and
at what moment it must be broken.

If one were to seek the perfect model of the way in which
the united front should not and cannot be formed, one could
not find a better—or rather, a worse—example than the Am-
sterdam congress of "all classes and all parties" against war.
This example deserves examination point by point.

1. The Communist Party in each and every agreement, tem-
porary or prolonged, must stand openly under its own flag.
Yet at Amsterdam, parties, as such, were ignored! As though the struggle against war were not a political task, and consequently a task of political parties! As though that struggle did not demand the most complete clarity and the most strict precision of thought! As though any organization other than the party were capable of formulating as completely and as clearly as the party the question of the struggle against war! And yet the real organizer of this congress, that ignored party, was none other than the Communist International itself!

2. The Communist Party must seek a united front, not with individual lawyers or journalists, not with sympathetic acquaintances, but with the mass organizations of the workers, and consequently, in the first place, with the Social Democrats. But a united front with the Social Democrats was excluded from the very outset. Even a united-front offer to the Social Democrats—to test openly the influence of the pressure of the Social Democratic masses upon their leaders—was declared inadmissible!

3. Precisely because the policy of the united front carries within itself opportunist dangers, it is the duty of the Communist Party to avoid every kind of dubious mediation and secret diplomacy behind the backs of the workers. Yet the Communist International judged it necessary to put forward—as formal banner-bearer and organizer, as behind-the-scenes negotiator—the French writer Barbusse, who supported himself on the worst elements of both reformism and communism. Without giving notice to the masses, but obviously with the backing of the presidium of the Comintern, Barbusse had "talks" on the subject of the congress with—Frederick Adler! The united front from above is banned, is it not? Yet as we see from this, through the mediation of Barbusse, it is acceptable! It is unnecessary to mention that the wirepullers of the Second International are miles ahead of Barbusse in the field of political maneuvering. Barbusse's behind-the-scenes diplomacy presented the Second International with highly advantageous excuses for shirking participation in the congress.

4. The Communist Party has the right, and even the duty, to win for its cause even the weakest of allies—if they are real allies! But in so doing it must not repel the working masses, who are its essential ally. Yet the participation in the congress of individual bourgeois politicians, members of the leading party of imperialist France, cannot but repel the French socialist workers from communism. Nor will it be easy to explain to the German proletariat why one may march side
by side with the vice-president of Herriot’s party, or with the pacifist General Schoenaich, while at the same time it is declared inadmissible to make proposals for common action against war to the reformist workers’ organizations.

5. It is most dangerous in applying the policy of the united front to have a false estimate of one’s allies — when false allies are presented as true, the workers are deceived at the outset. Yet this is the crime that the organizers of the Amsterdam congress have committed and are committing.

The French bourgeoisie is now, as a whole, "pacifist" — that is not at all surprising: every victor endeavors to prevent the defeated from preparing its war of revenge. The French bourgeoisie seeks, always and everywhere, guarantees of peace in order that the fruits of their pillage shall be held sacrosanct and inviolable.

The left wing of petty-bourgeois pacifism is prepared, in seeking these guarantees, even to ally itself with the Comintern. An episodic alliance! On the day war is declared, such pacifists will side with their own governments. The French workers will be told: "In our fight for peace, we went to the utmost extremes, even to the Amsterdam congress. But war has been forced on us — we stand for the defense of the fatherland." The participation of French pacifists in the congress binds them to nothing, and at the moment of the declaration of war will entirely benefit French imperialism. On the other hand, in the event of war for equal rights in the field of international brigandage, General Schoenaich and his like will be entirely on the side of their German fatherland and will exploit to the full their newly acquired Amsterdam authority in its service.

The Indian bourgeois nationalist, Patel, participated in the Amsterdam congress for the same reason that Chiang Kai-shek participated with "a consulting voice" in the Comintern. Such participation will, without doubt, increase the authority of the "nationalist leaders" in the eyes of the masses of the people. To any Indian Communist who at a meeting calls Patel and his friends traitors, Patel will reply: "Were I a traitor, I would not have been an ally of the Bolsheviks at Amsterdam." So the Stalinists have armed the Indian bourgeoisie against the Indian workers.

6. Agreement in the name of a practical objective must in no case be at the cost of concessions in principle, of silence on essential differences, of ambiguous formulations that permit each participant to interpret them in his own way. Yet the manifesto of the Amsterdam congress is drawn up entirely
on the basis of subterfuge and double meaning, of play upon words, of hiding contradictions, of flamboyant meaningless speeches, of solemn declarations which lead to nothing. Members of bourgeois parties and liars of Freemasonry "condemn" capitalism! Pacifists "condemn" pacifism! Then on the very next day after the congress General Schoenaich, in an article printed in Muenzenberg's paper, declares himself a pacifist! And the French bourgeois who has condemned capitalism returns to the ranks of his capitalist party and gives his vote of confidence to Herriot. Isn't this a scandalous masquerade, a shameful charlatanism?

Marxist intransigence, obligatory when realizing the united front in general, becomes doubly or trebly so when it is a question of a problem as acute as war. The resolute voice of that one man Liebknecht, during the war, had a significance incomparably greater for the development of the German revolution than the sentimental semiprotests of the whole Independent Social Democratic Party [USPD]. In France there was no Liebknecht. One of the principal reasons is that in France Freemason-Radical, socialist-trade-union pacifism builds up a sphere cunningly snared with lies and humbug.

Lenin insisted that in any kind of "antiwar" congress one should not attempt to seek agreement on commonplaces, but on the contrary to put the questions so clearly, so brutally, so precisely as to push the pacifists into burning their fingers and drawing back—thus providing an object lesson to all workers. Lenin wrote, in the instructions to the Soviet delegation to the antiwar congress at The Hague in 1922: "I think that if we have several people at The Hague Conference who are capable of delivering speeches against war in various languages, the most important thing would be to refute the opinion that the delegates at the conference are opponents of war, that they understand how war may and will come upon them at the most unexpected moment, that they to any extent understand what methods should be adopted to combat war, that they are to any extent in a position to adopt reasonable and effective measures to combat war" [Collected Works, volume 33, "Notes on the Tasks of Our Delegation at The Hague," December 4, 1922].

Just picture for a moment Lenin voting at Amsterdam on the empty and grandiloquent manifesto, hand in hand with the French Radical G. Bergery, with the German general Schoenaich, with the nationalist liberal Patel! One could not
better measure the depths to which the epigones have fallen than by the monstrous character of this picture.

In this book by Lenin there is not a single formula which we do not adhere to today. Today, twelve years after this book was written, there has constituted itself—based on a systematic alteration of Leninist policy and misuse of quotations from Lenin—a definite tendency, bureaucratic centrism, a tendency that did not exist when Lenin wrote his book.

It is not hard to explain why the Stalinist tendency exists. It has social support: the millions of bureaucrats, bred by a revolution, victorious but isolated in a single country. The separate caste interests of the bureaucracy create in it opportunist and nationalist tendencies. But, nevertheless, it is the bureaucracy of a workers' state, encircled by a bourgeois world. At every moment it collides with the Social Democratic bureaucracy of capitalist countries. The Soviet bureaucracy, dictating the direction of the Comintern, imposes on it the contradictions of its own situation. The whole policy of the epigones' leadership oscillates between opportunism and adventurism.

Ultraleftism has ceased to be an infantile sickness. It is now one of the methods of self-preservation of a faction pulled more and more by the developments of the world proletarian vanguard. The struggle against centrist bureaucracy is now the first duty of every Marxist. Were there no other reasons, for this reason alone we should greet warmly this Polish edition of Lenin's admirable work.
To the Editors of *Oktober Briefe*

Dear Comrades:

My Berlin friends inform me of your wish to receive an article from me for your publication. Since you are conducting a struggle to turn the SAP from its present centrist course to the path of communism, I am of course ready to cooperate with you in every way.

Now I should like, in a few words, to direct the attention of your readers to the extremely instructive piece in *SAZ* [Socialist Workers News] of September 28, under the heading "The Revolt of the Party Members in the KPD" [German Communist Party]. Not only does the piece convey a very interesting fact about the internal life of the KPD; it also throws a clear light on the leadership of the SAP itself. I choose three points from this piece, each of which has great programmatic significance.

1. The subheading reads: "Against the Ultraleft Zigzag Course of the Leadership." What sense do these words have? Perhaps there is an ultraleft course; but there cannot be a course of "ultraleft zigzags." In actual fact, the Stalinists are zigzagging between ultraleftism and opportunism: it is precisely in this that is expressed the centrist character of the Stalinist faction, but Seydewitz—like Brandler and Thalheimer—sees only "ultraleftism" in Stalinist policy, eyes closed to its no less impressive opportunist turns and exploits. However, the *SAZ* at the same time borrows from the Left Opposition the term "zigzags" to define the Stalinist course. The result is eclectic nonsense.
The Brandlerites speak only of the ultraleftism of the Stalinists because they, the Brandlerites, along with the Stalinists, have zigzagged in the direction of opportunism and still do. As for Seydewitz and Co., they have completely failed to think out all the stages in the path of the proletarian revolution since the world war. They, of course, consider criticism by the Left Opposition sectarian. Still less critically they chew on the wisdom of Thalheimer.

2. The piece in the SAZ gives an account of article number 6 of the newspaper of the Inner-Party Opposition. Unfortunately, I have not seen this article ("A Critical Party Voice"). The account in the SAZ arouses the most lively interest. The oppositionist magazine subjects to sharp criticism the policy of the official leadership and the party regime. The SAZ tells, later on, of "a letter from an Amsterdam antiwar congress delegate which reveals all the emptiness and theatricality of the undertaking." An extremely clear and important symptom!

What, however, is the attitude of the SAZ itself to the voice of the Inner-Party Communist Opposition? We read: "What is criticized here and what is demanded fully correspond to what the SAP has been saying since its inception on relations with the KPD. This is the most genuine affirmation of the correctness of our policy."

It isn't possible for me to check this assertion of the SAP on all questions since, as has been said, I don't have "A Critical Party Voice" at my disposal. But perhaps one question about Amsterdam will suffice. Where and when did the SAZ characterize the Amsterdam congress as an empty, theatrical undertaking? Dr. K. Rosenfeld represented the SAP at the antiwar congress. Did he expose there the lack of principle of the bloc of Stalinists and bourgeois Radicals, Freemasons, pacifist generals, and Hindu nationalists? Did he speak against the pompous and perfidious manifesto which erases all the boundaries between Marxism and pacifism? Did he support the objection of the six representatives of the International Left Opposition? Did he append his signature to our manifesto? Apparently not. The representative of the SAP took his place at the Amsterdam theatrical production in the role of a submissive actor.

On what basis does the SAZ write about "the affirmation of the correctness of our policy"?

3. The piece finishes with the words: "Only a complete change of course, reform of the KPD and of the Comintern from top to bottom, can help here." Reform? Is reform still possible? The KPD and the Comintern are not yet consigned to the scrap heap of history? Then by what right does the SAP declare
itself the third party and prepare to receive the inheritance of the SPD and KPD? An independent party can have only one path: the path of the liquidation of the KPD. The path of reform is, on the contrary, the path of the resurrection of the KPD. It is necessary to choose between these two opposing paths. The very word "reform"—as regards the party and the Comintern—is borrowed by the SAZ from the platform of the Left Opposition. How and why? Because inside the Communist Party a cold wind has blown. The SAZ wants to prove its kinship with the Inner-Party Opposition. In itself, striving to win over a new group is completely legitimate for every political organization. But a principled basis is necessary. The SAP leadership does not have this basis. It purports to be an independent party, yet at the same time it talks of the "reform" of the KPD. It unites on the international arena with every hopelessly centrist organization and, at the same time, talks about reform of the Comintern.

Such a leadership is capable of leading any organization to destruction. I wanted to tell you this with all the necessary frankness.

L. Trotsky
FIFTEEN YEARS! 263

October 13, 1932

The October Revolution is completing its fifteenth year! This simple figure demonstrates to the entire world the gigantic force which exists in the proletarian state. No one, not even the most optimistic among us, foresaw such vitality. And that is not surprising; such a prediction would have indicated pessimism with regard to the international revolution.

The leaders and the masses saw in the October upheaval only the first stage of the world revolution. The thought of an independent development of socialism in isolated Russia was, in the year 1917, neither defended nor supported nor formulated by anybody. In the following years as well the whole party without exception viewed the economic construction as the substructure of the material base for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the preservation of the economic alliance between city and country, and finally as the creation of points of support for the future socialist society which could be developed only on an international basis.

The road to the world revolution has proved to be much longer and more tortuous than we had hoped and expected fifteen years ago. To the external difficulties, of which the historic role of reformism showed itself to be the most important, were added the internal ones, above all, the policies of the epigones of Bolshevism, false to their core and fatal in their consequence. The bureaucracy of the first workers' state—unconsciously, but that is no excuse—does everything decisive to prevent the birth of a second workers' state. The knots tied by the bureaucracy must be untied or cut in order to proceed on the road to the revolution.

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If delay in the development of the revolution has stretched beyond the perspective we had sketched, we have nevertheless accurately analyzed the fundamental motive forces and their laws. This also completely applies to the problems of the economic development of the Soviet Union. Modern productive forces cannot be confined within national limits by a resolution or an exorcism. Autarchy is the ideal of Hitler, not of Marx nor Lenin; socialism and national states are mutually exclusive. Today as fifteen years ago the program of a socialist society in a single country is utopian and reactionary.

The economic successes of the Soviet Union are very great but, as we celebrate its fifteenth anniversary, its contradictions and difficulties have taken on threatening proportions. Lags, interruptions, and disproportions bear witness in the first place to wrong leadership. But that is not the whole of it. They reveal that the construction of a harmonious society is possible only through an uninterrupted experience extending over decades and only on an international basis. The technical and cultural obstacles—the gulf between city and country, the difficulties of import and export trade—prove that the October Revolution demands continuation on an international scale. Internationalism is not a convention ritual but a matter of life and death.

There will be no lack of jubilee speeches and articles. The majority of them will come from those who, in October, were the intransigent adversaries of the proletarian insurrection. We Bolshevik-Leninists will be called "counterrevolutionists" by these gentlemen. It is not the first time that history permits itself such jokes and we have nothing against it on that account. Even if with confusion and delay, history does its work.

And we, too, we will do ours!
THE TWELFTH PLENUM OF THE COMINTERN

Some Brief Observations

October 13, 1932

1. The report on revolutionary strategy was read by Kuusinen. His role in the Finnish revolution of 1918 shows he is just the right man to be the strategist of the international proletariat.

2. The principal theses declare again: "The relative stabilization of capitalism has come to an end." In 1932? But didn't the Sixth World Congress [1928] already speak of the end of the stabilization? The Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) [1929] proclaimed the "third period," that is, the period which leads directly to the proletarian insurrection. Now we are told—without any comment—that the stabilization of capitalism has again come to an end. That makes how many times?

3. On China it says: "The soviet revolution has triumphed over a large part of its territory." A revolution can be bourgeois or proletarian. Which of the two are we to understand in the present instance? Why does the Comintern cover the class content of the revolution with its soviet form?

4. "The new world imperialist war has become an immediate danger." The Sixth World Congress already had declared the danger of war to be immediate. For over four years the ECCI has been repeating the same formula. In any case, it is closer to a reality now than in 1928. But exactly what does the word "immediate" mean in the language of the Comintern?

5. The Communist parties are under the obligation "to counterpose real struggles against the war preparations to the abstract and hypocritically pacifist declarations of the Social Democracy." That is right. But in that case how about the no less abstract and no less hypocritical declarations of the congress of Amsterdam? It is remarkable: not a word on
the Amsterdam masquerade in the resolution. Are they already ashamed of their own child?

6. The theses give learned definitions of the different forms of fascism. They say: "The social-fascists prefer the moderate and 'legal' application of bourgeois violence . . .; they defend its democratic facade and try to keep as much as possible of its parliamentary forms." Now we understand. A square is a triangle whose four sides intersect at right angles.

7. As to France, they say that while the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade unions have been weakened, a strong revolutionary movement against war has been developed to make up for it. But a movement against war, when the proletarian vanguard has been weakened, necessarily becomes a petty-bourgeois movement and becomes transformed to the benefit of reformist pacifism.

8. The German Communist Party is advised to strengthen its struggle "against nationalism and chauvinism for proletarian internationalism." That is right. But how about the program of "national liberation"?

9. The duty is placed before the Polish Communist Party "of destroying the influence of the Socialist Party on the masses," and of "overcoming its weaknesses in the big plants, among the railroad workers, in the army." No advice could be simpler: destroy the enemy and become all-powerful. Kuusinen forgets only to show how to do it.

10. For Spain the advice is to strive toward "the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry under the form of soviets." How this regime is different from the dictatorship of the proletariat is, as usual, not explained.

11. For England as, incidentally, for all the other countries, the advice is to realize the united front from below. In other words, the plenum of the ECCI has again approved the renunciation of the policy of the united front.

12. In Manchuria it is proposed to create, on the basis of guerrilla war, "an elected popular government." A democratic slogan? Why is it given so vaguely? Why only for Manchuria? Why isn't it applicable to all of China?

13. The Indian Communist Party is assigned the task of "liberating the masses from the influence of the National Congress." But at the same time the ECCI fraternizes with Patel through the Amsterdam congress and artificially increases the authority of the National Congress.

14. In the organizational field the plenum recommends "the resolute liquidation of excessive centralism, the system of pure-and-simple command," etc. This advice does not sound bad
from the mouth of the ECCI, which for the fifth year has failed to call an international congress and commands by usurping the name of the International.

15. The ECCI insists (!) that the "Communist youth be transformed into a genuine mass organization." Magnificent advice. But why do the youth organizations vegetate and decay in spite of all the advice of Kuusinen? Just because they have not been freed from his advice.

16. In conclusion the theses advise one and all to struggle for the purity of doctrine on the basis of "Stalin's letter." Poor purity! Poor doctrine! Poor Comintern!

17. Soviets are mentioned in the theses in passing, in connection with China and Spain. For the other countries, in spite of the revolutionary perspectives set up in the theses, soviets in general are not mentioned; in particular the slogan of soviets is not raised before the German proletariat. It is not difficult to find the explanation. In Germany, as in the majority of advanced countries, real soviets can only be created on the basis of a broad and audacious united-front policy. Ultimatism and the slogan of soviets cannot be reconciled with each other. By renouncing the united front, the Stalinists renounce soviets.
A LETTER TO WEISBORD

October 13, 1932

Dear Comrade Weisbord:

This is in answer to your letter, and through your mediation to the letter of your group. My delay in answering was due to my certainty that *The Militant*, contrary to your premature assumption, would answer your request. And, in point of fact, I find that in its last issues my letter to you and your answer are published in full and even without any criticism.

This procedure is very accommodating, perhaps a little too much so. If you still remember our discussion about the possibilities and methods of fusion, you will understand without any comment from me that I cannot find your steps very happily chosen for the purpose, if the purpose remains that of fusion.

It is scarcely necessary to go into the details of your letter, but I feel obliged to emphasize the fact that your treatment of the question of centrism appears to me absolutely unsatisfactory. It is not a question of the terms, but of the political content of the Stalinist faction.

It is superfluous to repeat that I would be glad to observe a real rapprochement between your group and our American section, but it is evident that in the present stage this process cannot be seriously influenced from abroad. It is a task between yourself and the League.

With communist greetings,
L. Trotsky.
MILL AS A STALINIST AGENT

October 1932

The Left Opposition is placed in extremely difficult conditions from the organizational point of view; no revolutionary party in the past has worked under such persecution. In addition to repression by the capitalist police of all countries, the Opposition is exposed to the blows of the Stalinist bureaucracy, which stops at nothing. We repeat: at nothing.

It is of course the Russian section that is having the hardest time. All will remember how Blumkin, trying to establish a connection between Trotsky and his cothinkers in the USSR, was shot to death. To find a Russian Bolshevik-Leninist abroad, even for purely technical functions, is an extremely difficult task.

This and only this explains the fact that Mill was able for a time to get into the Administrative Secretariat of the Left Opposition: there was a need for a person who knew Russian and was able to carry out secretarial duties. Mill had at one time been a member of the official party and in this sense could claim a certain personal confidence.

His work in the Secretariat, however, very quickly showed his complete practical incompetency, not to speak of the absence of any political education whatsoever. In this last respect, by the way, Mill is a typical representative of both the greater and lesser bureaucrats with Stalinist training.

To this were soon added negative traits of a personal, or rather moral character. Having, for want of choice, landed in a responsible, even if purely technical, job, Mill started to feel himself occupying the role of something of a "leader." In relation to a number of French comrades, who are head and shoulders above him, he began to display completely
ridiculous pretensions. From behind the mask of the insulted Stalinist passing himself off as an "Oppositionist" there appeared the face of a little petty bourgeois from some wretched little township of old czarist Russia. Mill very quickly got into opposition to the Paris comrades, who in his opinion were not behaving with sufficient respect towards him and—this too must be said—were not taking sufficient trouble about his welfare. These insults were enough for the little petty bourgeois to try to form a bloc with Rosmer and others, against whom he had literally only the day before been waging a bitter struggle of "principle." This unworthy political about-face, produced by purely personal motives, led to Mill's removal from the Administrative Secretariat. The sections, especially the Russian one, corrected the error they had made, which was to a considerable extent forced on them, as stated above, by the difficulties of the objective circumstances. In the course of the next nine months Mill was completely outside of the ranks of the Left Opposition.

But this was not the end of his career. Just as pique at insufficient trouble over him had sent him to Rosmer, so his removal from the Administrative Secretariat sent him on the path of talks with the Stalinists; he made an official application for a job in Kharkov, where his relatives are living.

In the process of these deceitful talks Mill offered his services to the Left Opposition, evidently already serving in his new political function. Now Mill intends to "unmask" the Opposition; this is essentially what his work in Kharkov or Moscow will be.

There is no need to fear that a little petty bourgeois, expelled from the ranks of the Bolshevik-Leninists as an uncouth scoundrel, can play any role whatsoever in the struggle with the Left Opposition. We do not fear the truth. And as far as lies go, the Stalinists even before Mill have broken all records.

In one respect you might say the situation is according to standard: a Stalinist annoyed for some reason at the Stalinists temporarily consoles himself with the Opposition, is ejected from their ranks, and goes back to his own. There he will be completely in place.
THE LESSON
OF MILL'S TREACHERY

October 13, 1932

The case of Mill represents one of those episodes which, generally speaking, are quite inevitable in the process of selecting and educating our cadres. The Left Opposition is under terrific pressure. But not all are up to it. There will still be not a few cases of regrouping and of personal desertion. In this letter I would like to draw out of the Mill episode certain lessons which it seems to me are simple and not open to dispute.

Lenin spoke of ultra-leftism as an infantile malady. But we must remember that ultra-leftism is not the only political infantile malady; there are others too. As everyone knows, children find it hard to realize the nature of their illness or even its location. There is something of this sort in politics too. It requires a fairly high degree of maturity for two groups, at the very moment of their birth, to be able to define more or less clearly the cardinal points of their differences. More often young groups, like sick children, complain of pains in the arm or leg, while the pain in reality is in the belly. Individuals, or little groups, insufficiently hardened for a tenacious and long-range task of organization and education, disillusioned by the fact that success does not fall from the sky, ordinarily do not take account of the fact that the source of their failures lies in themselves, in their inconsistency, in their softness, in their petty-bourgeois sentimentalism. They seek the blame for their shortcomings outside of themselves and generally find it in the bad character of X or Y. Often enough they end by making a bloc with Z, with whom they do not agree on anything, against Y, with whom, as they say, they are in agreement on everything. When serious revolutionists are then astonished or indignant at their attitude, they begin to protest that an "intrigue" is being woven against them. This pernicious
road, observed more than once in various sections, has been followed to the end in the Mill episode and that is why it is particularly instructive.

How did Mill become a member of the Administrative Secretariat? I have spoken of this in my note for the press. Objective conditions demanded the presence at the Secretariat of a person who was closely connected with the center of the Russian Opposition, able to translate Russian documents, carry on correspondence, etc. Mill appeared as the only possible candidate, practically speaking. He declared his complete solidarity with the Russian Opposition, and took part in the struggle against Landau, Rosmer, etc. All our comrades will remember how Mill then, in the course of absolutely unprincipled conflicts with the leading group of the French League, suddenly tried to conclude a bloc with Rosmer, who had already abandoned the ranks of the League.

What did this fact mean? How was it possible for a responsible member, in the course of twenty-four hours, to change his position on a highly important question for the sake of personal considerations? Mill himself continued to declare that he had no kind of political differences with the Russian Opposition, only that such and such French comrades "displeased him." In other words, Mill had recourse to the same arguments which only the day before he had condemned in Rosmer. Rosmer has even built on the basis of the opposition between ideas and people a purely anecdotal theory which shows beyond any doubt that Rosmer broke with the Comintern not because he had raised himself to a higher historical point of view, but because at bottom he had not grown to an understanding of revolutionary policy and the revolutionary party.

The only conclusion which could be drawn from the unworthy conduct of Mill was this: for Mill, principles are in general clearly of no importance; personal considerations, sympathies, and antipathies determine his political conduct to a greater degree than principles and ideas. The fact that Mill could propose a bloc with a man whom he had defined as non-Marxist, against comrades whom he had held to be Marxists, showed clearly that Mill was politically and morally unreliable and that he was incapable of keeping his loyalty to the cause. If on that day he betrayed on a small scale, he was capable of betraying tomorrow on a larger scale. That was the conclusion which every revolutionary should have drawn.

The Russian Opposition, which more than all the other sections was responsible for having brought Mill into the Sec-
The Lesson of Mill's Treachery

retariat, immediately proposed his removal from that body. But what happened? This proposal, natural, urgent, corresponding to the entire situation, met with resistance among certain comrades. In the first rank were the comrades of the Spanish section, who even considered it possible to propose Mill as the representative of the Spanish section in the International Secretariat. At the same time they declared that they had no political differences with the leadership of the International Left Opposition.

This most unexpected step made a shocking impression on many of us at the time. But we asked, by what do the Spanish comrades let themselves be guided when they take up Mill as a cause? It is clear. They see in Mill a comrade who has been "crossed," and they hasten to take up his defense. In other words, on a political question of exceptional importance they let themselves be guided by considerations which are not political, not revolutionary, but personal and sentimental.

If Mill tried to conclude a bloc with the deserter Rosmer against the French League, the leading Spanish comrades concluded a bloc with Mill against the Russian, French, and a number of other sections, although in their own words they had no differences with them. We see in what a maze one can be lost by being guided, on important questions, not by political revolutionary considerations, but by impressions, sentimentalism, and personal sympathies and antipathies!

The fact that Mill "in search of work" entered into negotiations with the Stalinists and finally undertakes to "unmask" the Left Opposition in the press shows definitely that Mill is a corrupt petty bourgeois. Surely no one in our ranks will deny this. But this alone is not enough: we must understand that the sudden turn of Mill toward Rosmer was in its time only the dress rehearsal for his present turn toward the Stalinists. The basis for both acts of treason was the same inadequacy of the petty bourgeois who had fallen into the sphere of revolutionary politics.

I pause on this question with so much detail not on account of Mill, but on account of the question of the selection and education of the cadres of the Left Opposition. This process is far from finished, although it is precisely in this field that we have important successes to our credit.

The Spanish Opposition at present is going through an extremely difficult crisis. The leadership elected at the last conference has fallen apart although no principled basis for this decomposition can be found; for each member of the Central
Committee, we are referred to some particular personal reason. Still, for anyone who in the past had seriously gone into the position of the Central Committee of the Spanish Opposition toward the Mill episode, it was even then clear that the Spanish Opposition was on its way toward a crisis.

In fact, if the leaders of the Spanish Opposition did not understand the principled importance of the struggle which we were carrying on against Rosmer, Landau, etc., if they thought it possible to ally themselves with Mill against the fundamental cadres of the International Opposition, if at the same time they repeated that they had no differences with us and thus removed any justification for their manner of acting, for all these reasons we could not fail to say to ourselves with alarm, "The leaders of the Spanish Opposition will scarcely give a correct orientation to their section; but where a well-grounded orientation is lacking, there inevitably appear personal motives and feelings." To weld into a whole people of different training, character, temperament, and education can be done only by means of clear revolutionary principles. Otherwise the disintegration of the organization is inevitable. On personal sympathies, on friendships and clique spirit, nothing can be built but a lifeless debating club of the Souvarine271 type or a home for political invalids of the Rosmer type, and not even that for long.

Disagreeable as the task is, I must again touch on a "delicate" point because the interest of the cause demands it; no sound political relations can be built on suppressions and conventionalties.

When in our letters we asked the leading Spanish comrades by what principled motives, by what political and organizational considerations they let themselves be guided in taking up the defense of Mill against the Russian, German, French, Belgian sections, etc., we received the following type of reply, "We have the right to have our own opinion," "We refuse to be ordered about," etc. This unexpected reply seemed to us a highly alarming symptom.

Let us admit that someone among us really has a tendency to order people about. Such a tendency should be resisted, and the stronger the tendency the more the resistance. But the necessity for the most resolute struggle against any such habits of simple command would not free the Spanish comrades of the necessity of establishing a political foundation for their factional intervention in favor of Mill and against the overwhelming majority of the sections. In the request for prin-
cipated motives for this or that action there is in no way a tendency to simple command. Every member of the Left Opposition has the right to ask the responsible institutions of the Left Opposition the question: Why? To get rid of the burden of a concrete answer by mere affirmation of the right to have one's own opinion is to replace mutual revolutionary obligations by half-liberal, half-sentimental commonplaces. After such an answer, one could not fail to say to oneself again, "Certain leading Spanish comrades have not, unfortunately, a sufficiently solid common ground with the International Left Opposition. From this proceeds their inattention to the history of the Left Opposition, to the struggles through which it has gone, to the selection of cadres which it has carried through; from this proceeds also the tendency to be guided by personal impressions, by psychological estimations, by individual criteria; from this also, the affirmation of 'liberty' of opinion instead of a Marxist foundation for the opinion."

It is unnecessary for us to say how far removed we are from the thought of comparing any of the Spanish comrades to Mill. But it remains a fact that the leading Spanish comrades have not understood in time why we attacked Mill in an intransigent manner and why we demanded that the others do the same. Let us hope that now, at least, this serious lesson may lead to our coming together and not to additional discussion.
Radio and telegraph have flashed news to the entire world of the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the party, and along with them of more than a score of Bolsheviks. According to the official communication, those who are expelled allegedly were striving to reestablish capitalism in the Soviet Union. The political import of this new repression is imposing in itself. Its symptomatic significance is tremendous.

For many years Zinoviev and Kamenev were Lenin's closest pupils and collaborators. Better than anyone else, Lenin knew their weak traits; but he was also able to utilize their strong sides. In his "testament," so cautious in tone, in which both praise and censure are equally modulated in order not to strengthen some and weaken others too much, Lenin deemed it urgent to remind the party that the behavior of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October was "not accidental." 273 Subsequent events confirmed these words all too well. But no more accidental was the role which Zinoviev and Kamenev played in the Leninist party. And their present expulsion brings to mind their old and nonaccidental role.

Zinoviev and Kamenev were members of the Politburo, which in Lenin's time was directly in charge of the fate of the party and the revolution. Zinoviev was president of the Communist International. Together with Rykov and Tsiurupa, 274 Kamenev was Lenin's assistant, during the final period of Lenin's life, in the presiding office of the Council of People's Commissars. After Lenin's death Kamenev presided over the Politburo and the Council of Labor and Defense, the highest economic organ of the republic.

In 1923 Zinoviev and Kamenev launched a campaign against Trotsky. At the beginning of the struggle, they took
very poor account of its consequences, which of course does not testify to their political foresight. Zinoviev was primarily an agitator, exceptionally talented, but almost exclusively an agitator; Kamenev, a "wise politician" in Lenin's estimation, but lacking great willpower and too easily inclined to adapt himself to the intellectual, culturally middle-class, bureaucratic milieu.

Stalin's role in the struggle bore a much more organic character. The spirit of petty-bourgeois provincialism, narrowness of vision—that is what characterizes Stalin, notwithstanding his Bolshevism. His enmity toward "Trotskyism" had roots much deeper than that of Zinoviev and Kamenev, and for a long time previously it had sought political expression. Incapable himself of theoretical generalizations, Stalin urged on in turn Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, and picked out from their speeches and articles whatever seemed to him most appropriate for his own aims.

The struggle of the majority of the Politburo against Trotsky, which began to a considerable degree as a personal conspiracy, disclosed all too quickly its political content. It was neither simple nor homogeneous.

The Left Opposition included within itself, around its authoritative Bolshevik kernel, many of the organizers of the October Revolution, militant participants in the civil war, and a considerable number of Marxists from the student youth. But behind this vanguard, during the first stages, there dragged along the tail end all sorts of dissatisfied, ill-equipped, and even chagrined careerists. Only the arduous development of the subsequent struggles liberated the Opposition from its accidental and uninvited fellow travelers.

Under the banner of the "triumvirate"—Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin—were united many "Old Bolsheviks," particularly those who, as Lenin recommended as early as April 1917, should have been relegated to the archives; but there also were many serious members who had participated in the underground movement, strong party organizers, who sincerely believed that there was an impending danger of Leninism being replaced by Trotskyism. The further matters progressed, however, the more the bureaucracy grew and entrenched itself, the more solidly and cohesively it rebelled against the "permanent revolution." And it was this that subsequently guaranteed Stalin's preponderance over Zinoviev and Kamenev.

The fight within the "triumvirate," beginning to a considerable degree also as a personal fight—politics develops by
and through people, and nothing that is human is foreign to politics—soon disclosed its own principled content. Zinoviev, as president of the Petrograd Soviet, and Kamenev, as president of the Moscow Soviet, sought the support of the workers of the two capitals. Stalin's chief support was in the provinces and in the apparatus; in the backward provinces the apparatus became all-powerful sooner than in the capitals. Zinoviev, president of the Comintern, cherished his international position. Stalin looked down with contempt on the Communist parties of the West. He found the formula for his nationalistic limitations in 1924: socialism in one country. Against him, Zinoviev and Kamenev counterposed their doubts and refutations. But it was sufficient for Stalin to enlist those forces which had been mobilized by the "triumvirate" against Trotskyism to automatically overwhelm Zinoviev and Kamenev.

Zinoviev's and Kamenev's past, the years of their joint work with Lenin and the international school of emigration, must have made them hostile to the wave of isolation that threatened, in the last analysis, to sweep away the October Revolution. The result of the new fight on the top seemed to many absolutely astounding: two of the most vigorous instigators of the uproar against "Trotskyism" ended up in the camp of the "Trotskyists."

In order to facilitate a bloc, the Left Opposition—against the objections and warnings of the author of these lines—toned down certain formulations of its platform, and temporarily refrained from making official replies to the most acute theoretical questions. This was hardly correct. But the Left Opposition of 1923 did not make any essential concessions. We remained true to ourselves; Zinoviev and Kamenev came to us. There is no need to recapitulate the degree to which the coming over to the side of the 1923 Opposition by the sworn enemies of yesterday strengthened the assurance of our ranks and our conviction in our historical correctness.

Zinoviev and Kamenev, however, on this occasion as well, did not foresee all the political consequences of their step. In 1923 they had hoped, by means of a few agitational campaigns and organizational maneuvers, pushing all other questions aside, to free the party from the "hegemony of Trotsky"; now it seemed to them that, allied with the 1923 Opposition, they would quickly cope with the apparatus and reestablish both their own personal positions and the Leninist course in the party.
The Expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev 247

Once again they were mistaken. Personal antagonisms and groupings within the party had already completely become the tools of anonymous social forces, strata, and classes. The reaction against the October overturn had its own inner lawfulness, and it was impossible to skip over its ponderous rhythm by means of combinations and maneuvers.

Sharpening from day to day, the struggle between the Opposition bloc and the bureaucracy reached its final limits. The matter now no longer concerned discussion, even if under the whip, but a break with the official Soviet apparatus, that is, the perspective of an arduous struggle for a number of years—a struggle surrounded by great dangers, the outcome of which could not be foretold.

Zinoviev and Kamenev recoiled. As in 1917, on the eve of October, they had become frightened of a break with the petty-bourgeois democracy, so ten years later they became frightened of a break with the Soviet bureaucracy. And this was all the more "not accidental," since three-quarters of the Soviet bureaucracy was made up of those same elements which in 1917 tried to scare the Bolsheviks with the inevitable fiasco of the October "adventure."

The capitulation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, before the Fifteenth Congress [in 1927], at the moment of the organized crackdown on the Bolshevik-Leninists, was received by the Left Opposition as an act of monstrous perfidy. In essence it was. But even this capitulation had its measure of lawfulness, not only psychological but political. On a series of fundamental questions of Marxism (the proletariat and the peasantry, "democratic dictatorship," permanent revolution), Zinoviev and Kamenev stood between the Stalinist bureaucracy and the Left Opposition. Theoretical amorphousness avenged itself inexorably, as it always does, in practice.

For all his agitational radicalism, Zinoviev always stepped back from the actual inferences of political formulas. Fighting against Stalinist policies in China, Zinoviev opposed the break of the Communist Party with the Kuomintang. Exposing Stalin's alliance with Purcell and Citrine, Zinoviev hesitated irresolutely before the split with the Anglo-Russian Committee. Joining the struggle against the Thermidorean tendencies, he vowed beforehand in no case to bring matters to the point of expulsion from the party. In this spirit of going halfway was contained his inevitable downfall. "Everything except expulsion from the party" signified a struggle against Stalinism within the limits permitted by Stalin.
After their capitulation, Zinoviev and Kamenev did absolutely everything they could to restore the confidence of the ruling clique in them and to be assimilated into the official milieu. Zinoviev made his peace with the theory of socialism in one country, and once again exposed "Trotskyism," and even made attempts to burn incense to Stalin personally. Nothing helped. The capitulators suffered, shut up, and waited. And with all that they still did not succeed in hanging on to celebrate the fifth anniversary of their own capitulation; it seems that they were involved in a "conspiracy," and therefore were expelled from the party, perhaps to be deported or exiled.

What is astounding is that Zinoviev and Kamenev were booted out not for their own cause nor under their own banner. The bulk of the list of those expelled, according to the decision of October 9, consists of outright right-wingers, that is, the followers of Rykov-Bukharin-Tomsky. Does this mean that left centrist has united with right centrist against the bureaucratic core? Let's not rush to conclusions.

The most prominent names on the list, after Zinoviev and Kamenev, are those of Uglanov and Riutin, two former members of the Central Executive Committee. Uglanov, as the general secretary of the Moscow committee, and Riutin, as the head of the Agitprop, were in charge in the capital of the struggle against the Left Opposition, clearing every nook and corner of Trotskyism in 1926-27. They raised a particularly venomous hullabaloo against Zinoviev and Kamenev as "traitors" to the ruling faction. When Uglanov and Riutin, as a result of the Stalinist turn to the left, became the chief practical organizers of the Right Opposition, all the official articles and speeches harped on one and the same note: "No man can deny the great service rendered by Uglanov and Riutin in the struggle against Trotskyism, but their platform nevertheless represents that of the kulaks and bourgeois liberals." The Stalinists pretend that they are not aware that it was precisely around these issues that the struggle had taken place. Then, as now, only the right and the left had principled positions; the Stalinists thrived on the sops from each.

As early as 1928 Uglanov and Riutin began to assert that the Left Opposition had been correct in its stand on the question of the party regime—the acknowledgment is all the more instructive since no one could boast of success in entrenching the Stalinist regime more than Uglanov and Riutin. "Solidarity" on the question of party democracy, however, cannot cause
a change of heart of the Left Opposition in relation to the Right Opposition. Party democracy is not an abstract ideal; least of all is it designed to serve as a screen for Thermidorean tendencies. Moreover, Uglanov and Riutin, at least in the past, represented the most thoroughgoing Thermidorean wing in the camp of the Right.

Among the participants in the conspiracy the CEC lists other leading right-wingers like Slepkov and Maretsky, Red professors of the Bukharin school, directors of the Young Communist League and Pravda, instigators of many programmatic resolutions of the CEC and authors of countless articles and pamphlets against "Trotskyism."

On the proscribed list are found Ptashny and Gorelov, with a notation of their former adherence to the "Trotskyist Opposition." We have no way of judging whether this concerns two scarcely known capitulators from the Left who subsequently threw in their lot with the Right or whether this is a falsification to deceive the party. The former is by no means excluded, but neither is the latter.

In the resume of the participants, the chief leaders of the Right Opposition are conspicuously absent. Cables to the bourgeois papers report that Bukharin "has completely reestablished his party position" and is apparently slated for a post in the People's Commissariat of Education in place of Bubnov, who is being transferred to the GPU; Rykov, once again in favor, makes radio speeches, etc. The fact that neither Bukharin nor Tomsky are on the list of "conspirators" does make plausible some temporary bureaucratic indulgence toward the former leaders of the Right Opposition. But it is out of the question that they are being reestablished in their old positions in the party.

The group as a whole is accused of an attempt to create "a bourgeois-kulak organization in order to restore capitalism in the USSR and the kulak, in particular." An amazing formulation! An organization to restore "capitalism and the kulak, in particular." (!) This "particularity" gives the show away, or at least parts of it. There is no denying that some of those expelled, like Slepkov and Maretsky, in the period of the struggle against "Trotskyism," developed, like their teacher Bukharin, the idea of "the kulak's growing over into socialism." We don't know what stand they have taken since then. But it is quite possible that their guilt consists not so much in their desire to "restore" the kulak as their failure to recognize Stalin's victories in the sphere of "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class."
What is the relation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, however, to the program of "restoring capitalism"? The Soviet press informs us of the following in regard to their participation in the crime. "Knowing of the counterrevolutionary documents that were being circulated, instead of immediately exposing the agents of the kulaks, they preferred to deliberate over this document [?] and by this act alone, they became the direct accomplices of the antiparty, counterrevolutionary group." So Zinoviev and Kamenev "preferred to deliberate over the document" instead of "immediately exposing" it. The accusers do not dare to claim that Zinoviev and Kamenev were entirely beyond considering its "exposure." Where, how, and with whom did they deliberate? Had this occurred during a secret session of the Right group, the accusers would not have failed to inform us of it. Apparently Zinoviev and Kamenev "preferred to deliberate" with their own four eyes within their own four walls. As a result of their deliberation, did they express their sympathy for the platform of the right-wingers? If there were even the slightest hint of such sympathy, we would have been told about it in the decision. Silence on this matter testifies to the contrary: Zinoviev and Kamenev, obviously, subjected the platform to criticism instead of immediately ringing up Yagoda. But in view of the fact that they did not telephone, Pravda feels justified in applying to them the concept: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."

This crude accusation against Zinoviev-Kamenev makes it possible for us to conclude with assurance that the blow was directed against them, and primarily them. Not because they carried on political activity during the last period. We know nothing of that, and what is more important the CEC knows nothing of that either, as is evident from the decree. But the objective political situation has so deteriorated that Stalin can no longer tolerate legal candidates for leadership of one or another opposition group.

The Stalinist bureaucracy, of course, has long been aware that Zinoviev and Kamenev whom it has spurned were very much "interested" in the oppositionist trends within the party and were reading all sorts of documents that were not destined for Yagoda. In 1928 Kamenev even carried on secret negotiations with Bukharin regarding the possibility of a bloc. Reports of these negotiations were published at the time by the Left Opposition. The Stalinists, however, could not decide to expel Zinoviev and Kamenev. They did not want to compromise themselves by new scandals of repression unless there
was an urgent necessity for it. The period of economic successes, in part actual, in part fictitious, was then being inaugurred. Zinoviev and Kamenev did not appear to be immediately dangerous.

Now the situation has changed radically. True, the newspaper articles explaining the expulsion proclaim that because we have grown extremely strong economically and because the party has become absolutely monolithic, we therefore cannot tolerate "the slightest conciliatory spirit." But in this explanation the white threads that baste it together are all too much in view. The necessity for the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev, for an obviously fictitious reason, testifies on the contrary to the extreme weakening of Stalin and his faction. Zinoviev and Kamenev had to be removed post haste not because of a change in their behavior but because of a change in the circumstances. Riutin's group, apart from any actual activity, is dragged along in order to garnish the service. Knowing in advance that they may soon be brought to account, the Stalinists are "taking measures."

One cannot deny the fact that this juridical combination of the right-wingers, who inspired Stalin's policies from 1923-28, of the two actual or supposed former "Trotskyists," and of Zinoviev and Kamenev, guilty of knowing but of not informing, is a product entirely worthy of the political creativity of Stalin, Yaroslavsky, and Yagoda. A classical amalgam of the Thermidorean type! The aim of this amalgam is to mix up the cards, to disorient the party, to increase the ideological confusion, and in this way to hinder the workers from understanding what is happening and finding a way out. The supplementary task consists in politically demoting Zinoviev and Kamenev, former leaders of the Left Opposition, now expelled for "amity" toward the Right Opposition.

Inevitably the question arises: How could Old Bolsheviks, knowledgeable and experienced in politics, give their opponents the opportunity to deal them such a blow? How could they, who renounced their own platform for the sake of remaining in the party, in the end be flung out of the party because of a fictitious connection with a platform foreign to them? One must reply that this result also did not come about accidentally. Zinoviev and Kamenev tried to play tricks with history. Of course they were motivated, first of all, by concern for the Soviet Union, for the unity of the party, and not at all for their personal welfare. But they set their tasks not on the
plane of the Russian and world revolution but on the much lower plane of the Soviet bureaucracy.

In their most difficult hours, on the eve of their capitulation, they entreated us, then their allies, "to meet the party halfway." We replied that we were prepared to meet the party all the way, but in another and a higher sense than was required by Stalin and Yaroslavsky. But did that not mean a split? Was that not a threat of civil war and of the downfall of the Soviet power? We replied that Stalin's policies, if not opposed by us, would inevitably doom the Soviet power to ruin. And this was the idea expressed in our platform. Principles conquer. Capitulation can never be victorious. We shall do everything in our power to insure that the struggle for principles will be led in consonance with and in consideration of the whole situation, both domestic and foreign. But it is impossible to foresee all the variations of development. Nevertheless it is absurd and criminal to play hide and seek with revolution, to use trickery in dealing with classes and diplomacy in dealing with history. In such complex and responsible situations one must be guided by a rule excellently expressed by the French in the proverb: Fais ce que doit, advienne que pourra! Perform your duty, come what may!

Zinoviev and Kamenev have fallen victims because they did not keep to this rule.

If one leaves aside the absolutely demoralized capitulators of the Radek and Pyatakov type, who as journalists or functionaries will continue to serve any victorious faction (under the pretext of serving socialism), then the capitulators taken as a political group represent moderate party "liberals" who, at a given moment, rushed too far to the left or to the right and who subsequently took to the road of coming to terms with the ruling bureaucracy. But the situation today is characterized by the fact that this conciliation, which appeared so final, has begun to crack and to explode, and in an extremely acute form at that. The tremendous symptomatic significance of the expulsion of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Uglanov, and the others originates in the fact that in the new clashes at the "top" are reflected profound currents among the masses.

What were the political premises for the capitulations in the 1929-30 period? They were the bureaucratic turn in direction to the left, the successes of industrialization, the quick growth of collectivization. The five-year plan absorbed the attention of the working masses. A great perspective was opened up.
The workers were reconciled to the loss of political independence in expectation of near and decisive socialist successes. The peasant poor awaited a change in their future from the collectives. The standard of living of the lowest layers of the peasantry rose higher, although, it is true, to a considerable extent at the expense of the basic capital of agriculture. Such were the economic prerequisites and the political atmosphere producing the epidemic of capitulation.

The growth of economic disproportions, the worsening of the conditions of the masses, the growth of dissatisfaction among the workers and the peasants, the confusion in the apparatus itself—these are the prerequisites for the revival of each and every kind of opposition. The sharpness of the contradictions and the intensity of the alarm in the party more and more drive the moderate, cautious, and always-ready-for-compromise party "liberals" onto the road of protest. The bureaucracy, caught in a blind alley, immediately replies with repression, in a large measure as a preventive.

We do not as yet hear the voice of the Left Opposition in the open. Little wonder: the bourgeois papers that tell of the rewards presumably in store for Rykov and Bukharin at the same time report "new mass arrests among the Trotskyists." The Left Opposition in the USSR has been subjected in the course of a number of years to such fearful police persecution, its cadres have been placed in such exceptional conditions, that it is infinitely more difficult for it than for the legal "liberals" to openly formulate its opposition and to intervene organizationally in the developing events. In connection with this, the history of bourgeois revolutions informs us that the liberals in their struggle against autocracy, taking advantage of their legal prerogatives, were the first ones out in the name of the "people"; only the struggle between the liberal bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy cleared the way for the petty-bourgeois democracy and the proletariat. This of course is only a historical analogy but we think that it does elucidate the problem.

The resolution of the September CEC plenum suddenly out of the blue boasts that "having crushed counterrevolutionary Trotskyism, having exposed the anti-Leninist kulak essence of the Right opportunists, the party . . . has attained at the present time decisive successes. . . ." It can be expected that in the very near future it will be clear that the Left and Right Opposition are neither crushed nor annihilated but, on the contrary, are the only actual political currents in existence. It was
precisely the official policies of the last three or four years that prepared the conditions for the new upsurge of the Right-Thermidoran tendencies. The attempt of the Stalinists to dump the Left and the Right into a single pile is facilitated to some extent by the fact that today both the Left and the Right speak of a retreat. This is unavoidable: the urgent need for a regulated retreat from the line of adventuristic leaps has become the overriding task of the proletarian state. The centrist bureaucrats themselves dream of nothing else but the possibility of an orderly retreat, without losing face completely, yet they cannot help but realize that a retrenchment in the face of the shortage of food and all other goods may be their undoing. For this reason they retreat by stealth while they accuse the opposition of tendencies toward retreat.

The real political danger comes from the fact that the right-wingers are a faction for permanent retreat and that they have now been given the opportunity to claim: "We have always demanded this." The oppressive atmosphere in which the party lives does not allow the workers to understand at once the dialectics of the economic processes, and to correctly evaluate the limited, temporary, and conjunctural "correctness" on the one hand and the fundamental falsity on the other of the position of the Right.

All the more important, therefore, is the clear, independent farseeing policy of the Bolshevik-Leninists. Follow carefully all the processes in the country and within the party! Evaluate correctly the different groupings according to their ideas and their social ties! Do not become frightened by isolated tactical coincidence with the Right! Do not forget, because of tactical coincidence, the antagonism of the strategic lines!

Political differentiation in the Soviet proletariat will occur on the following questions: How to retreat? What are the limits of the retreat? When and how to proceed to a new offensive? What should be the tempos of the offensive? All these questions, very important in themselves, on their own do not suffice. We are not building policies for one country. The fate of the Soviet Union will be resolved in indissoluble connection with world development. It is necessary to place again before the Russian workers the problems of world communism in their full scope.

Only the independent emergence of the Left Opposition and the unification of the basic proletarian kernel under its banner can resurrect the party, the workers' state, and the Communist International.
ON FIELD AND WEISBORD

October 20, 1932

To the National Committee, Communist League of America

Dear Comrades:

I am replying herewith to your letter of October 7 concerning the question of Field.

1. It appears that you give the Field question a certain connection with the Weisbord question. I will therefore begin with the latter.

The Weisbord group addressed itself formally to the International Secretariat, with the request for its intervention. Weisbord, on his own initiative, came to me. The International Secretariat asked for my opinion in regard to this question and I had no formal possibility of withholding such an expression of opinion and could see no political reason for doing so. Naturally I held it to be my duty, in this especially delicate case, to do everything possible to strengthen the position and the authority of the League as against the Weisbord group. Since then I see no grounds to regret anything that was done in Prinkipo. The Weisbord group had to recognize the erroneousness of its own position on the most important questions as against the League. This is a considerable political gain. Moreover, your reply to the Weisbord statement can only strengthen your position and authority. I noticed that already, for example, with Comrade Field; he recognized that your reply was tactful and correct. Over what can you then complain in this case?

2. The case of Field is an entirely different one—simpler and more complicated. Simpler because this is a case of a single comrade; more complicated because our practical objectives appear not to harmonize entirely.

After conversations with Comrade Glotzer; after articles bearing upon this in The Militant, and after personal conversations with Comrade Field, I have received the following specific impression: the collaboration of Comrade Field in the League is not made more difficult or impossible because you look upon him as a somewhat politically or morally unworthy person or as an alien type, but rather because Field, who
during his past has not yet developed the capacity for a leading role in a revolutionary organization, nevertheless is pushed onto that road because of his intellectual qualities. This contradiction, which in general does not happen so seldom, can be overcome in a big organization. But as the League remains yet a small pioneer organization, it thereby feels itself compelled to take sharper measures to protect its own existence. This is about the way the case appears to me.

On the other hand, it seems to me that Comrade Field can be of considerable service to the Left Opposition as a whole because of his expertise in economic and statistical data. We need someone who follows the facts of the world economy thoroughly from day to day and who is in a position to render an account of these facts to himself and to others. I have already for some period of time looked around for such an economic expert in the Left Opposition. But without result. I hardly believe we can find another with the qualifications of Field.

I have of course taken into account the importance of the fact that Comrade Field is expelled from the New York branch. But such a formal act as the expulsion not only must be judged formally but also politically. One can expel someone because he is a spy, another because he is totally corrupted, a third because he represents a principled enemy tendency. But someone can also be expelled even though he is honest and fully worthy, because under the existing conditions he disturbs the unity of the organization and threatens its ability to act. In this latter case (and that is the case of Field) it would perhaps have been better from the very beginning to call upon the assistance of the international organization in order to neutralize such a comrade as far as the national organization is concerned and nevertheless to not lose him. This is not a complaint but rather a proposal for the future.

These are the general considerations from which I have proceeded. The case of Landau, Gorkin, etc., which you cite and utilize with great polemical skill (which I personally enjoyed), is not comparable to this case. Landau was not expelled; he attempted to expel the majority of his own organization. When this was objected to, he constituted his own faction. Two rival "Left Oppositions" struggled for the affiliated membership. In this case, to accept Landau would mean to betray our German organization.

Gorkin left the Left Opposition in order to engage in an aggressive collaboration with the most suspicious political orga-
On Field and Weisbord

Organizations; also with the Right Opposition. According to the charges of the Spanish comrades, Gorkin also engaged in personal dirty deals (money questions).

The Weisbord group can in a certain sense be considered a rival organization. Comrade Field is not at all a rival. Also Comrade Field did not establish connections with the Musteites or the Lovestoneites against the League. This really is a big difference. That he went over the heads of the League leadership is, from an organizational standpoint, not correct. That he went to Europe, seeking the way to the Left Opposition, does not speak against Field but for him. This proved that he meant it seriously.

All this induced me, after quite serious consideration, to send the contributions by Field on America to the sections as material for discussion. His contributions contain important thoughts and proposals and deserve to be read and discussed. And even if it should come to an international decision in the case of Field, these contributions could nevertheless serve as important material for the information of the sections.

The fact that the article of Comrade Field appeared in the Opposition press without a previous agreement with you was really not correct. For this I will assume the major responsibility and I am ready, if you consider it useful, to submit a corresponding apology to all of the sections.

I maintain however that the question of Field must be decided individually, not only from the standpoint of the organizational conflict in New York, but also from the standpoint of the international organization.

I will be very thankful if you will translate this letter into English and make it available for all the members of your leadership.

With the best and most friendly greetings and wishes.

Yours,

L. Trotsky

[Excerpt from a letter to the National Committee, CLA, October 22, 1932]

It appears that you were not sent a copy of my reply to Comrade Weisbord [October 13]. I wrote this reply before I had the opportunity to become acquainted with your comprehensive reply to the Weisbord group. You will notice, however, that our parallel actions quite well supplement each other. I am sure that we can also find a good basis of agreement in the case of Field.
October 22, 1932

The successes of the first two years of the five-year plan demonstrated to the bourgeoisie of the entire world that the proletarian revolution was a much more serious business than was apparent in the beginning. The interest in the Soviet "experiment" grew apace. Conspicuous groups of eminent bourgeois publications in many countries began printing comparatively objective economic information.

At the same time the international Communist press played up the most optimistic estimates of the Soviet press, exaggerating them crudely, presumably in the interests of propaganda, and transforming them into an economic legend.

Petty-bourgeois democrats, who were not at all in a hurry to form an opinion about so complex a fact as the October Revolution, welcomed with glee the possibility of discovering support for their belated sympathies in the statistics of the five-year plan. Magnanimously, at last, they "recognized" the Soviet republic in reward for its economic and cultural attainments. This act of moral heroism provided many of them with an opportunity to take an interesting trip at reduced rates.

It is infinitely more deserving, indeed, to defend the socialist construction of the first workers' state than to sustain the pretensions of Wall Street or of the City. But one can take as little stock in the lukewarm sympathies of this gentry toward the Soviet government as in the antipathies of the Amsterdam congress toward militarism.

People after the type of the Webbs (and they are not the worst of this lot) are, naturally, not at all inclined to break their heads over the contradictions of the Soviet economy. Without in any manner committing themselves, they strive chiefly to utilize the conquests of the Soviets in order thus to shame or arouse the ruling circles of their country. A foreign revolution serves them as a subordinate weapon for their reformism. For this purpose, as well as for their personal peace of mind, "the friends of the USSR," together with the international Communist bureaucracy, require a picture of successes in the USSR as simple, as harmonious, and as comforting as possible. Whoever disturbs this picture is nothing but an enemy and a counterrevolutionist.
A crude and detrimental idealization of the transitional regime has particularly entrenched itself in the international Communist press during the last two years, that is, during that period in which the contradictions and disproportions of the Soviet economy have already found their way into the pages of the official Soviet press.

There is nothing so precarious as sympathies that are based on legends and fiction. There is no depending on people who require fabrications for their sympathies. The impending crisis of the Soviet economy will inevitably, and within the rather near future, dissolve the sugary legend, and, we have no reason to doubt, will scatter many philistine friends into the bypaths of indifference, if not enmity.

What is much worse and much more serious is that the Soviet crisis will catch the European workers, and chiefly the Communists, utterly unprepared, and leave them receptive to Social Democratic criticism, which is absolutely inimical to the Soviets and to socialism.

In this question, as in all others, the proletarian revolution requires the truth, and only the truth. Within the scope of this brief pamphlet, I have deemed it necessary to present in all their acuteness the contradictions of the Soviet economy, the incompleteness and the precariousness of many of its conquests, the gross errors of the leadership, and the dangers that stand in the path of socialism. Let our petty-bourgeois friends lavishly apply their pink and baby-blue colorations. We deem it more correct to mark with a heavy black line the weak and indefensible points where the enemy threatens to break through. The clamor about our enmity to the Soviet Union is so absurd as to bear within itself its own antidote. The very near future will bring with it a new confirmation of our correctness. The Left Opposition teaches the workers to foresee dangers and not to lose themselves when they impend.

One who accepts the proletarian revolution only when it is accompanied by all conveniences and lifelong guarantees cannot continue on the road with us. We accept the workers' state as it is and we assert, "This is our state." Despite its heritage of backwardness, despite starvation and sluggishness, despite the bureaucratic mistakes and even abominations, the workers of the entire world must defend tooth and nail their future socialist fatherland which this state represents.

First and foremost we serve the Soviet republic in that we tell the workers the truth about it and thereby teach them to lay the road for a better future.
The Art of Planning

The prerequisites for socialist planning were first provided by the October overturn and by the fundamental laws of the Soviet state. In the course of a number of years state institutions for centralized management of the economy were created and put into operation. Great creative work was performed. What was destroyed by the imperialist war and the civil war has been reestablished. Grandiose enterprises have been created, new industries, entire branches of industry. The capacity of the proletariat organized into a state to direct the economy by new methods and to create material values in tempos previously unheard-of has been demonstrated in life. All this has been achieved against the background of decaying world capitalism. Socialism, as a system, for the first time demonstrated its title to historic victory, not on the pages of Capital, but by the praxis of hydroelectric plants and blast furnaces. Marx, it goes without saying, would have preferred this method of demonstration.

However, light-minded assertions to the effect that the USSR has already entered into socialism are criminal. The achievements are great. But there still remains a very long and arduous road to actual victory over economic anarchy, to the surmounting of disproportions, to the guarantee of the harmonious character of economic life.

Even though the first five-year plan took into consideration all possible aspects, by the very nature of things it could not be anything but a first and rough hypothesis, destined beforehand to fundamental reconstruction in the process of the work. It is impossible to create a priori a complete system of economic harmony. The planning hypothesis could not but include old disproportions and the inevitability of the development of new ones. Centralized management implies not only great advantages but also the danger of centralizing mistakes, that is, of elevating them to an excessively high degree. Only continuous regulation of the plan in the process of its fulfillment, its reconstruction in part and as a whole, can guarantee its economic effectiveness.

The art of socialist planning does not drop from heaven nor is it presented full-blown into one's hands with the conquest of power. This art may be mastered only by struggle, step by step, not by a few but by millions, as a component part of the new economy and culture. There is nothing either astonishing or disheartening in the fact that at the fifteenth
anniversary of the October Revolution the art of economic management still remains on a very low plane. The newspaper *Za Industrializatsiui* ([For the Industrialization]) deemed it possible to announce: "Our operative planning has neither hands nor feet" (September 12, 1932). And right now the crux of the matter is precisely in operative planning.

We have stressed more than once that "under incorrect planning or, what is more important, under incorrect regulation of the plan in the process of its fulfillment, a crisis may develop toward the very end of the five-year plan and may create insurmountable difficulties for the utilization and development of its indubitable successes" ("New Zigzags and New Dangers," July 15, 1931, *Biulleten Oppozitsii*, number 23). It is precisely for this reason that we considered that the hastily and purely fortuitous "transformation of the five-year plan into a four-year plan was an act of the most light-minded adventurism" (ibid.). Both our fears and our warnings have been unfortunately fully confirmed.

**The Preliminary Totals of the Five-Year Plan**

At the present moment there cannot even be a discussion about the actual completion of the five-year plan in four years (or more exactly, four years and three months). The most frantic lashing and spurring ahead in the course of the final two months will no longer have any effect on the general totals. It is as yet impossible to determine the actual percentage—that is, measured in terms of the economy—of the fulfillment of the preliminary program. The character of the data published in the press is more statistically formal than economically exact. Should the construction of a new plant be accomplished up to 90 percent of its completion and then the work be stopped because of the obvious lack of raw material, from a formal statistical viewpoint one may describe the plan as fulfilled 90 percent. But from the point of view of the economy the expenses accrued must simply be entered under the loss column. The balance sheet of the actual effectiveness (the useful functioning) of plants constructed or in the process of construction, from the viewpoint of the national economic balance, still belongs entirely to the future. But the results obtained, no matter how imposing if taken by themselves—even if considered from the bare quantitative viewpoint—are far short of those sketched in the plan.

The output of coal is maintained at present on the level of last year; therefore it has far from reached the plan figures
set for the third year of the five-year plan. "The Donbas lags behind at the tail end of the most backward branches of Soviet industry," complains Pravda. "The tension in the fuel balance is on the increase," echoes ZI (October 8, 1932).

In 1931 there were produced 4.9 million tons of cast iron instead of 7.9 million set by the plan; 5.3 million tons of steel instead of 8.8 million; and finally 4 million tons of rolled steel instead of 6.7 million. In comparison with 1930 this signifies a falling off in cast iron of 2 percent; in steel of 6 percent; in rolled steel of 10 percent.

For nine months of 1932 there were produced 4.5 million tons of cast iron, 4.1 million tons of steel, 3.5 million tons of rolled stock. Alongside of the considerable rise in the output of iron (new blast furnaces!) the production of steel and rolled steel in the current year remains approximately on the level of last year. From the viewpoint of the general tasks of the industrialization what decides, of course, is not the raw iron but the rolled stock and steel.

**Quantity and Quality**

Side by side with these quantitative results, which Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn (EZ) [Economic Life] characterizes as "shocking lapses," there is to be placed an extremely unfavorable and, because of its consequences, much more dangerous decline in quality. Following the special economic press, Pravda openly confesses that in heavy metallurgy "the situation as regards the indices of quality is impermissible." "The defective products eat up the steel that is up to quality." "The technical coefficients in the use of the equipment are taking a sharp turn for the worse." "The cost of production of commodities is rising sharply." Two figures will suffice: in 1931 a ton of iron cost 35 rubles; in the first half of the current year the cost came to 60 rubles.

In 1929-30, 47 thousand tons of copper were smelted; in 1931, 48 thousand tons, one-third of the amount set by the plan. For the current year the plan has been lowered to 90 thousand tons but for the first eight months less than 30 thousand tons have been smelted. What this means in the manufacture of machines in general, and of electro-technical equipment in particular, requires no commentaries.

In the sphere of electrification, with all its successes, there is considerable lagging behind; the power plants in August delivered 71 percent of the energy they were supposed to develop. ZI writes about "the inept, illiterate and uncultured
exploitation of the constructed power stations." Great difficulties are being threatened in the winter in the sphere of power production. They have already begun in the Moscow and Lenin-grad regions.

Light industry, which lagged excessively behind the plan last year, showed a rise in the first half of the current year of 16 percent, but in the third quarter it fell below the figures of last year. The industry providing foodstuffs occupies last place. The supplementary production of products by the plants of heavy industries compose for the eight months only 35 percent of the yearly goal. It is not possible at present to estimate what part of this mass of commodities that are hurriedly improvised really meets the requirements of the market.

The factories are supplied with coal and raw material by means of bursts of telegram lightning. Industry, as EZ puts it, "sits on lightning." But even bolts of lightning cannot deliver what does not exist.

Coal, hastily mined and poorly sorted, hampers the operation of coke-producing enterprises. Excessively high contents of moisture and cinders in the coke not only reduce the quantity of produced metal by millions of tons but also lower its quality. Machines of poor metal produce inferior products, result in breakdowns, force inactivity upon the workers, and deteriorate rapidly.

In the Urals, the paper informs us, "the blast furnaces are in trouble; because of inadequate supply of fuel they are allowed to cool down from three to twenty days. Here is a fact illuminating to the highest degree: the metallurgical plants in the Urals had their own horse convoys for the transportation of fuel; in February of this year the horses numbered 27 thousand, the number fell in July to 14 thousand, and in September to 4 thousand. The reason for this is lack of fodder.

Pravda characterizes in the following manner the condition of the Stalingrad tractor factory in which the quantity of annual castings fell from 250 to 140 thousand tons. "The equipment, because of the absence of rudimentary and constant technical supervision ... has excessively deteriorated." "Defective products have become as high as 35 percent." "The entire mechanism of the plant is wallowing in dirt." "In the foundries there is never a thought of the next day." "Methods of handicraft are swamping continuous-belt production."

Why is production lowered in light metallurgy in the face of colossal investments? Because, replies Pravda, "the separate
branches of a single combine are not coordinated with one another according to their capacity." Yet the task of coordinating branches has been solved by capitalist technology. And how much more complex and difficult is the question of the intercoordination of independent enterprises and entire branches of industry!

"The cement factory in Podolsk is in dangerous straits," writes ZI. "In the first half-year the production program was fulfilled approximately 60 percent, in the last months the fulfillment dropped to 40 percent . . . . The basic costs are twice as high as those set by the plan." The characteristics cited above apply in various degrees to all of present industry.

The administrative hue and cry for quantity leads to a frightful lowering of quality; low quality undermines at the next stage the struggle for quantity; the ultimate cost of economically irrational "successes" surpasses as a rule many times the value of these same successes. Every advanced worker is acquainted with this dialectic, not through the books of the Communist academy (alas! more inferior goods), but in practice, through experience in their own mines, factories, railroads, fuel stations, etc.

The consequences of this frenzied chase have entirely permeated the sphere of education. Pravda is compelled to admit that "by lowering the quality of preparation, by skipping scientific subjects, or by passing over them at 'cavalry trot,' the VTUZI [highest technological educational institutions] that took this path instead of aiding industry, injured it." But who is responsible for the "cavalry trot" in the highest educational institutions?

If we were to introduce a corrective coefficient for quality into the official data, then the indices of the fulfillment of the plan would immediately suffer substantial drops. Even Kuibyshev\textsuperscript{283} was forced to admit this more than a year ago. "The figures relating to the tremendous growth of industry become relative," he announced cautiously at a session of the Supreme Council of National Economy, "when one takes into account the variations in quality." Rakovsky expressed himself much more lucidly: "If one does not take into account the quality of production then the quantitative indices represent in themselves a statistical fiction."

**Capital Construction**

More than two years ago Rakovsky warned that the scope of the plan was beyond the available resources. "Neither the scale of the growth of production specified by the plan," he
wrote, "nor the specified plan of capital construction were prepared for... The entire preceding policy in the sphere of industry reduced itself in reality to the forced exploitation of old fixed capital... without the slightest concern for the future.

The attempt to compensate for lags by a single leap ahead is least realistic in the sphere of capital construction. The resources necessary for the fulfillment of the plan "do not obtain in the country and will not obtain in the nearest future." Hence the warning: "The plan of capital construction will break down to a considerable degree."

And this prediction also has been completely substantiated. In the sphere of construction the lag was extremely great as early as 1931. It has grown still more in the current year. The transport construction program for nine months was fulfilled 38 percent according to the estimates of the department itself. In other branches the matters relating to construction are as a general rule even less favorable; and worst of all is the sphere of housing construction. The material and monetary resources are divided between altogether too many constructions, which leads to the low effectiveness of the investment.

Sixty-five million rubles were expended on the Balkhashsky copper factory. The expenses continue to grow from day to day—in effect, for nothing; in order to continue work it was necessary to transport in the course of a year 300 thousand tons of freight, whereas available transportation can carry all told only 20 thousand tons. Examples of a similar kind, though not so obvious, are too many.

The poor quality of materials and of equipment react most cruelly on capital construction. "Iron for roofing is of such rotten quality," writes Pravda, "that it cracks when once handled."

The shocking backlog in the sphere of capital undertakings automatically undermines the foundations of the second five-year plan.

**Domestic Disproportions and the World Market**

The problem of the proportionality of the elements of production and the branches of the economy constitutes the very heart of socialist economy. The tortuous roads that lead to the solution of this problem are not charted on any map. To discover them, or more correctly to lay them, is the work of a lengthy and arduous future.

All of industry groans from the lack of spare parts. Weavers'
looms remain inactive because a bolt is not to be had. "The assortment of articles produced," writes EZ, "in the line of commodities of widespread consumption is haphazard and does not correspond to . . . the demand."

"One billion rubles have been immobilized, 'frozen' by [heavy] industry, in the course of only the first half of 1932, in the form of stocks of materials, unfinished products, and even finished goods in factory warehouses" (ZI, September 12, 1932). Such are the expressions in terms of money of certain disproportions and discordances according to the official estimate.

Major and minor disproportions make it necessary to turn to the international market. Imported goods to the value of one chervonets [gold monetary unit] can bring domestic production out of its moribund state to the value of hundreds and thousands of chervontsi. The general growth of the economy, on the one hand, and the sprouting up of new demands and new disproportions, on the other, invariably increase the need to link up with the world economy. The program of "independence," that is, of the self-sufficient character of the Soviet economy, discloses more and more its reactionary and utopian character. Autarchy is the ideal of Hitler, not of Marx and Lenin.

Thus the import of ore from the inception of the five-year plan multiplied five times in volume and four times in value. If within the current year this article of import fell off, it was exclusively on account of foreign exchange. But on this account the import of factory machinery grew excessively.

Kaganovich in a speech on October 8 asserted that the Opposition, Left as well as Right, "proposes to us that we strengthen our dependence upon the capitalist world." As if the matter concerned some artificial and arbitrary step, and not the automatic logic of economic growth!

At the same time the Soviet press cites with praise the interview given by Sokolnikov on the eve of his departure from London. "In England there is increasingly spreading the recognition of the fact that the advanced position of the Soviet state in industry and technology will present in itself a much wider market for the products of British industry." As a sign of the economic progress of the Soviet Union, Sokolnikov considers not the weakening but the strengthening of ties with the foreign market, and consequently the strengthening of dependence upon world economy. Is it possible that the former Oppositionist Sokolnikov is trading in "Trotskyist contraband"? But if so, why is he being featured by the official press?
Stalin's speech with its salutary "six conditions" was directed against the low quality of production, the high basic cost, the migration of the labor force, the high percentage of waste, etc. From that time on there has not appeared one article without reference to "the historic speech." And in the meantime all these ills which were to be cured by the six conditions have become aggravated and have assumed a more malignant character.

The Position of the Workers

From day to day the official press bears witness to the downfall of Stalin's prescription. In explanation of the falling-off in production Pravda points to "the decrease in labor power at factories, the growing migration, the weakening of labor discipline" (September 23). In the category of reasons for the extremely low productivity of the Red Ural combine ZI, alongside of "the shocking disproportions between the different parts of the combine," lists the following: (1) "the enormous migration of the labor force"; (2) "the muddleheaded policy of the workers' wage"; (3) "failure to provide [the millworkers] with some manner of livable quarters"; (4) "indescribable food for the millworkers"; (5) "the catastrophic falling-off of labor discipline." We have quoted word for word. As regards the migration, which "has grown beyond all bounds," this paper writes, "the living conditions [of the workers] are ghastly in all the enterprises of nonferrous metallurgy without exception."

In the locomotive factories, which failed to provide the country with about 250 locomotives for the first three-quarters of the year, "there is to be observed an acute shortage of qualified workers. More than two thousand workers in the course of the summer left from the single Kolomensk factory." The reasons? "Bad living conditions." In the Sormovsk factory, "the factory kitchen is a dive of the worst sort" (ZI, September 28). In the privileged tractor factory in Stalingrad, "the factory kitchen has fallen sharply in its work" (Pravda, September 21). To what a pitch the dissatisfaction of the workers must have risen in order to force these facts in the columns of the Stalinist press!

In the textile industry, naturally, conditions are not better. "In the Ivanovsk district alone," EZ informs us, "about thirty-five thousand qualified weavers left the shops." According to the words of this same paper, there are to be found shops in the country in which more than 60 percent of the total force changes every month. "The factory is turning into a thoroughfare."
In explanation of the cruel flop of "the six conditions" there was a tendency for a long time to confine the observations to bald accusations against the management and the workers themselves: "incapacity," "lack of willingness," "resting on their laurels," etc. However, for the last few months the papers more and more often point out, mostly on the sly, the actual core of the evil, the unbearable living conditions of the workers.

Rakovsky pointed out this reason of reasons more than two years ago. "The reason for the increase in breakdowns, the reason for the fall in labor discipline, the reason for the need to increase the number of workers," he wrote, "lies in the fact that the worker is physically incapable of bearing up under a load that overtaxes his strength."

But why are the living conditions bad? In explanation the papers refer to "the contemptuous [!] attitude to the questions relating to the living conditions of the workers and to providing them with the necessities of life" (ZI, September 24). With this single phrase the Stalinist press has said more than it had intended. A "contemptuous attitude" to the needs of the workers in the workers' state is possible only on the part of an arrogant and uncontrolled bureaucracy.

This risky explanation was made necessary, no doubt, in order to hide the basic fact: the lack of material goods to supply the workers. The national income is incorrectly distributed. Economic tasks are being set without any account being taken of the actual means. An increasingly inhuman load is being dumped on the shoulders of the workers.

References to "breaks" in the supply of foodstuffs are now to be met with in every issue of the Soviet press. Malnutrition plus forced exertions—the combination of these two conditions is enough to do away with the equipment and to exhaust the workers themselves. In consolation, Pravda prints a photograph of a working woman in the act of feeding "her own private" pig. That is precisely the way out. "Private domestic economy," lectures the paper (October 3), "hitherto tied the worker to capitalism, but now it attaches him to the Soviet system." One cannot believe one's eyes! Once upon a time we learned that private domestic economy depends upon the enslavement of the woman, the most abominable element of social slavery in general. But now it appears that its "own private" pig attaches the proletariat to socialism. Thus the hypocritical functionaries turn cruel necessity into virtue.

Poor nutrition and nervous fatigue engender an apathy to the surrounding environment. As a result, not only the old
factories, but also the new ones that have been built according to the last word in technology fall quickly into a moribund state. *Pravda* itself issues the following challenge: "Try and find at least one blast furnace that is not wallowing in rubbish!"

As touches on the conditions of morale, they are no better than the physical conditions. "The management of the factory has cut itself away from the masses" (*Pravda*). Instead of a sensitive approach to the workers, "barefaced bulldozing and domineering prevail." In every individual instance the matter touches isolated factories. *Pravda* cannot guess that the sum of the individual cases constitutes the Stalinist regime.

In the entire nonferrous metal industry "there is not a single factory committee that functions more or less satisfactorily" (*ZI*, September 13). However, how and why is it that in a workers' state the factory committees—of the entire industry and not only in the branch of nonferrous metals—function unsatisfactorily? Is it not, perhaps, because they are strangled by the party bureaucracy?

At the Djerzhinsky locomotive plant, during a single session of the central bureau of the blacksmiths, there were taken up simultaneously eighteen cases of expulsions from the party; in the wheelwrights—nine cases; in the boilermakers—twelve cases. The matter is not restricted to an isolated factory. Commandeering reigns everywhere. And the sole answer of the bureaucracy to the initiative and criticism from below is—repression.

The draft platform [April 1931] of the International Left Opposition proclaims: "The living standards of the workers and their role in the state are the highest criteria of socialist successes." "If the Stalinist bureaucracy would approach the tasks of planning and of a living regulation of the economy from this standpoint," we wrote more than a year ago, "it would not misfire so wildly every time, it would not be compelled to conduct a policy of wasteful zigzags, and it would not be confronted by political dangers" ("New Zigzags and New Dangers").

**The Agricultural Economy**

"The agricultural economy of the Soviet Union," wrote *Pravda* on September 28, "has become absolutely entrenched on the road to socialism." Such phrases, bolstered as a rule by bare citations of the number of collectivized homesteads and acres, represent in themselves a hollow mockery of the actual condition of agriculture and of the interrelations between the city and the village.
The headlong race to break records in collectivization, without taking into account the economic and cultural potentialities of agriculture, has led in fact to ruinous consequences. It destroyed the incentive of the small commodity producer long before it was able to replace it by other and much higher economic incentives. Administrative pressure, which exhausts itself quickly in industry, is absolutely powerless in the sphere of agriculture.

"The village of Caucasus," we are informed by this same Pravda, "was awarded the prize for its spring sowing campaign. At the same time, the tillage turned out to be so poor that the fields were entirely overgrown by weeds." The village of Caucasus is a symbol of the administrative hullabaloo for quantity in the domain of agriculture. One hundred percent collectivization has resulted in 100 percent overgrowth of weeds on the fields.

The collective farms were allotted more than 100 thousand tractors. A gigantic victory! But as innumerable local newspaper reports show, the effectiveness of the tractors far from corresponds to their number. At the Poltava machine-building station, one of the newest, "out of twenty-seven tractors recently delivered, nineteen are already seriously damaged." These figures do not apply only to exceptional cases. The station on the Volga Ukraine has fifty-two tractors; of these, two have been out of operation since spring, fourteen were being completely overhauled, and of the remaining thirty-six, less than half are being utilized in sowing, "and even these remain alternately idle." The coefficient of the useful functioning of the 100 thousand tractors has not been determined as yet!

During the dizziest moment of 100 percent collectivization, Rakovsky made a stern diagnosis: "In the sum total of the results which have been prepared for by the entire preceding policies and which have been aggravated by the period of ultraleft adventurism, the chief result will be the lowering of the productive forces of the rural economy, indubitably evident in the sphere of stock-raising and in part of the cultivation devoted to raising technical raw material, and becoming increasingly evident in the sphere of grain cultivation."

Was Rakovsky mistaken? Unfortunately, no. Nothing can produce so shocking an impression as the small, quite imperceptible decree issued by the CEC on September 11, 1932, which met with no comments in the Soviet press. Under the signature of Kalinin and Molotov, the individual peasant proprietors are compelled to relinquish, for the needs of the col-
lective farms and at their request, all horses at a set price. The collective farms are in turn obliged to return the horses to their owners in "good condition."

Such is the interrelation between the socialist and petty-bourgeois sections of the rural economy! The collective farms, which cultivate 80-90 percent of the arable lands and which should, in theory, attract the individualists by their achievements, are actually compelled to resort to the legal intervention of the state in order to obtain from individual owners by compulsion the horses for their own needs. Everything here is topsy-turvy. This single decree of September 11 represents a condemnation of the policies of Stalin-Molotov.

The Problem of Establishing the Link

Could the interrelations between the city and the village be improved on a material productive basis?

Let us recall once again: The economic foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be considered fully assured only from that moment when the state is not forced to resort to administrative measures of compulsion against the majority of the peasantry in order to obtain agricultural products; that is, when in return for machines, tools, and objects for personal use, the peasants voluntarily supply the state with the necessary quantity of grain and raw material. Only on this basis—along with other necessary conditions, nationally and internationally—can collectivization acquire a true socialist character.

The correlation between the prices for industrial products and agricultural products has undoubtedly changed in favor of the peasant. Actually it is an impossible task to perform an accounting in this sphere that corresponds to reality. For instance, Pravda writes that "the cost of a quintal of milk ranges in the collective farms from 43 to 206 rubles." The variation is even greater between state prices and the price on the legalized markets. No less heterogeneous are the prices for industrial products, which all depend on the channel through which they reach the peasant. But without in any way pretending to be exact, it is possible to assert that the price-scissors, in the narrow meaning of the term, have been closed by the peasants. For its own products, the village has begun to obtain such a quantity of monetary equivalents as would assure it industrial goods at fixed state prices—if such goods existed.

But one of the most important disproportions arises from
the fact that the availability of commodities does not correspond to the availability of money. In the language of monetary circulation, that is what is called inflation. In the language of planned economy this means exaggerated plans, incorrect division of forces and means, in particular between the production of objects for consumption and the production of means of production.

At the time that the correlation of prices began to turn against the city, the latter safeguarded itself by "freezing" the goods, that is, they were simply not put into circulation, but kept on hand to be distributed bureaucratically. This signified that only the pecuniary shadow of the scissors had closed its blades, while its material disproportion still remained. But the peasant is little interested in shadows. The absence of commodities has pushed him and continues to push him in the direction of a strike: he does not want to part with his grain for money.

Not having become a matter of simple and profitable exchange for both sides, the provision of foodstuffs and agricultural raw material has remained as before "a political campaign," "a militant drive," requiring each time the mobilization of the state and party apparatus. "Many collective farms," Pravda cautiously reports (September 26), "resist the collection of grain, hiding their stocks." We know what the word "many" signifies in such a context. If the exchange between the village and the city were advantageous, then the peasants would have no cause whatever to "hide their stocks"; but if the exchange is not advantageous, that is, if it takes the form of compulsory transfer, then all the collective farmers and not just "many," and the individual farmers as well, will strive to hide their grain. The obligation of the peasants to supply meat products is now officially given the character of a natural tax in kind, with all the repressive consequences that flow from it. The economic results of the 100 percent collectivization are expressed much more correctly by these facts than by the bare statistics of collectivized acres.

The fact that severe laws were passed against stealing socialist property sufficiently characterizes the extent of the evil, the gist of which, in the village, consists in the fact that the peasant strives to direct his grain not into socialist but into capitalist channels. The prices on the speculative market are high enough to justify the use of capital punishment. What part of the foodstuffs is diverted into the channels of speculation?

In the Volga-Caspian fish trust, it is reckoned that 20 percent of the catch goes to the private market. "And how much
really does go?" asks Pravda skeptically. In agriculture the percentage of the drain must be considerably higher. But even 20 percent means hundreds of millions of pounds of bread. Repression may become an inevitable method of self-preservation. But it does not replace the establishment of the link, it does not create the economic foundation for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and it does not even guarantee the provision of food.

The authorities, therefore, could not stop merely at repression alone. In the struggle for grain and raw materials they found themselves compelled to order the city to release industrial products, while in the cities, particularly in the provinces, the state and cooperative stores have become empty.

The balance sheet of "the link" with the village during this year has not as yet been taken. But the trading channels of the cities are exhausted. "We gave more goods to the village," said Kaganovich in Moscow on October 8, "and, if I may use the expression, we have offended the city." The expression is absolutely permissible; the cities and industrial districts, that is the workers, have been offended.*

**Conditions and Methods of Planned Economy**

What are the organs of constructing and applying the plan like? What are the methods of checking and regulating it? What are the conditions for its success?

In this connection three systems must be subjected to a brief analysis: (1) special state departments, that is, the hierarchical system of plan commissions, in the center and locally; (2) trade, as a system of market regulation; (3) Soviet democracy, as a system for the living regulation by the masses of the structure of the economy.

If a universal mind existed, of the kind that projected itself into the scientific fancy of Laplace—a mind that could register simultaneously all the processes of nature and society, that could measure the dynamics of their motion, that could forecast the results of their interreactions—such a mind, of course,

*In 1929 Preobrazhensky, 285 justifying his capitulation, prophesied that with the aid of the state farms and the collective farms the party would force the kulak to his knees within two years. Four years have elapsed. And what have we? If not the kulak—he has been "put out of commission"—then the strong middleman has forced Soviet trade to its knees, compelling it to offend the workers. As we see it, Preobrazhensky himself, in any event, was much too hasty in getting down on his knees before the Stalinist bureaucracy.
could a priori draw up a faultless and exhaustive economic plan, beginning with the number of acres of wheat down to the last button for a vest. The bureaucracy often imagines that just such a mind is at its disposal; that is why it so easily frees itself from the control of the market and of Soviet democracy. But, in reality, the bureaucracy errs frightfully in its estimate of its spiritual resources. In its projections it is necessarily obliged, in actual performance, to depend upon the proportions (and with equal justice one may say the disproportions) it has inherited from capitalist Russia, upon the data of the economic structure of contemporary capitalist nations, and finally upon the experience of successes and mistakes of the Soviet economy itself. But even the most correct combination of all these elements will allow only a most imperfect framework of a plan, not more.

The innumerable living participants in the economy, state and private, collective and individual, must serve notice of their needs and of their relative strength not only through the statistical determinations of plan commissions but by the direct pressure of supply and demand. The plan is checked and, to a considerable degree, realized through the market. The regulation of the market itself must depend upon the tendencies that are brought out through its mechanism. The blueprints produced by the departments must demonstrate their economic efficacy through commercial calculation. The system of the transitional economy is unthinkable without the control of the ruble. This presupposes, in its turn, that the ruble is at par. Without a firm monetary unit, commercial accounting can only increase the chaos.

The processes of economic construction are not yet taking place within a classless society. The questions relating to the allotment of the national income compose the central focus of the plan. It shifts with the direct development of the class struggle and that of social groups, and among them, the various strata of the proletariat itself. These are the most important social and economic questions: the link between the city and the village, that is, the balance between that which industry obtains from agriculture and that which it supplies to it; the interrelation between accumulation and consumption, between the fund for capital construction and the fund for wages; the regulation of wages for various categories of labor (skilled and unskilled workers, government employees, specialists, the managing bureaucracy); and finally the allotment of that share of national income which falls to the village, between the vari-
ous strata of the peasantry. All these questions by their very nature do not allow for a priori decisions by the bureaucracy, which has fenced itself off from intervention by concerned millions.

The struggle between living interests, as the fundamental factor of planning, leads us into the domain of politics, which is concentrated economics. The instruments of the social groups of Soviet society are—should be: the Soviets, the trade unions, the cooperatives, and in first place the ruling party. Only through the interreaction of these three elements, state planning, the market, and Soviet democracy, can the correct direction of the economy of the transitional epoch be attained. Only thus can be assured, not the complete surmounting of contradictions and disproportions within a few years (this is utopian!), but their mitigation, and through that the strengthening of the material bases of the dictatorship of the proletariat until the moment when a new and victorious revolution will widen the arena of socialist planning and will reconstruct the system.

**Suppression of the NEP, Monetary Inflation, and Liquidation of Soviet Democracy**

The need to introduce the NEP, to restore market relationships, was determined first of all by the existence of 25 million independent peasant proprietors. This does not mean, however, that collectivization even in its first stage leads to the liquidation of the market. Collectivization becomes a viable factor only to the extent to which it involves the personal interest of the members of the collective farms, by shaping their mutual relations, and the relations between the collective farms and the outside world, on the basis of commercial calculation. This means that correct and economically sound collectivization at this stage should lead not to the elimination of the NEP but to a gradual reorganization of its methods.

The bureaucracy, however, went the whole way. At first it might have thought that it was taking the road of least resistance. The genuine and unquestionable successes of the centralized efforts of the proletariat were identified by the bureaucracy with the successes of its *a priori* planning. Or to put it differently: it identified the socialist revolution with itself. By administrative collectivization it masked the unsolved problem of establishing a link with the village. Confronting the disproportions of the NEP, it liquidated the NEP. In place of market methods, it enlarged the methods of compulsion.

The stable currency unit, in the form of the chervonets, constituted the most important weapon of the NEP. While in its state
of dizziness, the bureaucracy decided that it was already standing firmly with both feet on the soil of economic harmony, that the successes of today automatically guaranteed the progression of subsequent successes, that the chervonets was not a bridle that checked the scope of the plan but on the contrary provided an independent source of capital funds. Instead of regulating the material elements of the economic process the bureaucracy began to plug up the holes by means of printing presses. In other words, it took to the road of "optimistic" inflation.

After the administrative suppression of the NEP, the celebrated "six conditions of Stalin"—economic accounting, piecework wages, etc.—became transformed into an empty collection of words. Economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations. The chervonets is the yardstick of the link. Of what possible use for the worker can a few extra rubles a month be if he is compelled to purchase the necessities of life in the open market at ten times their former price?

The restoration of open markets came as an admission of the inopportune liquidation of the NEP, but an admission that was empirical, partial, thoughtless, and contradictory. To label the open markets as a form of "Soviet" (socialist?) trade, in contrast to private trade and speculation, is to practice self-deception. Open-market trading even on the part of the collective farm as a whole ends up as speculation on the necessities required in the nearest city, and as a result leads to social differentiation, that is, to the enrichment of the minority of the more fortunately situated collective farms. But the chief place in the open market is occupied not by the collectives but by individual members of the collectives and by the independent peasants. The trading of the members of the collective farms, who sell their surplus at speculative prices, leads to differentiation within the collectives. Thus the open market develops centrifugal forces within the "socialist" village.

By eliminating the market and by installing Asiatic bazaars in its place the bureaucracy has created, to consummate everything, the conditions for the wildest gyration of prices, and consequently has placed a mine both under the plan and under commercial calculation. As a result, economic chaos has been redoubled.

Parallel to this the ossification of the trade unions, the Soviets, and the party, which didn't start yesterday, continues. Coming up against the friction between the city and the village, against the demands from various sections within the peasantry, from the peasantry as a whole, and from the proletariat, the bureau-
cracy more and more resolutely ruled out any demands, protests, and criticism whatsoever. The only prerogative which it ultimately left to the workers was the right to exceed production limits. Any attempt to influence economic management from below is immediately described as a right or a left deviation, that is, practically made a capital offense. The bureaucratic upper crust, in the last analysis, has pronounced itself infallible in the sphere of socialist planning (disregarding the fact that its collaborators and inspirers have turned out often to be criminal plotters and saboteurs). Thus the basic mechanism of socialist construction—the adaptable and elastic system of Soviet democracy—was liquidated. Face to face with the economic reality and its difficulties, the bureaucracy turned out to be armed only with the twisted and collapsed carcass of the plan, with its own administrative will also considerably deflated.

**The Crisis of the Soviet Economy**

Had the general economic level set by the first five-year plan been realized only 50 percent, this in itself could have given no cause as yet for alarm. The danger lies not in the slowdown of growth, but in the growing disparity between the various branches of the economy. Even if all the integral elements of the plan had been fully coordinated a priori, the lowering of the coefficient of growth by 50 percent would have in itself engendered great difficulties because of the consequences: it is one thing to produce one million pairs of shoes instead of two million, but it is quite another thing to finish building one-half of a shoe factory. But reality is much more complex and contradictory than our hypothetical example. Disproportions are inherited from the past. Targets which are set by plan include in themselves inevitable mistakes and miscalculations. The nonfulfillment of the plan does not occur proportionately, due to the particular causes in each individual instance. The average growth of 50 percent in the economy may mean that in sphere A the plan is filled 90 percent, whereas in sphere B, only 10 percent; if A depends on B, then in the subsequent cycle of production, branch A may be reduced below 10 percent.

Consequently the misfortune does not lie in the fact that the impossibility of adventurist tempos has been revealed. The whole trouble is that the wild leaps in industrialization have brought the various elements of the plan into contradiction with each other. The trouble is that the economy functions without material reserves and without calculation. The trouble is that the social and political instruments for the de-
termination of the effectiveness of the plan have been broken or mangled. The trouble is that the accrued disproportions threaten more and greater surprises. The trouble is that the uncontrolled bureaucracy has tied up its prestige with the subsequent accumulation of errors. The trouble is that a crisis is impending with a chain of consequences such as the enforced shutting down of factories and unemployment.

The difference between socialist and capitalist tempos of industrial development—even if one takes for comparison capitalism in its progressive stage—astonishes one by its sweep. But it would be a mistake to consider the Soviet tempos of the last few years as final. The average coefficient of capitalist growth results not only from periods of expansion but also of crisis. This has not been the case with the Soviet economy. In the course of the last eight to nine years it has experienced a period of uninterrupted growth; it has not yet succeeded in working out its average indices.

Of course we shall be told in refutation that we are transferring the laws of capitalism to the socialist economy, that a planned economy does not require regulation by means of crises or even by means of predetermined lowering of tempos. The repertory of proofs at the disposal of the Stalinist bureaucracy and its theoreticians is so restricted that it is always possible to forecast beforehand the particular generalization they will resort to. In this case, a pure tautology: we have entered socialism and therefore we must always act "socialistically," that is, we must regulate the economy so as to obtain ever-increasing planned expansion. But the gist of the matter is that we have not entered into socialism. We have far from attained mastery of the methods of planned regulation. We are fulfilling only the first rough hypothesis, fulfilling it poorly, and with our headlights not yet on. Crises are not only possible, they are inevitable. And an impending crisis has already been prepared by the bureaucracy.

The laws that govern the transitional society are quite different from those that govern capitalism. But no less do they differ from the future laws of socialism, that is, of a harmonious economy growing on the basis of tried, proven, and guaranteed dynamic equilibrium. The productive advantages of socialism, centralization, concentration, the unified spirit of management, are incalculable. But under faulty application, particularly under bureaucratic misuse, they may turn into their opposites. And in part they have already become transformed, for the crisis now impends. Any attempt to force the economy by further lashing and spurring ahead is an attempt to redouble the misfortunes in the future.
It is impossible to foretell the extent that the crisis will assume. The advantages of planned economy remain during crises as well, and one may say they show themselves with special clarity precisely in a crisis. Capitalist governments are compelled to wait passively until the crisis spends itself on the backs of the people, or to resort to financial hocus-pocus in the manner of von Papen. The workers' state meets the crisis with all its resources. All the dominant levers—the budget, credit, industry, trade—are concentrated in a single hand. The crisis may be mitigated and afterwards overcome not by strident command but by measures of economic regulation. After the adventuristic offensive, it is necessary to execute a planned retreat, thought-out as fully as possible. This is the task of the coming year, the sixteenth year of the proletarian dictatorship. *Il faut reculer pour mieux sauter:* Let us retreat in order the better to advance.

**The Soviet Economy in Danger**

The official press now prints from issue to issue an endless list of accusations against the workers, the directors, the technicians, the managers, the cooperative personnel, and the trade unionists: all guilty of not fulfilling the plans, the instructions, and "the six conditions." But what are the causes for this? Objective causes do not exist. To blame for it all is the ill will of those entrusted with the fulfilling. And that is just what *Pravda* writes: "Do there exist any objective causes whatever for this deterioration in the work? None whatever!" (October 2, 1932). People simply do not want to work as they should—and that's all there is to it. The October plenum of the CEC has ascertained that "there is unsatisfactory management in every link down the line." Except of course that link which is called the Central Executive Committee.

But are there really no objective causes for the poor quality of the workmanship? A specified amount of time is required not only for the ripening of wheat but also for the familiarization with complex technological processes. Psychological processes, it is true, are more pliable than those of vegetation, but this pliability has its limits. One cannot skip over them. And in addition—and this is no less important—one cannot demand a maximum of intensity and supply a minimum of nutrition.

The resolution of the October plenum of the CEC accuses the workers and the administrators of their inability "to clinch" their highest achievements, and of their continual falling behind the targets they had set. In reality the breakdowns were inherent in the character of the achievements themselves. By
virtue of an exceptional effort a man can lift a weight that is far above his "average" strength. But he cannot long sustain such a load over his head. It is absurd to accuse him of his inability "to clinch" his effort.

The Soviet economy is in danger! It is not difficult to determine its ailment. It springs from the nature of the successes themselves. The economy has suffered a rupture from excessive and poorly calculated exertion. One must proceed to cure it, painstakingly and perseveringly. Rakovsky warned us as early as 1930: "We are entering an entire epoch, one which will pass under the heading of payment in full for the entire past."

The Second Five-Year Plan

The second five-year plan was fashioned on the scale of "gigantism."* It is difficult, to be more correct, it is impossible to judge "on sight" the extent to which the final indices of the second five-year plan are exaggerated. But the question now concerns not the balance of the second five-year plan, but its points of departure, the line of its connection with the first five-year plan. The first year of the second five-year plan has received an onerous inheritance from the last year of the first five-year plan.

The second plan, according to the design, is the spiral continuation of the first plan. But the first plan has not been brought to completion. The second plan from the very beginning is left suspended in midair. If one allows things to continue as they have, then the second five-year plan will begin by plugging up the holes of the first, under the administrative whip. This means that the crisis will be aggravated. In this way one heads for catastrophe.

There is only one way out: the inauguration of the second five-year plan must be put off for one year. Nineteen thirty-three must be made a buffer between the first five-year plan and the second. In the course of this period it is necessary, on the one hand, to verify the legacy left by the first five-year plan, to fill in the most yawning gaps, to mitigate the unbearable disproportions, and to straighten out the economic front; and, on the other hand, to reconstruct the second five-year

*The hostility, an outright hatred, toward "gigantism" is rapidly growing in Soviet circles, as a natural and inevitable reaction against the adventurism of the last period. There is no need, however, to explain to what extent this reaction, from which the petty-bourgeois skinflint spirit derives satisfaction, may in the future become dangerous to the socialist construction.
The Soviet Economy in Danger

plan, so designing it as to make its points of departure mesh with the actual and not imaginary results of the first five-year plan.

Doesn't this simply mean that the period for the completion of the first plan will be prolonged another year? No, unfortunately that is not the case. The material consequences of the four years' uproar cannot be stricken out from reality by one stroke of a pen. A careful rechecking is necessary, a regulation, and a determination of the coefficients of growth actually achieved. The present condition of the economy excludes in general any possibility of planned work. Nineteen thirty-three cannot be a supplementary year of the first five-year plan, nor the first year of the second. It must occupy an independent position between the two, in order to assure the mitigation of the consequences of adventurism and the preparation of the material and moral prerequisites for planned expansion.

The Left Opposition was the first to demand the inauguration of the five-year plan. Now it is duty-bound to say: It is necessary to put off the second five-year plan. Away with shrill enthusiasm! Away with speculation! They cannot be reconciled with planned activity. Then you are for retreat? Yes, for a temporary retreat. And what about the prestige of the infallible leadership? The fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat is more important than inflated prestige.

The Year of Capital Reconstruction

Having been knocked off balance, the Soviet economy is in need of serious reconstruction. Under capitalism the disrupted equilibrium is restored by the blind forces of the crisis. The socialist republic allows the application of conscious and rational cures.

It is impossible, of course, to halt production in the whole country as it is halted during repairs in a factory or in an enterprise. But there is also no need to do that. It is enough to lower the tempos. The current productive labor for 1933 cannot be carried on without a plan, but this plan must be one for a single year, worked out on the basis of moderate, quality quotas.

Improvements in quality must be given first place. Inopportune construction should be eliminated; all forces and resources must be concentrated upon construction of the first rank; the interrelations between the various branches of industry must be balanced on the basis of experience; factories must be put in order; equipment must be restored.
Let there be an end to driving and spurring and establishing records; let the productivity of each enterprise be subject to its own technological rhythm. Return to the laboratories whatever has too soon been taken away. Finish building whatever still remains unfinished. Straighten out whatever has been bent. Repair that which has been damaged. Prepare the factory for a transition to a higher stage. Quality quotas must be given a character both supple and conditional in order that they may not interfere with achievements in quantity.

Nineteen thirty-three must gain complete mastery over the labor turnover, by bettering the conditions of the workers; that's where the beginning must be made, for herein is to be found the key to everything else. Workers and their families must be assured of food, shelter, and clothing. No matter at what cost!

The management and the proletarian cadres of factories should be freed of supplementary burdens, such as the planting of potatoes, breeding rabbits, etc. All questions relating to supplying factories with necessities must be regulated as independent and not supplementary tasks.

Order must be brought into the production of consumer goods. Commodities must be adapted to human needs and not to the raw by-products of heavy industry.

The process of inflation must be stopped with an iron hand and the stable monetary unit must be restored. This difficult and painful operation cannot be undertaken without boldly curtailing capital investments, without sacrificing the hundreds of millions that have been inefficiently or inopportunistically sunk into new construction, in order to forestall losses in the billions in the future.

A temporary retreat is urgent both in industry and in agriculture. The extent of the retreat cannot be determined beforehand. It will be revealed only by the experience of the capital reconstruction.

The managing organs must control, assist, and pick out everything that is viable and functioning, but they should stop driving enterprises to the limit, as is the case now. The economy and the people need a breathing spell from administrative violence and adventurism.

Many managers, as is shown by the papers, have arrived independently at the opinion that 1933 must differ in some essential way from this year. But they do not draw their ideas to the conclusion, in order not to expose themselves to danger.

In regard to rail transport, EZ writes: 'One of the most important tasks of 1933 must be the task of a full and final
liquidation of each and every imperfection, noncompletion, poor tie-up, and disproportion in the functioning of the different integral parts of the transport mechanism." Well spoken! This formula should be accepted in full, and be expanded to apply to the economy as a whole.

In regard to the tractor plant in Stalingrad, Pravda writes: "We must decisively dispense with defective methods of workmanship, we must put an end to fever along the conveyor in order to guarantee a regulated output of production." That is absolutely correct! Planned economy, taken as a whole, represents in its class a conveyor on a state scale. The method of plugging up holes is incompatible with planned production. Nineteen thirty-three must "put an end to fever along the conveyor," or at least we must considerably lower the temperature.

The Soviet government itself has proclaimed a "turn" from quantity to quality in agriculture. That is correct, but the question must be approached on a much wider scale. The matter concerns not only the quality of the cultivation of the soil, but the entire collective- and state-farm policy and practice. The turn from quantity to quality must be carried over into the functioning of the administration itself.

First of all, a retreat is inevitable in the sphere of collectivization. Here more than anywhere else the administration is the captive of its own mistakes. While on the surface continuing to autocratically command, to specify under the signature of Stalin and Molotov the precise number of acres for grain tillage, the bureaucracy in reality is now being carried along by the stream of events.

In the villages, in the meantime, a new stratum of the so-called "retired," that is, former collective farmers, has appeared. Their number is growing. It is utter insanity to forcibly keep within the collectives peasants who pilfer the crops, who sell the seed in bazaars and then demand it from the government for sowing. It is no less criminal, however, to let the process of disintegration take its own course. The tendency to downgrade the collectivization movement is evidently now raising its head even within the party ranks. To allow this would be to throw out the baby with the bath water.

Nineteen thirty-three must serve to bring the collectivized agriculture into line with the technical, economic, and cultural resources. This means the selection of the most viable collectives and their reorganization in correspondence with the experience and wishes of the peasant masses, first of all the peasant poor. And, at the same time, conditions for leaving the collective farms must be formulated so as to reduce to a min-
imum the disruption of the rural economy, not to speak of the danger of civil war.

The policy of mechanically "liquidating the kulak" is now in effect discarded. A cross should be placed over it officially. And simultaneously it is necessary to establish the policy of severely restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulak. With this goal in mind, the lowest strata of the villages must be welded together into a union of the peasant poor.

In 1933 the farmers will till the land, the textile workers will produce cloth, the blast furnaces will smelt metal, and the railroads will transport people and the products of labor. But the highest criterion of this year will lie not in producing as much as possible as fast as possible but in putting the economy in order; in checking over the inventories, separating the healthy from the sick and the good from the bad; in clearing away the rubbish and the mud; in building the needed houses and dining rooms, finishing the roofs, installing sanitary ventilation. For in order to work well, people must first of all live like human beings and satisfy their human needs.

To set aside a special year of capital reconstruction is a measure which of course solves nothing whatever by itself. It can attain its major significance only by a change in the very approach to the economy, and, first of all, to its living protagonists, the workers and peasants. The approach to the economy belongs to the domain of politics. The weapon of politics is the party.

Our task of tasks is to resurrect the party. Here as well we must take an inventory of the onerous inheritance of the post-Lenin period. We must separate the healthy from the sick, the good from the bad; we must clear away the rubbish and the mud; we must air and disinfect all the offices of the bureaucracy. After the party come the Soviets and the trade unions. Capital reconstruction of all Soviet organizations is the most important and most urgent task of 1933.
Question: "Lenin and all his followers were convinced at that time [in 1917] that only a revolution abroad could save them from certain doom. . . . They did not hope to survive unless revolutions in Europe and Asia weakened external hostility and gave Red Russia a breathing space for domestic entrenchment," says Mr. Fischer. Was Lenin speaking only in an immediate military and political sense of saving Russia from defeat and subjugation, or did he have in mind the whole perspective of Russia's developing on its own soil through the dictatorship of the proletariat to the ultimate Communist goal?

Answer: That affirmation of Mr. Fischer's, like a series of others, proves his lack of familiarity with the theory and the history of Bolshevism. In 1917 there was not a single Bolshevik who considered possible the realization of a socialist society in a single country, and least of all in Russia. In the appendix to my History of the Russian Revolution I give a detailed and documented study of the ideas of the Bolshevik Party on the October Revolution. This study, I hope, will make it impossible in the future to ascribe to Lenin the theory of socialism in a single country. Here I will limit myself to a single quotation, which in my opinion has a decisive character. Lenin died in January 1924; three months later Stalin expounded in writing Lenin's conception of the proletarian revolution. I quote word for word: "... to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to establish the power of the proletariat in one country still does not signify the full victory of socialism. The main task of socialism—the organization of socialist production—remains still in the future. Is it possible to fulfill this task, is it possible to achieve the definite victory of socialism in one country without the combined efforts of the proletarians
of several advanced countries? No, it is impossible. For the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the efforts of one country are sufficient—for this we have the testimony of the history of our revolution. For the definitive victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, especially of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient—for that are required the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries. . . ." Stalin closes the exposition of these ideas with the words: "Such are in general the characteristic features of Lenin's conception of the proletarian revolution" (Problems of Leninism, emphasis mine).

Only in the fall of 1924 did Stalin discover that it is especially Russia, as distinguished from other countries, which can by its own forces build up a socialist society. ". . . After having established its power and assumed the leadership of the peasantry," he wrote in a new edition of the same work, "the victorious proletariat can and must build up socialist society." Can and must! The proclamation of this new conception is closed by the same words: "Such are in general the characteristic features of Lenin's conception of the proletarian revolution." In the course of a single year Stalin ascribed to Lenin two directly opposed conceptions of the fundamental question of socialism. The first version represents the real tradition of the party; the second took shape in Stalin's mind only after the death of Lenin, in the course of the struggle against "Trotskyism."

Q: Is there reason to believe that the world revolution, or a series of social upheavals on the Eurasian continent, "ceased to be an immediate possibility" by 1921?

A: What shall we call an "immediate possibility"? In 1923 the situation in Germany was profoundly revolutionary, but what was lacking for a victorious revolution was a correct strategy. At that time I wrote a study about this question, Lessons of October, which served as a pretext for my elimination from the government. In 1925-27 the revolution in China was destroyed by the false revolutionary strategy of the Stalinist faction. To this last question I consecrate my book, Problems of the Chinese Revolution. It is quite clear that the German and Chinese revolutions in case of victory would have changed the face of Europe and Asia, and perhaps of the whole world. Once again, he who ignores the problems of revolutionary strategy would do better not to talk about revolutions at all.

Q: Is it true that "a revolution germinates only in national soil, that it does not result from imported money or pamphlets
or agitators, and that the capitalists will do more than the Communists to undermine capitalism"? Is it true that "by its very existence a truly Soviet, near-socialist system . . . must further the cause of revolution in other countries," and that "a strong socialist Soviet Union is the most effective stimulus to world revolution"?

A: The statements quoted in this question contradict each other. That the existence of the Soviet Union has an international revolutionary significance is a commonplace equally recognized by friends and foes. In spite of the existence of the Soviet Union, however, the proletarian revolution during the past years has not recorded a victory in any other country. In Russia itself the proletariat conquered in spite of the fact that there was no Soviet state in existence at the time elsewhere. For the victory are necessary, not only certain objective conditions, internal as well as external, but also certain subjective factors—the party, the leadership, the strategy. Our differences with Stalin are entirely of a strategical character. Suffice it to say that if we had carried through, in 1917, the policy of Stalin, the Soviet state would not be in existence today. It is therefore not true that the mere existence of the Soviet Union is capable of assuring the victory of the revolution in other countries. But it is also false that the revolution ripens and comes to development only on national soil. Otherwise what purpose is served by the Communist International?

Q: Granting that a capitalist economy, the more highly it is developed, becomes the more dependent on other countries, is it less true of the Soviet Union because it is developing toward a socialist economy?

A: National self-sufficiency or "autarchy" is the ideal of Hitler, not of Marx and Lenin. Socialist economy cannot reject the huge advantages of the world division of labor; on the contrary, it will carry it to the highest development. But in practice, it is not a question of the future socialist society, with an established internal equilibrium, but of the given technically and culturally backward country which in the interests of industrialization and collectivization is forced to export as much as possible in order to import as much as possible.

Q: Is it true that the theory of the permanent revolution, which is the platform on which you have fought Stalin since 1924, was "born in a time of Bolshevik mental depression" caused by "a series of failures both at home and abroad," or does this theory represent a consistent line found in all your "political writings and actions after 1903"? Mr. Fischer makes both statements.
The theory of the permanent revolution, in contradiction to the theory of socialism in one country, was recognized by the entire Bolshevik Party during the period from 1917 to 1923. Only the defeat of the proletariat in Germany in 1923 gave the decisive push to the creation of Stalin's theory of national socialism. The downward curve of the revolution gave rise to Stalinism, not to the theory of the permanent revolution, which was first formulated by me in 1905. This theory is not bound to a definite calendar of revolutionary events; it only reveals the worldwide interdependence of the revolutionary process.

Q: The statement is made that "Trotsky would not have neglected Soviet home industry any more than Stalin would ignore the usefulness of the Third International." Do you agree with the conclusion that "There are no whites and blacks in this picture. It is a matter of proportion and shade"?

A: Such an affirmation is possible only because of lack of familiarity with the history of the struggle between the Stalinist faction and the Left Opposition. The initiative for the five-year plan and the accelerated collectivization belongs entirely to the Left Opposition, in uninterrupted and sharp struggles with the Stalinists. Not having the possibility of occupying myself here with long historical research, I will limit myself to a single illustration. The Dnieprostroy is rightly considered the highest achievement of Soviet industrialization. Yet Stalin and his followers (Voroshilov, Molotov, and others), a few months before the beginning of the work, were decided opponents of the Dnieprostroy plan. I quote from the stenographic report the words spoken by Stalin in April 1926 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the party against myself as head of the Dnieprostroy commission. "There is talk . . . of our constructing Dnieprostroy through our own means. But the sums here are large, several hundred million. How can we avoid falling into the position of the peasant who had saved up some money, but instead of repairing his plough and renewing his equipment, bought a phonograph and went bankrupt? (laughter) . . . How can we not take into account the congress resolution that our industrial plans must correspond to our resources? But Comrade Trotsky does not take this congress decision into account" (stenographic report of the plenum, p. 110).

Simultaneously the Left Opposition for several years carried on a struggle against the Stalinists in favor of collectivization. Only when the kulak refused to deliver grain to the state did Stalin, under the pressure of the Left Opposition, accomplish a sharp turn. Being the empiricist that he is, he moved to
the opposite extreme, and set as a task for two or three years the collectivization of all the peasantry, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and the compression of the five-year plan into four years. The Left Opposition declared that the new tempos of industrialization were above our forces, and that the liquidation of the kulaks as a class in the course of three years was a fantastic task. If one wishes to say so, we find ourselves this time "less radical" than the Stalinists. *Revolutionary realism* tries to draw the maximum advantage from every situation—that is what makes it revolutionary—but at the same time it does not permit us to set ourselves fantastic aims—that is what makes it realistic.

**Q:** If we accept the views that the policy of Stalin has a purely empirical character, is determined by the circumstances of the moment and is incapable of seeing far ahead, how can we explain the victory of Stalin's faction over the Left Opposition?

**A:** Above, I emphasized the significance of revolutionary strategy. Here I must come back to the decisive importance of objective conditions. Without a correct strategy victory is impossible. But even the most correct strategy cannot give victory under unfavorable objective conditions. The revolution has its own laws: in the period of its culmination it pushes the most highly developed, determined, and farseeing stratum of the revolutionary class to the most advanced positions. Yet the proletariat has not only a vanguard, but also a rearguard, and besides the proletariat there are the peasantry and the bureaucracy. Not one revolution up to now has brought all that was expected of it by the masses. Hence the inevitability of a certain disillusionment, of a lowering of the activity of the vanguard, and consequently of the growing importance of the rearguard. Stalin's faction has raised itself on the wave of reaction against the October Revolution. Look back at history—those who guided the revolution in the time of its culmination never kept their leading positions long after the turning point. In France, the leader of Jacobinism perished on the guillotine; with us, the change of leadership was achieved by means of arrest and banishment. The technique of the process is gentler, but its essence is the same.

**Q:** How do you reconcile your criticism of the Soviet Union in the capitalist press with your revolutionary sympathies? Is it true that you are "turning the thinking youth away from Russia," "offering enemies of the Soviet regime the best possible arguments and material," and giving "ex-radicals and near-Communists an excuse for maligning Moscow and abstaining from participation in revolutionary action"?
A: The Soviet state does not need either illusions or camouflage. It can claim only that world authority which is confirmed by the facts. The more clearly and deeply the public opinion of the world, in the first instance the opinion of the working masses, will understand the contradictions and the difficulties of the socialist development of an isolated country, the more highly will it appreciate the results achieved. The less it identifies the fundamental methods of socialism with the zigzags and errors of the Soviet bureaucracy, the less will be the danger that, by the inevitable revelation of these errors and their consequences, the authority not only of the present ruling group but of the workers' state itself may decline. The Soviet Union needs thinking and critical friends, such as are capable not only of singing hymns in the hours of success, but of not shrinking in the hour of defeat and danger. Journalists of the type of Fischer accomplish a progressive work in defending the Soviet Union from calumnies, malicious inventions, and prejudices. But these gentlemen overstep the limits of their mission when they attempt to give us lessons of devotion to the Soviet state. If we fear to speak of dangers, we shall never conquer them. If we close our eyes to the dark sides of the workers' state which we have helped to create, we shall never reach socialism.
GREETINGS TO THE MILITANT

November 1, 1932

To the Editors of The Militant

Dear Friends:

I fear that my greetings to the fourth anniversary of The Militant will arrive a little late. But my greetings are none the less hearty because of it. All our friends on this side of the ocean value highly the work which you have carried on during this long, and yet short, period.

Can we consider ourselves satisfied with the results of our work? Of course, this question concerns not only the United States but also all the other countries in which our adherents live and struggle. To answer this question is not so simple. As yet, the Left Opposition has nowhere become a mass movement. But it has assembled the revolutionary kernel which knows what it wants. Precisely in this field are the achievements of The Militant greatest. Not so long ago the Right Opposition in a number of countries seemed to be much stronger and more deserving of attention than the Left. From the very outset, we were of the opinion that the right-wing group would experience an evolution towards the Social Democracy; giving up some of its elements to us and some to official centrism. The developments of the last year have completely confirmed this prognosis. In Germany the Brandlerites have split, giving a considerable minority to the Socialist Workers Party, which means to the Left Social Democracy. In Czechoslovakia the Right Opposition went over to the Social Democracy; the minority, with the revolutionary elements, under the leadership of Comrade Neurath, joined us. In Switzerland the Right Opposition is coming closer to the Social Democracy while among the better section of the workers sympathies are growing towards the Left Opposition. As far as can be judged from
here, the Lovestone group in America can hardly boast of any successes. Their official organ, in the first place, is characterized by confusion. These people do not know what they want and are scarcely capable of foreseeing what shore they will be washed upon by the first strong wave.

In the camp of official communism, confusion of no lesser degree: the resolutions of the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI offer a terrible testimonial of poverty which the leadership of the Comintern issued to itself. In spite of the exceptional conditions of the economic crisis and the complete international impasse of imperialism, communism barely moves ahead. In some countries (Germany, Bulgaria), it registers certain purely parliamentary successes, which do not, however, correspond in any way to the scope of the social crisis. In other countries, communism retreats before the Social Democracy on every field of the working-class movement (France, Czechoslovakia). In all countries without exception, the cadres of official communism are most dissatisfied, disoriented, split into separate inimical groups.

The condition of the party apparatus in the USSR bears a most menacing character. No one really trusts the leadership there and the leadership has lost all faith in itself. All that the party contains of thinking revolutionary elements is turning towards the Left Opposition. The forces on which Stalin based himself in the struggle against us are turning ever more towards Thermidor. The situation in the Soviet Union is an extremely difficult one. In the political chaos to which the centrist bureaucracy has brought the party, only the Left Opposition knows what it wants.

The political life of the United States is clearly approaching a turning point. Within the near future it will become clear that when Heraclitus the Dark said, "Everything flows, everything changes," he had in mind also the republic of Hoover-Roosevelt. Old traditions, conceptions, prejudices, will go by the board. Through a period of ideological chaos and stress, the classes in American society will create for themselves a new modern ideology. A strong revolutionary kernel, welded by a uniformity of doctrine and political method, will be called upon in such a period to play a great role. The creation of such a kernel is the achievement of The Militant. So much the heartier is my greeting.

L. Trotsky
Dear Comrade Calverton:

I received your pamphlet, *For Revolution*, and read it with interest as well as profit to myself. Your arguments against the American "knights of pure reform" are very convincing, certain of them are really splendid. But, so far as I understand your request, what you wanted from me was not literary compliments but a political evaluation. I am all the more willing to grant your request since the problems of American Marxism have acquired at the present time an exceptional importance.

By its character and structure, your pamphlet is most appropriate for the thinking representatives of the student youth. To ignore this youth would, in any case, be out of the question; on the contrary, it is necessary to know how to talk to these students in their own language. However you yourself repeatedly emphasize in your study the thought which is elementary to a Marxist: namely, that the abolition of capitalism can be achieved only by the working class. The revolutionary education of the proletarian vanguard, you correctly proclaim as the chief task. But in your pamphlet I do not find the bridge to that task, nor any indication of the direction in which it must be sought.

Is this a reproach on my part? Yes and no. In its essence your little book represents an answer to that special variety of petty-bourgeois radicals—in America they seem to be wearing out the threadbare name of "liberals"—who are ready to accept the boldest social conclusions provided they incur no political obligations whatever. Socialism? Communism? Anarchism? Very good! But not otherwise than by way of reforms. Transform society, morality, the family from top to bottom? Splendid! But absolutely with the permission of the White House and Tammany.

Against these pretentious and sterile tendencies you present, as I have said before, a very successful line of argumentation. But this controversy itself thereby inevitably takes on the
character of a domestic dispute in an intellectual club with its own reformist and its own Marxist wing. It was in this way that thirty and forty years ago in Petersburg and Moscow the academic Marxists disputed with the academic Populists: must Russia pass through the stage of capitalism or not? How much water has flowed over the dam since that time! The mere necessity of posing the question as you do in your pamphlet throws a glaring light on the political backwardness of the United States, technologically the most advanced country in the world. To the extent that you neither can nor have the right to tear yourself out of American conditions, to that extent there is no reproach in my words.

Yet at the same time there is a reproach. For side by side with pamphlets and clubs where academic debates pro and con revolution are carried on, in the ranks of the American proletariat, with all the backwardness of its movement, there are different political groupings and among them revolutionary ones. You say nothing at all about them. Your pamphlet does not mention the so-called Socialist Party, nor the Communist Party, nor any of the transitional formations, in particular the contending factions within the Communist movement. This means that you are not calling anybody in particular to go anywhere in particular. You explain the inevitability of the revolution. However, the intellectual who is convinced by you can quietly finish smoking his cigarette and pass on to the next item on his daily agenda. To this extent there is in my words an element of reproach.

I would not have put this circumstance at the top of the list if it did not seem to me that your political position, as I judge by your articles, is typical of a rather numerous and theoretically skilled stratum of left intellectuals in the United States.

There is, of course, no need to talk of the Hillquit-Thomas party as an instrument of the proletarian revolution. Without having achieved in the slightest degree the power of European reformism, the American Social Democracy has acquired all of its vices and, barely past childhood, has already fallen into what the Russians call "senility of dogs." I trust that you agree with this evaluation and have perhaps more than once even expressed similar views.

But in the pamphlet For Revolution you did not say a word about the Social Democracy. Why? It seems to me because, had you spoken of the Social Democracy, you would have also had to give an evaluation of the Communist Party. And this is not only a touchy but also an extremely important
question, which imposes obligations and leads to consequences. I may perhaps be mistaken with respect to you personally, but many American Marxists obviously and stubbornly avoid fixing their position with respect to the party. They enroll themselves among the "friends" of the Soviet Union, they "sympathize" with communism, write articles about Hegel and the inevitability of the revolution and—nothing more. But this is not enough. For the instrument of the revolution is the party, don't you agree?

I would not like to be misunderstood. Under the tendency to avoid the practical consequences of a clear position, I do not at all mean the concern for personal welfare. Admittedly, there are some quasi "Marxists" whom the Communist Party scares off by its aim of bringing the revolution out of the discussion club and into the street. But to dispute about a revolutionary party with such snobs is generally a waste of time. We are talking about other, more serious Marxists who are in no way inclined to be scared by revolutionary action, but whom the present-day Communist Party disquiets by its low theoretical level, by its bureaucratism and lack of genuine revolutionary initiative. At the same time they say to themselves, that is the party which stands furthest to the left, which is bound up with the Soviet Union, and which "represents" the USSR in a certain sense. Is it right to attack it, is it permissible to criticize it?

The opportunist and adventurist vices of the present leadership of the Communist International and of its American section are too evident to require emphasis. In any case, it is impossible and useless to repeat within the framework of this letter what I have said on the subject in a series of independent works. All questions of theory, strategy, tactics, and organization have already succeeded in becoming the object of deep divergences within communism. Three fundamental factions have been formed, which have succeeded in demonstrating their character in the course of the great events and problems of recent years. The struggle among them has taken on all the sharper character since in the Soviet Union every difference with the current ruling group leads to immediate expulsion from the party and to state repressions. The Marxist intellectual in the United States, as in other countries, is placed before an alternative: either tacitly and obediently to support the Communist International as it is, or to be included in the camp of the counterrevolution and "social fascism." One group of intellectuals has chosen the first way: with eyes blinded or half-blinded, it follows the official party. Another group wanders without a party home, defends, where it can, the Soviet
Union from slander, and occupies itself with abstract sermons in favor of the revolution without indicating through which gate one must pass to meet it.

The difference between these two groups, however, is not so great. On both sides there is renunciation of the creative effort in working out an independent opinion, and renunciation of the courageous struggle in its defense, which is precisely where the revolutionist begins. On both sides we have the fellow-traveler type and not an active builder of the proletarian party. Certainly a fellow traveler is better than an enemy. But a Marxist cannot be a fellow traveler of the revolution. Moreover, as historical experience bears out, at the most critical moments the storm of the struggle tosses the majority of the intellectual fellow travelers into the enemy's camp. If they do return, it is only after the victory has been consolidated. Maxim Gorky is the clearest but not the only example. In the present Soviet apparatus, incidentally, clear up to the top a very important percentage of people stood fifteen years ago openly on the other side of the October 1917 barricades.

Is it necessary to recall that Marxism not only interprets the world but also teaches how to change it? The will is the motor force in the domain of knowledge too. The moment Marxism loses its will to transform in a revolutionary way political reality, at that moment it loses the ability to correctly understand political reality. A Marxist who, for one secondary consideration or another, does not draw his conclusions to the end betrays Marxism. To pretend to ignore the different Communist factions, so as not to become involved and compromise oneself, signifies ignoring that activity which, through all the contradictions, consolidates the vanguard of the class; it signifies covering oneself with the abstraction of the revolution, as with a shield, from the blows and bruises of the real revolutionary process.

When left-bourgeois journalists summarily defend the Soviet republic as it is, they accomplish a progressive and praiseworthy work. For a Marxist revolutionist, it is absolutely insufficient. The problem of the October Revolution—let us not forget!—has not yet been solved. Only parrots can find satisfaction in repeating the words, "Victory is assured." No, it is not assured! Victory poses the problem of strategy. There is no book which sets in advance the correct orbit for the first workers' state. A mind does not and cannot exist which can contain the ready-made formula for a socialist society. The roads of economy and politics must still be determined only through experience and worked out collectively, that is, through a constant conflict of ideas. A Marxist who limits him-
self to a summary "sympathy" without taking part in the struggle over the questions of industrialization, collectivization, the party regime, etc., rises not to a higher level than the "progressive" bourgeois reporters of the type of Duranty, Louis Fischer, and others, but on the contrary stands lower, because he abuses the name of revolutionist.

To avoid direct answers, to play blindman's buff with great problems, to remain diplomatically silent and wait, or still worse, to console oneself with the thought that the present struggle within Bolshevism is a matter of "personal ambitions"—all this means to indulge in mental laziness, to yield to the worst philistine prejudice, and to doom oneself to demoralization. On this score I hope we shall not have any differences with you.

Proletarian politics has a great theoretical tradition, and that is one of the sources of its power. A trained Marxist studies the differences between Engels and Lassalle with regard to the European war of 1859. This is necessary. But if he is not a pedant of Marxist historiography, not a bookworm but a proletarian revolutionist, it is a thousand times more important and urgent for him to elaborate for himself an independent judgment about the revolutionary strategy in China from 1925 to 1932. It was precisely on that question that the struggle within Bolshevism sharpened for the first time to the point of split. It is impossible to be a Marxist without taking a position on which depends the fate of the Chinese revolution and at the same time that of the Indian too, that is, the future of almost half of humanity!

It is very useful to study, let us say, the old differences among Russian Marxists on the character of the future Russian revolution; a study, naturally, from the original sources and not from the ignorant and unconscionable compilations of the epigones. But it is far more important to elaborate for oneself a clear understanding of the theory and practice of the Anglo-Russian Committee, of the "third period," of "social fascism," of the "democratic dictatorship" in Spain, and the policy of the united front. The study of the past is in the last analysis justified by this, that it helps one to orient oneself in the present.

It is impermissible for a Marxist theoretician to pass by the congresses of the First International. But a thousand times more urgent is the study of the living differences over the Amsterdam "antiwar" congress of 1932. Indeed, how much is the sincerest and warmest sympathy for the Soviet Union worth, if it is accompanied by indifference to the method of its defense?
Is there today a subject more important for a revolutionist, more gripping, more burning, than the struggle and the fate of the German proletariat? Is it possible, on the other hand, to define one’s attitude to the problems of the German revolution while passing by the differences in the camp of German and international communism? A revolutionist who has no opinion on the policies of Stalin-Thaelmann is not a Marxist. A Marxist who has an opinion but remains silent is not a revolutionist.

It is not enough to preach the benefits of technology; it is necessary to build bridges. How would a young doctor be judged who, instead of practicing as an interne, would be satisfied with reading biographies of great surgeons of the past? What would Marx have said about a theory which, instead of deepening revolutionary practice, serves to separate one from it? Most probably he would repeat his sarcastic statement: "No, I am not a Marxist."

From all indications the current crisis will be a great milestone on the historical road of the United States. Smug American provincialism is in any case nearing its end. Those commonplaces which invariably nourished American political thought in all its ramifications are completely spent. All classes need a new orientation. A drastic renovation not only of the circulating but also of the fixed capital of political ideology is imminent. If the Americans have so stubbornly lagged behind in the domain of socialist theory, it does not mean that they will remain backward always. It is possible to venture without much risk a contrary prediction: the longer the Yankees are satisfied with the ideological castoff clothes of the past, the more powerful will be the sweep of revolutionary thought in America when its hour finally strikes. And it is near. The elevation of revolutionary theory to new heights can be looked for in the next few decades from two sources: from the Asian East and from America.

In the course of the last hundred-odd years the proletarian movement has displaced its national center of gravity several times. From England to France to Germany to Russia—this was the historical sequence of the residency of socialism and Marxism. The present revolutionary hegemony of Russia can least of all lay claim to durability. The fact itself of the existence of the Soviet Union, especially before the proletarian victory in one of the advanced states, has naturally an immeasurable importance for the labor movement of all countries. But the direct influence of the Moscow ruling faction upon the Communist International has already become a brake on the development of the world proletariat. The fertilizing
ideological hegemony of Bolshevism has been replaced in recent years by the stifling oppression of the apparatus. It is not necessary to prove the disastrous consequences of this regime: it suffices to point to the leadership of the American Communist Party. The liberation from the unprincipled bureaucratic command has become a question of life and death for the revolution and for Marxism.

You are perfectly right in saying that the vanguard of the American proletariat must learn to base itself on the revolutionary traditions of its own country too. In a certain sense we can accept the slogan, "Americanize Marxism!" This does not mean, of course, to submit its principle and method to revision. The attempt of Max Eastman to throw overboard the materialist dialectic in the interests of the "engineering art of revolution" represents an obviously hopeless and in its possible consequences retrograde adventure. The system of Marxism has completely passed the test of history. Especially now, in the epoch of capitalist decline—the epoch of wars and revolutions, storms and shocks—the materialist dialectic fully reveals its inexorable force. To Americanize Marxism signifies to root it in American soil, to verify it against the events of American history, to elaborate by its methods the problems of American economy and politics, to assimilate the world revolutionary experience from the standpoint of the tasks of the American revolution. A giant labor! It is time to start it with shirtsleeves rolled up.

In connection with strikes in the United States—after the shattered center of the First International had been transferred there, Marx wrote to Engels on July 25, 1877: "The porridge is beginning to boil, and the transfer of the center of the International to the United States will yet be justified." Several days later Engels answered him: "Only twelve years after the abolition of chattel slavery, and the movement has already achieved such acuteness!" They, both Marx and Engels, were mistaken. But as in other cases, they were wrong as to tempo, not as to direction. The great transoceanic "porridge" is unquestionably beginning to boil, the breaking point in the development of American capitalism will unavoidably provoke a blossoming of critical and generalizing thought, and it may be that we are not very far away from the time when the theoretical center of the international revolution is transferred to New York.

Before the American Marxist open truly colossal, breathtaking perspectives!

With sincere greetings,
L. Trotsky
Thank you for your letter and the clipping from the *Frankfurter Nachrichten* [Frankfurt News]. There is no need to tell you how I rejoice at your successes and hope that they may increase still more in the near future. They are extremely significant. In the present situation careerists seeking office or journalists looking for a newspaper don't come to the Left Opposition, poor and under attack not only from the ruling class but also from the Stalinist bureaucracy. To us come only people who are deeply devoted to the proletarian revolution, cadre elements. Armed with the correct methods, they advance on the road to the masses.

The article in the *Frankfurter Nachrichten*, like many other articles in the bourgeois press, clearly shows that the class enemy understands very well the danger which the Left Opposition represents to its policies. Unlike the Stalinists, they do not raise a howl that we are "counterrevolutionaries"; the bourgeoisie apparently puts no stock in the Stalinist labels and considers us—not without reason—their most irreconcilable enemies. The future will show that they are right.

The *Frankfurter Nachrichten* speaks of Trotsky's political attack on Thaelmann's "Hamburg dock workers." The purpose of this counterposition is all too clear: it is to play games with the workers' self-respect and to assign them to the official bureaucratic party, away from the influence of Bolshevik-Leninist criticism. Stalinist tactics today, as we have said, carry very little danger.

Needless to say, my criticism was directed not against Thaelmann's "dock workers" but against the very lofty bureaucracy, which stops the arguments of every critical worker with a fist in the mouth. But if Stalin cannot easily succeed with this method in the Soviet Union, still less will Thaelmann be able to succeed in stifling Marxist ideas among the proletariat in Germany.

I wish you success in your work in the future.  

L. Trotsky
November 13, 1932

To the Leadership of the Communist League of America

Dear Comrades:

I wrote you that we had in mind "legalizing" Comrade Field in one of the European sections for the duration of his work here. It was with the understanding that he would remain for a considerable period of time. But it now appears that this is impossible for him because of financial reasons and that he will soon have to return to America. With this is eliminated the above-mentioned plan, which we of course intended to carry out only in collaboration with you.

In regard to the future in America, the plans of Field are, as it appears to me from conversations with him, the following: he returns fully determined to work for the Left Opposition and to find his way back to the League. But in no case by the methods attempted by Weisbord. He will offer his services to the League without simultaneously raising the question of his reinstatement. I believe he can be of good service in the field of winning the intellectual Marxists (an activity for example in the sense of my letter to Calverton). Through our theoretical political superiority as against the party we will be able to count on certain sympathies from the "academicians," and we can utilize these sympathies materially and intellectually, without, of course, delivering the organization to these elements. During the course of this work it will perhaps be proven that Field himself belongs in the organization. But this you will be able to judge better than we can from this distance. What I want to insist upon is that the relationship with Field be as much as possible so arranged that he can in the future also be utilized for our international theoretical work.

Please let me once more assure the leadership of the New York organization that I was and still am very far from wanting to take its organizational decision lightly. My motive in this whole question was only the necessity of obtaining qualified forces for our international activities.

With best communist greetings,

L. Trotsky
The revision of the principles of Bolshevism has irrevocably led to the revision of the history of Bolshevism. In particular, that which is now called the history of the October Revolution is a completely artificial and contradictory construction which concentrates on the private and personal problems of the higher-ups of today's political world and not on the reconstruction and explanation of the facts of the past.

In 1922 the task was entrusted to Yakovlev — then in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture — to compile a "History of the October Revolution." The fact that the Central Committee appointed Trotsky beforehand to edit Yakovlev's work shows how far the Central Committee was — despite the absence of Lenin — from the thought of directing the history of the October Revolution against Trotsky. Redirection in this matter began only in 1924. Yakovlev, it is true, wrote no history of the October Revolution. But he managed to publish a few collections of historical material to which he provided his own prefaces. Roughly, one can lay down the following law: the correctness of Yakovlev's prefaces is in inverse ratio to the square of time which elapsed before the publication of each collection. More simply: the more time passed, the more boldly Yakovlev lied. In 1928, in his preface to the minutes of the Second Congress of Soviets, Yakovlev already was bold enough to assert: "The Bolsheviks did not yield to 'constitutional illusions,' and having rejected the proposal from Comrade Trotsky to time the insurrection without fail [?] for the Second Congress of Soviets, they took power before the opening of the Soviet Congress" (Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, State Publishers, 1928, p. 38).
From the quotation it follows that in the problem of the timing and methods of the insurrection the Central Committee, under Lenin's leadership, carried out a policy opposed to Trotsky's. The falsity of this construction, which belongs not to Yakovlev but to his inspirers, above all to Stalin, is smashed to smithereens by the facts and documents in the appendix to the last volume of Trotsky's *History*. But of the evidence cited in the *History* perhaps the most colorful piece is absent.

On April 23, 1920, the Moscow organization celebrated Lenin's fiftieth anniversary. The unwilling "hero" of the festivities stayed away from the celebration and appeared only at its very end in order to express the hope that the party would refrain from the depressing practice of jubilee celebrations. Lenin was mistaken in his hopes. Later jubilee celebrations took on a compulsory character; but this is a special problem. Kamenev was the main speaker at the celebration. Besides him, Gorky, Olminsky, and Stalin also spoke. Instead of forecasting the further development of events, Stalin, in a very short and clumsy speech, set himself the task of "pinpointing a trait [of Lenin] about which no one had as yet spoken—his modesty and the admission of his mistakes." The speaker cited two examples: the first concerning the boycott of the State Duma (1905), the second concerning the timing and method of the October insurrection. Let us quote verbatim Stalin's account about this second "mistake" of Lenin:

"In July 1917, under Kerensky, when the Democratic Conference was called and the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were setting up a new institution—the Preparliament which was supposed to set the rails for a switch to constitutional government—we in the Central Committee decided to go ahead with reinforcing the Soviets, to summon the Congress of Soviets, to begin the insurrection, and to proclaim the Congress of Soviets the organ of state power. Ilyich [Lenin], who was then in hiding, did not agree and wrote that it was necessary to disperse and arrest this riffraff [the Democratic Conference]. We realized that the matter was not so simple, knowing that the conference consisted of a half or at least a third of delegates from the front, that by arrest and dispersal we could only spoil the whole business and worsen relations with the front. All the holes and pitfalls on our course were more visible to us. But Ilyich is great and doesn't fear [?] either holes or pitfalls or chasms in his way; he doesn't fear threats and says, 'Be determined and go ahead.' But the fraction saw that it was disadvantageous to act in this way at the time, that it was necessary to go round these obstacles in order to take the bull
by the horns. And in spite of Ilyich's demands we went ahead with reinforcement and presented (?) the picture (?) of October 25 as the date of the insurrection. Ilyich, smiling, slyly looked at us and said, 'Yes, you were right.' This astonished us. Sometimes Comrade Lenin in problems of great importance confessed his shortcomings (?)" (The Fiftieth Anniversary of V. I. Ulyanov-Lenin, 1920, pp. 27-28).

Stalin's speech does not appear in any version of his Works. Nevertheless, it is extremely interesting. In the first place, it does not leave one stone standing of the latest legend, the most "scientific," formulated by Yakovlev, that the Central Committee under Lenin's leadership crushed the constitutional illusions of Trotsky regarding the timing and method of the insurrection. According to Stalin—that is, according to Stalin in 1920—it transpires, on the contrary, that on this question the Central Committee supported Trotsky against Lenin.

In his recollections of 1924,302 Trotsky tells how Lenin, appearing in the Smolny on the night of the twenty-fifth [of October] said to him, "All right, one can proceed in this fashion as well, provided we seize power." The "historian" Yaroslavsky in 1930 indignantly denied the authenticity of this account: after all, the overthrow was carried through by the Central Committee in accord with Lenin—against Trotsky; how could Lenin have said, "one can proceed in this fashion"? We learn from Stalin, however, that the Central Committee "in spite of Ilyich's demands" held its course toward the Congress of Soviets and "presented the picture of October 25 as the date of the insurrection"; Lenin, indeed, on his arrival at the Smolny declared, "Yes, you were right." Could one present a more convincing even if involuntary corroboration of Trotsky's account and a more crushing refutation of all later falsifications?

Stalin's jubilee speech is instructive in all its outlines and details. What a devastating primitiveness in the depiction of people and circumstances! Stalin even incorrectly describes the Central Committee's plan: "to go ahead with reinforcing the Soviets, to summon the Congress of Soviets, to begin the insurrection, and to proclaim the Congress of Soviets the organ of state power." This is that very mechanical schematism which Lenin, not unjustifiably, stigmatized as constitutional illusions: to summon the Congress of Soviets beforehand in order only then to announce the insurrection would have meant giving the enemy the chance to strike at the Congress of Soviets before the insurrection. The question arises of itself: Was Lenin's fear a result of one of his meetings with Stalin? In fact, the plan that was actually carried out consisted in mobilizing the
masses under the slogan of the Congress of Soviets as the supreme organ of the country and under cover of this legal campaign preparing the insurrection and striking at a suitable moment, near the congress but definitely not after it.

Stalin makes a crude mistake in the central point of the October strategy because he did not think out the problems of the insurrection for himself, neither at the time of the events nor afterwards. All the easier was it for him then to bless Yakovlev afterwards for attributing his own, Stalinist, strategical thoughts, not worked out to their conclusion, to Trotsky and for uniting Stalin with Lenin in a struggle against "constitutional illusions"! From this single episode the theoretical level of the epigones stands out in all its dreadful poverty.

The little book of 1920 jubilee speeches which has come into our hands by chance is not exceptional. Not only the archives of the party and of Soviet institutions but also official publications from before 1924 represent their own kind of foundation of dynamite on which is erected the superstructure of epigone ideology. Every brick of this foundation threatens to collapse. In great as in small problems the tradition of Bolshevism is fully on the side of the Left Opposition.
The Third Congress of the Comintern assembled in Moscow three months after the "March days" of 1921 in Germany. The young leadership of the German Communist Party, which hadn't yet cooled down after the March battles, was arguing in approximately the following fashion: Since this is a revolutionary epoch then we, the revolutionary vanguard, must march in the lead, not stopped by any obstacle, and draw the working class along by our example. This meant proceeding not from the concrete circumstances or from the real condition of the proletariat, with all its varied groupings, but from the general characterization of the period as revolutionary. Such is the general historical-philosophical basis of revolutionary adventurism. In 1921, this philosophy was sketched only in timid strokes. Ten years later, it is developed, canonized, bureaucratized—under the name of the theory of the "third period."

It is all the more important to recall Lenin's attitude toward this theory since one of his clearest speeches is still being hidden away from readers in the Comintern's archives. We have in mind Lenin's speech of June 17, 1921, at a session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the eve of the Third Congress. In order to clarify the extracts from this speech, which are quoted below, it is necessary to recall that ultraleftism at that time was to be found in almost all the parties. A section of the French delegation, for example, was advocating—though after the event—refusal of military service by those subject to the draft in 1919. The delegate from Luxembourg accused the French party of not "hindering" the occupation of Luxembourg by French troops. Trotsky, in speaking against the opportunist policies of Cachin-Fros-sard, was forced, as he explained, to preface his speech with criticism of the ultraleftists. He showed that it was impossible to conquer militarism by the passive opposition of one military age-group ("the class of 1919," as the French say); what was needed instead was the active intervention of
the whole working class. He showed that if the proletariat as a whole was not ready for a complete revolutionary overthrow, then it could not prevent the military occupation of Luxembourg. Attempts to solve these kinds of "private" problems by a show of strength when that strength was insufficient for solving the basic problem, i.e., the seizure of power, lead to adventurism—a path that could prove fatal for young Communist parties.

Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Radek were on the side of the ultra-leftists. But since they didn't know whose side Lenin would take, they themselves refrained from an open struggle. They pushed forward Bela Kun who defended not only the March strategy in Germany (for this strategy he personally bore a significant share of the blame), but also the ultra-leftist criticism of the Luxembourg delegate and of a section of the French delegation, including Laporte, a future fascist.

Lenin was not present at that session. Having found out about the debate that was developing, he sent for a verbatim transcript and then appeared at the session of the ECCI and made a powerful speech against the ultra-leftists:

"Comrade Bela Kun contends that only the opportunists are mistaken—but in actual fact the leftists too are mistaken. I have the verbatim transcript of Comrade Trotsky's speech. According to this report, Trotsky says that leftist comrades of this kind, if they continue along the same path, will destroy the Communist movement and the workers' movement in France. (Applause.) I am deeply convinced of this. I have therefore come here to protest against the speech of Comrade Bela Kun, who has opposed Comrade Trotsky instead of defending him—which he should have done had he wanted to be a genuine Marxist. . . .

"Comrade Bela Kun thinks that to be a revolutionary means defending the leftists always and everywhere. Preparation for revolution in France, one of the biggest countries in Europe, cannot be carried out by any party alone. The French Communists winning the leadership of the trade unions—that is what would please me most. . . .

"When I look at the magnificent work of the Communist Party, when I see all these cells in the trade unions and other organizations, I say: The victory of the revolution in France is assured if the leftists don't do anything stupid. And when someone says, as does Bela Kun, that coolness and discipline have not proven correct—that is idiocy in the spirit of the left wing. I came here to say to our left-wing comrades: If you follow such advice you will destroy the revolutionary movement. . . ."
Passing to the question of the French party's opportunist mistakes, Lenin said:

"Let us take another example—Marcel Cachin and others who in the French Chamber of Deputies refer to Anglo-French cooperation and say it is a guarantee of peace. This is opportunism, and a party which allows this is not a Communist party. Of course, in our resolutions we must show that such and such a statement cannot be tolerated, that this is not the Communist way. But it is necessary that the criticism be concrete. We must brand opportunism. But the real opportunism of the party, reflected in the speech of Cachin, is not subjected to criticism. Instead of criticizing it they criticize this statement [of Trotsky's], and give new 'advice.' This is what Comrade Trotsky said in his speech (the German version of Trotsky's speech is read).

"Therefore Comrade Laporte was completely wrong and Comrade Trotsky, who protested against this, was completely right. Perhaps the behavior of the French party was not thoroughly Communist. I am ready to admit this. But at the present moment such an idiocy—refusal of military service, etc.—would destroy the Communist movement in France and England. Revolution is not made by an appeal to those facing the 1919 draft. Comrade Trotsky was a thousand times right when he repeated this. But we still have the comrade from Luxembourg who rebuked the French party for not sabotaging the occupation of Luxembourg. Well! He thinks that this is a geographical question, as Comrade Bela Kun contends. No, this is a political problem, and Comrade Trotsky was completely right to protest against this. This is a very 'left-wing,' a very revolutionary idiocy, and one very harmful for the French movement.

"I know," continued Lenin, "that among the Communist youth there are genuine revolutionaries. Criticize the opportunists on concrete grounds, point out the mistakes of official French communism, but don't do silly things yourselves. When the masses come more and more toward you, when you are approaching victory, then it is necessary to take control of the trade unions. The majority of trade unions yield wonderfully to preparatory work, and if we succeed in this it will be a great victory. Bourgeois democracy has no standing any longer, but in the trade unions the bureaucratic leaders from the Second and the Two-and-a-half Internationals still prevail. In the trade unions we must first of all gain a reliable Marxist majority. And then we will begin to make the revolution, not with the help of an appeal to the 1919 military age-group and not with the help of those idiocies in which Bela Kun spe-
cializes, but, on the contrary, through the struggle against opportunism and against the idiocies perpetrated by the left-wingers. Perhaps this will be not so much a struggle as a warning against the speeches of Marcel Cachin—together with an openly declared struggle against the traditions of opportunism—and a warning against left-wing idiocies. That is why I considered it my duty to support fundamentally all that Comrade Trotsky said and to declare that the policy defended by Comrade Bela Kun is unworthy of any defense whatsoever by any Marxist or any Communist.

Who Bound Rakovsky?

In 1918 the Rumanian invaders of Bessarabia addressed to the inhabitants of Mogilev the following appeal:

TO THE PEACEFUL INHABITANTS OF MOGILEV

Hand over Rakovsky, bound, otherwise we will not stop the bombardment.

We want peace but Rakovsky wants war.

Choose him or us.

If you will only hand over Rakovsky to us you will get peace and we will send you provisions.

Rumanian Army

But the Soviet revolution did not bind Rakovsky or hand him over to his enemies; he was necessary to it; great work lay ahead for him.

In October 1927 the French reactionary rulers demanded the recall of Rakovsky from Paris. Chicherin, in a note of October 12, 1927, protested against "the recall of Mr. Rakovsky to whose efforts and energy the Franco-Soviet conference is indebted to a significant degree for the results obtained." But precisely because of this energy and these talents of a revolutionary diplomat Rakovsky became hated by the French bourgeoisie. It became necessary to recall him.

But Stalin recalled Rakovsky simply to fulfill the wishes of the Rumanian bourgeoisie: he bound Rakovsky hand and foot and, if he didn't hand him over to Bucharest, tied him up in Barnaul.

Just What Is This?

Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn comments on the decree of the Central Control Commission on the expulsion of "a counterrevolutionary group." The article shows groveling in unsurpassed fashion. In two smallish columns we read:

"Under the experienced leadership of the Central Committee with Comrade Stalin at its head";

further:
"... of the Leninist party, with Comrade Stalin its leader and teacher at its head";

after this:

"Our party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the most faithful disciple of Lenin";

right after that:

"The workers of our country and of the whole world see in the person of Comrade Stalin an unflinching fighter for socialism, under whose leadership [?] they are successfully going from victory to victory";

and finally:

"Under the banner of Lenin and under the leadership of his best pupil, Comrade Stalin. . . ."

All this was written not because it was Stalin's birthday, not on the occasion of his name day, and not on the anniversary of his "six conditions." No, this glorification, repeated five times, arises in an article devoted to the expulsion of a score of party members.

In the same article we find an aphorism which deserves to be immortalized: "The party has unmasked for all time the counterrevolutionary essence of the factional struggle against the general line of the party and against its Leninist leadership." Every leadership is "Leninist" because it leads, and its every line is "general," and every struggle is against the line of counterrevolution. This is unmasked—"for all time." And is, and was, and ever shall be. Amen.

"Big" and "Huge"

In Rabochaya Moskva's account of the September youth demonstration, we are told:

"In the offices of the governing bodies hangs a big portrait of Ilyich." A few lines after that: "There is a huge portrait of Stalin in the Museum of History." Everything is in proportion: for the big Lenin—a big portrait; for the huge Stalin—a huge portrait.

Adoratsky and Zinoviev

In 1923 Adoratsky wrote regarding Zinoviev's History of the Party:

"The lectures by Comrade Zinoviev are only fleeting sketches but they give a correct perspective and in general faithfully outline the contours of the movement and really serve as a good introduction to the study of the history of the party. . . ." (Proletarskaya Revolutsia, 1923, no. 5, p. 344).

It would be interesting to know what opinions Adoratsky, who has now replaced Ryazanov, holds on this question today.
TO GREEK FRIENDS EN ROUTE TO COPENHAGEN

November 19, 1932

Dear Comrades and Friends:

I sincerely regret that the circumstances—which are known to you—did not permit me to leave the ship and visit with you.

But my companions on this voyage conveyed your greetings and your friendly wishes.

As we passed through the Corinthian canal, we heard your friendly and warm voices in the night. We are with you with all our hearts.

Warmest fraternal greetings,
L. Trotsky
 PRESS STATEMENT AT MARSEILLES

November 21, 1932

There is nothing mysterious about my voyage and it presents, in my opinion at least, not the slightest interest to the public. This is the only reason why I refused to say anything to the Greek press or the Italian press. But since this has given rise to regrettable interpretations I believe it advisable now to make the following statement:

I have lived for four years in Turkey. I have read, I have written, and in my leisure hours I have fished and hunted. I have been chiefly occupied with The History of the Russian Revolution. This work is finished, and its last pages have gone to the printers.

Students in Copenhagen, at their own initiative, have invited me to lecture to them on the subject "What Is the October Revolution?" In my lecture, which I will give in German because I do not know the Danish language, I shall try to review the results of my historical researches.

My lecture pursues scientific, not propagandistic, aims; this does not mean, of course, that I intend to conceal my point of view, which remains the same as it was at the time of the October 1917 insurrection.

I am accompanied by my wife, N. I. Sedova, who has shared the vicissitudes of my life for thirty years, and by three young friends who came voluntarily from three different countries to the island of Prinkipo to help me in my scientific and political work: Jan Frankel, Czechoslovak; Otto Schuessler, German; Pierre Frank, Frenchman.

After our short visit to Denmark, we will return to Prinkipo, where we have retained our house with the small library restored after the fire of 1931.

That is all.
Sirs:

I am leaving France through which, actually, I had to pass in order to go to Denmark.

Passing through it briefly has only renewed and refreshed the impressions I already had of this country with its old culture and its taste for tough work.

I avoid political interviews so as not to complicate the technical matter of getting visas because of differences of opinion, which nonetheless retain their significance.

The French authorities with whom I have dealt during my short trip have done their duty with a great deal of tact.
Dear Sirs,

I am pleased to visit your hospitable country for the second time in my life. The first time the occasion was an international socialist congress, almost a quarter-century ago. Despite the shortness of my stay then, I took back the most pleasant memories of your capital, Copenhagen. My wife remembers even today the splendid photographs, postcards, etc. that I sent her from Copenhagen.

I come now, as you are all aware, at the invitation of the Danish Social Democratic student organization in order to give an account of the Russian Revolution. The goal of my lecture is to explain the historical lawfulness of the Russian Revolution. Unfortunately I do not speak Danish, and will therefore deliver the lecture in German.

One small supplemental remark, in some respects an apology: In response to a telegraphed request, I promised an interview—not a political one—to a Copenhagen paper. This was to be obtained in Marseilles by the correspondent of the paper in question. The late arrival of the ship and the necessity of overtaking the train in an automobile made it impossible to fulfill this promise. It was not my fault, but rather a force majeure.
AN INTERVIEW BY
SOCIAL-DEMOKRATEN

November 23, 1932

_Trotsky:_ First and foremost, I want to express my thanks for the invitation and entry permit to Denmark. I recognize that the government, which in no way shares my viewpoint, has given me permission to give a purely historical and scientific lecture to a number of interested young people. I had already received a similar invitation prior to this from Norway, but I had to turn it down because of a fire in my house in Istanbul last year. The trip has been a great pleasure, especially for my wife, who for ten years was in charge of all the museums in Russia, and who was happy to be able to see the wonders of Italy in this field.

_Rechendorf:_ How long has it been since you spoke in public?

_T:_ I have not given a speech in Western Europe since 1914, in Austria. For four years I have been isolated not only from political life, but also from public life in general and from any real communication with broader circles. I have no auditorium where I can speak face to face with people. All I have is my literary activity.

_R:_ Are you lonesome?

_T:_ On the island where my house is located, I live alone with my wife and my six-year-old grandson—who, by the way, was to have come with us—and with a few good friends, some of whom come to visit from great distances. There are six hundred inhabitants on the island, but I have no contact with them. I go fishing, hunting, and boating—and, of course, I write.

_R:_ Only about Russia?

_T:_ I was more at the center of the Russian Revolution than any other living person and as a result I have certain qualifications for portraying it. I have just finished a three-volume history of the revolution—a work that has required three years of intense labor. I just finished thoroughly going over the ma-
terial, which I plan to present to my audience in Copenhagen. And I am already enjoying the fact that I will be able once again to speak directly to an audience in a meeting, rather than to unknown readers. But I am going to talk only about the results of historical research; I am not going to talk politics.

R: Do you have any plans for the future?
T: Yes, I am preparing three books—one about the world economic and political situation and one about Lenin, a biography, which I have already written a little about in an English periodical.* But reports of my book on Lenin have leaked out. In Spain, for instance, a book on Lenin has already come out with my name on the title page. A falsehood and a forgery from one end to the other. I didn't write a word of it.

R: What's behind this forgery, politics or the desire to make a dollar?
T: A combination of both, I think. The book will bring in money, and at the same time it will do damage to me. The book is political in character, and it is full of abominations. Among other things, it has me making extremely disparaging and contemptuous statements about Lenin, speaking about him in a way that was completely inconceivable for me. I am now trying through the Spanish courts to have justice done in this matter.

R: What do you plan to write about Lenin?
T: Besides writing his biography, in the second volume I want to do away with the false interpretations of his teachings and the incorrect conclusions that have been drawn from his ideas. And in the third volume, which will be theoretical and political, I will go into a polemic against what I call his epigones in Russia.

R: Was Lenin himself the Russian Revolution?
T: As a Marxist, I know that history is made according to the material conditions. But under certain circumstances, men can end up playing a decisive role. Without a mechanic, the machine will not run, and without the spark plug's spark, the motor will not start—even if every other part is working fine. Lenin was the Russian Revolution's spark.

R: Do you mean that without Lenin, there would have been no revolution?

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*This text of the interview does not give the subject of the third book, but in another version of the text, published in Folkeblad, Trotsky said the following: "As for my third projected book, it is about the Red Army, about which I have some knowledge."—D. T.
An Interview by Social

T: All the necessary conditions for revolution were present in Russia in October 1917. But without him, I doubt that it would have occurred at that point. Or perhaps it would have lasted for three years; new factors would have come into play, and perhaps the opportunity would have been missed.

R: What was Lenin like?

T: A lovable and simple person. I can still remember him playing with my two sons in the corridors of the Kremlin, where we both had offices. He was like a child in the midst of all the seriousness. His character was such that he took a responsible approach to everything he did. He worked just as carefully on a speech to five workers in London as he did on a proposal to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This almost omniscient man could all by himself make the world's most complicated questions simple and easy for the uninitiated to understand.

R: What did his death mean for the Soviet Union?

T: That Russia lost a man who could not be replaced.

R: And for you?

T: Aren't you trying to sneak in some politics here? You know I'm not going to say anything about politics.

R: Isn't everybody asking you about politics?

T: Yes, they are, but in order to avoid any misunderstanding, I never let a word about current politics cross my lips—let alone an interview. I am writing. I am enjoying the pleasure of relaxing after the exertions of the trip, and I intend to spend my time seeing Copenhagen and its surroundings, and renewing acquaintances I made during my stay here twenty-two years ago for the 1910 congress.
"Are there particular reasons why you accepted the invitation to give a lecture in Copenhagen? I imagine you have received many other invitations as well?"

"Naturally it's a long way up here," Trotsky replies, "but I wanted to take a trip at the moment, and I am fond of Scandinavia. I've been here before, you know. It's purely accidental that I am now visiting Denmark before Norway. Two years ago I received an invitation from Norwegian students, and I was even granted an entry permit by Mowinckel, but in February of last year, just as I was about to begin the trip, there was a bad fire in my home in Prinkipo. All my manuscripts and papers were destroyed, and I left the island while the house was being repaired. I did not want to travel while that was going on. But now that is finished, and we will be going back there after our trip to Scandinavia."

"Have you been to Denmark before?" I ask, after promising not to touch on politics.

"In 1910 I took part in the international socialist congress in Copenhagen. I came here from England with Rosa Luxemburg, who in those years was living in exile from Russia the same as I. The lovely days spent in Copenhagen at that time are some of the happiest memories of my life. There is something gentle and friendly about the Danes. I'm not trying to flatter them, because obviously they can't help being the way they are. But it made an impression on me, I remember.

"We ended the congress with a big banquet in the city hall, I believe, and that was a magnificent experience. Yes, a lot has certainly happened since then. When I think back on the people who were together in Copenhagen at that time, numerous events come back to mind. There was Bebel, the German socialist leader; Jean Jaures, who was murdered when the world war broke out; Lenin, who was relatively unknown at the time;
and Rosa Luxemburg, who fell as a martyr for her passionate convictions. If we engaged in guesswork over the future, we nonetheless never guessed what was to happen later."

"Was your wife along with you that time?"

"No, but she has kept the photographs and picture postcards that I sent her from Copenhagen, and she has always looked forward to seeing the city that I praised so highly."

"Do you know that Lenin lived in Copenhagen a while when he was in exile?"

"That I have never heard, but I find it interesting to know. I myself almost went to Copenhagen in 1907 at the time of my second escape from Siberia. Disguised, I managed to get to the Urals. From there, in my rashness, I took the train to St. Petersburg, and fortunately was able to avoid the police spies. At the Finnish border, I was met by Finnish activists who helped me get to Sweden. Yet on my way to Copenhagen, I only reached Malmo—a steamship there happened to be heading for London."

"Are you going to give a speech in Norway this time too?"

"I think so. If only I can get in, I'll travel up there. My wife and I would also both like to go to Sweden, my wife mostly to see the museums and art. For ten years she was in charge of all the Russian museums—both scientific and artistic—and there are now many valuable collections that she was responsible for bringing together. In Italy, where we stopped on our way here, we had a great experience. We saw the new, huge excavations in Pompeii. What the Italians have achieved there is really colossal. A third of the city has been re-created just the way it was in times past and you can relive the life of the city at that time."

"Have you had a hard trip?"

"Not at all. We had eight days of marvelous sailing from Constantinople to Marseilles, where, fortunately, we arrived too late to catch the train, so we had to take a car to Lyons. That was an unforgettable drive—400 kilometers through southern France. I like to get around." With this Trotsky gets up and rolls up the window blinds. "I would also like to see a little of Denmark," he adds, "though it's too bad about the fog you've got here at the moment."

"What is your speech in Copenhagen going to deal with?"

"I am going to talk about the Russian Revolution—but it will consist of a purely historical and scientific explanation of events. I am going to stick exclusively to Russia and will not get into international politics. I unfortunately can't speak Danish, but I have chosen to speak in German, which is understood, I have heard, by many Danes."
"How long have you been living in Prinkipo?"
"For four years. I have been given the right to live in exile, you know, and Prinkipo is, naturally, better than Siberia. When I'm not writing, I go hunting or fishing. At present I am working on a new, big work on the Russian Revolution. I have a daughter, who lives with me along with her six-year-old son; and, as you know, where there are children, time never hangs heavy. Yet naturally I am not planning to settle down on the little island forever."
"Do you hope to go back to Russia?"
"No, thanks," smiles Trotsky, pulling thoughtfully on his grizzled, pointed beard, "now you're trying to provoke me into talking politics, but I already told you I wouldn't."
Esteemed listeners! My attempt to give the American radio audience a short expose of my lecture on the Russian Revolution is in two senses a daring enterprise. The limits of time are too narrow, and my English, my poor English, is in no proportion to my admiration for Anglo-Saxon culture. I beg your indulgence all the more since this is the first time that I am addressing an audience in English.

What questions does the Russian Revolution raise in the mind of a thinking man? One: Why and how did this revolution take place? And two: Has the October Revolution stood the test? The fact that the proletariat reached power for the first time in such a backward country as the former czarist Russia seems mysterious only at first glance; in reality, it is fully in accord with historical law. It could have been predicted and it was predicted. Still more, on the basis of this prediction, the revolutionaries built up their strategy long before the decisive events.

Permit me to quote here a passage from a work of my own in 1905:

"In an economically backward country,"—I quote—"the proletariat can arrive at power earlier than in a capitalistically advanced one. . . . The Russian revolution creates the conditions under which the power can (and in the event of a successful revolution, must) be transferred to the proletariat even before bourgeois liberalism receives the opportunity of displaying its genius for government."

I quote these passages to show that the theory of the Russian revolution which I advocate preceded the October Revolution by a long time.

Let me sum up briefly this work, which dates from 1905. In accordance with its immediate tasks, the Russian revolution
is a bourgeois revolution. But the Russian bourgeoisie is anti-revolutionary. The victory of the revolution is therefore possible only as a victory of the proletariat. But the victorious proletariat will not stop at the program of bourgeois democracy; it will go on to the program of socialism.

This was the theory of permanent revolution, formulated by me in 1905 and since then exposed to the severest criticism under the name of "Trotskyism." It is clear, therefore, that not only the causes but the general course of the revolution were visible to the Marxists years before it occurred.

The first and most general explanation is: Russia is a backward country, but only a part of world economy, only an element of the capitalist world system. In this sense, Lenin exhausted the riddle of the Russian Revolution with the concise formula, "The chain broke at its weakest link."

The intolerable condition of the peasantry under the feudal-monarchic system, aggravated by capitalist exploitation, created a terrific explosive force which found its leadership in the proletariat. A fundamental factor was the existence of a great revolutionary reserve in the oppressed nationalities on the borders of the empire, constituting 57 percent of the total population. To these must be added the experience of the revolution of 1905, which Lenin called the "dress rehearsal" for the revolution of 1917, and which witnessed the first creation of soviets; and the imperialist war, which sharpened all the contradictions, tore the backward masses out of their immobility, and thereby prepared the enormous scale of the catastrophe.

Last, but far from least, was the existence of a powerful Bolshevik Party, the most revolutionary party in the history of mankind. It was the living condensation of the modern history of Russia, of all that was dynamic in it. It learned to recognize the class mechanics of society in struggle, in the grandiose events of twelve years, from 1905 to 1917. It educated cadres equally capable of initiative and subordination. The discipline of its revolutionary action was based on the unity of its doctrines, on the tradition of common struggles, and on confidence in its tested leadership. Thus stood the party in the year 1917.

In September, Lenin, who was compelled to keep in hiding, gave the signal: "The crisis is ripe, the hour of the insurrection has approached." He was right. The bourgeoisie finally lost its head. The democratic parties, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries, wasted the remains of the confidence of the masses in them. The awakened army no longer wanted to fight for the foreign aims of imperialism. Disregarding demo-
cratic advice, the peasantry smoked the landowners out of their estates. The oppressed nationalities at the periphery rose up against the bureaucracy of Petrograd. In the most important workers' and soldiers' Soviets the Bolsheviks were dominant. The workers and soldiers demanded action. The ulcer was ripe. It needed a cut of the lancet.

Only under these social and political conditions was the insurrection possible. And thus it also became inevitable. The party carried through the October insurrection with cold calculation and with flaming determination. For this reason, it conquered almost without victims. Through the victorious Soviets the Bolsheviks placed themselves at the head of a country which occupies one-sixth of the surface of the globe.

The question now comes up: What was achieved at the high cost of the revolution? Many critics reveal their malicious joy over the fact that the land of the Soviets bears but little resemblance to a realm of general well-being. Why then the revolution and why the sacrifices?

Esteemed listeners! Permit me to think that the contradictions, difficulties, mistakes, and wants of the Soviet regime are no less familiar to me than to anyone else. But in criticism, as well as in creative activity, perspective is needed. Fifteen years! How much that is in the life of one man! But these same fifteen years—what an insignificant period in the life of a people! Only a minute on the clock of history!

In the course of the Civil War in the United States, fifty thousand men were killed. Can these sacrifices be justified? From the standpoint of the American slaveholder and the ruling classes who marched with them—no! From the standpoint of the progressive forces of American society, of the Negro, or of the British workingman—absolutely! And from the standpoint of the development of humanity as a whole, there can be no doubt whatever! Out of the Civil War came the present United States with its unbounded practical initiative, its rationalized technology, its economic elan. These achievements of Americanism will constitute a part of the basis for the new society.

The deepest, most objective, and most indispensable criterion of social progress is the growth of productivity of social labor. The evaluation of the Russian Revolution from this point of view is already given by experience. The principle of planned economy has for the first time in history shown its ability to record unheard-of results in production in a short space of time.

I have no intention of denying or concealing the seamy side of the Soviet economy. The results of industrial production
are influenced by the unfavorable development of agriculture. That field has not yet risen essentially to socialist methods, but at the same time has been led on the road to collectivization with insufficient preparation, bureaucratically rather than technically and economically. These mistakes can and will be corrected. The first Edison lamp was also not perfect. But this is a great question which goes far beyond the limits of my talk.

The profoundest significance of that great revolution, however, consists in the fact that it forms and tempers the character of the people. The conception of the Russian people as slow, passive, melancholy-mystical, is widespread and not accidental. It has its roots in the past. But in Western countries up to the present time those far-reaching changes which have been introduced into the character of the people by the revolution have not been sufficiently considered. The revolution is a hard school. We did not choose it. A heavy hammer smashes glass, but forges steel. The hammer of the revolution forges the steel of the character of the people.

For an explanation of the extraordinary persistence which the masses of the people of the Soviet Union are showing throughout the years of the revolution, many foreign observers, in accordance with ancient habit, rely on the "passivity" of the Russian character. The Russian masses of today endure their privations patiently, but not passively. With their own hands they are creating a better future, and they want to create it at any cost. But let the enemy only attempt to impose his will from the outside on these patient masses, and he will see whether they are passive or not!

I am sure that the great American people has the highest interest, moral as well as material, in observing with sympathy the efforts of the great Russian people to reorganize their social life on a higher historical level. If my short talk can help a few thousand or even a hundred Americans to understand the internal inevitability and the development of the Russian Revolution, I shall feel that my efforts have been well rewarded.
Trotsky in Copenhagen speaking to the United States, November 1932.

Trotsky in Copenhagen making a propaganda film in French, November 1932.
QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNISTS

November 1932

Comrades: You want my reply to the question of why I belong to the Bolshevik-Leninist faction which is in sharp opposition to the current policy of the Communist International and the Soviet government. I will try to outline at least the most important points of the question.

The chief aim of the Communist Party is to construct the proletarian vanguard, strongly class-conscious, fit for combat, resolute, prepared for revolution. But revolutionary education requires a regime of internal democracy. Revolutionary discipline has nothing to do with blind obedience. Combativity cannot be prepared beforehand nor can it be dictated by an order from above; it must always be renewed and tempered. Revolutionary discipline poses the question to every honest and conscious Communist worker: Do we have democracy in the party—yes or no? To ask the question is to answer it. Even the smallest vestiges of party democracy are vanishing with every passing day.

In the Soviet Union the Communist Party is in power. The economic successes are incontestable. The number of workers in the country has doubled and tripled. The cultural level of the masses has been considerably raised in the last fifteen years. In these conditions, party democracy ought to be expanding. But we see just the opposite.

Despite all the achievements and successes, the proletariat as a whole and the Communist vanguard in particular have been fettered by the steel grip of the party and state bureaucracies. The unprecedented deterioration of the party regime must have profound social and political causes. We, the Left Opposition, have more than once analyzed and revealed these causes during the post-Lenin period. Has the official leadership of the party ever loyally submitted our arguments to discussion by the party? Never!

The less the functionary is controlled by the masses, the less consistent he is, the more subject to outside influences he becomes, and the more inevitably his political oscillations resemble the graph of a delirious fever. That is centrism. I repeat: that is centrism. The destruction of democracy clears an area for the development of petty-bourgeois, opportunist, or ultraleft influences.
The differences began in 1923 over the questions of the party regime, industrialization, and relations with the kulaks. Moreover, are you acquainted with the 1926 platform of the Russian Left Opposition? Have you followed the later development of the struggle around the five-year plan and collectivization? In all these questions, the "crime" of the Opposition is that, armed with the Marxist method, it could see clearly, anticipate some things, and give warning in time against mistakes.

Have you read the documents which were written in the factional struggle over the questions of the Chinese revolution? Do you know about the opposing conceptions over the Anglo-Russian Committee—the application of the "united front" only from above and in fact against the masses in struggle? Is the work of the Opposition in this field known to you? If not, it is your duty to familiarize yourself with these documents before taking a position against the Left Opposition.

You must certainly remember the senseless adventures of the "third period" which have badly compromised communism in the eyes of all conscious workers. Is there a single Communist who still can have any doubts on this subject?

The new development in Germany gives a striking example of the fundamentally wrong policy of the leadership of the proletariat: likening democracy to fascism, repudiating the policy of the united front, and consequently renouncing the creation of soviets—because soviets are not possible except as the achievement of a united front of workers belonging to different organizations as well as to different parties. Nothing has helped the German Social Democracy to maintain itself as much as the policy of the international Stalinist apparatus.

We, the Left Opposition, remain faithfully devoted to the Soviet Union and the Communist International, with a different devotion, a different fidelity than that of the majority of the official bureaucracy. The worker who considers himself a Communist but who accepts hearsay, and does not study the documents or verify the facts, is not worth very much. No, he is not worth very much. It was about such people that Lenin invented his harsh but true saying: He who takes anybody's word in politics is a hopeless idiot.

The tenth year since the founding of the Left Opposition is drawing near. Great events have verified and confirmed our attitude. Serious cadres have been educated. We face the future with confidence. No force can separate us from the international proletarian vanguard. The Soviet Union—it is our fatherland! We will defend it to the very end! The ideas and methods of Marx and Lenin will become the ideas and methods of the Communist International!
TO AN UNKNOWN COMRADE

November 1932

Dear Comrade:

I am not sure whether you know my handwriting. If not, you will probably find someone else who does. I am profiting by this fortunate occasion to write a few words to you. The comrades who sympathize with the Left Opposition are obliged to come out of their passive state at this time, maintaining, of course, all precautions. To communicate with me directly is not always easy. But it is possible to find an absolutely sure way, of course, not direct; for example, through my son in Berlin. You can find him through Pemfert (I am enclosing his address), through Grylewicz, through personal acquaintances, etc. Keeping all precautionary measures, it is necessary to establish communications for: information, to distribute the Biulleten, aid with money, etc., etc. I am definitely expecting that the menacing situation in which the party finds itself will force all the comrades devoted to the revolution to gather actively about the Left Opposition.

I will wait for a written (typewritten) affirmation that this letter has been received. It can be written to: M. Pierre Frank, Poste Restante, Pera, Istanbul.

I clasp your hand firmly.

Yours,

L. Trotsky
My literary projects? First a book on the world situation. I will try to give a comparative picture of the correlation of forces in the world arena. The war and postwar developments, including the Russian Revolution, have entirely changed the face of our planet from the economic, political, military, and diplomatic points of view. This new face is in no way stable. The relationship of forces is dynamic, laden with unforeseen complications and sharp turns. We are no longer in the time of the Holy Alliance of Metternich, nor in the epoch of pretended European equilibrium between the Entente and the Triple Alliance. European equilibrium has become a bitter memory or a half-formed dream. Europe in general has ceased to be the center of the world. It is foolish to hope that one day it will again hold this place. The terrible crisis at present, despite its ravages in the United States, has modified the relationship of forces, not in favor of Europe, but in favor of the United States and the colonial countries. To see where we are going—the struggle for a new division of the world on the one hand and the attempts at disarmament on the other—it is necessary to uncover the fundamental economic, social, and political forces, to trace the curve of their development and their mutual reactions, and to draw out their perspectives. There you have the content of my projected book.

The collection of the necessary materials and preliminary studies on diverse questions have occupied me for several years. The fire that destroyed my house and library on Prinkipo in February 1931 was a serious blow to my work, but a great part of the material has been regathered since then. The principal obstacle to my work has been the poverty of documentation in Turkey. I need at least three months of preparatory work in one of the richest libraries in the world. The
place best situated for observing the panorama of the world, from every point of view, is in my opinion New York. Is it utopian to dream of working in one of the great American treasure houses of books? I hope the example of the Danish government will not be lost on other countries.

It is evident that political considerations, especially in the USSR, may contradict my literary plans. It is unnecessary to repeat that my sharp conflicts with the faction presently in power, conflicts that finally led to my banishment in Turkey, have changed neither my attitude toward the Soviet republic nor, I daresay, the attitude of the real majority of the party toward me.

The situation in the USSR is characterized by the combination of great successes with grave difficulties. The question of assessing the successes and difficulties depends, in the last analysis, on the program and the methods of the political leadership, which means its composition as well.

My connections with friends in the Soviet Union and my information enable me to declare with certainty: The prevailing opinion in the Bolshevik Party demands the establishment of unity in the ranks and the replacement of individual leadership, which has in no way justified itself, by collective leadership.

You ask if I am ready to collaborate with Stalin and his closest collaborators? I have never repudiated such collaboration, and now, before the serious difficulties within and without the country, I am less disposed than ever to repudiate it.

Politics knows no personal resentment nor the spirit of revenge. Politics knows only effectiveness. For myself, as well as my companions, it comes back to the question of the program of the collaboration.

The Left Opposition, to which I belong, presents its political program in a publication that appears in Russian in Berlin with my fullest participation. Number 32 of this publication, the Biulleten Oppozitsii, is now at the printers. In addition to its programmatic and political articles, our publication illustrates the internal situation in the country with many articles from the USSR. Thus I feel in no way isolated from the state that emerged from the October Revolution.
ON STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

November 1932

And so Trotsky arrived. Anyone expecting to be faced with an old, brutal, fearful figure would be disappointed. Quite the opposite. There was something friendly, highly cultivated, pleasant, and likable about him. After greeting each of his visitors, he sat down in the empty armchair and waited for our questions.

Where does the revolutionary outlook of students come from—when in fact they are revolutionary?

At the addition of this last qualification, a very revealing and mischievous smile came over the familiar features of his face.

"There you put your finger on it!"

Do they owe this to their social and economic position, or do we have to turn to psychology, perhaps even to psychoanalysis, to explain it?

Once again a mischievous smile. "First and foremost, you have to understand that students do not constitute a distinct and unified group in society. They fall into various groups, and their political attitude closely corresponds to the one prevailing in these various groups in society. Some students are radical-oriented; but of these, only a very tiny number can be won over to the revolutionary party.

"The fact is that very often radicalism is a sickness of youth among what are actually petty-bourgeois students. There is a French saying: 'Avant trente ans revolutionnaire, apres canaille'—Under thirty a revolutionist, thereafter a scoundrel. This expression is not heard only in France. It was also known and used in connection with the Russian students in the prewar period. Between 1907 and 1917 I was living in exile, and I traveled around a lot, giving speeches to the various colonies of Russian students abroad. All these students were revolution-
ary in those days. During the October Revolution in 1917, 99 percent of them fought on the other side of the barricades.

"You find this radicalism among youth in every country. The young person always feels dissatisfied with the society he lives in—he always thinks he can do things better than his elders did. So the youth always feel they are progressive—but what they understand by progress varies quite a bit. In France, for example, there is both a radical and a royalist opposition. Naturally this radicalism includes a certain number of healthy oppositionist forces, but for the most part it amounts to what can only be called careerism.

"Here we have the real psychological motor force. The young feel shut out; the old take up all the space, and the young can't find any outlet for their abilities. They are dissatisfied quite simply because they themselves are not sitting in the driver's seat. But as soon as they are sitting there, it's all over with their radicalism.

"It's like this: gradually these young people move into the available posts. They become lawyers, office heads, teachers. And so they come to look upon their earlier radicalism as a sin of their youth, as a simultaneously repulsive and charming error. As a result of this memory of his own youth, the academician comes to lead a double life throughout his entire life. What it is, is that he himself believes that he still possesses a kind of revolutionary idealism, and in reality he retains a certain liberal veneer. But this veneer is only a coating for what he really is—a narrow-minded, petty-bourgeois social climber, whose real interests boil down to his career."

Trotsky shifted in his chair a bit and looked around with a kind, apologetic smile.

Can students be of any importance to a revolutionary movement?

"The revolutionary student can only make a contribution if, in the first place, he goes through a rigorous and consistent process of revolutionary self-education, and, in the second place, if he joins the revolutionary workers' movement while he is still a student. At the same time, let me make clear that when I talk about theoretical self-education, I mean the study of unfalsified Marxism."

What should be the relationship between the academician and the workers' movement?

A stern and determined expression comes into Trotsky's eyes.

"He must realize that he is coming into the workers' movement as a learner and not as a teacher. He must learn to subordinate himself and do the work that is demanded of him,
and not what he wants to do. The workers' movement for its part must regard him with the greatest skepticism. A young academician must first 'toe the line' for three, four, or five years, and do quite simple and ordinary party work. Then, when the workers have confidence in him and are completely certain that he is not a careerist, then he can be allowed to move up—but slowly, very slowly. When he has worked with the workers' movement in this way, then the fact that he was an academician is forgotten, the social differences disappear."

What, then, is the role of the intellectual in the revolutionary movement?

"His role is to draw general conclusions on the basis of concrete facts. If this process of drawing generalizations out of current conflicting material is not constantly going on, the movement becomes banalized."

Earlier you said that by a theoretical self-education you meant the study of unfalsified Marxism. What do you mean by unfalsified Marxism?

"Criticism of Marxism is not so dangerous. Falsification is a different matter. What I mean by it is theories that go by the name of Marxism, but that have actually abandoned the essence of Marx's teachings. The revisionist Bernstein, for example, made the movement itself the main thing in his theory and pushed the ultimate goal into the background. What resulted from this 'Marxism'? In England, a MacDonald—or a Lord Snowden. 329 You can find other examples yourselves. Such falsification only uses the name of Marxism in order to deceive the workers."

Well, but, as Lis Toersleff wrote, the world hasn't stood still since Marx's time, has it?

"Of course not. I'm no fetishist—Marxism did not come to a halt when Marx died. Marx could also be wrong—mainly in his predictions of when events would occur, and then he erred only in his assessment of the timing. Lenin integrated newly emerged historical factors into Marxism and thus adapted it to our time."

Trotsky then took up the question of democracy and dictatorship: "We Communists do not deny—as, for example, the anarchists do—the importance of democracy. But we recognize its importance only up to a very definite point. That point is reached as soon as the class contradictions become so great that the tension causes a short circuit to occur. At that point, democracy can no longer function, and the only alternatives are either a proletarian or a bourgeois dictatorship. Look at the evolution of the Social Democratic republic in Germany from 1918 to the present. In the early days, the Social Demo-
crats had power, but now it is reactionary generals who are sitting at the wheel.

"Democracy can no longer even play its own game because of the class contradictions. Look, for example, at how the democratic right to asylum—the right of an exiled person to residency—is observed these days."

With the mention of the right to asylum, you could see that Trotsky was again coming back to Dalgas Boulevard. With a broad smile, he continued:

"I am not a stubborn Marxist. You can still get me to believe in democracy. But first you'll have to comply with two wishes: first bring about socialism in Germany through democratic means, and second get me a residence permit in Denmark."
A BOLSHEVIK-LENINIST DECLARATION ON COMRADE TROTSKY'S JOURNEY

November 1932

1. Journalists and politicians hostile to communism have tried to turn against the Left Opposition the fact that Comrade Trotsky used the visas of bourgeois and Social Democratic governments for his journey. By the same logic one could reproach a Communist for traveling on a capitalist ship.

2. Communism does not "deny" democracy as a principle; still less as a fact. All communism does is point out the limited historical role of bourgeois democracy. During one era, it facilitates the formation of proletarian organizations. But it is incapable of solving social problems. The single example of present-day Germany exhausts the question.

3. In all the old parliamentary countries, bourgeois democracy is using up what is left of its old capital. This applies particularly to the right of asylum: it exists in today's Europe only for refugee counterrevolutionaries, not for revolutionaries. The recent experience concerning the length of Trotsky's stay in Denmark reveals this with renewed force.

4. The fact that the Left Opposition had to avail itself of the initiative of a Social Democratic student organization is explained by one circumstance and one alone: the Stalinist apparatus has, for the moment, made it impossible for authentic Bolshevik-Leninists to speak at official meetings of the Communist Party. There is no need to mention that Comrade Trotsky's speech from beginning to end was devoted to the defense of the October Revolution and of the Soviet Union.

5. The Social Democratic government, i.e., the leftmost wing of bourgeois democracy, authorized Trotsky's entry into Denmark only because it felt it would be awkward to deny the request made by its own students and young workers, and thus to reveal too crudely, over a minor question, not only its antisocialist but its antidemocratic character as well.
As soon, however, as the question arose of a simple extension of the duration of the visa, this "democracy" showed that the difference between it and the White Russian emigres, who demanded that the visa be revoked, came down, all in all, to a matter of eight days.

6. Every regime must be judged first and foremost according to its own rules.

The regime of the proletarian dictatorship cannot and does not wish to hold back from infringing the principles and formal rules of democracy. It has to be judged from the standpoint of its capacity to ensure the transition to a new society.

The democratic regime, on the other hand, must be judged from the standpoint of the extent to which it allows the class struggle to develop within the framework of democracy.

7. The example of the Danish visa reveals the total insufficiency of contemporary democracy, even in secondary and minor matters. Under the pressure of world imperialist reaction, petty-bourgeois democracy, even in relatively "peaceful" Denmark, is shown to be incapable of maintaining its "reputation" by granting the right of asylum to a revolutionary, if only for a few weeks. Can one believe even for a moment, under these conditions, that democracy will be able to prevent civil war with its worn-out principles and formulas?

8. The Stalinist faction has taken up a shameful position in the struggle of class forces over the question of the visa. It acted with all its power, through its diplomatic agents, to prevent the issuing of the visa to Comrade Trotsky. Kobetsky in Denmark and Kollontai in Sweden threatened economic and other reprisals. As long as the Social Democracy still wavered on the question of the visa, the Stalinist agencies maintained an alliance with the bourgeois section of the coalition government, against the Social Democrats.

Aiding the imperialist bourgeoisie in the shattering of what was left of the right of asylum, the Stalinists ended up by directly and openly denouncing, to the capitalist governments and their police forces, the alleged holding of a "Trotskyist conference" in Copenhagen.

9. The furious campaign of vilification on the part of the Russian White emigres and the influential imperialist press, with a thinly disguised call for a terrorist attack against Comrade Trotsky; the perfidy of the Social Democratic leaders in relation to their own followers; and finally, the Stalinists' denouncing the Bolshevik-Leninists to the European police—all this blends into one inseparable whole. To complete the picture, one need only add that an important element in the opposition to the right of asylum was constituted by the Danish
royal family and, linked with it, the remnants of the Russian royal family.

10. Before the world working class it has been shown once more with full clarity that the Bolshevik-Leninists, the vanguard of the vanguard, have been placed outside of the law by the rulers throughout the world.

11. The denunciation by the Stalinist bureaucracy through Tass is not only shameful politically but also wrong as far as the facts are concerned. There was no "Trotskyist conference" in Copenhagen. Anyone who follows the press of the Left Opposition and the course of the preparatory work it is engaged in knows that no conference can be held any sooner than two or three months from now.

12. Only this is true: Comrade Trotsky's friends and co-thinkers, alarmed by world reaction's furious vilification, despite material difficulties and obstacles, hastened to Copenhagen from countries neighboring Denmark to lend him their assistance. The strong internal bond among the Bolshevik-Leninists internationally was shown with remarkable force. But the international conference remains as before a task of the period ahead.
Am I satisfied with the result of my trip? Completely. Wasn't I expecting to spend a longer time in Denmark? Yes. I had hoped that after my talk I would be able to stay a few weeks in order to secure medical treatment for my wife and me. However, the refusal of the Danish government was not unexpected. I am very far from illusions about democracy, consequently also from disillusion.

The opportunity for me to visit Denmark came about not in any way through principles of democracy (right of asylum, freedom of assembly, etc.), but by a play of political interests. The left circles of the students and the working-class youth expressed the wish to arrange my lecture in Copenhagen. The Social Democratic government found it all the more inconvenient to refuse because at present there is an undoubted shift to the left in the working class. As agreed, I kept my lecture strictly historical and scientific in character. But the government evidently found that eight days were more than enough to meet the interest in the ideas which I stand for.

My informed friends told me that the main opposition to my being granted the opportunity to stay and get medical care (apart from the court circles, the fascists, the leading circles of the Social Democracy, etc.) came from agents of the Soviet government. I am unfortunately not in a position to be able to refute this report. I should like only to emphasize that it is not a case here of the interests of the Soviet state or of the Russian people, but of the special interests of Stalin's faction. On November 27, Tass informed the world by radio that a secret "conference of Trotskyists" of the Western European countries had met at Copenhagen. It is difficult to call this report anything but a false denunciation. It is a denunciation, because it is a call for police repressions against my political cothinkers. It is a false denunciation, because no conference was called in Copenhagen at all.

The Danish authorities are very well aware of what really
took place. My friends in various countries of Europe were extremely worried by the campaign in the European reactionary press. They saw this campaign in connection with the recent disclosures in the left press about the terrorist act being prepared against me by the organization of General Turkul. Some two dozen of my cothinkers arrived from the six countries nearest Denmark. After the completely peaceful outcome of my talk, they all went home, apart from one or two who decided to accompany me back.

How is one to explain Tass’s unheard-of radio report, or the behavior of certain Soviet agents on the question of my visa? Above all by the internal situation in the USSR. The rumors about the forthcoming "collapse of Soviet power" assiduously spread—for the umpteenth time—by a certain section of the press are completely ridiculous and fantastic. But it is utterly indisputable that Stalin’s personal position has been shaken once and for all. The errors of his policy are now clear to all. In the party the tendency to reestablish a collective and more competent leadership is very strong. Hence the new wave of repressions against the so-called "Trotskyists." My friend Rakovsky, former chairman of people’s commissars of the Ukraine, subsequently Soviet ambassador in London and Paris, has had his three years' banishment extended for another three. All this is officially motivated by the Left Opposition’s ("Trotskyists") supposed carrying out of "counterrevolutionary" activity against the Soviet republic. My talk in Copenhagen, my radio speech to America, my interview for the sound film, enabled me to formulate our real attitude to the Soviet republic, which has not changed from 1917. Hence the exceptional efforts of the group now ruling in Moscow to expel me from Western Europe. The fact that the Stalin faction has found numerous allies and accomplices on this path is fully in accordance with the nature of things.

If I am not coming away from Copenhagen with any new ideas of the nature of bourgeois democracy, I am nevertheless taking back the best of memories of the friendliness and hospitality of the Danish people. I could adduce some absolutely exceptional examples in this field, which are perhaps impossible in any other country in Europe. . . .

You ask about the condition of my life in Turkey? There are not a few false conceptions circulating on this score. I did not of course come to Turkey voluntarily. But it is not true that the Turkish government is subjecting me to any restrictions. My wife and I chose Prinkipo Island for climatic considerations. We have more than once met with attention and cooperation from the Turkish government.
AN OPEN LETTER TO VANDERVELDE

December 5, 1932

Citizen Vandervelde:

Some years ago you addressed an open letter to me concerning, if I am not mistaken, reprisals against the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. You expressed yourself against the Bolsheviks in general and without exception—in the name of the principles of democracy. That is your right. If your criticism did not have the desired effect, it was because we Bolsheviks proceeded from the principles of revolutionary dictatorship.

The Russian Social Revolutionaries, your cothinkers on the question of democracy, at one time had opened up a terrorist struggle against us. They had wounded Lenin and sought to blow up my military train. Brought before a Soviet court, they found in you one of their most ardent defenders. The government of which I was a member allowed you not only to enter Soviet Russia but also to act in court as attorney for those who had tried to assassinate the leaders of the first workers' state. In your defense plea, which we published in our press, you repeatedly invoked the principles of democracy. That was your right.

On December 4, 1932, I and my companions stopped in transit at Antwerp harbor. I had no intention of propagandizing for the proletarian dictatorship there, or of acting as defense counsel for the Communists and strikers arrested by the Belgian government who, so far as I know, have made no attempts against the lives of the members of that government. Some of my companions, and my wife with them, wished to visit Antwerp. One of them needed to get in touch with a consulate in that city in connection with some travel matters. All of them were categorically forbidden to touch the soil of Belgium, even under guard. The part of the harbor where our
ship was had been thoroughly cordoned off. On both sides of the ship—port and starboard—police boats were stationed. From our bridge we were able to review a parade of democracy's police agents, military as well as civil. It was an impressive spectacle.

The number of cops and screws—permit me these familiar terms for brevity's sake—exceeded that of seamen and longshoremen. Our ship looked like a temporary prison; the adjacent part of the harbor, like a prison courtyard. The police chief made photocopies of our papers, although we were not bound for Belgium and, as mentioned, had not been permitted to get off at Antwerp. He demanded an explanation of why my passport was made out in someone else's name. I declined to engage in any discussion with the Belgian police, since they had nothing to do with me, nor I with them.

The police officer tried to use threats: he declared that he had the right to arrest anybody whom the ship's sailing route happened to bring into Belgian waters. I must acknowledge, however, that there were no arrests.

I urge you not to read my remarks as a complaint of any kind. It would be ridiculous to complain about such trifles in the face of all that the toiling masses and especially the Communists are forced to suffer nowadays in all parts of the world. But the Antwerp episode seems to me a sufficient excuse to return to your old "Open Letter," to which I did not reply at the time.

I am not mistaken, am I, in counting Belgium among the democracies? The war which you carried on was the war for democracy, wasn't it? Since the war you have been at the head of Belgium as a minister and even as prime minister. What more is needed to bring democracy to full flower? On that score, I believe, we would have no argument. Why then does this democracy of yours still reek so of the old Prussian police spirit? And how could anyone suppose that a democracy which experiences such nervous convulsions when a Bolshevik happens to come near its borders would prove capable of neutralizing the class struggle and of guaranteeing the peaceful transformation of capitalism into socialism?

In reply you will undoubtedly remind me of the Cheka, the GPU, the internal exile of Rakovsky, and my own expulsion from the Soviet Union. That argument misses the point. The Soviet regime does not adorn itself with the peacock feathers of democracy. If the transition to socialism were possible within the state forms created by liberalism, revolutionary dictatorship would not be necessary. For the Soviet regime the question can and should be posed of whether it is capable of
teaching the workers to struggle against capitalism. But it is absurd to demand that the proletarian dictatorship observe the forms and rites of liberal democracy. The dictatorship has its own methods and its own logic, a very rigorous one. Sometimes even proletarian revolutionists who helped establish the regime of dictatorship fall victim to this logic. Yes, in the development of the isolated workers’ state, betrayed by the international Social Democracy, the bureaucratic apparatus has acquired power which is dangerous for the socialist revolution. There is no need to remind me of this. But before the class enemy I assume full responsibility not only for the October Revolution which produced the dictatorship, but even for the Soviet republic as it is today, including its government which has exiled me and deprived me of my Soviet citizenship.

We destroyed democracy in order to settle matters with capitalism. You are defending capitalism allegedly in the name of democracy. But where is it?

Not in Antwerp harbor in any case. There were cops and screws and gendarmes with rifles. But not even the shadow of the democratic right of asylum was to be found there.

For all that, I left the waters of Antwerp without the slightest pessimism. During the noon break, longshoremen gathered on the deck, emerging from the hold or coming over from the docks. There were two or three dozen of them, sturdy, serene Flemish proletarians, thickly covered with coal dust. A cordon of detectives separated them from us. The longshoremen viewed the scene in silence, taking the measure of everyone present. One sturdy docker winked at us, over the flatfeet with their hats on. Our bridge responded with smiles; a stirring passed among the workers. They had recognized their own kind. I do not say that the Antwerp longshoremen are Bolsheviks. But by sure instinct, they made clear where they stood. Going back to work, they all smiled at us in a friendly fashion and many put gnarled fingers to their caps by way of greeting. That is our democracy.

As our ship sailed down the Scheldt in the mist, past cranes paralyzed by the economic crisis, all along from the docksides the farewell cries of unknown but faithful friends kept ringing out.

Finishing these lines between Antwerp and Vlissingen, I send a fraternal greeting to the workers of Belgium.

Leon Trotsky
A TELEGRAM TO HERRIOT

December 7, 1932

Together with my wife, I have received authorization to pass through France, from Istanbul to Copenhagen and return. At Dunkirk my friends informed me that by missing the boat we would be forced to remain nine days in France, near Marseilles, which did not enter our traveling plans. We made arrangements accordingly. Upon our arrival in Marseilles we were put on an Italian boat, Campidiglio, in spite of the fact that this unexpected turn disorganized the new arrangements. We ascended the boat without objection in order not to create an incident. We then learned that this boat is not indicated in our voyage and that it takes fifteen days to get to Istanbul which, without speaking of the material difficulties, would be entirely harmful to my wife's and my health. When I tried to explain to the special commissioner that I cannot leave on this boat, he threatened me with violent measures.

The transit visas, even the strictest, do not signify, at least without previous formal advice, the right of the police to hold me as a prisoner and to force me to take a boat which is absolutely contrary to that indicated for my trip. I hope that the French government will prevent this abuse. I am ready to leave France by way of Italy, and I hope that the Italian government will not refuse me a transit visa through Venice, which would permit me to leave France tomorrow or the day after.

I await your reply on the docks of Marseilles, with my wife, surrounded by police agents. The declaration of the police chief that he can take no responsibility for the attitude of the Russian Whites cannot change my decision, which is dictated by the circumstances.

L. Trotsky

P. S. I have just learned that the police are going to put us in a hotel in order to set us on the Italian boat by force if the Italian land visa is not given us before our departure.
I'm very sorry but I don't have a great deal to tell you. My trip is of an absolutely private character. All the rumors to the contrary are nothing but false hypotheses and extravagant inventions. Are my wife and I happy to get away from everything for a few weeks? Yes, we are glad to see once again the countries and cities we knew from long stays and frequent trips before the war. Many things have changed. Some for the better; others, more numerous, for the worse. But this is too complicated a theme, one better suited for a book than a brief interview.

The incident at Marseilles has already been widely reported, and not always very accurately, in the European press. I can give you a few words of explanation about this disagreeable incident, which I feel in no way responsible for. When I arrived at Dunkirk, the police informed me that the next ship from Marseilles would not be leaving for nine days and that we would have to spend a week in France. I was told that our friends had already rented a small villa outside Marseilles with the permission of the French authorities. We accepted this unforeseen episode in our voyage as stemming from absolute necessity, that is, shipping schedules and the French police. We changed our travel plans in accordance with the circumstances, and two of my collaborators remained in Paris to buy some books, etc. I arranged with my German editor for an interview in Marseilles. Our son came from Berlin with his wife to spend the week with us. When we got off the train at Marseilles we learned from the police that all the arrangements made for us twelve hours previously had been declared null and void, and that we had to board the Italian ship Campidiglio immediately in order to leave the following day. We yielded quietly and, as you can well believe, unenthusiastically
to these new orders from the police. We went on board, and it was only once we were in our cabin that we learned the ship was a freighter, that it would take two weeks to arrive in Istanbul, and that it was in no way adapted to the elementary needs of passengers. I climbed down from the bridge, and at the bottom of the gangplank I met the special commissioner from Marseilles. I told him that the situation was not a case of necessity but of caprice, that the visa we had been granted could not have been intended as a trap, and that we could not, especially with my wife suffering from seasickness, make use of a ship so unsuited to our voyage. The special commissioner told me he had orders to use force. "You think then that you have the right to use the power of the French police to put me on an Italian ship?" He answered me with a categorical "Yes." I refused to submit no less categorically. My wife and the young friends who accompanied us disembarked from the ship. Surrounded by the French police, we stayed in a somewhat inhospitable corner of the port from midnight until three thirty in the morning. My wife's cold remains as a souvenir of this episode of our trip. Telephoned orders and counter-orders succeeded one another. It was not until dawn that they drove us to the hotel. I sent telegrams of protest to the president of the Council, M. Herriot; to the minister of the interior; and to several deputies. I formed a new plan: to immediately ask the Italian government for authorization for passage from Marseilles to Venice. A response from Rome, positive, arrived in time to relieve the French authorities of a very disagreeable problem: whether to retreat or use force.

My trip across Italy took place under the most normal conditions. We gazed in constant admiration at this superb Po Valley, which I know very little and my wife, not at all. This is the first time we have visited Venice, and we hope it will not be the last.

Postscript, December 9, 1932

Ship schedules have once again intervened in our destiny, but this time in a much friendlier fashion. The ship from Venice left before we arrived. We spent five hours in Venice, rambling in every direction in this unique city. We were compelled to cross a great part of Italy, from Venice to Brindisi, by rail. Unfortunately half of this trip took place at night, which meant we were not able to see the diverse and always superb scenes of Italy.
PRESS STATEMENT AT ISTANBUL

December 11, 1932

Istanbul, Turkey, Dec. 11 (AP) — Leon Trotsky, exiled Russian Bolshevik, is back in Turkey, where life for him is dull but safe. Surrounded by civil service workers aboard the steamer Adria, where he will spend the night, he sent the following statement ashore by his secretary:

"My wife and I have had a very satisfactory trip, which was my first during my four-year stay in Turkey. Visa difficulties, which first made the trip seem impossible, were easily overcome, thanks to the loyal and swift aid of the Turkish authorities.

"This fact alone should quell rumors circulating in Europe that I am treated as a prisoner in Turkey. The rumors are untrue that I went to Copenhagen to talk with representatives of the Soviet government. Surely Turkey would be a likelier spot for such a conversation than Denmark. The trip was entirely private without the slightest political purpose.

"We shall return to the island of Prinkipo, where my fishing and hunting gear await me and where I have the small library which remains from the fire in 1931.

"I shall write a short book about my trip before settling down to more serious work on the international political and economic situation, which will occupy me throughout 1933."
While visiting Leon Trotsky at Prinkipo, I asked his opinion on "proletarian literature," after acquainting him with the debates provoked by certain quarrelsome writers in the West. It would, I trust, be absurd and inappropriate to have to insist upon Trotsky's right to represent the revolutionary tradition. Like it or not, his place in history is established. As a participant in the great Russian Revolution, he remains triumphant even when banished. As a writer he fulfills his task as a representative of the proletariat with rare clarity and firmness.

He began by telling me that his work scarcely left him time to keep abreast of literary movements, even those calling themselves "proletarian." Consequently he didn't feel qualified to take a position on the matter. But later, having taken sufficient time to reflect upon it, he gave me a series of documents, both long and short. All that remains for me is to present them scrupulously. The reader will find here an interview that was spread out over two weeks. It came into my hands from the second floor, where Trotsky lives, to the ground floor where he had lodged me.

The following is Leon Trotsky's text:

"My attitude toward proletarian culture is expressed in my book Literature and Revolution. To counterpose proletarian culture to bourgeois culture is incorrect or only partially correct. The bourgeois regime, and, consequently, bourgeois culture, developed over the course of several centuries. The proletarian regime is only a short-lived regime, in transition to socialism. So long as this transitional regime (the dictatorship of the proletariat) continues to exist, the proletariat cannot create a class culture that is to any degree complete. It can only fashion the elements of a socialist culture. The task of the proletariat is not to create a proletarian culture, but to produce a socialist culture on the basis of a classless society."
I reply to Trotsky that while he is certainly correct to dissociate the notion of culture from class attitudes, this distinction is only useful in reference to an as-yet-undetermined date in the future. Meanwhile, it is conceivable that the working class, in its period of struggle for the conquest of power and the emancipation of all categories of workers, could concern itself with creating, even with insufficient means, a distinctive, provisional culture precisely suited to the needs of the revolutionary struggle. It would be a culture of undefined duration, strictly limited to contemporary societies—but is this culture not necessary?

"Yes," replies Trotsky, "and please emphasize that I would be the last to scorn the creative attempts of an artistic or more generally cultural nature that happen to arise within the revolutionary movement. I only meant to say that the results of these attempts cannot be definitive... I will try to provide you with a more precise formulation."

I receive another document from Trotsky. It is an excerpt from a letter dated November 24, 1928, that he wrote to a deportation center. The fact that Trotsky gave me a copy of this document more than three years after it was written shows that he adheres rigorously to an opinion which our French "proletarian" writers will not accept without bitterness.

Let us read it:

"Dear friend, I received the very interesting wall newspaper and the issue of Oktyabr containing the article of Serafimovich. These curiosities of bourgeois belles lettres believe that they are called upon to create a 'proletarian' literature. What they mean by that, very obviously, is a second- or third-rate petty-bourgeois forgery. One would be just as correct in saying that margarine is 'proletarian butter.' Good old Engels perfectly characterized these gentlemen, especially in commenting on the French 'proletarian' writer Valles. Engels wrote to Bernstein, August 17, 1884: 'There is no reason for

*The interviewer is sorry to have to reproduce here such a harsh judgment on a writer whose Torrent de Fer (Torrent of Iron) he has translated. But what would become of an interview twisted to fit the taste of the interviewer? As far as Serafimovich is concerned, it should be noted that this author of bourgeois training and quite lackluster talent magnificently surpassed himself in his reportage on the civil war in the Caucasus. Moreover, he has the great merit of having given his full support to the October Revolution, thus drawing upon himself the hatred of better writers, now reactionaries, who had once received him with a discreet sympathy. —M. P.
you to be so complimentary about Valles. He is a deplorable literary windbag, or rather one with literary pretensions, who represents absolutely nothing in himself. For lack of talent he has gone over to the most extremist elements and has become a writer "with a cause" in order to put over his rotten literature' [the emphasis here is Trotsky's — M. P.]. Our classics were ruthless in such matters, but the epigones make 'proletarian literature' a beggar's knapsack in which they gather crumbs from the bourgeois table. And whoever is unwilling to accept these scraps for proletarian literature is called a 'capitulator.' Ah! Those vulgar personages! Those windbags! Those disgusting people! This literature is even worse than the malaria that's beginning to run rampant here again. . . ."

This outburst will scandalize the good souls in the revolutionary circles where the author of L'Insurge passes for a literary saint. But what can I do? It so happens that Engels, one of our classics, actually wields the cudgel. His disciple and continuator simply seizes it to destroy the reputation of an anarchist writer whose unsoundness we suspected without being too willing to admit it.*

A little later I use this written conversation as a pretext to question Trotsky on the manufacturers of the propaganda plays that furnish our soirees ouvrières [workers' evenings]. He tells me he knows nothing about them.

I also ask him about Mr. Henri Barbusse and Le Monde. In Trotsky's eyes, Mr. Barbusse and his literary entourage simply don't exist. I had hoped so.

*The revolutionary honesty of Valles, his fervor, valor, and self-denial are unquestioned. But his pathetic literature, full of bragging and empty of doctrine, is least suited to the proletariat. It is not part of the great movements of the masses of people and their heroic epochs. Still we must often regret that in such epochs "phrases," "boasting," and an inconsistent egocentricity multiplied by an unconscious "revolutionary" charlatanism have had so much influence on the masses. The Commune was only too rich in manifestations of this sort, and Valles, very sincere even in his affectation, derived from it a kind of literature of the firebrand petty bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, semi-Marxists and anarchists took it for the very model of revolutionary proletarian literature. The rediscovered pages of Valles published by Lectures du Soir only further support the severe judgment of Engels. It seems, moreover, that Poulaille has adopted a very superficial notion of contemporary revolutions and (with Valles in mind) far too enthusiastic an idea of "proletarian" literature.—M. P.
Suddenly, Leon Davidovich, still seeking to clarify his thinking, informs me that some curious works of Engels concerning Ibsen, never before published, have just been released.

Two mediocre German writers who once belonged to the extreme left wing of the Social Democracy and later became conservatives and fascists had initiated a polemic on the social value of Ibsen, whom they declared a reactionary petty bourgeois. Engels, invited to take part in the polemic, began by stating that lack of time and the complexity of the question made it impossible for him to go to the heart of the matter. Nonetheless, he wished to indicate that in his opinion Ibsen, a bourgeois writer, had exercised a progressive influence. In our epoch, declared Engels, we have learned nothing from literature if not from Ibsen and the great Russian novelists. The German writers are philistines, cowardly wretches, and mediocrities because German bourgeois society has been late in developing. However, Ibsen, a spokesman for the Norwegian bourgeoisie (which for the moment is a progressive element outstripping even the evolution of its own small country) has an enormous historical importance, both in and outside his country. For one thing, he shows Europe and the world the necessity of the social emancipation of women. As Marxists we cannot ignore that. We must make a distinction between the progressive bourgeois thinking of Ibsen and the reactionary, cowardly thinking of the German bourgeoisie. The dialectic obliges us to do so.

It was more or less in those terms that Trotsky passed Engels's reflections on to me. I was unable to take notes at the time. We were eating dinner.

On April 2, communicating from his rooms to the ground floor, Trotsky sent me this message:

"Comrade Parijanine—to avoid misunderstandings on the question of literature and proletarian culture, I would like to emphasize a point that is substantially understood by any Marxist but carefully blurred by the Stalinist bureaucracy and many others. Even under capitalism we must of course do everything to raise the cultural level of the working masses. And that includes, in particular, concern for their literary level. The party of the proletariat must consider the artistic needs of young workers with the greatest attention, sustaining and guiding their efforts. The creation of circles of promising worker writers can, if well conducted, give entirely profitable results. But important as this area of work is, it will inevitably remain confined within narrow limits. A new literature and
culture cannot be created by isolated individuals arising from the oppressed classes. It can only be created by the whole class, the entire people, once they have freed themselves from oppression. To violate historical proportions—which in the present case would mean to overestimate the possibilities of proletarian culture and proletarian literature—tends to distract attention from revolutionary problems in order to bring it to bear on cultural problems. It detaches young worker writers or 'apprentice' writers from their own class. It corrupts them morally, all too often making them second-class imitators with pretensions to an illusory calling. It is against this, and only this, in my opinion, that we must lead a relentless struggle."

In short, Trotsky calls for an authentic culture and rejects mediocre imitation—the flat, tasteless bread of the spirit, that bankrupt caricature of art, that miserable music-hall propaganda, that "prole" theater, those countless sentimental and "philosophical" horrors that the workers' organizations poison themselves with. Trotsky feels equally hostile toward the experimenters in "revolutionary art"—kindly sent our way by a "sympathizing" bourgeoisie irreparably satisfied or distracted by small eccentricities of style and staging. In a word, Trotsky scorns fugitives from the proletariat who, as artists living by their craft, pretend to remain "of the people," claiming to scorn and transform the bourgeois culture that celebrates them, if only for its own distraction.

Culture, the general disposition of societies to work and bear fruit in a certain way, is not improvised. Marxist doctrine holds that the new society will take in everything of value that remains from the old society; the revolutionary is far from denying the rights and duties of succession. It is always the task of a victorious class to impose a new culture, enriched and completed in its detail with the passage of time. But if new is truly new, if the present is the future, it nevertheless contains an enormous admixture of the past. A collaboration of all the popular forces awakened by the revolution is needed, Trotsky thinks, to create the new while preserving the heritage.

In Trotsky's view, as faithfully as I can interpret it, culture is the unified expression of the development of the working class, of the collective power that has already crystallized but which reveals itself only through the revolution. Marxists recognize the stability and the constitution of the species, the continuity of its responses to daily needs which is so constant and consequently so changing. This is what permanent revolution means. The two contradictory sides of this term affirm the highest law of nature that we know.
Trotsky, however, still worried that I might misrepresent his thinking. Along with the preceding letter, he sent me the following communication:

"It is necessary to define what is understood by proletarian literature. Works dealing with the life of the working class constitute a certain part of bourgeois literature. It is sufficient to recall *Germinat*. The same considerations apply even if such works are imbued with socialist tendencies and their authors happen to have arisen from a working-class milieu. Those who speak of proletarian literature, counterposing it to bourgeois literature, evidently have in mind not several works but a totality of artistic creation that, to their way of thinking, constitutes an element of a new, 'proletarian' culture. This implies that in capitalist society the proletariat would be capable of creating a new proletarian culture and a new proletarian literature. Unless the proletariat experiences a spectacular cultural upsurge, it is impossible to speak of a proletarian culture and literature, for in the last analysis culture is created by the masses and not by individuals. If capitalism offered such possibilities to the proletariat, it would no longer be capitalism. There would no longer be any reason to overthrow it.

"To portray a new, proletarian culture within the confines of capitalism is to be a reformist utopian, to believe that capitalism offers an unlimited perspective of improvement.

"The task of the proletariat is not to create a new culture within capitalism, but rather to overthrow capitalism for a new culture. Of course, certain artistic works can contribute to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. Talented workers can enter the ranks of distinguished writers. But there is still a great distance between this and 'proletarian literature.'

"Under capitalism the essential task of the proletariat is the revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power. After this conquest, the task is to build a socialist society and a socialist culture. I remember a short conversation with Lenin—one of our last—on these topics. Lenin demanded insistently that I come out in the press against Bukharin and other theorists of a 'proletarian culture.' In this exchange he expressed himself almost precisely as follows: 'To the extent that a culture is proletarian, it is not yet a culture. To the extent that a culture exists, it is already no longer proletarian.' His thinking is completely clear: once the proletariat has come to power, the higher it raises its own culture, the more this culture ceases to be proletarian, dissolving itself into socialist culture.

"In the USSR, the creation of a proletarian literature is proclaimed an official task. On the other hand, we are told that
in the course of the next five-year period the USSR will be transformed into a classless society. But in a classless society it is obvious that only a literature without a class character—therefore not proletarian—can exist. Clearly, there is a qualitative difference between the terms.

"The leading role of the 'fellow travelers' in literature corresponds, to a certain degree, to the transitional regime in the USSR. The preponderance of the 'fellow travelers' is also facilitated by the fact that the bureaucratic regime stifles the autonomous creative tendencies of the proletariat. The works of less gifted 'fellow travelers' who distinguish themselves by the flexibility of their spines are presented as models of proletarian literature. Among the 'fellow travelers' there are a certain number of real talents, though they still drain needed resources. But the sole talent of the Serafimoviches is mimicry.

"The crude mechanical tutelage exercised by the Stalinist bureaucracy on all forms of spiritual creation must be liquidated. This is the indispensable condition for raising the literary and cultural level of the young proletarian elements in the USSR to the path of socialist culture."

It was a question of literary technique that brought me to Prinkipo. Trotsky knew how much I respected him as a fighter for the proletarian cause and the illustrious organizer of the victories of October. He knew that I considered him one of the greatest men of our time. He had no need of cruder flat­tering confidences, and we didn't even discuss his politics. If my thought and feeling had obliged me to give him my full views, I would have done so, and I would so testify. My declaration would, I know, have no importance for the revolutionary movement. This I consider one of the reasons to abstain from reflections along those lines.

The specific purpose of my visit and stay was to clear up a translation of considerable length over which a difference had arisen between the author and me.

As one can easily imagine, during the long hours of work together we were led to discussions of which some record is worth preserving because of the historic position of my partner in conversation.

I believe that Leon Trotsky, as a writer, uses methods whose yield is very uneven. He acknowledges having edited or dic-

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*In the USSR, "fellow travelers" is the name given to writers, generally of middle-class or bourgeois background, who adapt themselves to the work of the revolutionary proletariat. —M. P.
tated certain of his numerous works with the sole concern of expressing his thought as rapidly and clearly as possible. If his temperament explodes with images or surprising metaphors that "correct" he is unconcerned. Above all, he deliberately uses current political terminology and doesn't worry about repetitions. He cares indifferently for this or that version, judging that the end is attained if his ideas have hit the point aimed at. I know of a book that he insisted be published immediately despite unquestionable imperfections in the translation—and he told me: "It tant."

But when Leon Trotsky, this man of action, wishes to erect his literary monument, he is quite different. He has written and he has said that he hesitated a long time between the careers of engineer and writer before becoming the revolutionary we know. In several periods of his life he has demonstrated a calling as a "man care he constructs books whose high artistic quality no one would deny: 1905, Lenin, My Life, and now, his History of the Russian Revolution.

"Ah, but it is difficult to write!"

Trotsky's manuscripts are immense sheets filled with as much paste as ink.

"My than yours. . . ."

Worth noting here is the extreme tact of Leon Trotsky. He comes to see me: "You ing you for working slowly. No. That was not at all my inten- tion. I know what you are doing. . . ."

But he sometimes becomes indignant when I claim to defend our French syntax against flagrant violations.

I had written a sentence whose construction was schematically shaped as follows: "Comme part il agissait de telle maniere et qu'enfin l'idée qu'il se faisait. . . ."
he was acting in such a way, and, finally, since the idea that he was developing. . . .")

"Ah!

"Que is regularly substituted for comme in a series of subordinate clauses. . . ."

"Ah! . . . look for something else! . . . take away these que's!"

"Yes, cries Trotsky. (He fidgets in his chair, his irritation unfeigned,
his expressive fingers warning me.) "Your que's! Don't you know that Flaubert detested the que's? Just wait! When we make the revolution in your country, your que's..."

I lowered my head: "Yes, perhaps... But the revolution has not yet taken place..."

Trotsky, good-natured and discouraged: "Well, let's not mention it any more... Leave them, your que's... But I'll make up for it soon... You'll see!"

And the battle continues.

Trotsky admires the writing of Flaubert and... of Pascal. Yes, Blaise Pascal, author of apologetics for Christianity. The materialist writer relished Pascal's quick and crisp formulas, the explosive strength that breaks the copious and methodical flow of French prose. Trotsky does not like the oratorical flourish, the "padded" (according to him) development; skill in this seems to him a weakness.

He teases me somewhat ironically:
"You write like Bossuet, comrade!..."
"Ha, ha, that wouldn't be bad at all, if I could believe you!..."

But did he not then become impatient when he senses the rhythmic recitation of Flaubert? No, probably not, because he found in Flaubert, independent of the rhythm, the extreme vigor of contrasts.

These preferences characterize not Pascal and Flaubert, but Trotsky himself. They indicate his affinities as a writer. What is more, in revealing his temperament, they in no way indicate his competence as a critic. They demonstrate only his originality as a man made for battle and the surprise of impulsive formulations.

It is nonetheless true that Trotsky's opinion of socialist culture in general and so-called proletarian literature in particular is of the first importance. For it determines exactly the relations between incomplete elements: on the one hand, artists of necessity bound in the pay of the bourgeoisie; on the other hand, the miserable cultural level of the proletariat, a level that the works of the so-called proletarian writers do not even attain.

There lies the tragic aspect of a situation that will change only with the revolution. And it is this aspect that Leon Trotsky has sharply and clearly raised.
OTHER WRITINGS OF 1932

In addition to the material in the present volume, the following writings of Trotsky during the period covered here have been published:

The History of the Russian Revolution, volumes 2 and 3. 1933. In Russian, German, and other languages these two volumes were combined into a single one designated as volume 2.


Leon Trotsky on the Jewish Question. 1970. Contains a letter to a Yiddish-language paper in New York, "Greetings to Unzer Kamf" (May 9, 1932).

The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany. 1971. Contains "What Next? Vital Questions for the German Proletariat" (January 27, 1932), "Interviews with Montag Morgen" (May 12, 1932), "The German Puzzle" (August 1932), "The Only Road" (September 14, 1932), and "German Bonapartism" (October 30, 1932).


The Spanish Revolution (1931-39). 1973. Contains "Message to the Conference of the Spanish Left Opposition" and "The International Relations of the Spanish Section" (both March 7, 1932), "To the Spanish Youth" (June 13, 1932), and "The Spanish Kornilovs and the Spanish Stalinists" (September 20, 1932).
NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. "The 'Uprising' of November 7, 1927." The Militant (weekly paper of the Communist League of America, section of the International Left Opposition), February 6, 1932. This was in response to a letter by Stalin, "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism," published at the end of October 1931, and reprinted in Stalin's Works, volume 13. Although Stalin had defeated and dispersed the Left and Right Oppositions in the Soviet Union, he was apprehensive at this time about the development of oppositional moods inside the Communist Party and anxious to nip them in the bud by creating an atmosphere inimical to any critical thinking and questions. Along these lines he seized on a discussion article in the magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia, "The Bolsheviks on the German Social Democracy in the Period of Its Prewar Crisis" by a minor writer named Slutsky, which had been printed a year before. Slutsky's article was "antiparty" and "semi-Trotskyist" and should never have been printed, Stalin declared; no forum should be provided for "a slanderer and falsifier," even when he wears the guise of a "historian." Why did the magazine's editors make this error? "I think that they were impelled to take that road by rotten liberalism, which has spread to some extent among a section of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks think that Trotskyism is a faction of communism—one which makes mistakes, it is true, which does many foolish things, is sometimes even anti-Soviet, but which, nevertheless, is a faction of communism. Hence a certain liberalism in the attitude toward the Trotskyists and Trotskyist-minded people. It scarcely needs proof that such a view of Trotskyism is deeply mistaken and harmful. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, which is fighting against communism, against the Soviet regime, against the building of socialism in the USSR. . . . Who gave the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie in the USSR a tactical weapon in the shape of open actions against the Soviet regime? The Trotskyists, who tried to organize anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927, gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of the Trotskyists raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and let loose the wrecking activities of the bourgeois experts. . . ." In addition to his article on the 1927 "uprising" at the revolution's tenth anniversary celebration, Trotsky
wrote several others, reprinted later in this volume, about the Stalinist crackdown on historical discussion and the meaning of Stalin's attack on the "rotten liberalism" in the Communist Party.

2. The Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists) was formed in 1923 as a faction of the Russian Communist Party, and the International Left Opposition was formed in 1930 as a faction of the Comintern. A group of ILO leaders met with Trotsky when he was in Copenhagen in November 1932, and an international preconference of the ILO was held in Paris in February 1933. When the ILO decided to work for the creation of a new International in 1933, it also changed its name to the International Communist League. The founding conference of the Fourth International was held in Paris in September 1938. It held one more conference during Trotsky's lifetime—an emergency conference in the Western Hemisphere in May 1940, which adopted a manifesto on World War II written by Trotsky (see Writings 39-40).

3. Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) became a Social Democrat in 1898, joined the Bolshevik faction in 1904, was coopted to its Central Committee in 1912, and elected to it for the first time in 1917. In 1917 he favored a conciliatory attitude to the Provisional Government before Lenin returned and reoriented the Bolsheviks toward winning power. He was elected commissar of nationalities in the first Soviet government, and general secretary of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) in 1922. Lenin called in 1923 for his removal from the post of general secretary because he was using it to bureaucratize the party and state apparatuses. After Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin gradually eliminated his major opponents, starting with Trotsky, until he became virtual dictator of the party and the Soviet Union in the 1930s. The chief concepts associated with his name are "socialism in one country," "social fascism," and "peaceful coexistence." His biography by Trotsky, uncompleted when the latter was assassinated in 1940, is entitled Stalin, An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence.

4. The notorious isolation prison camp in the Upper Urals held hundreds of Left Oppositionists. A report in The Militant, December 26, 1931, listed the names of 117, some of whom had been incarcerated there for almost three years; it also gave details about their eighteen-day hunger strike, broken only when their jailers beat and fed them forcibly.

5. Christian Georgevich Rakovsky (1873-1941), a leading revolutionary in the Balkans before World War I, became head of the Ukrainian Soviet in 1918 and later served as ambassador to London and Paris. An early leader of the Left Opposition, he was deported in 1928, where he suffered illness, medical neglect, and isolation. In 1934 he gave up the fight against Stalinism but his capitulation did not save him. In 1938 he was one of the major defendants in the third Moscow trial, where he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.
6. **Georgy Butilov**, Trotsky's coworker in charge of the Revolutionary Military Council's secretariat during the civil war, was arrested for refusing to sign false charges against Trotsky, went on a hunger strike, and died in prison in September 1928. **Jakob Blumkin** (1899-1929) was a Left Social Revolutionary terrorist who became a Communist and a GPU official. He was the first Russian supporter of the Left Opposition to visit Trotsky in exile in Turkey. Bringing back a letter from Trotsky to the Opposition, he was betrayed to the GPU and shot in December 1929. **Henry Yagoda** was Stalin's chief lieutenant in the Soviet secret police. After supervising the organization of the 1936 Moscow trial, he was made a defendant himself in 1938, was convicted and executed.

7. **Socialism in one country** was the theory proclaimed in 1924 and later incorporated into the program and tactics of the Comintern. It became the ideological cover for the abandonment of revolutionary internationalism in favor of narrow nationalism and was used to justify the conversion of the Communist parties throughout the world into docile pawns of the Kremlin's foreign policy. A comprehensive critique by Trotsky will be found in his 1928 book *The Third International After Lenin*.

8. **Chiang Kai-shek** (1887- ) was the right-wing military leader of the bourgeois-nationalist Kuomintang (People's Party) of China during the revolution of 1925-27. The Communists had entered the party on the orders of the Comintern leadership in 1923 and the Stalinists had hailed him as a great revolutionary until April 1927, when he conducted a bloody massacre of the Shanghai Communists and trade unionists. He ruled China until overthrown by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.

9. The aim of **Adolf Hitler** (1889-1945) and his National Socialist Party (Nazis) was to destroy the bourgeois-democratic government of Germany and replace it with a fascist regime. Trotsky had been warning since 1930 that despite the ultraleft rhetoric employed by the German Communist Party leadership, there was a serious danger that it might capitulate before the Nazis when a showdown came. In 1932 the Stalinists characterized such warnings as "Trotskyist slander." In 1933 the CP allowed itself and the German working-class movement to be destroyed without firing a single shot.

10. The **Comintern** (Third International or Communist International) was organized under Lenin's leadership as the revolutionary successor to the Second International. In Lenin's time its world congresses were held once a year—the First in 1919, the Second in 1920, the Third in 1921, the Fourth in 1922—despite the civil war and the insecurity of the Soviet Union. Trotsky regarded the theses of the Comintern's first four congresses as the programmatic cornerstone of the Left Opposition and the Fourth International. The Fifth Congress, where Stalin's machine was in control, was held in 1924, the Sixth not until 1928, and the Seventh not until 1935. Trotsky called the Seventh the "liquidation congress" (see
Writings 35-36), and it was in fact the last before Stalin announced its dissolution in 1943 as a gesture to his imperialist allies.

11. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924) restored Marxism as the theory and practice of revolution in the imperialist epoch after it had been debased by the opportunists, revisionists, and fatalists of the Second International. He initiated the tendency that became known as Bolshevism, which was the first to point the way on how to build the kind of party needed to lead a working-class revolution. He was the first Marxist to fully understand and explain the central importance of the colonial and national struggles. He led the first victorious workers' revolution in 1917, and served as the first head of state of the Soviet government. He founded the Communist International and helped to elaborate its principles, strategy, and tactics. He prepared a fight against the bureaucratization of the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet state but died before he could carry it out. His notes of the last week of December 1922 and first week of January 1923 (or, more narrowly, his letter of December 25 and postscript of January 4), written shortly before his last stroke which led to his death, are known as his testament. In the postscript Lenin called for the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary. The testament is reprinted in Leon Trotsky on the Suppressed Testament of Lenin.

12. NEP was the New Economic Policy initiated in 1921 to revive the economy after the civil war, replacing the policy of "War Communism." It was adopted as a temporary measure and allowed a limited revival of internal free trade and foreign concessions alongside the nationalized and state-controlled sections of the economy. The Nepman, who benefited from this policy, was viewed as a potential base for the restoration of capitalism. The NEP was succeeded in 1928 by forced collectivization of the land and the first five-year plan.

13. GPU was one of the abbreviated names for the Soviet political-police department; other names were Cheka, NKVD, MVD, KGB, etc., but GPU is often used in their place.

14. Ivan T. Smilga (1892-1938), an Old Bolshevik, was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council and in 1927 deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission. A leader of the Left Opposition, he was deported in 1928 and capitulated in 1929. At the time of the Moscow trials he disappeared, without trial or confession.

15. Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) became a revolutionary in 1896 and a collaborator with Lenin on Iskra in 1902. He broke with Lenin the next year over the nature of the revolutionary party and aligned himself with the Mensheviks. He broke with the Mensheviks in 1904 and tried during the next decade to reunite the party. In the 1905 revolution, he was the leader of the St. Petersburg Soviet and developed the theory of permanent revolution. In 1915 he wrote the Zimmerwald manifesto against the war. He joined the Bolshevik
Party in 1917, was elected to its Central Committee, and organized the Bolshevik insurrection that made the new Soviet state possible. His first government post was as commissar of foreign affairs. Then as commissar of war he organized the Red Army and led it to victory through three years of civil war and imperialist intervention. He formed the Left Opposition in 1923 and fought for the next decade to return the Soviet Union and the Communist International to Leninist internationalism and proletarian democracy. Defeated by the Stalin faction, he was expelled from the Communist Party and the Comintern, and exiled to Turkey in 1929. In 1933 he gave up his efforts to reform the Comintern and called for the creation of a new International. He viewed his work on behalf of the Fourth International as the most important of his career. Gregory Zinoviev (1883-1936) was a leading figure of the Comintern in Lenin's time, serving as its first president. He, along with Kamenev, helped Stalin launch the crusade against "Trotskyism" but then he formed a bloc with the Left Opposition, 1926-27; when he was expelled from the party in 1927, he capitulated to Stalin. Expelled again in late 1932, he repented again in 1933. He was framed up in the first Moscow trial in 1936 and executed.

16. "A Letter to the Politburo." By permission of the Harvard College Library. Translated for this volume by George Saunders. On October 31, 1931, Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag), the German Stalinist paper, published a report about the plans of a Russian White Guard terrorist group led by czarist general Anton W. Turkul to assassinate Trotsky in Turkey and to put the blame on Stalin (see declaration of the Bolshevik-Leninists on "The White Guard Preparation of a Terrorist Act Against Comrade Trotsky" in Writings 30-31). The information about the Turkul plot, which could have come only from the GPU, was not printed in the Soviet Union, and when representatives of the Left Opposition approached the Soviet embassies in Berlin and Paris to discuss the possibility of joint security measures in behalf of Trotsky, they got a runaround. The declaration cited above was another demand by the Left Opposition for Soviet help toward Trotsky's defense; it was sent to Moscow, and not published until later, when it had become plain that the Stalinists did not intend to help, and that they had published the Rote Fahne report primarily to provide an alibi for Stalin. Trotsky's letter to the Politburo also was not intended for publication originally; it was not until five years later, a few months after the first Moscow trial, that he recalled and printed part of this letter, as evidence that he could not have been together with Zinoviev and Kamenev in the kind of conspiracy charged at that trial (see "A Significant Episode," December 30, 1936, in Writings 37-38). Part of Stalin's answer to Trotsky's letter was the decree depriving him of Soviet citizenship a month and a half later.
17. The Politburo (Political Bureau) was the ruling body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1932 it consisted of Stalin, Andreyev, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, Kossior, Kubyshev, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, and Voroshilov.

18. The Chinese revolution of 1925-27 was crushed in part because the Chinese Communist Party, following the Comintern's orders, entered the Kuomintang and subordinated the workers' interests to those of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Trotsky is contrasting this false policy of class collaboration in China with the false policy of ultraleftism practiced by the Stalinists in Germany and elsewhere, 1928-34.

19. "Stalin's six conditions" to guide the development of industry, laid down in a speech June 23, 1931, stressed the need to organize the recruitment of workers for industry, eliminate "wage equalization," end the lack of personal responsibility, create a working-class industrial and technical intelligentsia, improve the treatment of the older engineers and technicians, introduce business accounting, etc. ("New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Construction," in Stalin's Works, volume 13).

20. The term dictatorship here is short for dictatorship of the proletariat, the Marxist term for the form of rule by the working class that will follow rule by the capitalist class (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie). More modern substitutes for dictatorship of the proletariat are workers' state and (a term Trotsky disliked) workers' democracy.

21. White Guards and White Russians were names used for the Russian counterrevolutionary forces following the October Revolution.

22. Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), the Russian author, was a Bolshevik sympathizer before and after 1905. He was hostile to the October Revolution in 1917, but later gave support to the new government until he left the country in 1921, ostensibly for reasons of health. When he returned in 1932, he gave general support to Stalin's policies. Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951), an Old Bolshevik, was people's commissar of foreign affairs, 1930-39, ambassador to the United States, 1941-43, and deputy commissar for foreign affairs, 1943-46. Stalin used him to personify "collective security" when he sought alliances with the democratic imperialists and shelved him during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact and the cold war.

23. Leon Kamenev (1883-1936), an Old Bolshevik, was, with Zinoviev, an ally of Stalin against Trotsky and then an ally of Trotsky until the Opposition was defeated and its leaders expelled. With Zinoviev, he capitulated in December 1927 and was reinstated in 1928, was expelled again in late 1932 and capitulated again in 1933. He was executed after the first Moscow trial frame-up.

24. Zinoviev and Kamenev, with Stalin, formed a "triumvirate" in the Politburo against Trotsky, initiating the crusade against
"Trotskyism" in 1923 and continuing it especially after Lenin's death in January 1924. They broke with Stalin in 1925 and collaborated with the Left Opposition in a Joint Opposition in 1926-27.

25. **Bonapartism** was a central concept in Trotsky's writings during the 1930s. He saw two types—bourgeois and Soviet. Bourgeois Bonapartism appears during periods of acute social crisis, he said, usually in the form of a government that seeks to raise itself above the nation and the contending classes; it must not be equated with fascism, even though both serve in the interests of maintaining the capitalist system. His most extensive writings on bourgeois Bonapartism will be found in *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*. His views on Soviet Bonapartism reached their final form in his essay, "The Workers' State, Thermidor and Bonapartism," reprinted in *Writings 34-35*.

26. In 1927 the GPU identified somebody seeking contact with members of the Left Opposition as a "**Wrangel officer**." Wrangel was a White Guard general who had fought against the Soviets in the civil war. This attempt to smear the Oppositionists as collaborators of counterrevolutionaries backfired when the GPU was forced to admit that the alleged Wrangel officer was actually an agent of the GPU.

27. **Karl Marx** (1818-83) was, with Frederick Engels, the founder of scientific socialism and a leader of the First International.


29. The **Brandlerite faction** was the German component (KPO) of the Right Opposition in the Comintern; in the Soviet Union, the Right Opposition leaders were Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky; in the United States, Lovestone.

30. The **Social Democracy** was the name of various socialist parties. Until 1914, when most Social Democratic parties supported the war, it was synonymous with revolutionary socialism or Marxism. Thereafter it was used by revolutionaries to designate opportunist betrayers of Marxism.

31. **Heinrich Brandler** (1881-1967) and **August Thalheimer** (1884-1948), leaders of the KPO, had been founders of the German Communist Party. Brandler was its principal leader when it failed to take advantage of the revolutionary situation in 1923, was made a scapegoat by the Kremlin and removed from party leadership in 1924. Both were expelled in 1929.

32. **Max Seydewitz** (1892- ), a left Social Democrat and member of the Reichstag, was one of the founders of the German Socialist Workers Party (SAP) in October 1931. A group in the KPO led by Walcher and Froelich advocated that the KPO join the new SAP, and later split away to join it themselves in 1932. Seydewitz soon left the SAP; after World War II he became a Stalinist functionary in East Germany.
33. On February 15, 1928, Pravda printed an article calling attention to a serious grain shortage and a kulak danger to the Soviet economy. Written only a month after Trotsky's deportation to Alma-Ata, it offered evidence supporting the proposals of the Left Opposition and was the first sign of the coming Stalinist "turn to the left" both in the USSR and in the Comintern.

34. Lazar Kaganovich (1893- ) was a crony of Stalin and an undeviating Stalinist in various Soviet governmental and party posts. He was removed from all his posts as an "antiparty" element when Khrushchev took over the Soviet leadership in the 1950s.

35. The Canton insurrection of December 1927 was called by the Chinese Communist Party at the instigation of Stalin. Since the party was isolated and the uprising unprepared, it was crushed in less than three days at a cost of several thousand lives. Cantonist therefore is probably a term for adventurist or putschist.

36. Left Radicals was the name used to designate the left wing of the prewar German Social Democracy. Its leaders were Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, and others who later founded the Spartakusbund and the German Communist Party.

37. A conference to reassemble the antiwar internationalist currents that had survived the debacle of the Second International at the outbreak of World War I was held in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in September 1915. Most of the participants were pacifists; a minority led by Lenin constituted the Zimmerwald Left. Ture Nerman (1886- ) was a Swedish poet and writer who represented the Norwegian delegation. Carl Hoglund (1884-1956) was a leader of the Swedish Left Socialist Party and, from 1917-24, a leader of the Communist Party. Julian Borchardt (1868-1932) was in the left wing of the German Social Democracy.

38. Frederick Engels (1820-95) was the lifelong collaborator of Karl Marx and coauthor with him of many of the basic works of Marxism. In his last years he was the outstanding figure of the young Second International. Eduard Bernstein (1950-1932), the literary executor of Engels, was the first theoretician of revisionism in the German Social Democracy. Socialism, he held, would come about through the gradual democratization of capitalism; therefore Marxism had to be "revised" and the workers' movement had to abandon the policy of class struggle for one of class collaboration with the "progressive" capitalists. Bernstein's book, Evolutionary Socialism, was attacked by the noted Marxists of the period, but revisionist theory and practice became increasingly dominant in the most important Social Democratic parties and led to the collapse of the Second International in 1914. The quotation is from Engels's letter dated November 28, 1882.

39. This passage demonstrates that while Trotsky in 1932 was opposed to giving up the policy of trying to reform the Comintern, his mind was by no means closed to the possibility that events might dictate its abandonment and replacement by the perspective of a new International.
40. "Internal Polemics and the Party Press." Internal Bulletin, Communist League of America, number 2, July 1932. In 1931, Max Shachtman, one of the founders of the CLA, served as its representative in the Administrative (International) Secretariat of the ILO; there he incurred Trotsky's criticism for positions he took in regard to a number of internal disputes in various European sections; Trotsky held that in these areas Shachtman was expressing personal preferences rather than really representing the CLA's positions. After his return to the United States, Shachtman was the leader of a minority tendency inside the CLA. In June 1932 a plenum (full meeting) of the CLA National Committee was held to try to resolve differences that were paralyzing the organization and to approve a clearcut position on the disputed international questions among others. After the plenum, two internal bulletins were published for CLA members; as part of the documentation one of these included six letters, full or excerpted, written by Trotsky during 1931 and 1932 to Shachtman and the CLA National Committee. The article by Felix (a member of the Communist League of France and leader of its Jewish group) to which Trotsky objected in the present letter appeared in The Militant of December 19, 1931. In reply the CLA National Committee informed Trotsky that his apprehensions about Shachtman in this instance were unfounded since he had had nothing to do with the publication of the Felix article.

41. The General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was the major union federation in France, dominated by a reformist leadership. A split in 1921 resulted in the formation of the radical but smaller rival, the Unitary General Confederation of Labor (CGTU), which lasted until the two were reunified in 1936.

42. Max Shachtman (1903-72) was a founder of the American Left Opposition and the Socialist Workers Party. In the early 1930s he led a minority tendency inside the CLA against a majority tendency headed by James P. Cannon; the differences between them were not well-defined, leading to a stalemate in which the external work of the organization suffered. These differences were overcome in 1933, partly with Trotsky's aid, and during the next several years Shachtman played a leading role in building the Fourth International movement in the U.S. In 1939, however, he succumbed to petty-bourgeois pressure when World War II began, and led a struggle to revise basic Marxist policies and practices. In 1940 he and James Burnham led a split from the Socialist Workers Party; in 1958 he joined the Socialist Party and became a leader of its right wing.

43. Maurice Paz (1896—), a French lawyer, was an early Oppositionist, associated with the magazine Contre le Courant (Against the Stream), which was published from 1927 to 1929. He visited Trotsky in Turkey in 1929 and broke with the Opposition the same year over what he considered its unrealistic perspectives. He joined the French Socialist Party and became part of its leadership, associated with the Paul Faure tendency of the apparatus.
44. **Albert Weisbord** (1900- ), who was expelled from the American Communist Party in 1929, organized a small group, the Communist League of Struggle, which proclaimed its adherence to the ILO in the early 1930s although its politics vacillated between those of the Right and Left Oppositions. He later broke with Marxism and became an American Federation of Labor organizer.

45. **Kadikoy**, in the outskirts of Istanbul, on the Asian coast, was the place where Trotsky, his family, and comrades lived for almost one year following the fire that destroyed their home in Prinkipo in the early hours of March 1, 1931. Most of the articles in this volume were written in Prinkipo, to which they moved back around the end of January 1932.

46. **Albert Glotzer** (1905- ) was a leader of the Left Opposition in the U.S. He was closely associated with Shachtman, and split from the SWP with him in 1940. At the end of 1931, he visited Trotsky in Kadikoy. His report of the visit, "Five Weeks in Kadikoy," appears in *Writings 30-31*.

47. The Jewish group of the Communist League of France was intended to promote Left Oppositionist propaganda among Jewish workers in that country; for a while it published a Yiddish paper, *Klorkeit* (Clarity). Trotsky's friendly letter to this paper in May 1930 is reprinted in *Leon Trotsky on the Jewish Question*. When the Jewish group became a faction in the French League, Trotsky accused it of trying to turn the League into a federation of national groups.

48. "Reply to the Jewish Group in the Communist League of France." From an unnumbered and undated internal bulletin published by the Communist League of America in 1932. This bulletin also contained parts of a circular letter to the sections of the ILO written by Trotsky December 22, 1931, which included criticisms of the Communist League of France and its Jewish group (for the whole letter, see *Writings 30-31*). The same bulletin printed "Declaration of the Jewish Group" to which Trotsky made this reply, and other articles, letters, and resolutions by its leaders.

49. The Jewish Bund (the General Jewish Workers Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) was part of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party until 1903, when it opposed Lenin's concept of a multinational, democratically centralized party. When the party rejected the Bund's demand for a federated party structure, in which the Bund would be in charge of relations with Jewish workers, it split and became an independent organization. In 1917 it sided with the Mensheviks against the Bolshevik Revolution.

50. **Bolshevism** and **Menshevism** were the two major tendencies in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, section of the Second International, following its Second Congress in 1903. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, and the Mensheviks, led by Julius Martov,
eventually became separate parties, ending up on opposite sides of the barricades in 1917. Old Bolsheviks were those who joined the Bolshevik Party before 1917, that is, members of the party's "old guard." Although it was an honorific designation, Lenin sometimes used it slightingly for party veterans who hadn't learned or relearned anything for a long time.

51. M. Mill had been chosen by the Russian Opposition as its member of the Administrative Secretariat of the ILO, largely because of his knowledge of the Russian language; after he was removed from this post in 1932 because of his maneuvers and personal intrigues, he became an agent of Stalinism. Trotsky described him as an East European, but Isaac Deutscher, in The Prophet Outcast, called him an American.

52. Raymond Molinier (1904- ) was a founder of the Communist League of France and its paper La Verite (The Truth), in 1929, with whom Trotsky collaborated in many of the League's internal disputes until 1935; their collaboration ended that year when the Molinier group published a periodical, La Commune (see Writings 35-36). Molinier was for several years the target of rumors and innuendos about allegedly improper fund-raising methods. In order to concentrate the discussion on the political differences, Trotsky sought to settle those rumors by having them formally investigated by a control commission.

53. Pierre Naville (1904- ) was a founder of the French League and a member of the International Secretariat of the ILO. He left the Fourth Internationalist movement during World War II. He is the author of many scientific books and of a memoir, Trotsky vivant, published in 1958.

54. Alfred Rosmer (1877-1964) was a revolutionary syndicalist and collaborator of Trotsky in France during World War I. He was elected to the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1920, and was a leader of the French Communist Party until his expulsion in 1924. He was a leader of the Left Opposition and its International Secretariat until 1930, when he withdrew over differences with Trotsky. Their personal friendship was renewed in 1936. He wrote several books on labor history. His memoir of Trotsky in Paris, 1915-16, appears in the collection Leon Trotsky, The Man and His Work (Pathfinder Press, 1969).

55. Kurt Landau was for a short time a leader of the Left Opposition in Austria and Germany; he was assassinated by the Stalinists in Spain during the civil war. Trotsky's analysis of "Landauism" appears in Writings 32-33. Trotsky's differences with Landau, Naville, and Rosmer were not the same in each case (see especially Writings 30 and 30-31), but they had this common feature—that he believed each of them represented tendencies that had joined the Left Opposition through accident or misunderstanding and that they lacked the political capacity to provide a Bolshevik type of leadership.
56. **Albert Treint** (1889- ), the leader of the French Communist Party who supported the Joint Opposition led by Trotsky and Zinoviev and was expelled in 1927, collaborated with several communist groups, including the Communist League of France, to which he belonged for a few years. He later joined a syndicalist group. For Trotsky's differences with Treint at the end of 1931, see *Writings* 30-31.

57. Disputes in the International Left Opposition over "faction" and "party" concerned the Opposition's relationship to the Comintern and the degree to which it could engage in independent political activity. The views of Trotsky and the ILO majority on this question at the end of 1932 are expressed in "The International Left Opposition, Its Tasks and Methods" (*Writings* 32-33).

58. **Henri Delfosse** had been, like Felix, a member of the editorial board of *Contre le Courant*.


60. **Heinrich Bruening** (1885-1970), the leader of the Catholic Center Party who was opposed to working with the Nazis, was appointed chancellor of Germany by Hindenburg in March 1930. Lacking a majority in the Reichstag, he ruled by decree from July 1930 to his dismissal in May 1932. Trotsky viewed him as a representative of Bonapartism in the epoch of the decay of the bourgeois system.

61. **Hermann Mueller** (1876-1931), a Social Democrat who served as chancellor in a coalition government (1928-30), was replaced by Bruening.

62. "Is Stalin Weakening or the Soviets?" *The Political Quarterly* (London), July-September 1932; a shortened version appeared in the *New York Times*, May 8, 1932. It has been dated January 1932 in this volume because of the reference in its next to last paragraph to the Seventeenth Party Conference in Moscow, which was held from January 30 to February 4.

63. **Vyacheslav M. Molotov** (1890- ), an Old Bolshevik, was elected to the Russian party's central committee in 1920 and soon became an ardent supporter of Stalin. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, 1928-34, president of the Council of People's Commissars, 1930-41, and foreign minister, 1939-49, 1953-56. He was eliminated from the leadership in 1957 for opposing the Khrushchev "de-Stalinization" program.

64. **Pavel Miliukov** (1859-1943) was the leader of the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats), the major capitalist party, and minister of foreign affairs in the first Provisional Government following the February revolution. **Alexander Kerensky** (1882-1970), associated with
the Social Revolutionary Party, was prime minister of the government overthrown by the Bolsheviks.

65. The first five-year plan was shortened to four years and three months, extending from October 1928 to the end of 1932. Further discussion on this five-year plan and on the projection of the second will be found later in this volume, in "The Soviet Economy in Danger."

66. Emelyan Yaroslavsky (1878-1943) was a top Stalinist specialist in the extirpation of "Trotskyism," which, however, did not prevent him from falling from favor in 1931-32 when he failed to keep up with the tempo demanded by Stalin in the rewriting of Soviet history.

67. Pravda (Truth) was the official Bolshevik paper starting in 1912; it became a daily in 1917.

68. Alfonso XIII, king of Spain, abdicated after the growth of rebellious movements among the workers, peasants, and students, and a republic was proclaimed in April 1931. The new government promised radical change and designated itself as a "republic of labor," but its leaders felt that granting Trotsky a visa would be going a bit too far. For Trotsky's analysis of the problems facing Spain, see The Spanish Revolution (1931-39) (Pathfinder Press, 1973).

69. Alexei Rykov (1881-1938), president of the Council of People's Commissars, 1924-30, Mikhail Tomsky (1886-1936), chairman of the trade unions until 1930, and Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938), president of the Comintern, 1926-29, represented the right wing in an alliance with Stalin against the left. The Stalinist drive against the Right Opposition began shortly after the Fifteenth Congress had expelled the Left Opposition at the end of 1927; by the end of 1929 all three capitulated. Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo in 1929, Rykov and Tomsky in 1930. Tomsky committed suicide during the first Moscow trial, Bukharin and Rykov were victims of the third Moscow trial.

70. This refers to the so-called Menshevik-Industrial Party "wreckers" trials, where the defendants confessed to sabotage of the economy. In 1930 and 1931 Trotsky accepted these confessions as valid (see Writings 1930-31), a view he still held in 1932. Later, prior to the first Moscow trial in 1936, he admitted that he had made an error in accepting the official version of these frame-ups.

71. Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947) was a leader of the British Conservative Party and prime minister in 1923, 1924-29, 1935-37. Winston Churchill (1874-1965) was first a Conservative, then a Liberal, and then a Conservative again, holding many cabinet posts, including prime minister, 1940-45, 1951-55. He took a hard line against the Bolsheviks, was one of the chief inspirers of imperialist intervention after the October Revolution, and remained a fervent opponent of the Soviet Union.

72. "For Collaboration Despite Differences." Internal Bulletin, Com-
munist League of America, number 2, July 1932. Shachtman withdrew his resignation and continued to serve as an editor of The Militant.

73. "Answers to Questions by the New York Times." The New York Times, March 5, 1932, where it was entitled "Trotsky Predicts World Sovietism." This interview was arranged through Simon and Schuster, the American publisher of The History of the Russian Revolution in 1932-33, which sold its rights to that work in the McCarthyite 1950s when Trotsky's books did not sell well.

74. In the United States this book was published under the name Whither Russia?

75. Thermidor 1794 was the month, according to the new calendar proclaimed by the French Revolution, in which the radical Jacobins led by Robespierre were overthrown by a right wing within the revolution; although it opened up a period of political reaction that culminated in the seizure of power by Napoleon Bonaparte, it did not go so far as to restore the feudal regime. Trotsky called the conservative Stalinist bureaucracy Thermidorean because he believed that their policies were preparing the way for a capitalist counterrevolution. Trotsky modified his theory about the Thermidorean analogy in a 1935 essay, "The Workers' State, Thermidor, and Bonapartism" (reprinted in Writings 34-35).

76. Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937) was the prime minister in the first British Labour government (1924) and in the second (1929-31). In 1931 he bolted the Labour Party to form a "national unity" cabinet with the Conservatives and Liberals (1931-35). Although he remained as prime minister, the real power in the government was held by Baldwin, and he was ignored by the Conservatives and reviled by the Labourites. Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) was an early advocate of a protective tariff when free trade was still the prevailing policy in England. The reference to the son was probably to Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937), Conservative foreign secretary (1924-29), who had been awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1925 for his part in the Locarno pact and entry of Germany into the League of Nations but became unpopular because of a break in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the failure of a Geneva disarmament conference in 1927. Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940), another son, Conservative prime minister (1937-40), is known for his appeasement policy toward Germany.

77. The united front was a tactic utilized by the Bolsheviks in Russia before the October Revolution and elaborated by the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920. It is designed to give the working class the opportunity to struggle jointly against the common class enemy, even when the workers are divided into reformist and revolutionary organizations. Between 1928 and 1934 the Stalinists perverted this tactic into what they called the "united front from below," which was based on the idea that joint-action arrangements
must be negotiated and consummated with the ranks, and not the leaders, of non-Stalinist organizations; the effect was to torpedo the possibility of any actual united fronts. Trotsky's fullest discussion of the united front will be found in *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*.

78. **Aristide Briand** (1862-1932) was expelled from the French Socialist Party in 1906 for accepting office in a capitalist cabinet. He was premier several times and representative to the League of Nations. On September 19, 1929, at a diplomatic luncheon attended by representatives of twenty-seven countries, he called for the establishment of a United States of Europe, which Trotsky used as the occasion to write an essay entitled "Disarmament and the United States of Europe" (*Writings* 29).

79. Trotsky's remarks about a labor party in the U.S. touched off a considerable discussion in the CLA and between the CLA and other radical organizations. Later in the year he wrote a letter on that subject alone ("The Labor Party Question in the United States," May 19, 1932, reprinted in this volume). Six years later, after the CIO had been organized, he modified his views and urged his American comrades to work for the creation of a labor party (see his 1938 discussions with Americans reprinted in *The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution* (Pathfinder Press, 1973).

80. "From a Letter to Simon and Schuster." The *New York Times*, February 27, 1933, in a story entitled "Publish First Volume of Trotsky's History." On the date that the first volume of *The History of the Russian Revolution* was published, Simon and Schuster persuaded the *New York Times* to print excerpts from a letter Trotsky had written the publishers (date of letter not given). In addition to the excerpts, the *Times* summarized Trotsky's remarks about technical difficulties he had encountered in Turkey in obtaining material for his history, and about the complete suppression in the Soviet Union of the thirteen volumes of his *Collected Works* published in the 1920s; he estimated that the *Works* projected at that time would have come to more than thirty volumes. A letter in 1971 from the editors of the present volume asking for a complete copy of the Trotsky letter received the following reply: "Unfortunately, Simon and Schuster long ago gave up the rights to the book and I am afraid the letter you are referring to is somewhere in our warehouse in New Jersey."

81. Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* was published in two volumes in Europe, and in three in the United States.

82. **Woodrow Wilson** (1856-1924) was U.S. president, 1913-21; **David Lloyd George** (1863-1945) was British prime minister 1916-22.

83. The *Entente* was the World War I alliance of Great Britain, France, Russia, and later Italy.
84. "Interview by the Associated Press." From an Associated Press dispatch from Prinkipo in the New York Times, February 27, 1932; excerpts, somewhat modified, also appeared in La Verite, March 15, 1932, where they were mistakenly dated. This interview, which Trotsky stipulated had to be printed word for word or not at all, took place six days after the Soviet government issued a decree stripping him of his Soviet citizenship; Trotsky had not yet seen the text of the decree, about which he wrote at length a few days later in his "Open Letter to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR." Trotsky's remarks here and in other statements for the capitalist press about his lack of time for current politics should not be read too literally. Even his historical writings were intended to strengthen the revolutionary movement, and his voluminous political correspondence of 1929-40 represented a major political intervention in the life and work of the Left Opposition and the Fourth International. Statements giving a contrary impression had a "diplomatic" character—he was still trying to get a visa for a European country that would put him closer to the center of political events, and he wanted to avoid if possible any trouble with the Turkish authorities.

85. "Amalgam" was the term frequently used by Trotsky to designate the Kremlin's practice of lumping together different or opposing political opponents and accusing them of common crimes or sins.

86. Permanent revolution was the theory and label most closely associated with Trotsky beginning with the 1905 revolution when he first developed his ideas about the leading role of the working class in backward and underdeveloped countries. Although Lenin and the Bolsheviks accepted the conclusions of this theory in leading the revolution in 1917, the Stalinists centered their fire on it in the 1920s, especially after adopting the theory of socialism in one country. Trotsky's defense, The Permanent Revolution, was written in 1928.

87. This statement was at least partly ironical. MacDonald (note 76) was the prime minister of a government engaged in savagely suppressing the Indian struggle for independence; it had recently arrested Mohandas Gandhi and outlawed the nationalist Congress movement.

88. "Interview by the United Press." Biuletten Oppozitsii (Bulletin of the Opposition), number 28, July 1932. Translated for this volume by Tom Scott. The UP interviewer was J.D. Quirk. Trotsky started this Russian-language magazine shortly after his expulsion from the USSR in 1929; it continued publication until a year after his death in 1940. In 1932 the Biuletten was being printed in Germany, where Trotsky's son and coeditor, Leon Sedov, was then living. After Hitler came to power in 1933 and banned it, the Biuletten was transferred to Paris. The complete collection, in four volumes, has been reprinted by Monad Press, 1973. On February 18,
shortly before this interview was obtained, the Japanese invaders of Manchuria had declared that vast northeast Chinese province to be an "independent" nation named Manchukuo and established a puppet regime to rule it in the interests of Japanese imperialism.

89. The Seiyukai, founded in 1900, and the Minseito, in 1928, were the two principal bourgeois parties until the dissolution of all parties by the military government in 1940. Both were viewed as "liberal" but this was true only in relation to the central government. They were headed by samurai families and were virtually in the pay of the big monopolies. They supported the government's persecution of the labor movement and the left.

90. The mikado was Hirohito (1901- ), who had become emperor of Japan in 1926.

91. The Chinese Eastern Railroad was the portion of the original route of the Trans-Siberian Railroad which went through Manchuria to Vladivostok. It became the object of a bitter dispute in 1929. When the Japanese imperialists consolidated their control of Manchuria in 1932, the CER remained in the hands of the USSR. Stalin hung onto it until 1935, when he sold it to Manchukuo in an effort to ward off a Japanese attack. The railroad came under Soviet control again in World War II. Although the Communist Party took over the Chinese mainland in 1949, Stalin did not cede the railroad to Mao Tse-tung's government until 1952.

92. "On Being Deprived of Soviet Citizenship." The Militant, April 2 and 9, 1932. On February 20, 1932, the Soviet Central Executive Committee issued a decree depriving thirty-seven persons of their Soviet citizenship and forbidding their return to the USSR. Trotsky and the members of his family in exile were on this list; in fact, they were its chief targets. Coming only a few months after the revelations about the "Turkul plot" against Trotsky's life (see "A Letter to the Politburo," earlier in this volume), the decree undoubtedly was intended to remove whatever protection against terrorist action Trotsky's Soviet citizenship may still have afforded him. In addition, it increased the risks run by anyone in the Soviet Union who might be considering making contact with Trotsky.

93. Izvestia (News) was the official daily paper of the Soviet government.

94. Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), a leader of the German Social Democracy, was regarded as the outstanding Marxist theoretician until World War I, when he abandoned internationalism and opposed the Russian Revolution. He helped to form the Two-and-a-half International but left it shortly before its collapse to return to the Second International in 1922. Alfred Adler (1870-1937) was a Viennese psychologist and psychiatrist who was at first a Freudian but later formed his own school; the person probably meant by the authors of the dispatch was Frederick Adler, the Austrian Social Democrat (see note 255).
95. **Vladimir Purishkevich** (1870-1920), one of the monarchist leaders in the czarist Duma (parliament), was a notorious anti-Semitic leader of Black Hundred gangs and an organizer of pogroms.

96. **Feodor Dan** (1871-1947), a Menshevik leader on the presidium of the Petrograd Soviet in 1917, was an opponent of the October Revolution. **Raphael Abramovich** (1879- ) was a prominent Bundist and right-wing Menshevik. He left Russia after the revolution and Dan was expelled in 1922, both ending up in the United States.

97. **Centrism** is the term used by Trotsky for tendencies in the radical movement that stand or oscillate between reformism, which is the position of the labor bureaucracy and the labor aristocracy, and Marxism, which represents the historic interests of the working class. Since a centrist tendency has no independent social base, it must be evaluated in terms of its origin, its internal dynamic, and the direction in which it is going or being pushed by events. Until around 1935, Trotsky saw Stalinism as a special variety—"bureaucratic centrism." After that, he felt that "bureaucratic centrism" was inadequate as a term for the Stalinists.

98. **Usrialov** was a Russian professor and economist who opposed the October Revolution but later went to work for the Soviet government because he believed it would inevitably be compelled to restore capitalism; he supported Stalin's measures against Trotsky as a step in this direction.

99. **Mikhail Kalinin** (1875-1946) was elected president of the Soviet Central Executive Committee in place of the deceased Sverdlov in 1919. **Kliment Voroshilov** (1881-1969) was commissar of war, 1925-40, and president of the USSR, 1953-60. Both were placed on the Politburo in 1926. They were believed to sympathize with some of the ideas of the Right Opposition but went along with Stalin, perhaps because he had access to information that would have embarrassed them if made public.

100. In 1923 Germany was shaken by a prerevolutionary crisis, which the floundering leadership of the German Communist Party bungled, enabling the government to survive. Brandler was the principal leader of the party at that time.

101. The two-class workers' and peasants' parties was a formula used by the Stalinists in the 1920s to justify support for the Kuomintang and other bourgeois parties in the Orient. Trotsky's critique appears in *The Third International After Lenin* and *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*. The **Kuomintang** of China was the bourgeois-nationalist party founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1911 and led after 1926 by Chiang Kai-shek. In 1926, the Kuomintang was admitted into the Comintern as a sympathizing party. The bloc with British strike-breakers refers to the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee established in May 1925 by the "left" bureaucracy of the British trade unions and union representatives of the Soviet Union. For the British this was a cheap way to demonstrate "progressivism" and shield them-
selves against criticism from the left, especially useful at that time, not long before the British general strike of 1926 which they sold out. The committee folded only when the British members, no longer needing a left cover, walked out in 1927.

102. Bessedovsky, Agabekov, and Dmitrievsky were Soviet diplomats who defected to the capitalist world.

103. In "A Squeak in the Apparatus," an article dated April 13, 1930, Trotsky had called attention to evidence of dissension in the CP's ranks (see Writings 30).

104. Dmitri Manuilsky (1883-1952) was secretary of the Comintern from 1931 to its dissolution in 1943. Like Trotsky, he had belonged to the independent Marxist organization, the Mezhrayontzi (Inter-District Group), which fused with the Bolshevik Party in 1917. He became a supporter of the Stalinist faction in the early 1920s.

105. The theory of social fascism, developed by Stalin, held that the Social Democracy and fascism were not antipodes but twins. Since the Social Democrats were only a variety of fascism, and since just about everyone but the Stalinists was some kind of fascist (a liberal-fascist or a labor-fascist or a Trotsky-fascist), then it was impermissible for the Stalinists to engage in united fronts with any other tendency against the ordinary fascists. No theory could have been more helpful to Hitler in the years leading up to his winning power in Germany. The Stalinists finally dropped the theory in 1934 without any explanation, and soon were wooing not only the Social Democrats but also capitalist politicians like Roosevelt and Daladier, whom they were still calling fascists early in 1934.


107. "A Word of Welcome to Osvobozhdenie." Osvobozhdenie (Liberation, the weekly paper of the Bulgarian Left Opposition), April 15, 1932. Translated for this volume by Iain Fraser.

108. The International Red Aid was organized in the early 1920s as a labor defense and civil liberties organization; its United States component was named the International Labor Defense.

109. The German Left Opposition and Trotsky supported the presidential candidacy of Ernst Thaelmann, nominated by the Communist Party in opposition to Hindenburg and Hitler, in the two-part election held in March and April 1932.

110. "I See War with Germany." The Forum, April 1932. More than a year before Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany, Trotsky wrote that a Nazi victory "would mean, according to my
deepest conviction, an inevitable war between fascist Germany and the Soviet republic" ("The Japanese Invasion of Manchuria," *Writings* 30-31). Like many of his prognoses, this proved accurate. But in this case some of his premises proved wrong. In the present article, written early in 1932, he asserted that if Hitler came to power, "he would become one of the chief pillars of Versailles, and would turn out to be a mainstay of French imperialism." This assertion, which he noted himself "may seem paradoxical," was based on the assumption that however Hitler came to power—legally or through a coup—the German working class would resist and Germany would in effect be plunged into a civil war: "This would inevitably paralyze the forces of the country for a considerable period of time, and compel Hitler to seek in surrounding [capitalist] Europe, not revenge, but allies and protectors." In defense of that view it might be argued that at the start of 1932 it was still correct to expect that the powerful German working class would not submit to fascism without a struggle to the end. But even if that was so, it was no longer the case a year later, when Hitler was appointed chancellor; if at the start of 1932 the German workers had not become too demoralized by the Stalinists and Social Democrats to conduct an effective struggle, they evidently had reached that stage by the start of 1933. Even then Trotsky continued, in the first days after Hitler's appointment, to hope for and advocate last-ditch resistance by the German workers. Not until Hitler began to consolidate his victory (achieved through a combination of legal and extralegal actions) did Trotsky concede that civil war was out of the question. And even then he argued that it had been correct and necessary "to proceed from a course based upon resistance and to do all in our power for its realization. To acknowledge a priori the impossibility of resistance would have meant not to push the proletariat forward but to introduce a supplementary demoralizing element" ("Germany and the USSR," March 17, 1933, in *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*). Hitler's victory proved to be so easy that he had a much freer hand in foreign policy than Trotsky had expected in 1932. When that became clear in the spring of 1933 Trotsky revised his analysis of the Nazi strategy abroad (see "Hitler and Disarmament" in *Writings* 32-33).

111. The *League of Nations* was set up by the victors of World War I, who prohibited the entry of the defeated nations at its inception. The U.S. did not join. During World War II, the United Nations was organized as its successor.

112. The *Versailles Treaty*, signed in June 1919, reshaped national boundaries along the lines of the secret treaties of the Allies. It deprived Germany of territory in Europe and of her overseas colonies, limited her military strength, and provided for payment of war reparations. It was engineered to accomplish the dismantling of German military and economic strength, but it also had the aim of stemming the revolutionary tide in Germany. It was a major factor in Hitler's coming to power and prepared World War II.
113. Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), the founder of Italian fascism, was a member of the antiwar wing of the Socialist Party in 1914 but became an agent of the Allied imperialists. He organized the fascist movement in 1919, became dictator in 1922, and set the pattern of repression on which the German Nazis modeled their regime. He remained in command of Italy until 1943; two years later, he was killed when attempting to flee Italy.

114. Josef Pilsudski (1867-1935) was exiled to Siberia while a student for an alleged attempt on the life of Alexander III. On his return in 1892, he founded the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Interned in 1917 by the Central Powers, he was freed by German revolutionists in 1918 and returned to Warsaw to become chief of the newly created Polish republic. In March 1920 he led his army against the Soviet Union in the Ukraine, and was driven back into Poland by the Red Army in June. He retired in 1923, but led a coup in May 1926 that returned him to power and was dictator of Poland from various posts until his death. An article about the 1926 coup, "Pilsudskism, Fascism, and the Character of Our Epoch," appears later in this volume.

115. The Polish Corridor, a narrow strip of land about ninety miles long extending to Danzig (Gdansk) and the Baltic Sea, was taken from Germany and assigned to Poland by the Versailles Treaty.

116. Le Temps (The Times) was the unofficial voice of the French government in the 1930s.

117. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Trotsky decided that the economic and political conditions in the Soviet Union were unfavorable for intervention by the Red Army, and that under these circumstances demands for such intervention would be sheer adventurism (see "Germany and the USSR," March 17, 1933, and "Hitler and the Red Army," March 21, 1933, in The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany).

118. "The Left Social Democrats." Osvobozhdenie, April 22, 1932. Translated for this volume by Iain Fraser.

119. In the presidential runoff election of April 10, 1932, Thaelmann, the Communist Party candidate, received 3,706,800 votes, or 10.2 percent of the total. In the primary election on March 13 he had received 4,983,300, or 13.2 percent of the total.

120. "On a Political Novel." From the preface, Ich Kann Nicht Mehr... by Margarete Neumann, E. Prager-Verlag, Leipzig-Wien, 1932. Translated for this volume by David Thorstad. The author's preface introduced Trotsky's letter with the following explanation: "This book deals with the struggles and fate of the Trotskyists in the Soviet Union. I therefore sent the manuscript, before it was printed, to the outstanding leader of this Opposition, Comrade Trotsky.
Especially because, as a member of the Communist parties of Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Germany since 1919, I was both ideologically and organizationally linked to this opposition movement from 1923 to 1930. For that reason, I feel it is my duty to inform the reader of Comrade Trotsky's comments, which are contained in the following letter. Although Trotsky said it was objectionable to him, the publisher printed his picture on the jacket of the novel.

122. Ivar Kreuger (1880-1932), Swedish financier and "match king," headed a worldwide match-production-and-marketing monopoly which went bankrupt in 1931-32, revealing financial speculation, etc. He shot himself in Paris in March 1932.
123. Andre Tardieu (1876-1945) was premier of the French right-wing cabinet, which was ejected from office a few weeks after this interview in a parliamentary election which brought a shift to the left.

125. Karl Radek (1885-1939) was an outstanding revolutionary in Poland and Germany before World War I and a leader of the Comintern in Lenin's time. He was both an early Left Oppositionist and one of the earliest to capitulate to Stalin after his expulsion and exile. He was readmitted to the party in 1930 and served as a propagandist for Stalin until he was framed up in the second Moscow trial and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
126. The Brest-Litovsk peace treaty ended Germany's war against the new Soviet government in March 1918. A sharp struggle took place at the Seventh Party Congress between those, headed by Lenin, who felt the Soviet Union was so weak militarily that it had no choice but to accept the peace treaty on very unfavorable terms, and the "Left Communists," headed by Bukharin and Radek, who demanded declaration of a revolutionary war as a matter of principle. Trotsky held a third position of "neither war nor peace": against signing the peace treaty and against conducting a revolutionary war. When Germany insisted on the signing of the treaty and renewed its military attack, Trotsky supported Lenin. There is a question as to whether the Lenin quotation cited by Trotsky actually was aimed against Radek, or whether it was aimed against Ryazanov, another supporter of the "revolutionary war" position. The following note about this quotation appears in the findings of the Dewey Commission, which investigated the charges against Trotsky in the Moscow trials, published in the book Not Guilty (Harper & Brothers, 1938, p. 199): "In checking this quotation we find that it appears as Trotsky gave it in Lenin's Collected Works, State
Publishers, 1925 (volume 15, pp. 131-2). In the third Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*, published in 1935 [and in subsequent editions], the name of Ryazanov has been substituted for that of Radek (volume 22, p. 331). The editors neither explain the change nor even state that in earlier editions Radek's name figured in place of Ryazanov's.


128. In the April 24, 1932 elections to the Prussian Landtag (state parliament), the Nazis made big gains, becoming the largest party in the state that contained a majority of the German population. The Communist Party received less votes in Prussia than it had received in the first presidential election in March, and 300,000 less than it got in Prussia in the previous Reichstag election (September 1930). In the French parliamentary elections of May 1 and 8, 1932, the Communist Party more or less held its own despite a trend to the left that benefited the liberals. The sense in which it could be said that the German and French elections went in the same direction was that in both countries the Stalinists were unable to make any gains at the ballot box even in the midst of acute economic and political crises.

129. "'Blocks' and Absurdities." *Der Neuer Mahnruf* (The New Call), publication of the Communist Opposition of Austria (the Mahnruf group), October 1932. Translated for this volume by Janet Peace. This probably was a letter to the ILO Administrative Secretariat.

130. The *L. group* was the one led by Kurt Landau (see note 55).

131. *Die Permanente Revolution* was the paper of the official German section of the Left Opposition, published until Hitler came to power in 1933, when it was replaced by *Unser Wort* (Our Word), which was published in exile and smuggled into Germany.

132. "The Labor Party Question in the United States." *The Militant*, June 11, 1932. Trotsky's remarks about the labor party in his interview, "Answers to Questions by the *New York Times*," evoked questions in the United States which prompted him to write this letter. Among these questions were those raised by the Communist League of Struggle, an American group led by Albert Weisbord, who had gone to Turkey to discuss his differences with the Left Opposition (see "To the Communist League of Struggle," May 22, 1932).

133. The *Second National Conference of the Communist League of America* had been held in New York in September 1931. It adopted a resolution (see *The Militant*, July 25, 1931) which opposed advocacy of a labor party while recognizing the need to work inside any that might be formed.
134. Jay Lovestone (1898- ) was a leader of the American Communist Party who was expelled on Moscow's orders in 1929 shortly after the downfall of his Soviet ally, Bukharin. The Lovestone group, like others of the Right Opposition tendency, remained in existence until World War II. Lovestone himself later became cold-war adviser on foreign affairs for AFL-CIO president George Meany.

135. Chartism, a mass movement which began in 1838 and dissipated in the early 1850s, was a struggle for political democracy and "social equality" which attained near-revolutionary proportions. It centered around "The People's Charter," a program drawn up by the London Workingmen's Association.

136. At the end of 1919 the Chicago Federation of Labor, along with labor bodies from other areas, formed a national Labor Party, later called the Farmer-Labor Party, and ran a presidential ticket in the 1920 elections. The American Communist Party ignored this development, but at the end of 1922, under the direction of Comintern representative John Pepper (Joseph Pogany), it reversed itself and succeeded in capturing control of the Farmer-Labor Party at its July 1923 convention. The Chicago Federation of Labor and other labor groups withdrew, and the name of the party was changed to Federated Farmer-Labor Party; it then proceeded to tie up with the 1924 La Follette Progressive Party presidential campaign. There was objection to this policy in the Communist Party, and an opinion of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which was consulted, characterized the tactic as opportunist. The Communist Party hastily put up its own candidates, with one section of the FFLP supporting them and the other joining the La Follette campaign.

137. Reformism is the theory and practice of gradual, peaceful, and parliamentary change (as opposed to revolution) as the best or only means of proceeding from capitalism to socialism. Reformists therefore strive to soften the class struggle and promote class collaboration. The reformists of the trade-union bureaucracy in the United States make no pretense of going beyond a liberalized capitalism.

138. Epigones, disciples who corrupt their teachers' doctrines, was Trotsky's derisive term for the Stalinists, who claim to be Leninists.

139. "International and National Questions." Internal Bulletin, CLA, number 2, July 1932. The National Committee of the CLA had adopted a statement on the international questions disputed in the ILO, printed in The Militant, April 23, 1932 (and later to be reaffirmed by a plenum in June); it was in accord with the position taken by Trotsky and a majority of the ILO leadership. The internal CLA dispute to which Trotsky referred concerned developing differences between a majority led by Cannon and a minority led by Shachtman; Trotsky was not to take a position on this dispute until a year later, when it was resolved (see Writings 32-33).
140. "Who Should Attend the International Conference?" An unnumbered and undated internal bulletin of the CLA, 1932. Signed "G. Gourov." Trotsky's proposals at the end of this letter to the Administrative Secretariat were adopted and governed participation at the international preconference held in Paris in February 1933 (see Writings 32-33).

141. Julian Gorkin had been a figure in the Left Opposition in Spain before he joined the Workers and Peasants Bloc led by Joaquín Maurin. He later became a leader of the POUM (Workers Party of Marxist Unification) which was formed in 1935 when Maurin's group merged with the Spanish Left Oppositionists led by Andrés Nin.

142. Spartakos (Spartacus) was the paper published by the Greek group that formerly had been recognized as an affiliate of the Left Opposition.

143. Josef Frey (1882-1957), a founder of the Austrian Communist Party from which he was expelled in 1927, was also briefly the leader of an "Austrian Communist Party (Opposition)." The negotiations for reaffiliation with the Left Opposition were broken off by the Frey group before the preconference was held.

144. Édouard van Overstraeten, a leader of the Communist Party who was expelled in 1928, was a founder of the Left Opposition in Belgium. The dispute in the Belgian organization between the Executive Committee in Brussels led by Overstraeten and the Charleroi Federation took on serious proportions through 1929-30 and ended in a formal split in December 1930. The Overstraeten group existed for a short while under the name of the League of Communist Internationalists, but he withdrew from politics before it expired.

145. The Archio-Marxists had become associated with the Left Opposition in mid-1930. Its publication was called Pali Ton Takseon (The Class Struggle).

146. The Prometeo group, whose journal was called Prometeo (Prometheus), was also known as the Italian Left Faction and as the Bordigists, after their leader, Amadeo Bordiga (1889-1970), who was expelled from the Comintern on charges of "Trotskyism" in 1929. It was the first Italian group to adhere to the ILO, but its inveterate sectarianism compelled the ILO to dissociate itself from it at the end of 1932.


148. The German Socialist Workers Party (SAP) was formed in October 1931 after the Social Democrats expelled a number of left-wing Reichstag deputies headed by Max Seydewitz and Kurt Rosenfeld, also a well-known civil liberties lawyer. In the spring of 1932, a split occurred in the German Communist Right Opposition (KPO, Brandlerites) and a wing headed by Jakob Walcher joined the SAP.
When Seydewitz and Rosenfeld withdrew from the SAP, the ex-Brand-lerites became its leaders. In 1933 the SAP agreed to work together with the Left Opposition in forming a new International, but it soon changed its mind and became an opponent of the Fourth International.

149. Morris Hillquit (1869-1933), a lawyer, was one of the founders of the American Socialist Party.

150. "To a Bulgarian Worker in the U.S." Osvobozhdenie, June 17, 1932. Translated for this volume by Iain Fraser.

151. "Closer to the Proletarians of the 'Colored' Races!" The Militant, July 2, 1932. The Johannesburg letter to which Trotsky referred appeared in the same paper's June 4 issue. It was addressed to the CLA and expressed the decision of its signers to apply for membership in the Left Opposition, circulate its literature, etc. The following paragraph of explanation in their letter is of special interest: "Comrades! Do not worry over seeing all these applicants being Negroes, and think that we are purposely refusing to unite with the European comrades. No, we are not. It is only about two months ago that we have been considering joining your league. Although it is difficult for a Negro comrade to organize a European worker, we hope that later on white militants will follow our lead. The color question makes organization difficult. Negro workers are generally being considered inferior even on such matters as revolutionary organization, and usually European workers are being considered superior. We have been functioning under the name of Communist Party of Africa."

152. "Democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" was the formulation used by Lenin to designate the objective of the Bolsheviks before 1917; after the February 1917 revolution he discarded this perspective and reoriented the Bolsheviks to a struggle for power and a workers' state, the "dictatorship of the proletariat." After Lenin's death the Stalinists revived the discarded slogan and used it to justify class collaboration between the workers and the capitalists in China, which led to the crushing defeats of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27.


154. Henri Barbusse (1873-1935) was a pacifist novelist who joined the French Communist Party in 1923 and wrote biographies of Stalin and Christ.

155. Romain Rolland (1866-1944), novelist and dramatist, was a leading spirit of the "left" ever since his pacifist denunciation of World War I. In his later years he lent his name to Stalinist literary congresses and manifestoes.
156. Emile Vandervelde (1866-1938), leader of the Belgian Socialist Party and president of the Second International, 1929-36, was among the first socialists to enter the war cabinet, serving as premier, and held various cabinet posts in the twenties. He was a signer of the Versailles Treaty.

157. The Profintern (Red International of Labor Unions) was organized in Moscow in July 1920 as a rival to the reformist Amsterdam International. In 1945 the leaders of the two union internationals united as the World Federation of Trade Unions, but they split again when the cold war began, and the reformists created the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1949.

158. The Second International (also known as the Labor and Socialist International) was organized in 1889 as the successor to the First International. It was a loose association of national Social Democratic and labor parties, uniting both revolutionary and reformist elements, whose strongest and most authoritative section was the German Social Democracy. Its progressive role had ended by 1914, when the major sections violated the most elementary socialist principles and supported their own imperialist governments in World War I. It fell apart during the war but was revived as a completely reformist organization in 1923. The Amsterdam International (the International Federation of Trade Unions, sometimes called the "yellow" international) was the major organization in this field, associated with and controlled by the reformists.

159. The Anti-Imperialist League (or League Against Imperialism) was one of the projects of Muenzenberg (see note 258). Its first congress was held in Brussels in February 1927, its second and last in Frankfort on the Main in July 1929. The period between the two congresses witnessed the breakup of the Anglo-Russian Committee, the Kuomintang suppression of the Chinese revolutionary forces, and the Stalinist shift to an ultraleft policy. This was reflected in the representation to and the character of each of the congresses.

160. Ossip Piatnitsky (1882-1939) was a secretary of the Comintern, 1922-31, and headed its Organizing Bureau, whose aim was to control the practical everyday work of the various Communist parties.

161. "Why I Signed Radek's Theses on Germany." The New International, February 1938, where it appeared under the title "Two Letters on the German October." The New International was the monthly magazine of the American Left Opposition and Socialist Workers Party until 1940, when a minority split from the SWP under the leadership of Max Shachtman and James Burnham; Shachtman published the NI until 1958 when his group entered the Socialist Party. In 1940 the SWP began publishing Fourth International, whose name was later changed to International Socialist Review.

162. Alois Neurath was a leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and a member of the Executive Committee of the Comin-
tern. After being expelled as a "Trotskyist," he became a Brandlerite. In 1932 he became critical of Brandler because of the latter's apologies for the Soviet bureaucracy's role inside the USSR and his dishonest criticisms of Trotsky's proposals on how to fight the Nazis in Germany.

163. Yuri Pyatakov (1890-1937) played a leading role in the October Revolution and the civil war and held many key party and state posts. In his testament Lenin called him and Bukharin the "two ablest young men in the party." He became a Left Oppositionist in 1923, was expelled in 1927, and capitulated and was reinstated in 1928. As vice chairman in the commissariat of heavy industry, he helped to industrialize the country in the 1930s. He was convicted in the second Moscow trial and executed.

164. Hermann Remmele (1880-1937) became part of the Thaelmann leadership in the German Communist Party in the years when the Nazis rose toward power. In 1933 he fled to the Soviet Union, where he was executed by the GPU in 1937.

165. The platform of the Opposition, of which Trotsky was the principal author, was the program of the bloc between the Left Opposition and the Zinoviev-Kamenev group. It was translated in The Real Situation in Russia (1928).

166. Paul Boettcher (1891- ) was a German Communist Party functionary who became a leader of the SAP in the 1930s, and joined the Stalinists in East Germany after World War II.

167. The Central Committee of the German Communist Party asked the Russian Politburo to send Trotsky to Germany in a capacity which would have meant, in effect, that he direct the impending insurrection. Zinoviev, together with Stalin and Kamenev, offered various pretexts for not concurring in the German request, and nominated Pyatakov for the mission.


169. The "third period," according to the schema proclaimed by the Stalinists in 1928, was the final period of capitalism. The Comintern's tactics during the next six years were marked by ultraleftism, adventurism, sectarian "red" unions, and opposition to the united front. In 1934 the theory and practice of the third period were officially discarded and replaced by those of the People's Front (1935-39), but the latter period was not given a number. The "first period" was 1917-24 (capitalist crisis and revolutionary upsurge); the "second period" was 1925-28 (capitalist stabilization).

170. Johannes Buechner was the author of a pamphlet titled The Agent Provocateur in the Labour Movement; it was translated and printed in England and distributed in the U.S., without a date or any information about the author. An extract: "It is often those groups which have seceded from the Communist party which provide the police with a definite contingent of informers and agents provocateurs, who aim at the political disintegration of the Commu-
nist party. . . . It is characteristic that Trotsky's autobiography *My Life* has been published in Polish by the Warsaw political police in an attempt to impair the morale of the Communist movement. The press organs of the 'right' and 'left' renegades—*Contre le Courant*, *Die Rote Fahne*, and the like—are everywhere distinguished not only by slanders against the Communists but also by direct or indirect denunciations. The police in all countries are gathered round the renegade groups like maggots on a carcass."

171. The **Social Revolutionary Party** (SRs), founded in 1900, soon became the political expression of all the earlier Populist currents in Russia and had the largest share of influence among the peasantry prior to the October Revolution. Its right wing was led by Kerensky. The **Cadets** (Constitutional Democratic Party), a bourgeois-liberal party which favored a constitutional monarchy for Russia, was representative of the progressive landlords, bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia. It was headed by Miliukov.

172. **Roman Malnovsky** (1878-1918) was a czarist police agent in the Bolshevik Party for years and was even elected to its first independent Central Committee after the definitive split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1912. That same year he was a successful Bolshevik candidate to the Duma, aided by the police in their arrest of his opponents. In 1914, when he suddenly gave up his seat in the Duma, he was expelled from the party. Although there had been suspicion about him, his connection with the police wasn't proved until after the October Revolution when the police files were opened. He was tried and executed.

173. **Erich Ludendorff** (1865-1937), German general, chief of staff of the army during World War I, conducted the negotiations with Lenin allowing Lenin's return to Russia through Germany, then at war with Russia. The **sealed train** was the one that carried Lenin and twenty-nine other Russian emigres from Switzerland through Germany back to Russia in March 1917. The emigres had previously tried to make other arrangements but when these efforts proved unsuccessful, they negotiated the conditions for passing through Germany. This, along with a charge of receiving German gold, was employed in a campaign of slander and repression against the Bolshevik Party in July 1917, and later echoed by counterrevolutionaries as evidence of collaboration of the Bolsheviks with the reactionary regime of Germany.

174. **Iraklil Tseretelli** (1882-1959) was a Menshevik leader who supported the war and held ministerial posts in the bourgeois Provisional Government, March-August 1917.

175. **Lev Sosnovsky** (1886-1937), an outstanding Soviet journalist, was, like Rakovsky, among the early supporters of the Left Opposition and one of the last to capitulate; he was killed without trial or confession. **Nikolai Muralov** (1877-1937), an Old Bolshevik, was a commander in the civil war. He was exiled in 1927 and later a victim of the second Moscow trial.

177. The Hohenzollerns became the ruling family of Germany in 1871; their dynasty lasted until November 1918, when the German revolution overthrew the monarchy and Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated.

178. Vatslav Vorovsky (1871-1923), an Old Bolshevik who served as a Soviet ambassador, was assassinated in Switzerland while attending an international conference at Lausanne. Conradi, his assassin, was a White Russian.

179. Max Hoffmann (1869-1927), major-general, with Kuhlmann, foreign secretary, headed the German delegation at the peace negotiations held in Brest-Litovsk in November 1917-January 1918. Trotsky headed the Soviet delegation at the decisive sessions. Brest-Litovsk was a town on the Polish-German line.

180. "Hands Off Rosa Luxemburg!" The Militant, August 6 and 13, 1932. Stalin's article to which Trotsky replies in defense of Luxemburg was written in the form of a letter, the same one that contained the allegation of an "uprising" by the Opposition on November 7, 1927 (see note 1).

181. Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) was a founder of the Polish Social Democratic Party and a leader of the left wing of the German Social Democratic Party, where she fought revisionism and the party's support of World War I. Although jailed in 1915, she and Karl Liebknecht organized the Spartakusbund, which later became the Communist Party of Germany. Freed by the revolution of November 1918, she helped lead the Spartacist uprising. This was crushed in January 1919 and she and Liebknecht were assassinated on the orders of the Social Democratic rulers of Berlin. Some of her writings recently published in English are Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, and The Accumulation of Capital.

182. August Bebel (1840-1913) was a cofounder with Wilhelm Liebknecht of the German Social Democracy. The party became powerful under his leadership, which, like that of Kautsky, formally rejected revisionism but bore responsibility for the growth of the opportunist tendencies that took over the SPD shortly after his death.

183. The full title of Lenin's article is "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution." This and following quotations are taken from the English translation of Lenin's Collected Works which was published in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. In some cases, Trotsky's dates and those in the Collected Works do not correspond.

184. George Plekhanov (1856-1918) formed the first Russian Marxist group, the Emancipation of Labor, in Switzerland in 1883. He was an editor of Iskra but degenerated politically and was at odds
with the Bolsheviks and even with the Mensheviks. Later he was an ardent supporter of the war and opponent of the Bolshevik Revolution.

185. On **August 4, 1914**, the more than one hundred Social Democratic deputies in the Reichstag voted for the war budget, despite the party's antimilitarist stand up to that time; on the same day the French and Belgian socialist parties issued manifestoes declaring support of their governments in war. **Vorwaerts** (Forward) was the daily paper of the SPD.

186. **Alexander Shlyapnikov** (1885-1937) was active in the Bolshevik illegal organization in Russia during World War I and one of the heroes of the civil war. He headed the "Workers' Opposition," 1921-23, and later the group of "twenty-two" who were very critical of the NEP. He was jailed by Stalin, his fate unknown.

187. **Gustav Noske** (1868-1946), a right-wing German Social Democrat, was minister of defense in 1919, charged with the suppression of the Spartacist uprising. As minister, he ordered the assassination of Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

188. **Julian Markhlewsky** (1866-1925), veteran of the Polish labor movement and a founder with Luxemburg of the Polish Social Democratic Party, worked for decades in the German labor movement. After the Russian Revolution, he was head of the University of the Peoples of the East in the Leninist Comintern. **Felix Dzerzhinsky** (1877-1926), a founder of the Polish Social Democratic Party, was active in the Polish and Russian revolutionary movement. After the revolution, he headed the Cheka from its formation in December 1917, and from 1924 also the Supreme Council of National Economy. He was a supporter of Stalin.

189. **Albert Purcell** (1872-1935) was a leader of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress and of the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee during the betrayal of the British general strike of 1926.

190. **Alexandre Millerand** (1859-1943) was the first socialist to enter a bourgeois cabinet when he became minister of commerce in the French government in 1899; he was subsequently expelled from the Socialist Party. He held several ministerial posts and was president of the republic in 1920. Rosa Luxemburg wrote a series of articles in 1900-01 under the title "The Socialist Crisis in France" which scathingly denounced Millerand; a long excerpt from these articles is reprinted in **Rosa Luxemburg Speaks**.

191. **Alexander Parvus** (1869-1924), prominent in prewar years as a Marxist theoretician in Eastern Europe, collaborated with Trotsky and reached conclusions similar to the theory of permanent revolution. Trotsky broke with him in 1914 when Parvus became one of the leaders in the prowar wing of the German Social Democracy. In 1917 he tried to reconcile the German party with the Bolsheviks and later the Independent Socialists with the Ebert-Noske SPD leadership.
192. Julius Martov (1873-1923), one of the founders of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, was a close associate of Lenin in the early years. He later became a left-wing Menshevik leader, opposed the October Revolution, and emigrated to Germany in 1920.

193. Ulrich von Hutten (1488-1523), German humanist and poet, was a theoretician for elements of the nobility who were for reform of the empire by eliminating princes and secularizing church property.

194. "An Appeal for the Biulleten." Biulleten Oppozitsii, number 28, July 1932. Unsigned. Translated for this volume by Fred Buchman. The name of an "official" or "responsible" editor was required in the Biulleten at this time, when it was three years old and being published in Berlin, Anton Grylewicz performed that function. The actual editors were Trotsky and Leon Sedov.


196. Demyan Bedny (1883-1945), unofficial poet laureate in the Soviet Union until 1930, wrote propaganda poetry again during World War II but was never back in favor.

197. Leopold Averbach (1903-1937), a literary critic, was the dominant figure in the RAPP until 1932 and the denunciation of Averbachism. Ironically, he was disposed of during the purges as a "Trotskyist." The RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) was the controlling organization in the literary field from 1929 until 1932, when it was replaced by the Union of Soviet Writers. It attacked the fellow travelers, allowed only "proletarian" literature, and tried to organize literary production like industrial production, in the spirit of the first five-year plan. Trotsky's views on proletarian literature appear in the appendix to this volume, "An Interview on 'Proletarian Literature,'" by Maurice Parijantine; also in Leon Trotsky on Literature and Art and Literature and Revolution.

198. Nikolay Klyuev (1885-1937) was a peasant poet of a mystical-revolutionary-Populist character. He was caught in the purges and probably died in a concentration camp.

199. The Black Hundreds were monarchist gangs that were formed by the czarist police to combat the revolutionary movement; they organized pogroms against Jews and workers. Kievlyanin (the Kievian) was a former monarchist daily newspaper.

200. Alexander Bezynmsky (1898- ), a rival of Demyan Bedny as chief poet, played a leading role in the RAPP with Averbach; the height of his popularity was 1929-31.

201. "Declaration to the Antiwar Congress at Amsterdam." The Militant, August 27, 1932. This manifesto, signed by the Russian, German, Greek, Spanish, French, American, Belgian, Czechoslova-
kian, British, Swiss, Bulgarian, and Italian sections of the Left Opposition, was written for the antiwar congress held in Amsterdam August 27-29, 1932. The congress was run in a highly undemocratic manner, with known Oppositionists having difficulty in getting the floor or being heard over the boozing. The Oppositionists were unable to get a vote on their main resolution and had to content themselves with voting against the document presented by Barbusse, which was adopted by around 2,000 to 6.

202. **Paul von Hindenburg** (1847-1934) was a Prussian field marshal who commanded the German forces in World War I. Against Social Democratic opposition he was elected president of the Weimar republic in 1925, and in 1932 was reelected with Social Democratic support. He appointed Hitler chancellor in January 1933. Trotsky's reference here is to the coup carried out by Hindenburg's recently appointed chancellor, Franz von Papen, on July 20, 1932. Shortly before this, Papen had lifted a ban on the Nazi storm troopers, who took to the streets in a reign of political terror that left hundreds killed and wounded. Papen then utilized this to claim that the Social Democratic government of Prussia could not maintain "law and order" in that state with more than half of Germany's total population, and he deposed that government on July 20, appointing himself Reich commissioner for Prussia. The Social Democrats, who had sworn they would oppose any coups, "whether from the right or the left," meekly submitted. No one benefited more from this coup than Hitler. Eleven days later, when Reichstag elections were held, the Nazis received another big advance, becoming the largest party in the Reichstag.

203. **Frank Kellogg** (1856-1937), U.S. secretary of state, 1925-29, arranged the **Kellogg Pact**, an agreement to renounce war as an instrument of national policy signed by fifteen countries in 1928. It was later ratified by a total of sixty-three, including the Soviet Union. **Edouard Herriot** (1872-1957) was the leader of the bourgeois Radical (or Radical Socialist) Party who was most prominently identified with the policy of arranging alliances with the Socialist Party in the 1920s (Left Bloc)—an early form of the People's Front. Trotsky wrote a pamphlet about him, **Edouard Herriot, Politician of the Golden Mean** (see **Writings 35-36**).

204. **Mohandas Gandhi** (1869-1948) was the leader of the nationalist movement that later became the Congress Party of India. He organized massive opposition to British rule, but insisted on peaceful, nonviolent, passive resistance methods.

205. The **PUP** (Party of Proletarian Unity) was a short-lived French centrist group formed by expelled Communist Party and former Socialist Party members. The British **ILP** (Independent Labour Party), founded in 1893, played an influential role in the creation of the Labour Party, to which it was affiliated and in which it usually occupied a position on the left. It voted to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in 1932, after which it flirted with the Stalinists and other centrists before voting to return to the Labour Party in 1939.
206. "Pilsudskism, Fascism, and the Character of Our Epoch." Intercontinental Press, March 1, 1971. Translated by George Saunders. In 1932 Trotsky found a copy of the stenogram of a speech he had been permitted to make in July 1926 at a special commission of the Comintern. The commission had been set up to consider mistakes made by the Polish Communist Party that facilitated Marshal Josef Pilsudski's seizure of power on May 12, 1926. Trotsky wrote an introduction to the speech and printed both under the above title in Biuletnie Oppozitsii, numbers 29-30, September 1932. Seeking information about some of the Polish figures mentioned by Trotsky in this and a subsequent article, "Greetings to the Polish Left Opposition," August 31, 1932, the translator asked the help of Isaac Deutscher, who had been a young leader of the Polish Opposition in 1932 and had published these articles by Trotsky in Polish at that time. In a letter shortly before his death in 1967, Deutscher supplied some of the information sought and an opinion about Trotsky's political designation of certain Polish Communist Party leaders (Warski, Koszrewa, Walecki, Leszcynski, Lapinski): "He [Trotsky] was absolutely right in the substance of the controversy, but in the personal characterization he allowed himself, in the heat of battle, to make some polemical overstatements. When you republish these remarks now, you ought to pay attention, in my view, to two circumstances: First, all these leaders whom Trotsky mentions were the founders of the Polish Communist Party, cofounders of the Communist International, active participants of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal movements, etc. In 1925 they all protested, in the name of the Polish Central Committee, against Stalin's and Zinoviev's first anti-Trotskyist campaign. Second, all of them perished in the Stalinist purges in 1938. Stalin never forgave them the protest against Trotsky's treatment. They were all denounced by Stalin as Trotskyists, spies, agents of the Polish political police, etc., and have all been emphatically rehabilitated in the post-Stalin era. Between 1925 and 1938, as emigres in the USSR they did adjust themselves to the Stalin line. But they did so with many mental reservations and with much anguish; and some of them, whenever they could, advised Polish Communists, coming to Russia on short trips, to work quietly within the Polish party against the Stalinist line. To describe them now, as Trotsky did in 1926 or 1932, as 'Menshevik types' would be utterly wrong and unjust. Warski . . . , like Walecki, Lapinski, and Kostrzewa, were in the end Bukharinists or near-Bukharinists, the leaders of the Right Opposition in the party, but not Menshevik types. . . . There is no need to blur over the political mistakes they all made in their quasi-Bukharinist period. But when one gives an appraisal of their activity three decades after their martyrdom, one should take into account the whole of their record, and not merely one part of it; and one should treat them objectively and historically, without being too much affected by an epithet Trotsky threw out in a particular situation. . . ." For a discussion of Deutscher's differences with Trotsky over the nature of the Pilsudski regime, see Writings 34-35, note 56.
207. Adolf Warski (1870-193?), a close associate of Rosa Luxemburg for almost 25 years, was a founder of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), which was for a time affiliated to the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, on whose central committee he served. When the SDKPiL helped to form the Polish Communist Party in 1918 he became one of its chief leaders.

208. Wera Kostrzewa was a member of the Left Polish Socialist Party (Left PPS) which merged with the SDKPiL to form the Polish CP.

209. The PPS (Polish Socialist Party) was a reformist nationalist organization founded by Pilsudski and others in 1892. A radical wing, the Left PPS, split away and became an independent party until it merged with the SDKPiL in 1918. Under Pilsudski's leadership the PPS moved to the right, becoming aggressively anti-Soviet after World War I. After his coup in 1926, the PPS nominally was in opposition, but did not conduct an active fight against his regime.

210. Jacobins was the popular name for members of the Society of the Friends of the Constitution who provided the leadership of the French Revolution. The left-wing Jacobins (the Mountain) were led by Robespierre and Marat; the right-wing Jacobins (the Girondists) by Brissot; and the centrists (the Plain) by Danton.

211. Maximilian Walecki (1877-193?) joined the PPS in 1895 and became a leader of the Left PPS after its split. He became a leading member of the new Polish CP in 1918, author of its programmatic platform and its representative to the Comintern.

212. Julian Leszczynski (1890-193?), originally an SDKPiL leader and then a major figure in the Polish CP, was, unlike many of his Polish colleagues, a prominent Comintern spokesman during the "third period" and the early years of the People's Front, but he too perished in the purges.

213. "Intensify the Offensive!" The Militant, August 27, 1932. The incident referred to in this article occurred in Paris on July 28, 1932, at a public meeting on the German political crisis called by the French Communist Party. Left Oppositionists had announced that they would attend and present their point of view. When they arrived, they were greeted with the remark, "You'd better make sure you've some iodine and bandages on hand." When one of the speakers, Pierre Semard, the Communist Party's general secretary, said a few words about the united front, the Oppositionists applauded. Semard then gave the order, "Throw them out!" Some fifty Stalinists assaulted the Oppositionists, kicking them in the head and stomach and beating one unconscious, and threw them out. Maurice Thorez took the floor, raised his foot demonstratively, pointed to it and said, "This is the method to deal with them." A report appeared in The Militant, August 20, 1932.

214. The Narodniki (Populists) were an organized movement of Russian intellectuals who saw the development of Russia in the lib-
eration of the peasantry and conducted their activities among them. In 1879 the movement split into two parties, one of which was led by Plekhanov, which split again, the Plekhanov group becoming Marxist while the other wing evolved into the Social Revolutionary Party.

215. **G. K. Ordzhonikidze** (1886-1937), an organizer of the Stalin faction, was later put in charge of heavy industry. Although he remained a faithful Stalinist, the circumstances around his death are still not publicly known.

216. "Three Letters to Lazar Kling." By permission of the Bund Archives of the Jewish Labor Movement, New York City. Translated for this volume by Marilyn Vogt. Parts of these letters were compiled into a question-and-answer article published under the title "On the 'Jewish Problem'" in **Class Struggle**, February 1934, and reprinted in **Leon Trotsky on the Jewish Question** (Pathfinder Press, 1970); parts were also included by Joseph Nedava in his **Trotsky and the Jews** (Jewish Publication Society of America, 1972). Lazar Kling, a journalist, had met Trotsky in New York in 1917 and in Moscow in the 1920s, where he became a sympathizer of the Left Opposition before returning to the United States. In 1932 he corresponded with Trotsky and became a member of the editorial board of **Unzer Kamf** (Our Struggle), the Jewish-language paper of the Communist League of America (1932-33); for a brief period he was also a member of the CLA. He deposited four letters from Trotsky at the Bund Archives; the fourth, dated January 28, 1934, will be found in **Writings 33-34** (second edition).

217. "Perspectives of the Upturn." **The Militant**, August 12, 1933; the postscript was printed in **Internal Bulletin**, Communist League of America, number 4, 1932.

218. **Solomon Lozovsky** (1878-1952) was in charge of the Profintern (Red International of Labor Unions). "Lozovsky's 'third period'" refers to ultraleft and adventurer policies in the union movement, Manuilsky's, to similar policies on the political arena. Lozovsky was arrested and shot on Stalin's orders during an anti-Semitic campaign.

219. **RGO** were the German initials of the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition, a small union federation organized by the German Communist Party in 1929 to compete with the ADGB (General German Trade Union Federation, also called the free trade unions), the major union federation, led by the Social Democrats. At the end of 1930 the ADGB had almost five million members, the RGO fewer than 150 thousand.

220. Leaders of the Belgian Opposition at this time were playing a leading role in a militant mine strike in Charleroi.
221. **B. J. Field** had recently been expelled from the CLA in New York, and had gone to Turkey where he offered to collaborate with Trotsky on a number of projects.

222. "A Conversation with Trotsky." *Die Linke Front* (The Left Front), December 1, 1932. Translated for this volume by Iain Fraser. An introductory note in this SAP journal stated that a member of its staff (Bergmann) had visited Trotsky in Prinkipo and prepared excerpts from their discussion. Some of the formulations attributed to Trotsky are more one-sided than those he made in his own writings at the time, but Trotsky himself certified in writing that Bergmann had caught the gist of their conversation "broadly correctly."

223. **Jakob Walcher** (1887- ) and **Paul Froelich** (1884-1953), founders of the German Communist Party, became leaders of the KPO and then leaders of the SAP, which they joined in the spring of 1932. After World War II, Walcher rejoined the Stalinists, holding posts in East Germany, while Froelich, a biographer of Rosa Luxemburg, died in West Germany.

224. **Ernst Thaelmann** (1886-1945) was the leader of the German Communist Party, its presidential candidate, and a supporter of the Comintern policies that led to Hitler's victory. Thaelmann was arrested by the Nazis in 1933, and was executed at Buchenwald in 1945. **Paul Loebe**, a Social Democrat who was president of the Reichstag, 1924-32, had been suggested by the SAP and other figures as a presidential candidate to be supported in the 1932 German election by both the Social Democrats and the Communists. The SPD preferred to support the incumbent Hindenburg, the CP ran Thaelmann, and Loebe did not run.

225. **Georg Ledebour** (1850-1947) was a German Social Democrat who opposed World War I and became a founder of the centrist Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD). He fought against entry of the USPD into the Third International in 1920 but did not rejoin the SPD with the USPD in 1922 and founded a new USPD. In 1931 he joined the SAP, where he opposed linking up with the Left Opposition. He fled to Switzerland in 1933 and died there.


227. The **Tesniaki** were a revolutionary tendency in the Bulgarian Social Democracy which took over leadership of the party in 1903 and of the Bulgarian unions later. They changed their name to the Communist Party of Bulgaria in May 1919, two months after participating in the founding congress of the Comintern.

228. **V. Kolarov** (1877-1950), a Tesniaki leader, became a member of the presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International, 1922-43, and president of the Krestintern (Peasant International), 1928-39; as a top leader of the Bulgarian government after World War II, he helped to arrange the Sofia equivalent of the Moscow trials, the Kostov purge. Georgi Dimitrov (1882-1949), Bulgarian Communist Party leader, had emigrated to Germany and was one of the defendants in the Reichstag fire trial set up by the Nazis in 1933. He was acquitted, permitted to leave Germany, became a Soviet citizen and executive secretary of the Comintern, 1934-43, and was premier of Bulgaria, 1946-49.

229. Stanislaw Lapinski was a leader of the Left PPS and the Polish CP. In 1915-16 he had collaborated with Trotsky in Paris on the antia war paper Nashe Slovo (Our Word).

230. "Fourteen Questions on Soviet Life and Morality." Liberty, January 14, 1933, where it appeared under the title "Is Soviet Russia Fit to Recognize?" This article was written during the 1932 election campaign, when recognition of the USSR was one of the campaign issues. United States recognition finally took place in November 1933, sixteen years after the revolution.

231. Nadezhda K. Krupskaya (1869-1939) was a leader of the Bolshevik Party and the companion of Lenin.

232. Leonid Krasin (1870-1926), an associate of Lenin and a leader in the 1905 revolution, served the Soviet government in important administrative and diplomatic posts, including commissar of foreign trade, 1922-24. In the interval between revolutions, he became a successful engineer.

233. The Romanov dynasty ruled Russia from 1613 to 1917.

234. "Peasant War in China and the Proletariat." The Militant, October 15, 1932. As Trotsky said in the first paragraph, the Chinese Bolshevik-Leninists were beginning to recover from severe repression by the Kuomintang government.

235. The Left Opposition manifesto on China, cosigned and co-written by Trotsky, was published in September 1930 and is reprinted in Writings 30-31.

236. Nestor Makhno (1884-1934) headed peasant bands that fought against Ukrainian reactionaries and the German occupation forces at the beginning of the civil war in Russia but by 1919 turned against the Soviets; he was finally routed in 1921.

237. Victor Chernov (1876-1952), a founder and leader of the Social Revolutionary Party (SRs), served as minister of agriculture in the Provisional Government after the February revolution, and opposed the October Revolution.

239. "From the Archives." Biuletlen Oppozitsii, numbers 29-30, September 1932. Unsigned. Translated for this volume by Iain Fraser.

240. V. V. Osinsky (1887-1938) was a leader of the Democratic Centralism opposition until 1923, then a member of the Left Opposition for a few years, and finally a supporter of the Right Opposition.

241. The Stalinists, including Molotov, had bitterly denounced Trotsky for falsifying the history of 1917 when, in his pamphlet Lessons of October (1924), Trotsky told about the disorientation of the Bolshevik Party before Lenin's return to Russia in April.

242. Nikolai N. Sukhanov (1882-1932) was a Menshevik-Internationalist during World War I and a member of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee. His book about the October Revolution was translated into English under the title The Russian Revolution 1917. He was one of the defendants in the 1931 Menshevik trial, last heard of in prison, where he complained that he had been double-crossed by the Stalinists, who had promised him that he would be released from prison after a short while in return for his "confession" at the trial.

243. A second conference of the Zimmerwald movement was held at Kienthal, Switzerland, at the end of April 1916, where Lenin's views prevailed.

244. Yakov M. Sverdlov (1885-1919), an Old Bolshevik, was in charge of the organizational work of the Bolshevik Party both during the revolution and afterwards. He served as president of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.


247. Franz von Papen (1879-1969) was a representative of the Junkers, the Prussian landed aristocracy. He was appointed chancellor of Germany by Hindenburg in June 1932 and helped Hitler rise to power by dissolving the Social Democratic government of Prussia. Replaced by Schleicher in December 1932, he became Hitler's vice-chancellor in January 1933.

248. Wang Ming (1904- ) was one of a group of Chinese students in the Soviet Union during the Chinese revolution of 1925-27. He returned to China in 1930, became the party's general secretary in 1931, and left for Moscow to become the Chinese dele-
gate to the Comintern in 1932. He continued to be a literary spokesman for Stalinist policies in China until he was stripped of all authority by Mao Tset-tung in the early 1940s. He held nominal posts in the early days of the Mao regime after 1949, but in the mid-1950s moved back to Moscow where he now lives in exile.

249. While Trotsky thought that mobilizing the masses for the war against Japanese imperialism could not be the central fighting slogan of the revolutionaries in 1932, he did put it in first place in 1937, when the second major phase of Japan's invasion of China began, and he carried on a bitter struggle against sectarians in and around the Fourth Internationalist movement who refused to support the Chinese side (see Writings 37-38).

250. Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942), a leader of the Left Opposition, was a founder and leader of the Chinese Communist Party and followed Comintern policy in the Chinese revolution. In 1929 he published a letter to the Chinese Communists announcing his support of the Left Opposition and explaining his own part in the defeat of the Chinese revolution and the part played by Stalin and Bukharin. He was imprisoned from 1932 to 1937 and his health was broken. He left the Trotskyist movement while in prison and became something of a humanist Social Democrat, but was not active in politics after his release. His last years were devoted to literary work, including an autobiography which dealt only with the years before the founding of the CP.

251. Alexander Martinov (1865-1935) was an extreme right-wing Menshevik before 1917 and an opponent of the October Revolution. He joined the Russian Communist Party in 1923, and became an opponent of Trotsky. He was a chief architect of the "bloc of four classes" in China, which sought to justify the Stalinist tactic of having the Chinese CP join the Kuomintang on the basis that the Kuomintang was a party of the "progressive" bourgeoisie.


253. Kurt Rosenfeld (1877-1943), a well-known civil-liberties lawyer, was a left-wing leader of the German Social Democracy who was expelled in 1931 and helped to found the SAP, of which he was a leader for a short time.

254. Dr. Joseph Kruk was the representative of a small group, the Independent Labor Party of Poland.

255. Frederick Adler (1879-1960) was the secretary of the Austrian Social Democratic Party from 1911 to 1916, when he assassinated the Austrian premier and was thrown in prison. Freed by the 1918 revolution, he was a founder of the Two-and-a-half International, which he led back into the Second International in 1923, becoming secretary of the amalgamated body.

256. Paul von Schoenaich (1886-1954) was a Junker naval officer turned pacifist who wrote favorable articles on the Soviet Union.
257. Vallabhbhai Patel (1877-1950) was a right-wing leader of the Indian Congress Party and became a member of the government after the proclamation of India's independence.

258. Willi Muenzenberg (1889-1940), an organizer of the Communist Youth International and a loyal Stalinist, founded a whole string of propaganda enterprises with Comintern money, including newspapers, magazines, a film company, a publishing house, etc. He continued his operations for the Comintern in Paris after 1933, until he broke with its People's Front policy in 1937. He was found dead in mysterious circumstances after the Germans invaded France.

259. Karl Liebknecht (1871-1919) was a German Social Democratic deputy in the Reichstag when World War I broke out. Although he followed SPD discipline in voting for war credits on August 4, 1914, he soon broke with the war policy and was imprisoned for antiwar activity from 1916-18. With Rosa Luxemburg, he founded the Spartakusbund, leading the November 1918 uprising with her. They were both assassinated by order of the Social Democratic government.

260. The Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) of Germany was founded in 1917 by centrist elements from the Social Democratic Party. The majority of the USPD fused with the German Communist Party in 1920. The minority continued as an independent organization adhering to the Two-and-a-half International until 1922, when it rejoined the SPD, with the exception of a small group headed by Ledebour.

261. Gaston Bergery (1892-1958), a French Radical Party politician and "friend of the Soviet Union" in the 1930s, became a founder of the People's Front in 1935. Later he turned right and served as an ambassador for Petain.

262. "Zigzags and Eclectic Nonsense." Biulleten Oppozitsii, number 31, November 1932. Translated for this volume by Tom Scott.

263. "Fifteen Years!" The Militant, November 12, 1932.

264. "The Twelfth Plenum of the Comintern." The Militant, November 5, 1932. The plenum was held in Moscow, August 27-September 15, 1932.

265. Otto Kuusinen (1891-1964) was a Finnish Social Democrat who fled to the Soviet Union after the collapse of the Finnish revolution in April 1918. He became a Stalinist spokesman and a secretary of the Comintern from 1922 to 1931.

266. The German Stalinists developed an agitation for the "national liberation" of Germany in order to compete with the Nazis as champions of German nationalism in opposition to the oppressive Versailles Treaty. Only the Nazis benefited from this competition.
267. The **Indian National Congress** was founded in 1885, but it was only after 1920, under Gandhi, that it became a mass organization of struggle against British domination. After India gained political independence in 1947, it became the major political party.


271. **Boris Souvarine** (1893- ) was a founder of the French Communist Party and one of the first biographers of Stalin. He was repelled by Stalinism in the 1920s and turned against Leninism in the 1930s. For Trotsky he was a prototype of the cynicism and defeatism that marked the renegades from Bolshevism.


273. Zinoviev and Kamenev opposed the Bolshevik decision to launch the insurrection in October 1917 and expressed their opposition publicly. For this they were almost expelled, but their violations of discipline were overlooked when the insurrection was successful.

274. **Alexander Tsiurupa** was a deputy president of the Council of People's Commissars under Lenin; in 1924, after Lenin's death, he became head of the State Planning Commission.

275. **Walter Citrine** (1887- ) was general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, 1926-46. For his services to British capitalism he was knighted in 1935 and made a baronet in 1946.

276. **Nikolai A. Uglanov**, a Stalinist who rose to high rank through his anti-Trotskyist zeal and then became a Right Oppositionist, was dropped from the Central Committee in 1930 and capitulated. Implicated in the Riutin case in 1932, he capitulated again. In the end he disappeared in the purge. **M. N. Riutin**, another leader of the anti-Trotskyist crusade in Moscow, was also removed from some of his posts in 1930 for sympathy for the Right Opposition. At the end of 1932 he was arrested and expelled from
the party for circulating a platform critical of Stalin that advocated reform, through party and constitutional channels, of the party and the economy. He was specifically charged with holding discussions with Bukharinists and Zinovievists. Agitprop, Department of Agitation and Propaganda, was set up as a department under the Secretariat of the Russian Communist Party in September 1920; its jurisdiction was expanded through the twenties to include the press and publishing houses, religion, etc.

277. Slepkov was a Bukharin supporter. Maretsky, a professor, was accused of expounding neo-Populist ideas in the university and the press.

278. Andrei Bubnov (1883-193?), an Old Bolshevik who was associated with the group of Democratic Centralism and other oppositionist groups, as early as 1923 dropped all of them and lined up with Stalin. He was a victim of the purge of the Stalinist apparatus at the end of the thirties.

279. "On Field and Weisbord." Internal Bulletin, Communist League of America, number 4, 1932. This letter was in response to one Trotsky got from the CLA National Committee that had criticized his procedure in relation to Weisbord and Field, printed in the same bulletin. After this reply was received, the National Committee said it was satisfied and was dropping the matter. Many years later James P. Cannon, then national secretary of the Socialist Workers Party, still recalled the "happy day when we got that letter," because for him it meant that in the Left Opposition the relations between national sections and the international leadership would not resemble that developed in the Comintern after Lenin ("Internationalism and the SWP," May 18, 1953, in his book Speeches to the Party, Pathfinder Press, 1973).

280. A. J. Muste (1885-1967), a Protestant minister and pacifist who became involved in the labor movement during World War I, was a founder in 1929 of the Conference for Progressive Labor Action (CPLA) to promote militancy, union democracy, and industrial unionism inside the American Federation of Labor. In 1933 the CPLA organized the American Workers Party, a centrist group moving to the left. At the end of 1934, the AWP merged with the CLA to form the Workers Party of the United States, of which Muste was secretary. In 1936, after the WPUS had voted to enter the Socialist Party, Muste broke with Marxism and returned to pacifism and the church. In the 1950s he was one of the few to defend victims of the witch-hunt and helped form the American Forum for Socialist Education to encourage systematic exchange of radical views. In the 1960s he played a leading role in building the anti-war movement.

281. "The Soviet Economy in Danger." The Militant, November 12, 19, and 26, 1932; December 3, 17, and 31, 1932; and Jan-
Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932)

uary 7, 1933; also included in a 1933 Pioneer Publishers pamphlet of the same name.

282. Sydney Webb (1859-1947) was the chief English theoretician of gradualism and a founder of the Fabian Society. He and his wife, Beatrice Potter Webb (1858-1943), coauthored numerous books on trade unionism and cooperation, one of which Lenin translated into Russian. They became apologists for Stalinism in the 1930s without ceasing to be reformists and patriots.

283. Valerian V. Kuibyshev (1888-1935), Old Bolshevik, held a variety of posts before becoming chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy in 1926, from which post he served as a leading spokesman for the Stalinist economic policies. Although he was a dedicated Stalinist, he met with a mysterious death.

284. Gregory Sokolnikov (1888-1939), another Old Bolshevik, filled diplomatic and military posts after the revolution; for a time he supported the Zinoviev opposition on the issue of the party regime. He was framed up in the second Moscow trial in 1937 and drew a prison term.

285. Eugene A. Preobrazhensky (1886-1937), a secretary of the Bolshevik Central Committee, 1920-21, wrote The New Economics in 1926, a creative analysis of the problems facing the Soviet economy. A Left Oppositionist, he was expelled from the party in 1927, readmitted in 1929, expelled again in 1931, again readmitted. His last public appearance was at the Seventeenth Congress in 1934. During the purges he refused to make a confession and was shot without a trial.

286. "Leninism and Stalinism." The Militant, April 15, 1933. When Louis Fischer's article, "Trotsky's World Revolution," appeared in Current History, September 1932, B. J. Field, who was then visiting Trotsky in Prinkipo, persuaded Trotsky to answer Fischer in the form of an interview. On October 7, 1932, Trotsky wrote a letter to Field, in which he said, "You undertake to introduce a little clarity into the question concerning the struggle between the faction of Stalin and that faction of Bolshevism to which I myself belong. It is not an easy task; the Soviet Union has fortunately many friends in the world. Not a few friends has also the Stalinist faction. . . . Your article, written with a full knowledge of the literature of the question, can undoubtedly serve to eliminate some conscious or unconscious confusion. Precisely for this reason, I give with full willingness answers to the questions which you asked me. I do not doubt that there will be some publications in America with sufficiently large political interests to give a place to your article. For my part, I will await with the greatest interest what the opponents will say concerning the inventions which you have refuted and the facts which you have established." (New International Bulletin, January 1936, in an article by Field, "Sectarianism, Centrism and Trotsky.") Field evidently was unable to place the interview with the magazines he approached, because in the end it was printed only in The Militant.
287. Louis Fischer (1896-1970) was a European correspondent for The Nation, serving chiefly in the Soviet Union, and author of several books on European politics. Trotsky viewed him as an apologist for the Stalinists.


289. Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) was the Republican president soon to be defeated in the November 1932 elections by Democrat Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1945).


291. V. F. Calverton (1900-1940), a radical writer, was editor of The Modern Monthly, which printed several articles by Trotsky until 1937, when Trotsky broke off relations because of its attitude toward the role played by Carleton Beals in the Dewey Commission hearings on the Moscow trials (see Writings 37-38).

292. Norman Thomas (1884-1969) was the Socialist Party's presidential candidate in 1928 and in the subsequent elections through 1948.

293. Walter Duranty (1884-1957) was a New York Times Moscow correspondent for years and an apologist for the Stalinist policies.

294. Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) was a major figure in the German working-class movement, establishing the General German Workers Union. His followers joined the early Marxists in founding the German Social Democracy.

295. Max Eastman (1883-1969), editor of The Masses before World War I, was an early sympathizer of the Russian Left Opposition and translator of several of Trotsky's books. His rejection of dialectical materialism in the 1920s was succeeded by his rejection of socialism in the late 1930s. He became an anti-Communist and an editor of Reader's Digest.

296. The First International (International Workingmen's Association), under the tutelage of Marx and Engels, was founded in London in 1864. Its center was moved to the United States after the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871; its last conference was held in Philadelphia in 1876.


298. "Field's Future Role." Internal Bulletin, Communist League of America, number 4, 1932. On his return to the United States, Field renewed relations with the CLA, was readmitted to membership and became a writer on economic questions for The Militant. He was expelled again early in 1934 for violating discipline during a hotel strike in New York.
299. "Stalin Again Testifies Against Stalin." Biulleten Oppozitsii, number 32, December 1932. Signed "Alpha." Translated for this volume by Tom Scott. Trotsky returned to Stalin's 1920 speech in his article, "What is Historical Objectivity?" April 1, 1933 (see Writings 32-33). He also used most of the present article for his chapter on "How the October Insurrection Actually Took Place," March 3, 1937, in the American edition of The Stalin School of Falsification.

300. Yakov Yakovlev (1896-1939), who joined the Bolshevik Party in 1913, was a chief right-wing spokesman in the Ukraine in 1918 and later an ardent supporter of Stalin against the Opposition. He, along with many other Stalinists in the apparatus, vanished during the purges.

301. The Democratic Conference, like the Preparliament which was set up by it, was an effort by the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries to find a new base of popular support outside of the Soviets after the Soviets had begun to reject them and turn toward the Bolsheviks in the weeks before the overthrow of the Provisional Government. It proved fruitless.

302. The "recollections of 1924" are Trotsky's short book which was republished in 1971 with a new translation by Tamara Deutscher under the title Lenin: Notes for a Biographer. See page 96 for Lenin's remark on the day of the insurrection.


304. The Third World Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow June-July 1921, took place after a shift in the international situation which, in the opinion of Lenin and Trotsky, required that the revolutionary movement develop defensive tactics, learn how to promote the united front, win over the ranks of the reformist and centrist organizations, etc. This put them in opposition to ultraleft currents in the Comintern, but they succeeded in winning a majority at the congress for their "right-wing" position. The March 1921 events were a series of uprisings in the central provinces of Germany in isolation from the workers in the rest of the country. The German Communist Party intervened in these uprisings and tried to carry them further than the situation allowed; their delegates at the congress hoped it would gloss over or approve their adventurist errors.

305. Marcel Cachin (1869-1958) and Louis-Olivier Frossard (1889-1946) were leaders of the French Communist Party who came from a parliamentary background in the Socialist Party; their opportunism rankled members of the French delegation at the Third Congress,
who represented the younger, more revolutionary ranks of the party.

306. **Bela Kun** (1886-1939) was a leader of the Hungarian revolution of 1919 and head of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet republic. Moving to Moscow, he became a Comintern functionary, noted for a bent toward ultraleftism. He was reportedly shot by the Stalin regime during its purge of Communist exiles in the late 1930s.

307. **M. Laporte**, who Trotsky says later became a fascist, was the leader of the French Young Communist League in 1921. In *The First Five Years of the Communist International*, Trotsky gave the following account of his exchange with Laporte: "On that occasion I asked one of our young friends [Laporte]: 'What is your opinion, should the draftees resort to armed or purely passive resistance?' And the comrade vehemently replied, 'Naturally, with revolver in hand.' He supposed that he was thus manifesting his complete agreement with the Third International; that he was thus giving the Third International the greatest revolutionary happiness and that he was fulfilling his duty by speaking as he did. He meant it quite seriously and he was unconditionally ready to fight the draft with revolver in hand. Naturally we poured a bucket of ice water over him and I believe the comrade will learn better" (volume I, p. 276).

308. The **Two-and-a-half International** (or International Association of Socialist Parties) was formed in February 1921 by centrist parties and groups that had left the Second International under pressure from the revolutionary masses. While criticizing the Second International, its leaders did not have a basically different orientation; in May 1923 they reunited with it.

309. **Georgi V. Chicherin** (1872-1936), who had been a diplomat in the czarist ministry, supported the Social Revolutionaries in the 1905 revolution and was forced to emigrate. Returning to Russia in January 1918, he became a Bolshevik, succeeding Trotsky as commissar of foreign affairs in 1918 and serving in this post until 1930.

310. **Vladimir Adoratsky** (1878-1945), an Old Bolshevik, worked in the Commissariat of Education and at the University of Kazan before replacing Ryazanov in the Marx-Engels Institute.

311. **David B. Ryazanov** (1870-1937), historian and philosopher, was a Menshevik-Internationalist during World War I and joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. He organized the Marx-Engels Institute and withdrew from political activity. But his scholarly and scrupulous attitude toward party history made him offensive to Stalin, who ordered him to be implicated with the defendants at the 1931 "Menshevik trial." He was dismissed as director of the Marx-Engels Institute and exiled to Saratov. Trotsky gives 1933 as the year of his death; others subsequently have set it as 1935 and 1938.

312. "To Greek Friends En Route to Copenhagen." **Pali Ton Takseon**, December 3, 1932. Translated for this volume by Gerry Foley. A Social Democratic student organization in Copenhagen had invited Trotsky to give a lecture on the Russian Revolution in No-
He accepted, hoping that he might get a visa for an extended period from Denmark or another country. The Danish Social Democratic government gave him a visa for only eight days. He and his party sailed from Turkey on November 14. When his ship stopped at Greek ports of call, he was denied permission to go ashore; the government's pretext was a threatened Stalinist demonstration, which did not take place. A pro-Trotsky demonstration did take place, however, at Piraeus, and another took place at night when the ship passed through the Corinthian canal. Trotsky's letter refers to the latter, when shouts—"Long live Trotsky! Long live the Commune!"—could be heard all along the canal.

313. "Press Statement at Marseilles." The New York Times, November 22, 1932. The Times' translation, which was not altogether complete, has been compared with the French original, by permission of the Harvard College Library, and corrected slightly. The French authorities intercepted Trotsky and his party on the steamship Praga shortly before it reached the harbor of Marseilles and sped them across France by car and train to Dunkirk for another ship that would take them to Denmark. By this timethe French press was in an uproar of rumor, speculation, and denunciation. The French authorities suggested that Trotsky prepare a press statement that they could give the reporters, who were angry at the government for preventing them from interviewing Trotsky.

314. Jan Frankel, a Czech Oppositionist starting in 1927, became a member of Trotsky's secretariat and guard in 1930. He was the only other witness besides Trotsky at the April 1937 hearings on the Moscow trials conducted by the Dewey Commission (see The Case of Leon Trotsky). Otto Schuessler, of Leipzig, also was known as Oskar Fischer. Holding that the Soviet Union had become fascist, he broke with the Fourth International after World War II. Pierre Frank (1906- ) was then a member of the Communist League of France, and later of the International and United Secretariats of the Fourth International. He was a secretary of Trotsky from 1932 to 1933. His brief history of the Fourth International, La Quatrième Internationale (Maspero, 1969), was serialized in English in Intercontinental Press, March 13-June 5, 1972.


316. "Press Statement on Reaching Esbjerg." By permission of the Harvard College Library. Translated for this volume by Allen Myers. This was prepared in German for Trotsky's arrival at the port of Esbjerg, Denmark.
317. "An Interview by Social-Demokraten." Intercontinental Press, October 30, 1972. Translated by David Thorstad. The interview was obtained by Henrik Rechendorf on the train that was taking Trotsky, Natalia Sedova, and their friends from Esbjerg to Copenhagen, and appeared in the November 24, 1932, issue of the Copenhagen paper Social-Demokraten.

318. "An Interview by Politiken." Intercontinental Press, October 30, 1972. Translated by David Thorstad. This interview, also held on the train trip from Esbjerg to Copenhagen, appeared in the Danish paper Politiken on November 24, 1932.

319. Johan Mowinckel (1870-1943) was the prime minister or minister of foreign affairs for most of the period between World War I and 1935.

320. Jean Jaures (1859-1914), prominent French socialist and outstanding orator, was assassinated on July 31, 1914.

321. "Radio Message to the United States." By permission of the Harvard College Library. An incomplete and overedited version of this speech was printed in The Militant, December 3, 1932. Trotsky's arrival in Denmark on November 23 was greeted by blasts from a member of the Danish royal family, the Soviet ambassador and the Danish Stalinists. His activities in Copenhagen therefore were restricted, but he made maximum political use of time there. In addition to his speech to the students on November 27, he made a radio speech and a short propaganda film as well as holding political discussions with a number of his comrades from various parts of Europe and trying to find ways of extending his visa. The speech to America, the first he had ever given in English, was transmitted over radio by the Columbia Broadcasting System.

322. Trotsky's figures for the Civil War casualties were wrong; the official estimate is almost a half a million.

323. "Questions for Communists." Translated for this volume by Patti Iiyama from a sound film. While in Copenhagen, Trotsky gave a short propaganda speech, in both French and German, which was recorded on film. The translation here is from the French version. Its objective was to reach members of the Communist parties and to pose questions that could help them to learn what the Left Opposition really stood for.

324. "To an Unknown Comrade." From The Case of Leon Trotsky, pages 274-5. A British visitor to Copenhagen, Harry Wicks, told Trotsky that he had contacts with Russians in London, and they had connections in the Soviet Union, but that they did not have the necessary confidence in him, even though they sympathized with the
Left Opposition and understood he was a member. Trotsky wrote this letter and gave it to Wicks for possible help with his work among Russians in London.

325. Franz Pfemfert (1879-1954), editor of Die Aktion (Action), 1911-32, one of the most important publications of German Expressionism, was active in the Spartakusbund, then in the KAPD, and in 1926 initiated the Spartakusbund II which was dissolved in 1927. Alexandra Ramm, his wife, translated Trotsky's works into German. Both of them were his friends, not political associates. Anton Grylewicz was a leading Oppositionist in Germany, listed in Biuletren Oppozitsii, then being published in Berlin, as its "official editor."

326. "Literary Projects and Political Considerations." By permission of the Harvard College Library. This statement for the press was translated from the French for this volume by Michael Baumann.

327. Prince Lothar von Metternich (1773-1859), Austrian minister of foreign affairs, 1809-48, organized the Holy Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Prussia in 1815, with the aim of maintaining control of Europe following the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy was formed in 1882. Counterposed to it was the Triple Entente of Britain, Russia, and France, formed in 1907. The two rival blocs maintained a balance of power in Europe up to World War I.

328. "On Students and Intellectuals." Intercontinental Press, November 13, 1972. This interview by students who had invited him to Copenhagen first appeared in the December 9, 1932, issue of the Studenterbladet. It was reprinted in the March 1937 issue of Fjerde Internationale (Fourth International), from which this translation by David Thorstad was made.

329. Philip Snowden (1864-1937), chairman of the British Independent Labour Party, 1903-06 and 1917-20, left the ILP in 1927 to join the Labour Party, which he left in 1931 when he supported MacDonald's "national unity" government.

330. "A Bolshevik-Leninist Declaration on Comrade Trotsky's Journey." Biuletren Oppozitsii, number 32, December 1932. Unsigned. Translated for this volume by Fred Buchman. Trotsky's efforts to get his visa extended gained him only an additional two days. One of the factors that worked against these efforts was the November 27 announcement in Moscow, through Tass, the Soviet press agency, that Trotsky was using his stay in Copenhagen to hold a secret "international Trotskyist conference."

331. Mikhail V. Kobetsky (1881-1937), an Old Bolshevik, in the early years after the revolution served on the Executive Committee of the Comintern; subsequently he was placed in the diplomatic ser-
vice. Alexandra M. Kollontai (1872-1952), a popular Bolshevik agitator during the 1917 revolution, supported the ultraleft Workers Opposition in the early postrevolution years; she separated from all opposition movements before the decisive struggle against the Left Opposition, and became part of the apparatus. Her first post after the revolution was commissar of social welfare. Following that, the first woman in the world to be an ambassador, she filled a series of ambassadorial posts for a quarter-century, and escaped the purge that caught practically all who had been prominent in the early days.

332. "Answers to Journalists' Questions." Biulleten Oppozitsii, number 32, December 1932. Translated for this volume by Iain Fraser.

333. "An Open Letter to Vandervelde." Biulleten Oppozitsii, number 32, December 1932. Translated for this volume by George Saunders. Another translation appeared in The Militant, January 7, 1933. When Trotsky's ship back to Turkey stopped at Antwerp, it found the harbor cordoned off by police. The incident reminded Trotsky of the time in 1922 when the noted Belgian Social Democrat Emile Vandervelde had been permitted to enter the Soviet Union to act as defense attorney for forty-seven Social Revolutionaries on trial for terrorist acts. On that occasion Vandervelde wrote an open letter to Trotsky, which had remained unanswered. Looking out at the cops on the Antwerp docks, Trotsky decided to send an open letter of his own to Vandervelde, who was now president of the Second International.

334. Under Soviet law either partner in a marriage could take the name of the other, or both could keep their own names. For citizenship requirements Trotsky had taken the name of Sedov from his wife, long before he was exiled. It was this name that appeared on his passport.

335. "A Telegram to Herriot." The Militant, January 14, 1932, in an article titled "From Istanbul to Copenhagen." When Trotsky got back to Marseilles, the police tried to ship him off immediately on an Italian freighter, contrary to other arrangements that had been made and approved. In addition to this telegram to Herriot, he sent telegrams to the French premier and his minister of the interior and the leaders of the French Communist and Socialist parties.

336. "Press Statement at Brindisi." By permission of the Harvard College Library. Translated from the French for this volume by Michael Baumann. The Italian government granted Trotsky permission to enter Italy, and the trip continued to Venice and then to the southeastern port city of Brindisi.
337. "Press Statement at Istanbul." An Associated Press dispatch from Istanbul, in the New York Times, December 12, 1932, under the title "Trotsky at Istanbul; Thanks Turks for Trip." He did not write a short book on his Copenhagen trip, as he said he would in the last sentence of this press statement; his daughter Zinaida was to commit suicide a few weeks later. And he found it more useful to turn his attention to the coming international conference of the Left Opposition, which coincided with Hitler’s victory in Germany, the event which opened an entirely new chapter in his life.


339. Oktyabr (October), a Soviet literary group formed in 1922, began publication of the monthly journal of the same name in 1924. Alexander Serafimovich (1863-1949) was a prerevolutionary writer associated with Maxim Gorky; his book, Zhelezny potok (Torrent of Iron), was published in 1924.

340. Jules Valles (1832-1885), a participant in the Paris Commune, wrote a trilogy, Jacques Vingtras, of which the third volume is I’Insurge (1886). It is now available in English as The Insurrectionist (Prentice-Hall, 1971).
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